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" 1 THE

HISTORY

GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S
ADMINISTRATION

SCINDE,

AND

CAMPAIGN IN THE CUTCHEE HILLS.

LIEUT.-GEN. SIR W. F. P. NAPIER,

WITH II APS AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

THIRD EDITION,

LONDON:

CHARLES WESTERTON,
20, ST, GEORGE'S PLACE, HYDE PARK CORNER,

185&"

. A/ 4

LIST OF APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

Beport of Kurrachee Collector on Criminal Trials under the
Ameers, page 349.

APPENDIX II.
Extracts from a Beport upon Production by C. W. Bichardson,
Esq., Deputy Collector in Scinde, 350.

APPENDIX III.
Extracts from Letters by Sir C. Napier to the Supreme Grovern-
ment about the Mullaree Biver, 352.

APPENDIX IV.
Extracts from a Letter by Sir C. Napier to Lord Ellenborough
when preparing to commence the Campaign against the
Hillmen, 353.

APPENDIX V.

Extracts from Letters by Sir C. Napier to Lord Ellenborough
and Sir H. Hardinge, touching the Mutiny and Sickness
of Troops, 360.

APPENDIX VI.

Observations by Sir C. Napier on the 6th Section of the New
Articles of "War for the Indian Army, re-introducing Cor-
poral Punishment, 364.

APPENDIX VII.

Compressed Observations on the necessity of restoring Corporal
Punishment in the Indian Army, 368.

APPENDIX VIII.

Memoranda on the Baggage of an Aj-my, addressed to Lord
Ellenborough, 377.

APPENDIX IX.
Extracts from a Letter to Lord Bipon on Prize-Money, 386.

APPENDIX X.

Extracts from a Letter to Lord Bipon on the Hill Cam-
paign, 387,

LIST OF APPENDICES.

APPENDIX XI.
Names of the Volunteers from the 13th Eegiment who scaled
the Rock of Trukkee, 389.

APPENDIX XII.
Extract of a Letter by Sir Roderick Murchison upon the Geo-
logical Specimens collected by Captain Yicary in the
Cutchee Hills during Sir 0. Napier's Campaign, 390.

APPENDIX XIII.
Letters by Sir C. Napier to the Governor of Bombay touching
Eorged and Stolen Letters published by Dr. Buist, 390.

APPENDIX XIV.
Letters from Sir C. Napier to the Governor- General relative to
Lieutenant- Colonel Outram's published Slanders, 392.

APPENDIX XV.
Extract from a Letter addressed by Sir C. Napier to the
Governor- General about Medals, 394.

APPENDIX XVI.
Letters from Sir C. Napier to the "Widow of the Ameer Noor
Mohamed — and Extracts of a Letter to the Governor-
General touching the Secret Scheme of the Ameers and
their Women, 397.

APPENDIX XVII.
Statement of General Hunter touching the Progress of the
Horse-mart at Sukkur, 398.

APPENDIX XVIII.

Observations by Captain Rathborne, Chief Collector of Scinde,
confirmed by Comments of Mr. Edwardes, Civil Magistrate
at Simla, showing one source of immense profit to the
Company by Conquest of Scinde, 400.

APPENDIX XIX.

Notes by Major Beatson on his March to blockade the Northern
Entrance of Trukkee, 403.

APPENDIX XX.

Information relative to the Resignation of the Turban by
Roostum — and Letter from Sir C. Napier to Sir Jasper
Nicholls, 411.

LIST OF PERSPECTIVE VIEWS.

V. Zuraiiee, or Liillee Defile To face Page 199

2°. Pass of Junimuck, with Encampment 201

3°. Pass of Sebree 211

4°. Pass of Goojroo 221

5°. Defile leading from Deyrah to the Murrow

Plain : 225

6°. Trukkee seen through an opening of the Outer

Screen of Bocks 226

7°. Defiles threaded by Major Beatson 22 S

8°. Head-quarter Encampment — Trukkee beyond 229
9°. Bird's-eye View of Trukkee from the Height

over the Encampment 229

10°. South Entrance to Trukkee from the Exterior. . . 230

11°. South Entrance to Trukkee from the Interior. . . 235

12°. Interior of Trukkee 236

Note. — The perspective views were drawn to illustrate Sir
C. Xapier's campaign in the Cutchee hills, by Lieutenant
Edwards, an officer on his staff. A love of art led that
gentleman to aim too much at agreeable pictures ; and the
austerity of the region has not been adequately rendered.
The defiles threaded by Major Beatson, sketched by another
officer, more truly depict the savage desolate nature of the
crags amidst which the hill men were warred down,

LIST OF TOPOGEAPHICAL PLANS.

1°. G-eneral Plan of Scinde with the Cutchee

Hills End of vol.

2°. Enlarged Plan of the Cutchee Hills with

Movements of the Troops End of vol.

3°. Hypothetical Plan of Campaign To face page 288

Note. — The rivers and streamlets marked in the Cutchee
Hills, are but beds of torrents without water, except in heavy
rain. The Teyaja alone flows continually, but at Heyrah it
was only a yard wide during the campaign, and the whole
region is inexpressibly arid.

PEEFACE.

When the History of Sir C. Napier's Conquest
of Scinde was . published, an account of his after-
administration in that country was promised as
a sequel ; hence the present work, which includes
also his campaign against the hillmen of Cutchee.
It is dedicated, as the History of the Conquest
was, to the British people, because from the people
only can support be looked for against the un-
ceasing efforts made to suppress the just claims of
a victorious general, and successful administrator,
to the applause of his countrymen. But to obtain
that support ingenuously, the man's thoughts as
well as his actions should be made known with all
integrity — wherefore his opinions of government
generally, of particular systems, and his views and
feelings on every important occasion, have been,
where the necessity of compression would admit,
recorded in his own words.

A more artful structure of composition might have
been adopted to the advantage of the writer; but
the original turn of genius, the natural temper and
unsophisticated character of Sir C. Napier could not

viii

PREFACE.

then have been presented with such naked honesty :
nor could he be in any way so successfully defended
from slanderers as by letting the reader hear him
think aloud. Many of his opinions, thus recorded,
will however be misunderstood, if taken other-
wise than as applications to the peculiar customs
and prejudices of the people he was dealing with.
He might, for example, be supposed to advocate
military in preference to civil government, if his
reasoning on that head was not entirely dependent
on the exigencies of a recent conquest over a
violent, warlike race, which was to be at once
controlled and civilized. In like manner his
objection to the employment of civil servants, if
not read with reference to the particular state of
affairs at the time, and especial reference to his
conviction, that the system of civil administration
established in India was essentially vicious as well
as inapplicable to the condition of Scinde, would
seem to imply an indiscriminate contempt for all
civil servants and all civil government. But this
would be entirely opposed to his real sentiments,
and to his practice ; for all his efforts were directed
so to use his military power as in the shortest time
to render the Scindian population fitted to receive
and willing to uphold civil institutions, of which
he laid the foundations. How he performed that
difficult task this work will show ; and also the
many obstacles opposed to his success ; for he was
not a man working with and sustained by power —
the flame of his genius burst upwards through the
official ashes heaped to keep it down. Military

PREFACE. ix

despotism had no part in his scheme of government
beyond the first necessity : and it may be here
stated as a fact honourable to both, that his
successor, Mr. Pringle, a Company's civil servant,
zealous and of a just disposition, after two years'
experience voluntarily proffered an acknowledg-
ment of the great capacity for civil government
evinced in Sir C. Napier's Scindian institutions.

NOTICE.

The author having reserved to himself the right
of giving permission to translate this work into
German, has done so, and it will be immediately
published in Germany under that authorization.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S
ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

CHAPTER I.

When Shere Mohamed, called the Lion, was defeated CHAP. i.
near Hyderabad, his vanquisher publicly declared that
another shot would not be fired. This was ridiculed as a
vain boast, but it proved a sound prediction, and well
founded on the following considerations.

A country peopled by distinct races, having different
religions and opposing interests, could not furnish either
the passions or the material means for a protracted contest
under misfortune. The Scindian proper, the cultivator of
the soil, was but an oppressed bondsman, an unarmed
slave, and the destruction of the ameers was his deliver-
ance. The Hindoos, numerous, timid, and of a faith con-
demned by Beloochee and Scindian alike, were an isolated
plundered people and sure to accept peace with protection.
The Beloochees only had an interest to prolong the war ;
for having been habitually oppressors they desired to
maintain their profitable ascendant position. But they
had lost two great battles, their treasury had been taken,
six of their princes were captives, and their political and
military organization was so shattered they could not take
the field again for regular warfare, while the diversity of
religion and interests was a sure bar to any general insur-

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. I. gent resistance. Moreover, the Belooch polity was feudal,
1843* an(^ ^s natural tendency to disunion was augmented in
Scinde, because the sirdars and chiefs owed service to
many heads, — each ameer being sovereign — and though
their princes lived in families and even in the same for-
tresses, it was in hatred, agreeing in nothing save to oppress
their subjects and turn the land they misgoverned into a
wilderness for hunting.

Mohamed, the Lion of Meerpoore, was the hardiest of the
Talpoorees, but he had been signally defeated at Hyderabad.
At Meeanee he had not fought at all, and his failing to
do so, though caused partly by the rapidity of the English
leader, resulted chiefly from a miscalculation of chances
and advantages ; for, Sobdar excepted, the ameers had
been to him always inimical, and he, thinking like all
of his race the British could not stand before the fierce
swordsmen gathered on that fatal field, moved slowly.
Victory he knew would render the other Talpoor princes
more insolently encroaching towards himself, and he re-
served his contingent force of twelve thousand warriors
entire, to influence the after-arrangements. While on the
march he heard with astonishment that the battle was lost
and the Talpoor dynasty overthrown; whereupon, falling
back to Meerpoore, he offered peace, yet insincerely and
only to gain time for collecting all his own feudatories and
rallying the fugitives from Meeanee. But though a tempo-
rary union of the tribes had taken place before that battle,
old feuds were not forgotten, and only the Lhugarees and
Nizamarees, under the leading of Ahmed Khan, the chief
who assailed the residency, joined him in mass; the others
held aloof, or came with broken numbers, for they had little
love towards him, and six thousand of their bravest were
stretched in death on the gory banks of the Fullaillee.

Great was the Lion's intrepidity to lift his standard amidst
all this carnage and terror, defying the conqueror in the
very heat and flush of victory, when by merely remaining
quiet he might have retained in safety his dominions and dig-
nity ; and had this gallant effort been made from national
feeling, the English leader would have felt it a painful duty

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

to strike the valiant prince. But the deliverance of an CHAP. I.
oppressed people, and the safety of the whole Christian
community in India, then seriously menaced by the recent
Mahometan success at Cabool, were in one and the same
scale with the interests of his country and the honour of
his army, while in the other were only gallantry and
tyranny — wherefore he smote the last ameer as he had
smitten the first, renewing the terrors of Meeanee and ren-
dering them indelible.

Shere Mohamed, thus stricken, could not become the
leader of a protracted warfare, and indeed many chiefs
and sirdars had abandoned his cause between the two
battles, proffering their salaam, or fealty, to the English
leader, who treated them so as to excite hope for the
future and stifle any lurking attachment to the fallen
dynasty ; no difficult matter ; for though it came within
the Talpoor sirdars' notions of honour to uphold the
family sovereignty while any of the princes struggled in
the field, there was no attachment of that kind between
the ameers and their feudatory chiefs. As princes
they had warred for the Talpooree dynasty, not for the
interests of the Belooch race; and the latter had as-
sembled in arms neither from personal attachment nor
from national feeling, for being recent and isolated con-
querors they had dominion without a country. They
were moved to fight by religious hatred and a desire to
maintain their power of plundering and oppressing, their
pride and cupidity being excited by the Affghan successes.
" We are braver and more numerous than the warriors
under Ackbar at Cabool 33 was their cry, u the Feringhees
at Sukkur and Kurrachee are not so many as those he
killed : no, not by half ! why then should we not destroy
them also?"

Now the battles of Meeanee and Hyderabad dissipated
all this swelling fierceness, and Sir C. Napier, judging
that having found him too strong in battle they would, if
beneficence followed victory, prefer his rule to that of the
ameers, resolved to treat them with a munificent libe-
rality. Those who submitted, soon discovered that their

b 2

sir charles napier's

CHAP. I. bravery in fight was a recommendation ; and they felt his
1843 generosity was innate, not assumed, when they saw the cap-
tive ameers, from whom nothing was to be gained, treated
with a respectful and forbearing humanity even while
their conduct was dangerous and offensive. Moreover,
the great sirdars and chieftains, those who were still in
arms and those who had submitted, were for the most
part at feud with the Lord of Meerpoore, and in a man-
ner absolved from fealty towards the other ameers by
reason of their captivity ; wherefore it was reasonable to
suppose they would, if their own possessions and dignities
were assured, make their salaams in good faith.

These considerations led the English leader to look on
the Lion as an isolated chief whose bravest followers had
fallen in battle, leaving him without material resources
for regular warfare, and without influence beyond his own
feudatories — as one also, who, notwithstanding the great-
ness of his mind, despaired of success from irregular war-
fare, because his flight had been to the desert when all his
insurrectional resources were in the Delta. For there
was his richest territory, there his most numerous
feudatories ; and the country itself was so intersected with
canals, so dotted with forts, so overspread with unhealthy
marshes, that difficulties almost insuperable at that time
would have opposed the progress of the British, more espe-
cially during the inundation which was close at hand.
To fly from such a lair was to say hope was lost, and
formed one of the many reasons which prompted the
confident assertion that the conquest of Scinde was
effected by the battle of Hyderabad so far as arms were
concerned. It was the prediction of a sagacious mind,
not an idle boast, and when the government of the country
was conferred on him, Sir C. Napier evinced the sincerity
of his conviction by proceeding at once to establish a
polity which made no distinction between the vanquished
Beloochees and the delivered races of Scindees and
Hindoos.

Having fixed notions of government, he rejected the
vulgar opinion that Indian statesmen were to be guided

ADMINISTRATION" OT SCIXDE.

by something occult and peculiar, not by great principles CHAP. I.
based on the common nature of man. Condemning the j^J"
system of the East Indian Company, he applied to that
body the poet's character of Lord Bacon, at once the
meanest greatest of mankind, and thus analyzed its policy.

"To the genius of some goyemors-general and some
military commanders, and to the constant bravery of the
troops, belongs all the greatness j to the Courts of
Direction, designated by Lord TTellesley as the ( ignomi-
nious tyrants of the East/ all the meanness. Xot that
directors have been personally less honourable than other
gentlemen, but that they are always in a false position, as
merchants ruling a vast and distant empire solely for then
private advantage. Xo man ever seeks to be a director
from mere patriotism or thirst for military glory unac-
companied by pecuniary profit ; and hence, when the
Court does send out a governor-general of great mind,
which is not often nor willingly done, it treats him as if
he were unworthy to possess power at all. This is natural.
Their objects are not alike. His will be the welfare, the
aggrandizement, the unity of a hundred and twenty millions
of people committed to his charge: theirs the obtaining
all possible profit from the labour of those people. If the
safety of their empire demands a war the directors object ;
not as it inflicts miseiy, but having personally a brief
tenure of power they dread loss of profit. This feeling
has always led them to quarrel with then best governors-
general. The merchant, unable to distinguish between
wars for self-preservation and conquest, objects to both as
lessening immediate gain j and it must be admitted that the
former has in India always involved the latter/'

{e The mercantile spirit weakens if it does not altogether
exclude noble sentiments, and the directors have always
regarded their armies with a sinister look. The bravery
and devotion of their troops, not their own commercial
skill and enterprise, have expanded then original small
settlement on the Hooghly to a mighty empire ; and yet
on every accession of territory the soldier has been treated
as unfit to govern what his sword had won ; on each new

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

acquisition a civil establishment has been fastened, incon-
gruent with the military barbarism of the people to be
governed bnt fulfilling the conditions of patronage and
profit which make the Direction an object of desire. For
those civil servants have much higher salaries and allow-
ances than the military servants have, and the proprietors'
dividends are thus lowered as the directors' patronage
becomes augmented, the true nature of the transaction
being covered by loud protestations against all wars/'

" In this manner a vicious circle of policy is completed,
and a solution furnished of that seeming paradox, that
while the instructions issued by the directors for the
government of the East have always been moderate and
opposed to aggrandizement by war, their empire has been
continually augmented by arms and little or nothing has
been effected for the welfare of the people. The truth
being, that men momentarily possessed of power at home
object to war lest it should diminish immediate profits;
but when the soldier has won new dominions the suc-
cessors of those ephemeral sovereigns hastily gather the
private advantages. They denounce war notwithstanding,
because it is easy and graceful to be philanthropic in
words ; and the topic furnishes convenient arguments for
supplanting the military by civil establishments to the
advancement of their own private family interests."

"All this is detrimental to the Company's general
interests ; for those civil servants are, with splendid
exceptions, ignorant of great principles, devoid of business
habits, and therefore wasteful of the new resources. The
more experienced men naturally abide by their old high
and lucrative offices, with the details of which they are
familiar, and decline new duties in perhaps insalubrious
localities and amongst a people with whose language and
customs they are unacquainted. Wherefore nepotism works
freely, and young, and often very incapable men, are sent
to acquire experience and fortunes at the expense of the
proprietors' dividends, by misgoverning newly conquered
territories. Unknowing how to rule even a settled
country, they have to create every branch of administra-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

tion, and must necessarily manipulate roughly, and as it CHAP. I.
were with horny hands when the nicest touch is essential Jjj^j"
— meddling arbitrarily and ignorantly with social and
financial affairs where error may give mortal offence, where
parsimony may be folly and extravagance madness."

This picture of the civil service in India has been con-
firmed by the Honourable Mr. Shore — one of the body
and well acquainted with his subject — an honest bene-
volent man, whose exposition, published in 1837, has never
been controverted ; although he has effaced the directors'
pretensions to moderation and justice, by showing that
their public instructions, so lauded for their ethics, have
invariably been neutralized by an appended provision,
that nothing was to be of force which tended to lower
dividends. Sir C. Napier, because he accepted Mr. Shore's
exposition as coinciding with his own observation, has
been called an enemy to all civil servants, and has from
many of them suffered wrong; but he only condemned
a system under which the best must misgovern, as
founded on false principles. Personally he judges the civil
service to be like all other bodies, furnishing good and bad,
clever and foolish persons ; and he has always been glad
to act with those of sound heads and honourable views,
though he refused to bend his experience of mankind to
newspaper dictation, and the narrow conceit of men who
assume that long residence in the East confers an other-
wise unattainable capacity for Indian government.

Spurning such arrogance, he remarked— " that length
of residence and sensual indulgence weakened body and
mind, and give only aptness for official details without
enlargement of ideas ; and most of those persons, gene-
ralized as ' Old Indians,' because they have worn out origin-
ally vigorous appetites and feeble minds while enjoying
large salaries and the adulation of black clerks, who do
all their duties, imagine they only know the East. Despising
and avoiding the society of the natives, they yet pretend
to know the characters of those natives, and call them-
selves the Statesmen of India! There are however
amongst those vegetations of a rank soil, men who do study

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. I. the people, who know their customs and their history,
lg43 applying minds of a high order and powerful energies to
their work ; and pre-eminent in that class are the unco-
venanted servants whose enterprise has brought them in
mature life to India — men who cannot live in luxurious
ease, and therefore the most valuable of the Company's
dependants."

That the people of India had feelings in common with
the rest of the human race the new governor thought no
fallacy, and he imagined two years might suffice to fill any
head with all the knowledge of peculiar customs necessary
for modifying general principles which nature designed it
to contain. With those notions he classed and epitomized
the character and interests of the people under his govern-
ment in the following manner.

" The money-seeking Hindoo goes about all eyes, and
with fingers supple as his conscience, robbing everybody by
subtlety as the Beloochee robs them by force. To him
the conquest must be as a feast and a blessing of grace."

"The Scindee, strong and handsome, is indolent from
the combined effect of heat and slavery ; but he has fine
natural qualities, and his bondage being of recent date he
may be reclaimed and fitted for independence — to him
also the conquest is a blessing, and it shall be my business
to make it a feast."

" The Beloochee, though fierce and habituated to acquire
property by violence, is shrewd, and has a strong though
savage sense of dignity and honour according to the
customs of his race. A combination of coercion, of re-
spectful treatment, of generosity and temptation, may
therefore bend him to better habits, without breaking the
chivalric spirit which is now his best quality. He fought
desperately for the ameers, because to fight and plunder
was his vocation ; but neither he nor his particular chief,
nor the ameers, fought from national feeling ; education
and habit have divested all three of patriotism in the
European sense. The Beloochee warrior loves his race, his
tribe, not the general community, which he regards but as
a prey and spoil. The chief's allegiance to the sovereign

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

being feudal is slight, and the more easily snapped, because CHAP. I.
the ameers, personally odious, are captives ; a consider- 1843<
ation of weight in all countries, but especially so in the
East, where the fealty is to the throne not the person."

1 f Strongest of the influences which brought the warriors
to battle was their natural fierceness, excited by unbounded
confidence of success and the hope of plundering an army
more affluent than that which had been despoiled the year
before in Afghanistan. But there was also latent fear.
For conscious of their own ferocious design to massacre
every European in Scinde, they thought the English had
discovered the project — as indeed they had — and meaned
to revenge it in kind. They had seen them in peace,
under the mask of treaties, seize Sukkur, Bukkur and
Kurrachee, and naturally concluded they would go further
in war, and either slay all the Beloochees or reduce them
to the grovelling condition they had themselves reduced
the Scindees. With men of this temper a change of
dynasty will be little regarded if their own dignities and
possessions are respected ; and as it is a desire to obtain
property, and not any abstract love of glory which impels
them to war, their contempt for industry may be abated
by the attraction of honest gains — when debarred of profit
by violence they will seek it in commerce and agriculture,
if openings are famished to them."

' ' To meet the requirements of these different races in
the present circumstances my policy must be, while fast-
ening on the country a strong military gripe, to apply all'
softening and healing measures to the vanquished race,
all protective and encouraging measures to the liberated
populations — to make strong even-handed justice be uni-
versally felt — to draw forth the abundant natural resources
of the country, and repair the terrible evils of the ameers'
misgovernment. The trading Hindoo will then attach
himself to a system which protects his calling and opens a
wider scope for its exercise. He will for his own sake give
timely intelligence of designs to restore the oppressive
yoke of the Beloochees, and the rich Banians have a won-
derful knowledge of all that is passing."

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. I. " The Scindian cultivator will not be less earnest to
1843 support a government which raises him to independence,
and encourages his labour on a grateful soil ; and he is not
deficient in strength of body or spirit to defend himself
against attempts to renew his bondage. He may also be
stirred if necessary against Belooch ascendancy through
the Kallora prince, who is alive and not without influence
over the former subjects of his family. Residing in the
Punjaub, he has claimed of me the restoration of his
dominions, offering half the revenues and magnificent pre-
sents ; but affairs not being in a state to require his inter-
ference, my reply was, ' When you can give back the lives of
my soldiers who fell in battle to dethrone the ameers,
can repay the expenses of the war and furnish a tribute,
we will negotiate/"

With these views, Sir Charles Napier, who had all his
life studied the great principles of government, and in
Cephalonia tested his theoretic convictions by successful
practice, soon framed a political edifice of which justice
and diligence were the beams and jointings. Nor did he
lose time in nice consideration of the ultimate appearance
of his work ; for he thought delay in satisfying the minds
of the Scindian and Belooch races as to their condition
under the conquest, might produce a partisan warfare more
costly and dangerous than any momentary defect in his
plan of government. Hence, while his cannon still re-
sounded on the banks of the Indus, he had made known that
all persons, whether of high or low degree, were confirmed
for the time, and would be so permanently, according to
their behaviour, in the employments they held under the
ameers ; and that all rights and possessions would be safe
from confiscation, save those of the people who contrary
to the faith of nations had assailed the residency. Then
as governor he made his proclamation of conquest, short
and decisive. "The Talpoors have been overthrown by
the British and are dethroned — Scinde belongs to them
no longer. All revenues paid to the ameers are now to
be paid to the English. Hitherto armed men have been
treated as soldiers fighting by the orders of their masters.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

From this time forward armed men assembled shall be CHAP. I.
treated as robbers and outlaws. Slavery is abolished 1843
throughout the land, and all people are invited to return
and live peaceably at their homes.-" And this well-judged
general system of conciliation was supported by a very subtle
and sagacious stroke of policy ; for finding the numerous
tenants and debtors of the ameers were influential persons,
he released them from their liabilities, observing, that
" between a ruler with a sponge and one with an iron
sceptre there would be no hesitation, and the cause of
their creditors would be permanently abandoned."

Lord Ellenborough, judging that a government spring-
ing from conquest and to be administered by the conqueror
should for a time at least be sustained by the sword, made
that of Scinde military and despotic ; and the new governor
immediately announced "that the conquest of a country
was sufficient convulsion for any people to endure, without
adding thereto abrupt innovations on their social habits ;
wherefore no avoidable change was to be made in the laws
and customs. The executive officers were only to correct
those evils which the tyrannical Belooch conquerors had
inflicted, thus teaching the people that the coming of the
British was a redemption from slavery and not a mere
change of masters."

This was a wise measure that could not have been
effected by a civil government, which must have had its own
disturbing organization with great expenses, and would
thus have planted the seeds of discontent, to grow into
insurrection, as happened afterwards in the Punjaub ; but
a despotic military government was no disturbing event,
being only the substitution of an English for a Belooch
master, with the accompaniment of justice and wisdom
instead of cruelty and oppression. The dulness of Indian offi-
cial forms was however disturbed, and severe censures were
passed by men, who blinded with going round in a political
mill, imagine there is no other road of governing and regard
vigour on great occasions as the sign of indiscretion. The
abolition of slavery, proclaimed in obedience to Lord
Ellenbor ough's orders, was condemned with peculiar vehe-

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. I. mence. " It would produce discontent — it was unwise —
1843> why vex the people with such spurious philanthropy?"

Such were the cries of men startled from their monotonous
self-sufficiency by the rustling wing of genius passing over
their official dormitories. Their opinions were not shared
by the slave-girls of the harems in Scinde, who all rushed
forth to liberty and their homes ; nor during the whole of
the subsequent administration was any resistance made, or
even a complaint uttered against the edict, though at first
infractions happened and were punished.

The new governor was very desirous < to be known to
the people as a peaceable ruler, but withheld for some time
after the battle of Hyderabad, the full action of his
authority,. because the flitting operations of the Lion gave
the robber bands in the Delta an excuse for calling them-
selves his soldiers. Hence the English leader, knowing
what force there is in a name, would not apply a corrective
until he had put down the ameer himself ; observing that
while those bands had a nominal sovereign they would have
moral strength, and using his name might raise their pre-
datory hostility to the dignity of insurrectional warfare.
Then the Lion, active and hardy, would shift his operations
to the Delta where he was most to be feared ; and where,
besides the force he could bring with him, he had four
thousand feudatories, and could rally twenty thousand
fierce Beloochee swordsmen, roving since the battles about
Scinde and ready for any mischief.

This also was the time when the factious enemies of Lord
Ellenborough at Bombay were most active to make their
foul prognostications, of evil, realities, urging the Beloo-
chees to insurrection and the sepoys to mutiny; but the
English general's resources and energy went beyond their
ken, and as they made their malignant hopes their guides
they were signally foiled. The crisis was however dan-
gerous ; for though the Delta could have been surrounded
and the Juts and Khosas — two tribes driven by the ameers'
tyranny to live as outlaws in the great desert — could have
been brought against it, a horrible war of extermination
would have ensued, and reinforcements must have been

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

drawn from India when all Lord Ellenborough's vigour CHAP. I.
could scarcely keep down insurrection there. In fine, fifty
thousand men would have been required to crush an
insurgent warfare in the Delta, and meanwhile the hill
tribes on the north-western frontier of Scinde, robbers
by vocation, would have poured down on the plains like
streams of lava.

It was this danger, lurking in the swamps of the Delta,
that had induced Sir C. Napier to brave the deadly sun of
Scinde in June, when despite of a heat which the Beloo-
chees vainly imagined no European could support he
finally crushed the Lion, and forced him to fly across the
Indus to the mountains of Kkelat, which ended the
insurrectional danger. But, as the Lion, accompanied by
the Lhugaree chief, Ahmed Khan, both having treasure,
then endeavoured to stir up the mountain Beloochee tribes
and the AfTghans of Candahar to war on Scinde, the
Bombay faction clamorously and joyfully pointed to their
efforts as certain to produce a partisan warfare which would
finally deprive the British government of the recently
conquered kingdom.

But when the Lion was driven from Scinde the dis-
orders of the Delta were corrected with martial severity and
promptitude. No longer able to call themselves the ameeiV
soldiers, they were hunted down as robbers by those very
villagers who would have joined them in arms under the
Lion's orders — so imposing is established government even
under the most revolting forms. The prisoners were
punished more or less severely at the places they had
plundered ; and those who had perpetrated murders were
hanged with labels on their breasts, bearing legends in
three languages, to the effect that they were put to death,
not for opposing the British but for killing villagers.
Amongst those executed was the murderer of Captain
Ennis, and it was the general's intention to hang the
Ameer Shadad, having full proof that he was the instigator
of that barbarous action ; but Lord Ellenborough forbade
the punishment, and that high-born ruffian and loathsome
sensualist became the cherished favourite of the Bombay

SIR CHARLES NAPIER?S

CHAP. I. faction for having cruelly murdered a sick and defenceless
1843 British officer.

While thus displaying his power and sternness against
criminals. Sir C. Napier restored to the chieftains and
sirdars who made salaam their rich swords, as he had
before restored those of the ameers. They belonged to
him of right, and their aggregate value was great, seeing
that four hundred chiefs had submitted and many others
were ready to do so ; but between gain and greatness it
was never in his nature to waver : the fiercest chief however
trembled when his weapon was restored with this stern,
though flattering admonition. " Take back your sword.
You have used it ivith honour against me, and I esteem a
brave enemy. But if forgetful of this voluntary submission
you draw it again in opposition to my government, I will
tear it from you and kill you as a dog."

All the sirdars were permitted to wear arms as a mark of
dignity, and to show the governor's confidence in them; but
their retainers were disarmed and with them the camp fol-
lowers of the army — fifteen thousand — who had taken advan-
tage of the times to commit excesses. The chiefs of tribes
on the western bank of the Indus were treated however
very warily ; for Beloochistan proper was mountainous, and
the Scindian tribes had both feuds and friendships with
those of Khelat and of the Cutchee hills. Many of the
western Scindian chiefs had not made salaam; and the
general, who was chary of pressing them as the political
agents had during the Afighan war, and with very bad
results, refrained from disarming their followers as he had
done on the eastern bank of the Indus, lest apprehension
of further innovations should produce a confederacy.
Rigorously speaking therefore only the eastern bank of
that river could be called a subdued country. But with
his usual subtle policy he effected the object of protecting
the villagers on the east from individual Belooch insolence,
by causing every Beloochee who passed the Indus from
the west to be disarmed, as if it were a process of war,
giving the spoil to his soldiers, and thus the thing passed.
However, to protect the Scindees on the western bank

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

from being plundered, he told the hill tribes, dependent CHAP. I.
and independent, that he would put all of their race to lg43<
death who passed the Indus from the west with arms ;
and if they offered violence to the Scindees on that side
he would enter their hills with fire and sword.

These were no mean proofs of resolution, for more than
twenty thousand roving swordsmen were then on the
western side ; and he dared not arm the Scindees in
defence, because strong-handed robbery had been so long
the prevailing system that every young man, almost every
boy, who could procure a sword or matchlock thought it
glorious to become a robber. His indirect policy was
however so effectual, that the country, which just before
the conquest and during the war had been overrun with
armed men spreading terror and misery, soon presented the
aspect of a peaceful community ; and that surprising result
affected men's minds and disposed them to accept the
new government with cheerfulness while they trembled at
its power.

There were also particular instances of impartial justice
which made a profound impression upon all classes. A
Parsee merchant was murdered on the highway and his
goods carried off; two armed Beloochees were tracked and
seized ; they had obeyed the orders of their chief, they said,
and the . goods were in his house. He was demanded from
his tribe and was given up ; the proofs were clear, and all
three were hanged many miles from any soldiers. This
could not have been done for a political matter, but the
general, subtle in his policy, knew the tribes would not
risk the anger of a conqueror for a mere criminal, and by
the population at large the punishment was loudly ap-
plauded with this significant remark — " The Padishaw
kills nobody for himself." And thenceforth wherever he
went the people crowded to see the "just Padishaw."

This moral contentment was aided by a superstitious
feeling, common to Beloochees and Scindees. For imme-
diately after the " murder of the Kalloras" so the epoch
of the ameers'" accession was designated by the Scindees,
while the Bombay faction called the latter " Patriarchal

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

chap. I. Princes/3 no rain fell for six years, famine was in the land,
1843. and as the Kalloras were a sacred race this drought was
judged an effect of divine wrath. But at the commence-
ment of Sir C. Napier's warfare abundance of rain fell for
many successive days, a refreshing dispensation which had
not happened for several years before, and this, being
compared with the tradition of the Kallora drought, was
viewed by both races as a sign that the ameers' time was
come and the English a favoured people. That notion,
and the steady discipline of the troops, the umemitting
activity of their chief, his manifest love of justice, his
confirming all persons in their possessions and employ-
ments, and a great reduction of taxation, with entire
suppression of the oppressive violence previously accom-
panying government exactions, created a wonderful affec-
tion for his rule. Only four months before, the people had
seen him descend on their country with all the terrors
of war, an irresistible conqueror, and already they felt him
as a peaceful legislator, striving to improve the condition
of all, whether well-wisher or enemy : wherefore they ac-
cepted his administration as the effect of a benignant fate.

His power was military and despotic, but neither harsh
nor capricious, for he put a bridle on himself by promul-
gating a formal code of regulations in judicial proceedings,
which admitted all the ordinary legal forms of the land,
with the superaddition of English revision, guided by
an honourable sense of equity and referable in all
serious cases to his own supervision — his confirmation
being essential to legal execution. And he rigidly re-
strained his own paramount power within the published
regulations, save where the absolute safety of the conquest
demanded an unusual exercise of authority. Meanwhile,
founding his policy on the idiosyncracies presented by the
three races, he endeavoured to conciliate the great
Beloochee chieftains and sirdars with a generous treat-
ment, and a respectful acceptance of their notions of
honour without reference to a European standard, which
they could not comprehend and would have submitted to
only as the imposition of a conqueror.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Always however, he restricted this to matters not CHAP. I.
affecting those below them ; for he sought not the hollow
distinction of pleasing the great and powerful with an
underworking of misery for the multitude. And knowing
the human mind is never better disposed to gratitude and
attachment than when softened by fear, his iron hand was
felt within the velvet glove, that all might know he pro-
tected their lives and fortunes from a sense of benevo-
lence, not from fear or weakness. " It will not do," he
observed, " to let their barbaric vanity gradually wipe away
the fear cast on them by the two battles." But to soothe
the pride of the chieftains and sirdars while their entire
submission was exacted, the queen's picture, covered with
a curtain from the gaze of private men and retainers, was
shown to those who made salaam; a ceremony so agree-
able that every new batch eagerly demanded to see the
" Great Padishaw's face."

Nevertheless they did not understand how a woman
could govern ; nor clearly comprehend the nature of the
governor-general's power. They knew the last was of
superior rank to the general, and thought he might, after
the eastern manner, at some time put him to death and
seize his wealth ; but judging that a difficult affair, seeing
how strong he had been in battle how entire was the
devotion of his troops, they with profound reverence
accepted him as their immediate lord. One old chief
being told of the queen's rank and power, exclaimed,
" But sahib she did not beat me at Meeanee ; you are my
king now" Another asked, "How far off is she?" So
and so. "And you are next in rank?" "No! The
governor- general is so in India." "How far off is he?"
" He is at Calcutta." " Oh 1 1 have heard of Calcutta, and
it is far off; — you are at Hyderabad. Answer me one
thing. Cannot you cut off my head?" "Yes ! if you do
not obey." " That is enough, I am your slave"

They looked on the head of the army as the head of
everything, and that alone justified Lord Ellenborough
in constituting the government a military one, and con-
fiding it entirely to the conqueror, of whom all were in

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. I. dread, and from whom therefore benefits flowed with more
1843 grace and effect. His appointment was however, a signal
for the outbreak of malignity incredibly base, and so
inveterate that it continues to this day. Emanating
originally from the council and some of the permanent
official persons of the Bombay government, it was sup-
ported by their dependent and expectant partisans, all
stung to the quick at the loss of the sinister profits in
perspective from the accession of new territory. But foul
as their own bad deeds would it be, to make this ac-
cusation without reservation or exception — there were
civilians in office who opposed and disdained this hosti-
lity, men whose honour demands respectful acknowledg-
ment, and amongst those highest in position and character
Mr. John Warden must be named.

Incessant efforts were made by this faction to render
the military government of Scinde a failure. Newspaper
organs openly, and expectant tools secretly were set to
work in England and in India to vilify the victorious
general; and they were countenanced and encouraged by
the directors and by the Board of Control under Lord
Bipon, whose injurious and offensive conduct towards Sir
C. Napier shall be exposed, because it is not fitting to re-
spect folly when it degrades authority by insulting merit.

In July Lord Ellenborough placed the Scindian govern-
ment in direct communication with the Calcutta council,
to relieve it from the interested meddling of Bombay.
The official expectants at the last place, having then no
hope either to force their way, or to sneak, into lucrative
Scindian appointments, nothing was too gross for the
polluted pens they hired to blacken Sir C. Napier and lower
his exploits. " He had not gained victories, he had slaugh-
tered some poor half-armed people who made no resist-
ance"— "Scinde was a waste of sand" — "a Golgotha,
foully and murderously obtained, a disgrace only to be
put away by restoring its patriarchal princes."

Then he was " an imbecile ruffian, delighting in car-
nage, faithless, rapacious, a liar who disgraced the army,
and stained the glorious age of Wellington." — " Why did

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

not the sepoys rise and put an end to the fellow's doings? CHAP. I.
He had brutally torn away the ornaments of the ameers5 1843>
women and dishonoured his uniform" — " Luxuriously
changing his residence to feast on the delicious pulla
fish, he was encircled by parasites who hourly promul-
gated shameless falsehoods to prop the reputation of his
ridiculous system of government, which all 'Old Indians'
knew must fail." — " He had taken the traitor Ali Moorad
to his bosom" — a traitor because he had not warred
against the British troops ! — " had loaded him with pre-
sents, had conferred on him the possessions of the plun-
dered patriarchal princes of Scinde! and was at once his
benefactor and dupe."

Foremost to predict disaster was Outram, the discarded
political agent, who announced, that forty of the younger
ameers were at large, that while they were so, continual
insurrections would disturb the English rule, and after
ten years of guerilla warfare the country must be restored
to the fallen princes — with much more of a like bald
presumptuous talk, showing the vulgar character of his
mind, which could see and exaggerate difficulties but had
no resources for overcoming them. His predictions were
echoed by most of the Indian and not a few of the London
newspapers ; and though the course of this work will show
how the touch of genius bursted these bubbles, the new
governor's labour and difficulties were much augmented
by these infamous arts of men, who with official power to
do evil had hearts and heads so gorged with malice and
falsehood that there was no room left for honour or
patriotism.

Few persons could have borne up against such a torrent
and fury of abuse, and such malignant and foul official
thwarting ; fewer still could have worked a way to order
and a fair frame of government through such a chaos ; but
the indomitable energy of Sir C. Napier may be thus
judged. He had three distinct governments to correspond
with — Calcutta, Bombay and the Board of Control — and
often from the stoppage of daks and other circum-
stances, as many as a hundred letters would arrive

c 2

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. I.

1843.

See conquest
of Scinde.

together in the midst of arduous military operations ; and
through them he had to work while acting against the
Lion, while subjugating the Delta, tranquillizing the popu-
lation, organizing the administration, and establishing
his general scheme of polity. The sun-stroke received
in the field had so debilitated him, that the medical men
urged him to quit Scinde as the only chance of life, and
Lord Ellenborough, with a rare generosity, proposed to go
in person to that country and conduct the government
there until his health was restored. That he would not
suffer, and though he could only write lying on his side —
the heat being above 132° of Fahrenheit in an artificially
cooled tent — though frequently at the point of death from
exhaustion, he with stupendous energy continued to labour
until he had reduced the evil influences of war insurrec-
tion and social confusion to placidity, and cast the foun-
dations of a new civilization.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

CHAPTER II.

Having to create all branches of administration, and CHAP. II.
reform the social system, the general's first object was to ~£
find qualified subordinates. Everything was new, there was
no guide, the land and its conditions were to be studied,
and for the civil branches of administration the choice
of men was restricted ; nevertheless, with a happy fortune,
he found what he sought in his army, and by soldier
civilians , the administration of Scinde was established
and conducted with far less expense, and more activity,
than it could have been done by civil servants.

This is not conjecture. The expenses of Outranks
political agency had been by Sir C. Napier abated sixteen
thousand pounds annually; and his own monthly con-
tingent charges varied from six and ten to one hundred
and fifty rupees, whereas Outranr's had been as much
as sixteen thousand ! Moreover certain civil servants
had been sent from Calcutta for the administration of
Upper Scinde, with a promise, as they said, of an esta-
blishment ; which in India generally means a large retinue
of clerks to do business while the heads of the depart-
ment recreate themselves. Sir C. Napier would not allow
of these clerks and called for work ; this was at
first peremptorily refused; but finally two of the gentle-
men wrote an expostulatory letter to their superior, Captain
Pope, the collector, declaring they obeyed him with dis-
gust and detestation ! Lord Ellenborough recalled them,
and a Mr. Richardson, appointed by the general, did
singly for five hundred rupees a month, and without any
disgust, the work for which they had received above two

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. ii. thousand rupees. Scinde was then left in the hands of
!843. the military men, and though in addition to their own
business the arrears of the political agency, neglected by
Outram, were to be brought up, a solid framework of
administration was soon laid, fit for immediate usage,
yet capable of receiving improvements without alteration
of the general form.

The governor, being the only visible source of power,
surrounded himself with troops that all might remember
the sword would uphold what it had won. But those
troops were also disposed with reference to the chances
of insurrectional and partisan warfare from the hill tribes,
who might be stimulated to hostility by the Talpore
princes still at large, or by their own appetite for plunder.
Affghan or Seikh invasions, events then considered veiy
likely to happen, were also contemplated, and the military
arrangements were so contrived as to meet all these chances,
and preserve internal tranquillity without affecting the
discipline and readiness of the army for active service, and
without bringing the soldiers into contact with the people
except in powerful masses : the troops thus obtained, in
addition to their real power, all the imaginary power of
the unknown, to augment the fear and wonder which
their prowess in battle had created.

This system was directly opposed to that of the political
agents, who had during the Affghan war always spread
their forces, and with a baneful result ; but it was Sir
C. Napier's fixed conviction that the civil and military
forces should be kept entirely distinct in their support
of government. "Soldiers," he said, "were instituted to
fight declared enemies, not to be watchers and punishers
of criminals ; they should be, in thought and in reality,
identified with their country's glory — the proudest of
her sons — and never employed to enforce the behests of
the civil administration until the civil power was found
too weak. A contrary system lowered the army to a
criminal police, hurt the soldiers' pride, and by dissemi-
nation and ignoble contact injured their discipline and
high feeling. It also substituted for the civil, a military

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

force too easily had recourse to, thereby abating the CHAP. II.
vigilance activity and resolution which ought to be cha- 1843
racteristics of civil power. And to these general considera-
tions he added two especial ones, of weight in Scinde,
namely, that the sepoys should be debarred from forming
too close friendships with the people, while the latter
would be saved from the domineering arrogance of soldiers
flushed with conquest; an arrogance which renders all
armies, in every foreign country where they have long
acted, whether as friends or enemies, so odious that no
policy can counteract it when once entertained.

With these views he embodied a numerous police, com-
posed chiefly of Scindians who had been so employed by
the ameers ; but the greater number had suffered in person
or family from the cruelty of those princes, and bore
towards them the hatred of emancipated slaves to cruel
masters. They were at first timid, the natural result of
oppression, and very impatient of discipline, deserting
when checked \ but by mixing with them bold adven-
turers, Patans and Rajpoots, and even some of the minor
chiefs who had fought at Meeanee ; and by giving them
a handsome uniform, and a military organization under
European officers, the necessary courage was created, and
they soon acted alone or alongside the troops on the most
dangerous services.

By degrees their numbers were increased to two thousand
five hundred, divided into three classes, namely, the city,
the rural and the mounted police. The first were for the
great towns. The other two, clothed and armed in a
different manner, were designed for the protection of the
plains j and they were to act not only against ordinary evil-
doers, but against the plundering hill tribes on the west of
the Indus, aiding the troops if the incursions called for mili-
tary operations. They protected small stations, guarded the
daks, escorted criminals and treasure, enforced executions,
relieved the soldiers from many isolated minor duties, and
formed a body of excellent guides in war. When circum-
stances called for the combined service of all the forces of
government, the rural police, finding themselves then

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. II. elevated to the dignity of soldiers, acquired greater confi-
1843. dence and courage to perform the duties imposed on them
when alone — duties which as regarded the hill tribes were
at once honourable and dangerous, being in fact partisan
warfare.

Uncontaminated by the ignoble, though necessary em-
ployment of detecting and dealing with rascal offenders in
the great towns, which belonged entirely to the city police,
the rural police soon caught the spirit of their organization,
and, finding themselves well supported by the government,
at first fell into the extreme of being too rough. Their
duty was however very trying, and especially with the
Beloochees, their recent masters ; if they had not been
haughty they would have been cowed by those fierce pas-
sionate men, and would probably have finally coalesced
secretly with them ; indeed a fear of this termination
made the general very cautious in checking them, until
the course of their duties had produced some sharp fights,
in which several were killed on both sides : but then,
knowing the feuds thus engendered would bar any
coalition, he proceeded to enforce a vigorous discipline.

While establishing this power in support of the govern-
ment and arranging his military system, he organized
the civil gradations of administration in the following
manner.

Immediately beneath himself sat a commissioner for
civil affairs, Captain Brown, the person in Scinde best
acquainted with the country. All matters relative to the
taxes and customs were referred in the first instance to
him for examination and report. His title was afterwards
changed to that of secretary to the government, but his
functions remained the same.

The whole country was divided into three great col-
lectorates or districts, namely, Sukkur, Kurrachee and
Hyderabad, and there was a separate collectorate for
customs. The first embraced all the dominions on the
right of the Indus as far south as S eh wan. The second
included all Scinde on the right bank, from Sehwan
to the coast. The third extended from the boundary of

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Ali MooracPs territory in the norths to the mouths of the CHAP. II.
Indus, and to Cutch eastward, being bounded thereby the
desert. At each station was a chief collector, having
under him three sub-collectors disposed in the most con-
venient places for superintendence and communication,
and each sub-collector had a staff of subordinates.

Every month the collectors sent statements of receipts
and expenditure to the commissioner of civil affairs, who
laid them, with his observations, before the governor,
without whose direct authority no expense could be
incurred.

At the end of each month a report was made to the
governor-general ; stating the disbursements in gross, the
receipts, the balance in hand, the average price of labour,
and cost of food for five persons, together with explana-
tions of the causes producing a variation in the balance
from one month to another. To this was appended a
memorandum upon the extent of country newly irrigated,
in square measure, the length of roads made, the public
buildings begun or finished, and the height of the waters
of the Indus.

Each station was supported by a body of police under a
European commander, and protected by a powerful mass
of regular troops, always within reach, yet only to be
employed when the police and irregulars being unable to
resist incursions the duty became a warfare.

At Hyderabad, which was at first the seat of govern-
ment, the police were under the European captain of
police, who had European lieutenants at the other stations,
the responsibility for discipline, payments and organi-
zation being as rigorous as for troops of the line.

To sustain the rural police, the irregular cavalry,
composed of men who disdained the company of persons
lower in degree, were distributed between the collectorates
and around them ; and though disposed in smaller bodies
than the regulars were still in masses.

Every branch of the physical force was thus kept
distinct ; yet combined for general purposes ; and each
was stimulated to excellence by unity of purpose and

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. II. employment. For as the city police stood between the
rural police and the more degraded of the population,, so
the rural police stood between the city police and the
irregulars, troops whose pride prevented familiarity with the
people; and all three hedged round the regulars, who were
never interrupted in their discipline by being detached on
police duties, and never degraded in their own estimation
by intercourse with criminals. Remaining in masses, they
were isolated mysterious objects of terror and respect for
an uncivilized people, who knew them only by their
terrible deeds in war. Meanwhile the police being in
constant contact with the population were forced to exert
all their energies, having however, where overpowered, the
irregular horsemen to look to for support, and finally the
regular troops, of whose strength in battle the most exag-
gerated notions had been formed.

To these gradations of authority was added another,
which Sir C. Napier indeed found in existence, but gave
to it an entirely new direction ; adapting it with a subtle
policy to his schemes for regenerating the social condition
of the people. The land of Scinde was divided into
districts of various extents and value, called kardarats,
and over each was a Kardar or headman, answering to the
cadi of the Arabians. They were nominally only allowed
to decide in small causes, and to a certain extent punish
summarily with fine and imprisonment, but in practice
they exercised power of life and death and torture ; and
though in capital cases they referred to the ameers it "was
but a form, as those princes always decided on the recorded
evidence of the kardar, who collected their land revenue
and customs, and rendered in person an account every
half-year at Hyderabad. In some districts they farmed
the customs and land-taxes, and were then generally very
harsh and oppressive, frequently fining and torturing the
miserable ryots to increase their own gains : one kardar
was said to have realized in a year fifteen hundred pounds
by fines alone.

These men had necessarily great influence with the
people; but they were from fear the slaves of the Beloochee

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

sirdar, or chief, to whose jagheer or estate their villages chap. II.
belonged, and were consequently enabled to oppress but
not to protect those under them; and like all slaves
they were venal, knavish and deceitful. Nevertheless Sir
C. Napier, true to his avowed principle of causing as little
disturbance as possible in the social relations of the people,
continued the kardars, because they were a link of order
to which the population was accustomed ; but he gave
them large salaries, to prevent any indirect taxation for
their own behoof ; and he attached them to the collector-
ates, with a warning that being thus part of and directly
responsible to the government, the continuation of their
appointments would depend upon their good beha-
viour.

If the villagers preferred just complaints against any
kardar, he was removed and otherwise punished according
to his offence. Their interests being thus bound up with
the well-being of their people and their conduct closely
watched by the officers of the collectorate they became
circumspect, and willingly served a government from which
they derived high pay without the odium and vexation of
being at once slaves and tyrants, suspected by their
masters and hated by their constituents.

This circumspection however, was not of immediate
'growth; many of the kardars, concluding the governor's
regulations were like eastern laws, to be broken by the
powerful, behaved oppressively. Prompt punishment cor-
rected this error, but the danger of such misconduct in-
duced the establishment of sub-collectors with assistants ;
and they and the officers in command of distant out-
posts received magisterial authority, that the delinquencies
of the kardars might be more readily checked. The
population was thus generally encouraged, and a heavy
blow was given to the feudal or clan system, which Sir
C. Napier designed to break down without appearing to be
an enemy ; for the kardars, no longer dependent on the
Beloochee sirdar for existence, did very soon, as was
expected, become protectors of their villages against the
injustice of the chiefs ; and were, on appeal, in rightful

SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S

CHAP. II. cases supported by the government, which thus only
1843 appeared as an arbitrator not a meddler.

The villagers had been too long enslaved and were
still too fearful of their tyrants to dare being in the wrong
at first ; and before that spirit could arise, the clan
system would, it was judged, be broken down and the
influence of regular government prevail. But if con-
trary to expectation the villagers were in the wrong, the
redress awarded the chief would attach him to a system
which protected his rights and saved him from the
employment of armed men to enforce his just demands ;
for under the ameers all was effected by violence, and the
retainers invariably exacted more than the right, im-
poverishing their employers both ways. He was thus also
saved from feuds, which in Scinde were infinite, and
virulent to an almost incredible degree.

It was noticed by the duke of Wellington that one of
the greatest dangers to the Indian empire from every new
acquisition of territory, was " the throwing out of employ-
ment and of means of subsistence, all who had previously
managed the revenue, commanded or served in the armies,
or plundered the country

This danger, peculiarly formidable in Scinde, where not
an official body but a whole race had plundered the
country, was completely obviated by the employment of
the kardars, and by the organization of a police which
attached so many loose dangerous men to the govern-
ment ; and by the still more prudent course, of preserving
the Beloochee noblemen in their possessions and folio w-
ings, under a peaceable tenure.

The system of collectorates and kardarats soon affected
the revenue favourably. The receipts, which in the first
month were not above three thousand pounds, rose in July
to above ten thousand, and many evasions and false modes
of collection were discovered ; and many false oppressive
kardars were punished. This increase during a time of
war and trouble, and when the ameers' taxation had been
reduced, proved that a great revenue could be obtained.
It was certain also to be augmented by an increasing

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

population. For already the people of Kandahar were CHAP. IT.
flocking to Shikarpoor, to enjoy the protection of a man
who so regarded and upheld justice, that men were under
him in the midst of war and conquest safer than with
others in profound peace. The Scindees, satisfied with
a little food, easily obtained, were indeed disposed to
indolence as the greatest pleasure and contrast to their
former state of forced labour; but it was foreseen and so
happened, that new wants and the example of strangers,
joined to judicious taxation and encouragement of labour,
would in time stimulate them to draw from the rich soil
beneath their feet an increasing amount of its inex-
haustible productions.

Many attempts were made at first, to impose on the
new government and ascertain the character of its chief.
One was conspicuous from the extent of its aim, and the
amusing facility with which it was disposed of and future
projects of a like nature precluded; for it was an effort to
establish a precedent which would in its effects have
caused universal confusion. The Hindoo merchants, ever
watchful to gain, and now stimulated to revenge for
the Beloochee sirdars' former oppressions, thought to get
back not only the loans forced from them under the ameers,
but compound interest on an original interest of thirty,
forty and even fifty per cent. : and to establish a ruling
precedent they first claimed from the ameers. The general
at once perceived the extent of their drift, and foreseeing
that the ameers, if referred to, would admit any claim, how-
ever false or usurious, were it only to make the English pay;
and because they would calculate, that if restored, as they
then expected to be and as the faction at Bombay gave
them hopes of being, they could reclaim all these false debts
and easily recover the money by torturing the claimants.
Wherefore seeing that a door would be thus opened to
endless false pretensions and incalculable mischief, he thus
answered the rich Banians, who put their case in the
following plausible manner. "You sahib, having con-
quered the ameers and seized their treasure are respon-
sible for their debts ; we invoke your sense of justice.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. II. To us they owe much." The sum was immense, the claim
1843 clearly a forged one ; for the ameers often took but never
borrowed, save in the way of forced loans, well understood
to be confiscations — their way being to make the rich
Banians bid as at an auction for their own noses and ears.

To have dismissed the matter at once in the exercise of
absolute power would have been easy, and without evil
consequences ; but the general, desirous to give a public
check to the concoction of such schemes in future, thus
replied. " The ameers were your friends when you lent
this money, but they were my enemies, and I never
heard of men fighting battles and risking the dangers of
war to serve their enemies. I shall therefore keep what
I have won for my government. You know that all taxes
and debts due to the ameers previous to the first battle
have been remitted; how then can I be justly called
upon to pay their creditors for money advanced before
that epoch— and advanced to enable them to make war
upon me ? Your claim is of this class, and so far from
paying, my intention is to have all loans to the ameers
examined, with a view to the infliction of a fine upon their
creditors for having assisted my enemies."

" We then are ruined, sahib — we must starve — we must
die ! "

" That," he replied, " will be very convenient ; for I am
about to construct a large cemetery and shall want bodies
to put into it — be therefore at ease, when you die I will
take you under my protection and bury you honourably \"
They laughed and the matter terminated.

The whole revenue would not have sufficed to meet such
hollow demands, but privately small claims were examined
and paid, when found just, as a matter of generosity not
of law, and this cutting of the Gordian knot was indis-
pensable, and within the rights of a conqueror, creating
neither surprise nor discontent, even with these usurers,
who could produce no proofs in support of their demands.

To the collectorates was attached the judiciary system,
that protection might march abreast with taxation. Each
collector was a superior magistrate ; the sub-collector and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

the officers commanding certain outposts were inferior CHAP. II.
magistrates, and all were restricted in authority by the jjjjjj'
following regulations.

The military magistrate was to make a preliminary
investigation, assisted by the cazi, a kind of judge-attorney,
who was to expound the Mahometan law and the customs
of the place — and as between man and man, the Maho-
metan laws are simple, clear and very just. This was
however only to aid the magistrates, who decided accord-
ing to their own equitable notions unfettered by legal
niceties ; a freedom of judgment which was given because
prompt redress and punishments in every-day occurrences
were essential to tranquillity, and to the first progress
of the government machinery ; and in the choice of
collectors regard was had to moral qualities, as well as to
abilities. Indeed all appointments, from the highest to
the lowest, were given to men who had served well in the
campaign — and all recommendations and requests from
England, whether of friends or of powerful people, were
denied. — u Those who won the land have the first right to
govern it if competent to the task," was the invariable
answer, and not until their claims were honourably satisfied
would the general look even towards his own family.

Magistrates had arbitrary power to decide in all cases
which they were competent to hear, yet they were pre-
monished to attend to the cazi, unless they doubted his
integrity, and their power was to be exercised under the
following regulations.

Where the property in litigation exceeded twenty-five
rupees the evidence was to be recorded in Persian, and no
civil suit could be entertained for any sum except on a
written petition in the same language, on the back of
which the magistrate's decree was to be recorded.

No suit involving the right of property in land was to
be judged by any save chief collectors and their immediate
assistants; and all the military magistrates were bound
to transmit to the collectors of their districts, on the first
of each month, a report of the cases decided by them
during the previous month.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. II. In the criminal jurisdiction a number of specified minor
I843" offences were left to the discretion of the assistant magis-
trates, but the more serious were for the decision of the
collector; and where the sentence was to be executed
without appeal, the maximum of punishment was six
months' ordinary imprisonment, or three months' with
hard labour ; twenty-four lashes, or a fine of one hundred
rupees : but only one of these penalties could be inflicted
for a single offence, and none of them save for offences
specified in the regulations. Where the punishment
exceeded this scale the sanction of the governor was
necessary; and when the fine passed twenty-five rupees,
or the incarceration more than one month, a record of
the case and sentence was made in the Persian language,
whereas minor causes were merely entered officially in a
book.

This system was in conformity as to the general frame-
work with the nominal laws of the country under the
ameers ; but with these appreciable improvements, — that
they were real — that the European magistrates, higher in
character and station, were less liable to be swayed by
private motives than the kardars — that their authority was
more restricted by forms, their proceedings more frequently
and rigorously revised — that their punishments were
clearly defined and all torturing and oppression prohibited.
The ameers, seeking to obtain as much revenue as possible,
were indulgent to oppressive kardars, whereas the English
ruler, seeking only to insure justice was vigilant to restrain
and inexorable to punish them. These differences were
soon widely made known, for on several occasions, kardars
convicted of oppression were degraded and punished in
the presence of the people they had wronged.

In capital cases the proceedings were entirely different.
The magistrate had to take down the evidence in writing,
and transmit it to the judge-advocate-general of Scinde —
Captain Young, a qualified person and of great justice and
industry — who had been appointed by Lord Ellenborough
at the request of Sir Charles Napier. That functionary,
after due examination, placed the record before the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

governor, with his own observations upon the legal and CHAP. II.
equitable points, and the latter imposed upon himself the 1843
enormous labour of analyzing, in conjunction with the
government secretary, every document of this nature,
before he even affixed his order for a military commission
to try the accused.

Trials were conducted under rules, having for aim to
elicit the truth without a slavish adherence to lawyers'
dicta, and the minutes were laid before the governor by the
judge-advocate-general, with an opinion as to the proceed-
ings, finding and sentence ; whereupon the former again
went through the case before decreeing execution. He
never augmented punishment, or inflicted it of his own
authority, though that was unlimited ; for he could put
men to death without responsibility, save to his conscience
and public opinion ; but conscious of the weakness of
human nature when invested with unrestricted power, he
voluntarily created these checks, and entailed upon him-
self these oppressive examinations, without evading, or
shrinking from them, during the whole of his government.
Whether in peace or war in quarters, or in the field, no
serious sentence was executed without his having previously
made himself master of the case, and duly reflected upon
what justice and policy required.

This union of legislation, judgment and execution, was
undoubtedly the essence of despotism ; but though lean-
ing theoretically to the doctrine which opposes all capital
punishment, Sir C. Napier thought the arguments in
favour of that doctrine were only applicable to a high-
wrought state of society, which furnished so many other
modes of repression for crime. " They who adhered to it
in Scinde," he said, "would soon be thrown into the
Indus" — " Beccaria and Livingstone would find it hard to
rule Beloochees without capital punishment."

Death however he inflicted only for murder ; a restric-
tion which did not prevent his rule being at first more
stern and life-taking than comported with his natural
benevolence ; giving him constant care and anxiety, which
combined with other vexations affected his health. For

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. II. the habits of the Beloochee race had been so barbarous,
jj^J their customs so ferocious, and the worst examples of
cruelty and all odious vices had been so constantly given
by the ameers, that a general depravity of feeling pre-
vailed and could only be corrected by fear. Torture,
and mutilations worse than death were common punish-
ments, applied not only by the ameers but by their nobles,
and even by the kardars of villages. Child-murder, espe-
cially of females, was so common as to be the rule not the
exception, and was indeed with them no crime. Whenever
a woman was guilty of infidelity, or even suspected — and
that suspicion was excited by trifles, and often pretended
from interested views — one man would hold her up by the
hair while another hewed her piecemeal with a sword. To
kill women on any pretext was a right assumed by every
Beloochee, and they could not understand why they were
to be debarred.

A man had been condemned for murdering his wife ;
his chief sued the general for pardon. " No ! I will hang
him." " What ! you will hang a man for only killing his
wife ! " " Yes ! She had done no wrong." " Wrong !
No! but he was angry! why should he not kill her?"
"Well, I am angry, why should not I kill him?" This
conviction of their right to murder women was so
strong and their belief in fatalism was so firm, that many
executions took place ere the practice could be even
checked ; but, finding the general as resolute to hang as
they were to murder, the tendency after a time abated,
and to use his significant phrase "the gallows began to
overbalance Mahomet and predestination." They were
however a stubborn race, and their contempt of death may
be judged of by the following anecdote, chosen rather for
its forcible portraiture than its singularity as to the indif-
ference displayed. A Beloochee condemned for murder
walked to execution conversing with calmness on the
road; when turned off the rope broke and he fell, but
started up instantly and with inexpressible coolness said
" Accidents will happen in despite of care ! try again /"
Sir C. Napier classed under the head of slavery, the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

dragging young girls from their homes for the harems CHAP. II.
of the great; and often he rejoiced at being the instru-
ment of Providence to suppress the cruelty exercised
towards women, though to do so, he was forced to wield
the sword so terribly in battle and give the axe of justice
such a sweep ; but the feeling respecting the non-right of
women and children to their existence and freedom
demanded the sternest repression; for the examples of
unmitigated cruelty and debauchery given by the nu-
merous ameers, had a wide currency which sharp justice
only could counteract. From that painful duty he did
not shrink; but his repugnance to take life acted strongly
in confirmation of his conscientious resolve to spare him-
self no labour in the examination of all judicial matters —
five or six hours' sleep in the twenty-four was his only
relaxation from care, and that not always permitted.

He also put down the practice of suttees, which how-
ever was rare in Scinde, by a process entirely character-
istic. For judging the real cause of these immolations to
be the profit derived by the priests, and hearing of an
intended burning, he made it known that he would stop
the sacrifice. The priests said it was a religious rite which
must not be meddled with — that all nations had customs
which should be respected and this was a very sacred one.
The general affecting to be struck with the argument
replied. " Be it so. This burning of widows is your cus-
tom ; prepare the funeral pile. But my nation has also
a custom. When men burn women alive we hang them,
and confiscate all their property. My carpenters shall
therefore erect gibbets on which to hang all concerned
when the widow is consumed. Let us all act according to
national customs !" No suttee took place then or after-
wards.

Even-handed justice was naturally offensive in a certain
measure to the Beloochee race, whose long-exercised
supremacy was thus broken down ; but they had expected
a cruel overbearing master in their conqueror, and finding
him the reverse, resigned themselves with eastern quietude
to their " kismet" or fate ; and brutal as they were in

d 2

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. II. many ways,, their faults were more those of education and
1843 false pride than any innate depravity: nature had not
given them such fine persons without corresponding qua-
lities of mind, and to their chivalric notions the general
diligently appealed, adding a soothing flattery, and opening
new views of self-interest.

All the land in Scinde belonged to the state, and
grants of it, called jagheers, were made by the ameers
on the feudal tenure of bringing so many swords and
shields into the field when the prince called for them.
These jagheers could always be resumed, and the smaller
jagheerdars were liable to constant capricious removals
from one estate to another, the ameers invariably seeking
profit by the change. But the tenures of all were very
uncertain, seeing that their masters, acknowledging no
law but their own will, or fears, watched eagerly to re-
sume jagheers whenever a favourite was to be endowed
or a spirited man crushed. Even the greatest chiefs were
at times dispossessed, and with the possessions of the
chiefs went those of all his personal followers. Then he
would take shield and matchlock, to live by plunder ; and
so long as he abstained from the ameer s' private estates
and money, he was free to rob all others if his hand was
strong.

Inconceivable as this may be to civilized men, it was the
custom in Scinde ; and one of those customs which must
have dissolved the ameers' power, or rather the whole
frame of society in a short time, if the conquest had not
interfered. It had already taken a singular social form.
To rob an unprotected stranger was a matter of course, and
the exacting of black-mail, after the manner of the Scotch
Highlanders, was also established ; but in Scinde, a run-
ning account was kept on the following curious basis. If
two tribes were at feud and one found the balance of loss
in cattle or goods against it, the overplus was charged
to some weaker tribe, upon whom a foray was made to
enforce this strange debt. Yet social intercourse was not
broken thereby; the robbed men, with a civil salaam,
and pretending to know nothing of the act, asked the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

robbers to aid them in spoiling a third tribe to the same CHAP. II.
extent, and thus a species of poor-law was enforced by 1843
arms.

Change of jagheers, and often entire deprivation, had
been very frequent under the ameers, and upon that
uncertainty of possession the English general founded his
main resource for attaching the Beloochees to his rule,,
without lowering their dignity or reducing their imme-
diate follower s5 means of existence. England he told
them neither wanted nor would have the aid of warriors
on the feudal system, her regular army was sufficient, as
they had learned to their cost ; hence no service of sword
and shield could repurchase their jagheers, which were all
forfeited by the conquest. Nevertheless he would restore
them, with this condition — that when any public work
was in progress through their jagheer, each jagheerdar
was to provide labourers with mattock and spade in the
same proportion as he had before been bound to provide
warriors with matchlock and sword ; and it was his design
to commence such works as would enhance the value of
their possessions. This was assented to, and thus another
sap was laid to the feudal system without being discovered.
For he did not deceive himself in supposing that the great
men, thus made permanent landholders, would accept
Scinde from his hands as a country, instead of from the
ameers as a spoil.

These measures being taken with the powerful classes,
it remained to improve the condition of the people at large,
and to draw forth the resources of the subdued land —
a land so rich by nature that it was said " it might be
tilled with a man's nails." The general aspect presented
great leading features which served as guides for the
fixture action of administration. First of these was the
Indus, with its periodical inundations, which, like that of
the Nile, was at war with the desert, and the cause of all
fertility ; but though capable of being made in time
the great artery of commerce with the Punjaub and the
nations of Central Asia, the aid of art was required, and
expenses which should be the consequences rather than

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

chap. II. the exciters of commerce. It was of varying depths,,
1843f capricious in changing its bed, and subject to whirlpools
of such extraordinary violence as to turn even a steamer
round with amazing velocity. It would not suffer build-
ings near its stream. " I have/' said the general, " seen
from the deck of a steamer as much as half an acre of the
bank carried away at once." The navigation also required
boats of a peculiar construction, and there were no perma-
nently accessible ports at the different mouths — Kurrachee
was forty miles from the nearest navigable branch of the
river, and, though the best port of Scinde, was very in-
convenient at all times, and in the monsoons nearly
unapproachable.

From river commerce therefore Sir C. Napier expected
little advantage, until Sukkur and Kurrachee should
become populous ; and for the moment he looked only to
assuage the most prominent dimculties, leaving to time
and the enterprise of merchants, the development of the
great commerce which he foresaw would finally spring up,
if not repressed by bad government and wars. Never-
theless, in anticipation, he thus early meditated a great
scheme of river police to be continued by the khan of
Bhawalpore, which would secure trade for hundreds of
miles up the Indus, and render Kurrachee an emporium.
Meanwhile the value of the Indus for interior traffic, and
for its influence on agriculture attracted his immediate
attention, and the engineers who were employed to take
the levels found the bed of the river above the plane of
the surrounding country ; wherefore it was apparent that
scientific operations, which were immediately set on foot,
would, with no great expense, control and regulate the
irrigation of the land and be productive of immense
wealth and prosperity.

Next to the river came the mountains and the desert
for consideration. The Hala range, bounding Scinde on
the west, touched the Indus at Sehwan, but receded below
and above that point, so as to leave wide extents of fertile
country, of which the northern was the richest and most
important. It was the most exposed also to the plunder-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCIXDE.

iiig excursions of the kill and mountain tribes, and hence CHAP. II.
protection by arms and administration was more needed 1843<
than peaceful works on that side.

On the east Scinde was bounded by the Thur or great
desert, which only left a narrow strip of land between it
and the river, and continually advanced where not re-
pressed by the hand of man ; but between absolute waste
and absolute fertility, there was a line ten or twelve miles
broad and nearly four hundred long, which partook of
both characters, and could by artificial means be restored
to the latter. Moreover, during his march to Emaumghur,
Sir C. Napier had discovered, what no European had before
known, that a range of fertile hills with rich woods was
to be found on this neutral ground, lining the west bank
of the Narra river, which fended off the naked waste of
sand.

This Narra, whether a natural channel or entirely arti-
ficial, had at one time run near Omercote in the desert,
and it was thought — if re-opened — that it would restore a
great track to agriculture — the newly-discovered hills
would then furnish a retreat and shelter from the raging
heat to a population settled there. A corps of surveying
engineers was obtained from Lord Ellenborough to examine
and report on the practicability of this great scheme,
and with a benevolent elation of mind at the prospect,
Sir C. Napier exclaimed. " If I can restore this immense
Mesopotamian plain to cultivation I shall do much for the
people of this great country, to which I have done no
injury, no wrong, and I shall laugh at the cant of c Fallen
Princes' 93

South of Hyderabad was the Delta of the Indus,
naturally the richest portion of Scinde, but the most
intricate, the most insalubrious, and, because of these
things and the wild character of the population, the most
chfncult to govern. All ameliorations there required great
caution, lest discontent should render it a Scindian
La Vendee.

Such was the general aspect of the country, and it
brought conviction, that the first and greatest efforts for

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. ii. the general welfare must be directed to encourage agri-
1843> culture and small trading, by laws, by public works, and
an improved system of irrigation which should give full
effect to the annual inundations. River commerce could
only be a secondary consideration, though not to be
neglected ; but it was foreseen that internal and external
trading — then principally carried on by caravans — would
augment when the vexatious restrictions of the ameers
were exchanged for facilities and encouragement, which
would lead to the use of the river, and ultimately develop
the great resources and advantages of Scinde. In fine,
Sir C. Napier's view of the matter was thus laconically
expressed. " Control the robbers. Control the waters.
Open the communications, and the natural richness of
the land and the variety of produce ivill do all the
rest."

There was however a strange obstacle to be overcome —
scarcely could a handicraftsman be found ! The ameers
and sirdars in their short-sighted tyranny had laid that
branch of industry waste ! They forced carpenters, smiths,
builders and other artisans to work for low, or rather
nominal wages — seeing that half their scanty earnings
were taken as a tax for license to work at all ; and of the
other half a moiety went to the collector as a present. If
the starving workman was importunate, or that his work
did not give satisfaction, he was assailed with blows, or
suffered the loss of nose or ears; wherefore, knowing
that, unlike the poor serf who tilled the soil, they could
gain bread in other countries, the artisans gradually aban-
doned Scinde, and those who remained were hard to find,
and so few that even a small house could not be built.

This was an obstacle severely affecting the welfare of
the troops, for whom it was the genera? s anxious desire
to provide good barracks — having in every quarter of the
globe seen that bad barracks were a powerful cause of
crime and death and general unhealthiness with British
soldiers. Everywhere he had found them inconveniently
planned, ill situated, and exhibiting the extravagance, the
negligence and criminal indifference in the authorities

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

to the lives and morals of the troops. Hence one of his CHAP. n.
first objects was the construction of barracks, which should 1843
give the soldiers a fair chance of health. This want of
artisans stopped him short in that and other public works ;
but to remedy the evil he proclaimed in Scinde and the
neighbouring countries his need, inviting craftsmen of all
kinds, with assurance of employment at high wages. His
reputation for good faith soon brought many, and their
demands were, at first, as he expected, exorbitant, exceeding
in the proportion of ten to one the wages under the
ameers. The English community then took alarm, and
many persons proposed, according to Indian notions, that
a maximum should be established. To this a deaf ear
was turned as being unjust and financially impolitic ; and
because a few years' experience of such social protec-
tion would give the Scindians spirit, if the country were
given back to the ameers, to resist the oppressions of those
tyrants, and thus mankind would be benefited.

There were however strange notions of political eco-
nomy afloat. An official person wished to compel the
fishermen on the coast to drag for pearl oysters in despite
of their objection that few pearls were to be got at that
season, and as they were only paid for the number they
obtained their families would starve, whereas by fishing
for sharks they could support themselves.

" Are we here," the general asked, " to protect the poor
or to rob the people of the land?"

" To protect the poor."

" Do you call forcing them to labour for the govern-
ment and starving some twenty families protection?"

"But they won't starve, they acknowledge they can
get pearls."

"Would they fish for sharks if they could get more
money by dragging up pearls ?"

" No, I suppose not, but the revenue will suffer."

" Have we any right to prevent them winning their
bread as they think best themselves ?"

" No." So the matter ended.

This liberal policy was successful ; the remuneration for

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. II. labour gradually found its level; a high one, but that was an
1843 effect of previous oppression ; and it was within the general's
views to encourage industry at the expense of luxury.

In September the administration was arranged in all
its branches, and Sir Charles Napier, whose bodily powers
were then nearly expended, transferred his quarters to
Kurrachee ; partly to recover his strength, principally
because it was more suitable for the seat of government,
being the key of the country politically, militarily, and
commercially. But previous to describing his government
when in full activity, a general recapitulation of what he
had achieved since his entrance into the country will not
be misplaced.

In October 1842, the political and military affairs of
Scinde had been placed in his hands at a crisis of great
danger, when the disasters in Afghanistan had shaken
the British Indian empire to its centre ; he was a stranger
to the people and the country, and ill seconded by some
of the political agents, yet in three months he had laid
open the hostile designs and intrigues of the ameers, had
broken their combinations and forced those of Upper
Scinde, when on the point of assailing his troops at an
inconvenient moment, to fly to Lower Scinde without a
sword-stroke. At the same time he detached Ali Moorad
the most powerful of them from the family alliance, and
made him a firm ally.

In January 1843, he marched into the desert and
destroyed the fortress of Emaumghur, thought by the
Beloochees to be impregnable.

On the 17th of February, with less than two thousand
fighting men he defeated thirty-five thousand Beloochee
warriors, killing nearly six thousand in a battle of four
hours' duration — which gave him the strong fortress of
Hyderabad and six sovereign ameers as prisoners.

During the remainder of February and the first three
weeks of March, he constructed an intrenched camp,
and a fort to protect his steamers, while he maintained a
very dangerous position with unsurpassed resolution in the
face of thirty thousand fresh enemies.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

On the 21st of March, he with five thousand men CHAP. II.
defeated twenty-six thousand strongly intrenched under
the Lion at Dubba, in a battle of three hours 3 duration, in
which five thousand Beloochees were killed — and then with
matchless activity reducing the fortified towns of Meerpoor
on the edge and of Omercote in the heart of the desert, he
regained Hyderabad on the 8th of April, before the inun-
dation of the Indus could break up his communications.

During the remainder of April and in May he repaired
the fortress of Aliar-ka-Tanda ; strengthened Meerpoor;
digested and proclaimed the principles and plan of his
government, and partly by menace, partly by clemency,
brought four hundred of the great sirdars and chiefs of
tribes to submit. Meanwhile, keeping the plundering
bands of the Delta in check, he organized a steamboat
expedition to re-open his communications up the Indus,
which had been intercepted by the tribes from the west ;
and at the same time arranged an immense combination
of troops, from posts hundreds of miles apart, to crush the
Lion, who had not only raised another army but prepared
the conquered Beloochees about Hyderabad for a general
insurrection.

Early in June, though the mercury stood at 132° of
. Fahrenheit in an artificially- cooled tent, he marched from
Hyderabad, and having by a dexterous stroke of policy
prevented the breaking out of the general insurrection, on
the 8th entirely crushed the Lion. While thus employed
a sun-stroke reduced him to the last degree of bodily
weakness, yet in this state he entirely suppressed the dis-
turbances of the Delta, completed the organization of
his government, and brought the country to a state of
general tranquillity.

In September, the labour endured, coupled with the
effects of the sun-stroke, had so affected his health, that
the medical men told him he must go to Kurrachee
and quit work or prepare to quit life and work together.
Work he would not abandon, but consented to try Kurra-
chee, and arrived. there just ten months after he had first
set foot on shore the year before, having in that time

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. II. achieved the conquest of a great kingdom, and organized
1843 the government of a numerous people, already taught to
regard him as a just ruler.

But now the Bombay faction, those persons who had
been constantly denouncing him, and continued to
denounce him to the world as a man of unmitigated
ferocity, pretended alarm for the consequences of his
conciliating system of government. — " He was encouraging
and trusting men who were unworthy of trust " — "The
Belooch chiefs were deceiving and would betray him"
— " Shere Mohamed was arousing all Beloochistan for
war " — " conciliatory measures were weakness, and would
produce mischief." Sir George Arthur, the governor of
Bombay, was fortunately so far influenced by these asser-
tions as to allude to them in his letters, which elicited the
following reply, shaking the flimsy texture of woven folly
to pieces, and showing the power with which the land was
held.

" Shere Mohamed has gone to Kandahar, leaving his
family behind ; from which it would seem that he means
to return. Meanwhile he is his own ambassador; and a
king who is his own ambassador is also a beggar, and not
much to be feared. We are friends with the great chiefs
of Scinde, and will, I hope, continue so. Those who .
croak should say what they fear. Suppose the chiefs
should prove traitors ! Have I not got my troops in
hand, and in masses ? They are not scattered in feeble
detachments, they cannot be cut off. Are not my maga-
zines full ? Do I not maintain discipline ? Have I not
repaired all fortified places that ought to be defended,
and thrown up new works everywhere that they are likely
to be required ? In what point then am I careless ; and,
unless that be shown, where is the mischief of con-
ciliation ? If the whole country were in arms I could do
no more than I do now. I am ready to encounter fifty
thousand enemies by merely sounding a bugle. I am
indeed but half-prepared against climate, but that I cannot
help. I cannot make workmen labour as I wish, and
were I to punish these wild fellows they would disappear."

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

CHAPTER III.

At Kurrachee Sir C. Napier opened his administration CHAP. III.
with a careful examination of the collectors' and engineers'
reports, relative to the state of the people under the ameers
and the prospects of Scinde under an ameliorated system.
It then appeared how terrible a scourge is bad government,
how wide it spreads, how deep it penetrates ; how infinitely
more devastating and dreadful it is than war, which is
generally but a transient blast, exciting the highest ener-
gies of man as it passes, and consequently leaving behind
it the vigour necessary to repair its evil effects. Nor are
those effects so far as agriculture is concerned very lasting,
or the plains watered by the Po, and those through which
the Scheld passes, which have for centuries been the
battle-fields of Europe, would not exhibit, as they do and
always have done, the highest cultivation.

In war also, when not too prolonged, the dignity of
women gains most, because they are of necessity imbued
with high and serious thoughts, and the passions excited
tend in both sexes to exalt the imagination and forbid the
access of baseness. National not civil warfare however it
must be, for the last belongs to bad government, and must
be reckoned among its dreadful consequences. In Scinde
the unmitigated evils of such government were exhibited
in shocking characters ; and it was for the conqueror, the
man of war, to remedy them. They were indeed such and
so deep-seated, that only a conqueror could arrest their
rapid progress towards entire desolation.

The land, as before noticed, belonged entirely to
the state, and the ameers raised the chief part of their

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. ill. revenue from it ; exacting their dues with shocking
1843. cruelty — mutilations and tortures. Nominally the sove-
reign's exaction was but half, yet various minor oppressions
made the land-tax upon the ryots amount to two-thirds,
or more, of the gross produce. It was levied also capri-
ciously, and at some places in money, but generally in
kind, the realizing money upon which gave rise to new
exactions and oppressions.

Under the Kalloras the ryots had hereditary tenures,
which gave them an interest in the soil ; and always Scinde,
from its natural fertility, when tolerably governed, had
been a rich and productive country. The ameers, seeking
only personal profit, broke all the ancient tenures, rendered
the husbandman a mere slave, and turned nearly a fourth
of the finest land into hunting wildernesses. They gave
still greater tracts of equal fertility, as jagheers, to indolent,
careless Beloochee chiefs, who cultivated scarcely a tithe,
caring for nothing beyond their immediate ease and feudal
dignity.

But those jagheerdars were themselves subject to heavy
oppressions, and the greatest could not get from their
jagheers an amount equal to that obtained by the ameers
on government lands ; while the minor ones, from inability,
or neglect to provide water-courses, indispensable to
fertility in Scinde, often found it impossible to collect half
that amount : hence their turbulent urging of wars
between the ameers to obtain plunder and pay. Their
daughters were excluded from inheritance; their sons
were only accepted when supposed intelligent enough,
and willing, to forward the paramount interests of the
ameers : and they had on such occasions to make great
presents.

The grain taken for the land-tax was sold by the ameers
to their subjects, and often they forced their umbardars or
corn-factors, generally Hindoos, to take it at a price fixed
by their own authority — thus in 1842-3 Musseer Khan
compelled his umbardars to purchase rice in the husk at
twenty-six rupees, though they could only obtain from
eighteen to twenty rupees for it when cleaned.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Irrigation being the sole source of fertility in Scinde, CHAP. III.
the ameers were driven by necessity to foster it, and they 1843>
increased the number of canals cut by former governments
for extending the waters of the Indus to inland parts
during the periodical inundations. They were partially
cleaned once a year at the government expense ; which
was however small on the whole matter, because the
greatest part of the country was a dead level below the
water-line of the flood. Where it was more elevated the
Persian water-wheel was used. For this indispensable,
self-interested, aid to agriculture one-half, in some cases
two-fifths of the produce was levied on the jagheerdars,
according to the method of irrigation employed — the
highest tax being where new canals had been cut. But
those proportions and all others were nominal, the mode
of ascertaining the government share varied under every
ameer, and even varied under the same ameer.

One was the " buttaee " system, or taking the govern-
ment share in kind on the gross produce when harvested.
Another, called the " kasgee," was by estimating the value
of the growing crops, the kardars fixing the government
share, which the cultivator was bound to deliver to the
ameer's corn-factor thrashed and winnowed. A third
mode, called the " danbundee" varied only from the
kasgee in this ; the value of the growing crops was in the
latter made after measurement of the land — in the for-
mer by a mere inspection. Both were preferred by the
ryot to the buttaee, because under that many impositions
were superadded ; such as the maintenance of the govern-
ment " chokedar," who guarded the crops while ripening —
and the feeding and feeing of many retainers of the kardar,
while the latter was making the buttaee. The mode also
was often varied at the caprices of ameers and kardars;
and the ryots were frequently charged with head-money,
and the expense of carrying the government grain to the
stores. When, as often happened, the ryot had not seed
left for his next year's crops he was forced to buy back his
own grain at enhanced prices from the ameers.

These oppressions had caused the abandonment of great

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. III. districts of good land, and two tribes, the Juts and Khosas,
1843. tad gone off bodily to the desert to live by the strong hand.

Throughout the country cultivation was withering away,
and the ryot passed a life of hopeless wretchedness, while
the handicraftsmen nearly disappeared altogether.

Nor were the manufacturers and tradespeople better
treated, though the extreme subtilty of the Hindoo trader
gave him some protection. In times not remote, Scinde
had been celebrated for its cotton fabrics and shawls.
Tattah a town near the lower Indus, was the chief seat
of this industry and was then rich and populous : it was
now desolate, and the whole country for forty miles was
a waste ! At Tattah also was found a man who had been
shut up twenty-six years in a small cage and become
idiotic. It was said, that having committed some crime,
the ameers made his family responsible for him, and in
terror this method of security was adopted. But the
ameers' condemnation as rulers is not to be taken from
isolated cases, it was written on the broad surface of the
waste around Tattah in unmistakeable language. There
was the fair sheet of fertile land, spread out by the Almighty,
and upon it those men had scrawled in horrid characters,
desolation ! For miles beyond the precincts of the shrunken
ruined city, the plain was covered with tombs of fine
cut stone, showing the numbers and riches of the olden
people, who had been succeeded by the scanty squalid
population now burthening the shrivelled agricultural
resources. Brutal government only could be assigned for
this change. The ameers had crushed agriculture on land,
and on the water had nearly annihilated traffic by vexa-
tious and oppressive imports and transit duties; a few
years more and the whole country would have become a
howling wilderness, and the tyranny which had thus over-
whelmed a community of a million of human beings with
misery, in a land fertile enough to subsist ten millions in
comfort, would have dissolved of itself. No modern war
ever did, or could produce such devastation, such ruin as
this; and the Scindian conquest, so foully decried by
interested calumniators, was a providential interference to

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

restore civilization and bring hope to the hearts of a CHAP. III.
despairing people. 1843

Although far from having the pestilent climate attri-
buted to it by those who were not allowed to plunder its
revenues, Scinde has very unwholesome localities and
sickly seasons, caused by the vehement heat, the marshes
left by the inundation, the malaria produced by the exten-
sive hunting-jungles, and vast tracts of fertile land left
uncultivated by the wretched Scindees who were unable
to sustain the oppression of their Beloochee masters. But
there are many places exceedingly salubrious ; Kurrachee
is especially so; and good government with extended
cultivation would certainly again render Scinde as healthy
as in the days when it supported great cities and teemed
with riches. To confer that good government, to restore
that salubrity and those riches, was Sir C. Napier's ambi-
tion, and he made his public works travel abreast with
the other branches of his administration, as far as a
country nearly denuded of artisans and the usual resources
of civilization would permit.

His views were large, his activity incessant, and as the
remains of ancient cities and stations were numerous he
naturally looked to them as guides ; but the speculations
of learned men and travellers about Macedonian stations
on the Indus he held in no reverence when he saw the de-
structive rage of the river, and knew it must have changed
its bed a hundred times in as many years. Yet there were
places, such as Roree, Sehwan, and Jurruk, a point below
Hyderabad, where solid rock controls the rushing waters,
and judging those to have been the olden stations of im-
portance he directed his attention to them while considering
how to consolidate his conquest. The soldiers' health
was however the most pressing consideration, and pre-
vious to quitting Hyderabad he had commenced capacious
barracks, well raised above the exhalations from the earth
and twenty-five feet in height, with double roofs and upper
ventilation ; and always attentive to the general welfare,
he built these barracks of fine burned bricks, with a view to
revive the pottery manufacture at Hyderabad, which under

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. til. the ameers' tyranny had decayed. He would have adopted
1843 the same model at Kurrachee, but barracks had been com-
menced there before the war according to the usual habits
of those who construct the sties generally appropriated
for the British soldier, and he could only amend them by
giving verandahs ; yet he commenced and in time finished
new barracks for a troop of horse-artillery on his own
plan, and they remain, a pattern of excellence.

His other public works were as follows. At Hyderabad
he repaired and strengthened the ameer's great fortress,
completed his own intrenched camp, organized the steamer
station at Kotree, and advanced the fort commenced there
between the battles. He showed also how the Indus
might be restrained from swallowing the land in its ca-
pricious gluttony as it descended to the ocean. This
Kotree fort was originally raised two hundred and fifty
yards from the. river on the right bank, and yet three days
of inundation brought the main stream within a hun-
dred yards; whereupon, as an experiment, thick stakes,
twelve feet in length, were planted along the bank and
firmly backed with brushwood, and that simple expedient
gave hope of controlling the ravages of a stream which
at times would carry away whole shikargahs, to the equal
detriment of the land and its own navigation.

Eastward of Hyderabad the large fortress of Aliar-ka-
tenda was restored, the walls of Meerpoore were repaired,
and bridges were cast over the greater nullahs, between
it and Hyderabad, to secure communication during the
inundations.

Within the desert Omercote was strengthened, and its
communications with Meerpoore, and with Boog in Cutch,
was assured by the occupation of many small forts.

Cutch had been taken from the Bombay presidency and
placed under Sir C. Napier, but the Bombay political
agent had remained there, an honourable amiable man,
and a zealous public servant, yet without military know-
ledge, which had caused embarrassment and some danger
See Conquest during the partisan warfare in the Delta. The general had
of Scmde. therefore asked to have Colonel Roberts, the able officer

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

who captured the Lion's brother, placed at Boog in an CHAP. III.
independent military position. Lord Ellenborough with l84«,
his usual judicious promptness made him also political
agent, a situation for which he was eminently qualified,
being intimately acquainted with the Rao and the people,
and having extraordinary influence with the Juts, the
Khosas, and other wild tribes in that quarter. He was in
fine the fittest man possible for the post ; but the removal
of a civilian, added to the loss of the general control, was
clamorously denounced at Bombay as a treacherous op-
pression ; for to replace a man unqualified from peculiar
circumstances, with one essentially able, at a crisis of
danger, was for the faction an inexpiable offence.

Below Hyderabad, Jurruk was surveyed, with a view
to form another great steamer station ; and above Hyder-
abad, a military post was designed for Sehwan, notwith-
standing the heat, which is so great there that the natives
guard against it during the raging months by keeping their
turbans and even their bedclothes constantly wetted : yet
with the aid of good barracks, and employing only sepoys
under certain conditions, it was hoped to maintain a mili-
tary post.

I^>rth of Sehwan, the places of Sukkur Bukkur and
Roree — by the natives run into one name — and all the
other military points were strengthened, and a large serais
or mercantile depot, was projected. It was designed by
Lord Ellenborough, who thus early sought to prepare
for a great commerce with Central Asia by the Indus
and its confluents. A trading port at Sukkur and docks
for building the smaller boats required for the upper
branches of the rivers were to be added, and Sir C.
Napier established at a later period a great central mart
there, especially for horses, by which he hoped to supply
the Indian army with the fine strong animals of Affghan
and Turkistan at a much less cost than the slight Arabian
horses were obtained for. This vast scheme would have
quickly established a trade between Central Asia and
Bombay, but when several hundreds of fine horses had
been sent to Bengal, at less than half the cost of the inferior App. XVII .

e 2

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. in. Arabs bought for the military service, official jealousy,
1843 folly or self-interest, interfered. An order arrived to
stop the trade, which was thus, with many other noble
schemes and beneficial plans, thwarted after Lord Ellen-
borough's departure by the perversity of boards and
councils, who would not tolerate such disturbance of their
official monotony.

To the eastward of this triple station, the surveying
engineers were, as before said, employed to ascertain the
facilities of re-opening the Narra river, and restoring to
fertility the wooded hills and the long tract of country
lining that great watercourse.

On the westward of the Indus, works involving the
future prosperity of Shikarpoor and the health of a wide
district were projected. That town was rapidly regain-
ing its former opulence and importance through the
immigration of merchants and men of capital, who flocked
from the surrounding states, and even from distant parts
of India, to live under the protection of the just governor of
Scinde. Sickness was however always prevalent both at Shi-
karpoor and at Sukkur, and Sir C. Napier remarked that
when the one town was salubrious the other suffered from
pestilence, an alternation which followed certain changes of
the wind. Wherefore, concluding the malaria came from
swampy ground lying between the towns and periodically
inundated by the overflowing of the Indus, he projected
two great sanitary and commercial works, namely, a raised
causeway to connect the places for trading and military
intercourse, and a bund, or dike, to bar out the inun-
dation : the last a great affair, for the construction, of
very considerable height and solidity, was above thirty
miles long.

Kurrachee was not neglected in the scheme of public
constructions. Plans were prepared for fortifying the
cantonments and rendering that station the great military
hold of the British in Scinde ; and as the population was
increasing in a very sensible manner, civil works were
projected to support a prosperous commercial city, and
make it the great port of the Indus. Many and great

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

obstacles were however to be overcome. The neighbour- CHAP. III.

hood was hilly, but the actual shore so flat and the 1843

harbour so shallow that vessels had always difficulty in

making the port, and in the monsoons did not attempt it.

To remedy this a lighthouse was built, and to render the

port commodious, the construction of a pier or bunder,

was at once commenced on so great a scale, that, besides

the land approaches, it was to be carried nearly two miles

into the water.

The works designed to protect the port and the rising
city were likewise very considerable, and measures were
taken to finish a great watercourse, called the Ghara Canal,
commenced at a former date to join the port with the
Indus. Swimming-baths were constructed for the use of
the troops, and the chief commissary, Major Blenkins,
undertook the superintendence of a large tract of ground
appropriated for a government garden, which under his
able management soon produced every species of vegetable
indigenous to Scinde, and all kinds of European esculents
besides — and so exuberantly, that while three thousand
soldiers were amply supplied without cost to them, and
the officers purchased at a cheap rate, enough remained
for general sale to repay the expense fourfold. Scurvy
which had previously prevailed to an alarming extent then
disappeared entirely, and fine plantations of trees were
laid out, promising shelter and recreation for the popu-
lation at no distant time, for vegetation is very rapid and
luxuriant in Scinde.

To nourish this garden and provide for the health of the
rising town, levels were taken and a plan laid down for
turning a small river called the Mullyar or Mulleree, run-
ning at the distance of twelve or fourteen miles, not only
into the government garden for irrigation and fountains, but
into the houses of the town and cantonments for health and
convenience. Finally it was to be conducted by pipes to
Keymarree point, where the great mole was to end in deep
water, and thus supply the shipping, at once ; an object of
great importance, because the vessels only got water with
difficulty from a distance inland, and at a great expense.

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. in. The facility of executing this great and useful project was
ascertained, and the estimated cost not more than a thou-
sand pounds a mile ; but the scheme was not ripe before
Lord Ellenborouglr's recall, and the government which
succeeded him could never be induced to sanction the
expense, or even to notice the letters proposing it, though
Appendix in. the health of the soldiers and of the population was
grievously affected by the bad water of Kurrachee.

It may here be observed, that in all things Sir C. Napier
was strongly supported by Lord Ellenborough ; and with
respect to the public works enumerated above, some were
of that nobleman5 s conception, in others he had been
forestalled. One had been simultaneously planned by
both, namely, the restoration of water from the Indus to
Cutch, which the Kalloras first, and then the ameers, had
with a fiendish policy — only second in enormity to the
monstrous conception of Albuquerque to destroy Egypt by
turning the course of the Nile — cut off at Shah Bunder in
the Delta ; thus giving the people of Cutch up as a prey
to the encroaching waste. Lord Ellenborough however,
merely proposed to make the Indus reflow in the with-
ered district ; Sir C. Napier projected the restoration of
the Narra, not only to benefit Cutch, but to recover the
great and fertile strip of land before mentioned as
bounding that river on the west. Unhappily this last
project was too great to be executed from the resources of
Scinde alone, and the officials of the supreme government
always repressed instead of encouraging the noble and
beneficent plans of the Scindian governor.

These many and great works were not dealt with in
that easy method by which some men have obtained
unearned fame — namely, by issuing orders for their con-
struction, leaving to others the finding of means, and
to their own successors debt. Sir C. Napier was practi-
cally acquainted with every branch of execution, whether
for the excavation of canals, the construction of piers or
the erection of edifices, and he decided with a full know-
ledge of the subject in detail. His plans involved indeed
great expenses from their number, their magnitude, the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

scarcity of artisans,, and the high wages these last CHAP. III.
demanded — wages which he was continually importuned 1845
to regulate by tariff — but for him who was casting the
foundations of a great community, the permanent rights of
labour were far more important than any temporary in-
convenience, however great. Hence, holding fast to great
principles in all branches of administration, he rigorously
squared his undertakings with his means, and for public
profit, not display.

His receipts however more than kept pace with his
expenses. The revenue under the ameers had sunk to
forty lacs, which was far below that raised by the Kal-
loras, or even that of the Char-yar. But all their re-
ceipts were the offscourings of oppression, not the surplus
which the country under honest government could fur-
nish without pressure, and the English ruler peremptorily
rejected remorseless taxation. He strove instead to ascer-
tain and restore all the natural resources, to re-open,
enlarge and invigorate the closed or shrunken arteries of
public prosperity, and trusted to the renewed vitality of
the community for future profit. His early revenue was
therefore small, the first financial year, reckoned from
the battle of Hyderabad, giving only ninety thousand
of the four hundred thousand pounds, said to have been
paid to the ameers. But war had raged during full six
months of that period, much grain had been carried off by
the Beloochee troops, and when peace came the English
collectors could not for several months extend their
operations far from the camps, lest the roving Beloochees
should fall on them ; for no military escorts were allowed,
nor had the general any desire to be involved in premature
police difficulties with such fierce and dangerous fellows
for the sake of a small increase of revenue. Moreover Ali
Moorad's revenue and that of the districts of Subzulcote
and Bhoongbarra, made over to Bhawalpoore, had been
included in the ameers' receipts.

From this restricted, imperfect collection, a surplus of
seventeen thousand pounds in money was obtained after
defraying all the civil expenses ; and the estimated value of

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. III. the public grain in store was much greater — an example
1843> of economy combined with efficient work, contrasting too
strongly with the extravagance and inefficiency of most
other administrative establishments in India not to give
offence. The comparison was dangerous, and to blind the
public a clamour was raised about the burthen and
expense of Scinde — the statistics published being not only
false in themselves but improperly loaded with the cost of
the troops quartered there. To this was added also the
equally false assertions, that the country was not subdued ;
that the people — that term being used without discrimi-
nation for all the inhabitants — sighed for the return of
their Patriarchal Princes, and would rise at once for their
restoration, but for the enormous force maintained to keep
them down.

The expense of the army in Scinde certainly exceeded
the revenue derived from that conquest, because a very
powerful body of troops were by the general government
quartered there ; not for the purpose of overawing the
people, who were rejoicing or contented according to their
races at the change of government ; but to be ready for
the exigencies of an extraneous war, which, actually be-
ginning at Gwalior, was very likely to break out also
in the Punjaub, and might from thence extend to Affghan-
istan. The expectation of it had also rendered Beloo-
chistan and the hill tribes bordering Scinde uneasy and
dangerous. It was not Scinde therefore, it was India that
required these troops, and their cost was a general charge
which in no manner depended on the state of affairs in
the former country. But the most artful turn given
to this unfounded clamour was the assumption that
any extraordinary number of troops were maintained in
Scinde at all ; for, with exception of some increase to the
Scinde irregular horse, not an extra man had been raised
for the conquest or the holding of that country. The
troops employed were of the ordinary standing army of
the East, and would have been embodied though Scinde
had never been entered. They were merely pushed
forward into advanced cantonments on a new frontier,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

and it might with equal propriety have been alleged CHAP. III.
that Hampshire was a peculiar burthen on England be- 1843.
cause a large garrison and expensive dockyard is there
maintained. Scinde, when conquered, was an integral
part of the Indian empire and subject to the influences
and effects of the general policy of that empire, which
was at this time menaced by two great wars.

It was said also, and with as little truth, that the
former frontier of India towards Scinde, being more
restricted, would have enabled the Company to reduce
their troops ; but the new frontier was in fact the shorter
and stronger, and the conqueror was soon prepared, and
proposed, to maintain his conquest when not menaced by
a Seikh war, with as few troops as had been employed
in Scinde before the conquest ; and not only to pay
the whole cost of these troops from the resources of the
coimtry but to provide a large surplus for the general
treasury.

This clamour would have been here unnoticed, as being
part of the filth with which every man who travels fast on a
great road must expect to be spattered, if it had only been
the cry of those from whom it appeared to come ; but it
was supported and encouraged by the directors, by the
Council of Bombay, and by several members of parlia-
ment ; and it has ever since been directed unceasingly to
the ruin of all the great public works and admirable
arrangements of the first Scinde administration. Yet those
arrangements and constructions were worthy of all support,
having in view to make Kurrachee an emporium for trade
with Central Asia, and to organize institutions capable of
sustaining a great and prosperous community. Thus,
scarcely was the war ended when the surveying engineer
establishment was spread over the country, laying down the
principal geographical points for an accurate survey, and
taking the levels of the land and of the Indus, with the
object of organizing a complete scientific system of irriga-
tion. The shikar gahs also, covering one-fourth of the
fertile country, were taken in hand as having become state
property j and they were full of very fine timber, infinitely

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. in. valuable, as supplying fuel for the steam navigation of
1843. the Indus ; but being too extensive and choked with fallen
trees and j angle, the first measure was to give the people
the loose timber for the pains of fetching it away. This
was followed by the appointment of a commission to
class and regulate them as forests, and set out such fertile
tracts as might be deemed most fitting for cultivation,
to be held under government tenures calculated to encou-
rage agriculture — in fine those receptacles for wild beasts
were made to yield revenue to the government, wood and
grass to the villages, and timber to the towns, and for
export.

While thus providing for internal tranquillity and civili-
zation, Sir C. Napier had also to arrange his foreign policy,
for the comprehension of which it is necessary to give
a descriptive sketch of the states bordering on Scinde,
commencing with Cutch.

The Rao of Cutch was an ally at whose court a British poli-
tical agent had long resided; and his country was important
from its situation and from the unsettled tribes on its borders.
Through Cutch, by Deesa, was the direct land communica-
tion with Bombay, always of great importance when the
monsoons cut off the sea intercourse. It was to secure this
communication that Omercote and Meerpoore had been
repaired, and so many forts restored, and bridges cast
between those places and Hyderabad. Cutch was also of
direct interest in regard to the Delta. Colonel Roberts
could raise on emergency as many as two thousand
Khosas and Juts, who, abhorring their ancient oppressors
the Beloochees, were ready to pour with fire and sword
upon those of the Delta if an insurrection called for such
a measure. Meanwhile his great influence over those
tribes secured that line of communication from disturbance.

Eastward of Cutch was Guzerat, under the Guickwar;
and northward of Guzerat were the states of Joudpore
and Jessulmeer, of old the independent countries of the
bravest of the heroic Rajpoots, now subjected allies of the
British, having political residents and being entirely under
the power of the Indian government ; for they were

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

hemmed in on the east by India, and on the west was the CHAP. III.
great desert, across which only a few lines dependent on lg43
the wells led to Scinde.

The communication with Jessulmeer was direct from
Roree, and on that side, within the desert, was the fort
of Shah-ghur long held by Roostum's nephew Mohamed, Plan 1.
but evacuated when the Lion was finally defeated. It was
then taken possession of by the British, though belong-
ing to Ali Moorad as a turban appendage, compensation
being promised, but neither the Bombay nor the supreme
government up to this time have redeemed that promise !

From this geographical trace it may be seen, that the
eastern frontier of Scinde, which was however very unde-
fined, because the ameers with a sinister policy had
removed the boundary-marks and destroyed all records,
was defended by Meerpoore, Omercote and Shah-ghur ;
that it was fringed by allies who had no interest to betray,
or make war, and being watched and controlled by a gar-
rison at Deesa and political agents at J oudpoor and J essul-
meer, were unable to effect mischief if so inclined. The prin-
cipal passages across the desert were thus secured, and the
communication between Scinde and Bombay was assured
by land when the monsoons debarred intercourse by sea.

Tracing the line of frontier further northward, a state of
great importance presented itself, namely Daodpootra or
Bhawalpoor. It had long been protected from Runjeet
Sing's ambition by the British government, and Lord Ellen-
borough had recently restored to the rajah the districts
of Subzulcote and Bhoongbara, formerly torn from him by
the ameers. He appeared faithful, but Sir C. Napier was
disquieted that great interests should depend on an eastern
prince, who might be coerced by the Seikhs, then very
menacing towards the British. The rajah's subjects also
leaned strongly towards those who desired the downfall of
the Feringhees ; and his territory, lying between the great
desert and the lower Sutlej and lining the banks of the
latter, gave him power to intercept the direct commu-
nication between the north-west provinces of India and
Scinde, by land and by water. This might prove infinitely

60 SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. in. dangerous if war happened with the Seikhs, and hence, as
1843. ^Qe feith of the supreme government was so pledged that
the rajah's dominions could not be absorbed while he was
true to the alliance — which he could yet betray at a critical
moment without previous indications of enmity — the
general used every means to conciliate and attach him
more closely.

On the north-east, Scinde was closed by the Mooltan
country, which, spread between the lower Sutlej and the
Indus, descending below the junction of those rivers to
Kusmore. The dewan of this territory, a tributary of
Lahore, called Sawan Mull, father of the since noted
Moolraj, was reputed able and prudent, and professed
great friendship for the conqueror of Scinde; but the
latter easily detected the Seikh feeling behind the screen
of protestation, and towards Sawan his bearing was that of
offering no offence, yet plainly intimating that any hostile
indication would be instantly resented.
Plan l &2. North-west of Scinde was Cutch-Gundava, belonging to
the khan of Khelat, and connected with the lower Indus
by a range of peculiarly savage rocks called the Cutchee
hills, which run nearly perpendicularly westward, from
the river, towards the Bolan mountains. In those hills
dwelt dangerous tribes, namely, the Mazarees next the
Indus, then the Bhoogtees, Jackranees, Doomkees and
Kujjucks, all of which were subdivided into smaller
tribes.

North of the Doomkees and Bhoogtees were the Mur-
rees and Keytrians. One branch of the Mazarees, lying
on the Indus, owed allegiance to the Mooltan man ; but
the other tribes were claimed as subjects by the khan of
Khelat. The Murrees denied his supremacy, and were
themselves of better customs and civilization than their
neighbours. They had been unjustly meddled with during
the Affghan war by the political agents, and their prin-
cipal fort of Kahun had been occupied ; but they defeated
one British detachment under Major Clibborne, destroyed
another under Lieutenant Clark, a young officer of pro-
mising ability and heroic courage, and finally forced the

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

political agent to recall Lieutenant Brown from Kahun, CHAP. III.
after a long and most intrepid defence. 1843,

The Jackranees, Bhoogtees, Doomkees, and one branch
of the Mazarees, were avowedly predatory, fierce, daring
absolute robbers, but calling themselves Lootoos or
plunderers. They had indeed some chivalric feelings and
customs, yet were still robbers, ferocious and devastating,
despising civilization, thinking all property belonged of
right to the sharpest sword, and the plains made by nature
and cultivated by man for their spoil. Very powerful they
were, and northward and westward they had a vast sweep
of mountains inhabited by kindred tribes to retire upon
if pressed by superior forces, while on the south they were
defended by the desert of Kusmore, eighty miles wide,
which separated them from Scinde. This waste, they,
knowing the wells and preparing beforehand in the recesses
of their wild hills for expeditions, could easily pass, but it
was hard for troops to cross and attack their rocks in
return, which made them incredibly insolent.

Westward of these people was the Khelat country,
inhabited by Beloochees. During the Affghan war their
capital had been stormed, and their khan, a popular prince,
killed ; wherefore the nobles were enemies of the British.
But the son of the slain khan, a youth of eighteen, had
been restored, had received money and personal kindness
from Sir C. Napier, and being of a grateful disposition
was, so far as he was his own master, friendly ; wherefore
the general corresponded with him amicably, giving
advice and support against his turbulent sirdars, and
against the AfFghans of Candahar, who continually
menaced him. *

On the west, the Scindian frontier rested on the Hala
mountains, and between them and the Indus, next the
desert of Kusmore, was the country of the Chandikas
and other tribes, previously of the same plundering habits
with the Cutchee tribes, but now subjects of the British
government. Below them to the southward were the
Bins and Lhugarees, touching on the Indus at Sehwan ;
and between that point and the sea- coast were the

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. in. Jokeas. Beyond the Jokeas was the jam of Beilas
1843> country,, a dependant on Khelat. These different tribes
partly occupied the plains, partly the mountains, for the
frontier of Scinde included the eastern slopes of the
Hala range ; but the western slopes were inhabited by
the Khelat tribes, who shall be in future called the
Mountain tribes, in contradistinction to the Cutchee Hill
tribes, whose fastnesses, though of wonderful ruggedness
and strength, were not of altitude entitling them to be
ranked as mountains.

All these tribes, Scindian and Khelatian, the general
sought by a mixture of generosity, justice and severity,
to conciliate with the new order of things, and he was not
unsuccessful; his rough dealing with the jam of the
Jokeas has been related in the Conquest of Scinde, and
coupled with the following treatment of Wullee Chandia,
the head of the Chandikas, illustrates his policy. This
last chieftain had followed the British army with ten thou-
sand warriors so closely, just before the battle of Meeanee,
that he was within one march of it when the action
was fought ; and if Outranks imbecile counsel had then
weighed so much as to cause the delay of only a few
hours, the Chandikas would have fallen on the rear
during the fight. Wullee' s march was stopped by the
victory, and he retreated across the Indus to his own
country, where in concert with others he resisted all
Ali Moorad's attempts to take possession of the lands
ceded in right of the turban. These confederates being
too strong for the ameer, he proposed a conference, to
which they came, twenty-nine in number, with a hundred
and fifty followers ; but Ali having prepared an ambus-
cade killed several and captured the rest, amongst them
Wullee Chandia.

Proud of this perfidy, he brought his prisoners to the
general, expecting applause, while the captives looked
only for that death they would themselves have inflicted
in like circumstances. Both were disappointed, Ali was
publicly and severely reproached for his want of faith
and compelled to give all the chiefs presents in amends ;

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

find they were restored not only to liberty bnt to their CHAP. III.
possessions, with encomiums on their bravery, and expres- 1843
sion of sorrow for the base treatment they had experienced.
The scene with Wullee was thus described at the time.
" He is a fine vigorous old man, resembling in look a
large owl ; for his white hair and beard, thick and
clustering like feathers, discloses of his bronzed counte-
nance little more than a very hooked nose and two im-
mense round black lustrous eyes, which he kept fixed on
the general without a wink, and in perfect silence, until the
speech which announced his restoration to freedom was
interpreted. Then he eagerly asked, ' Is this true ? Am
I free ? Ma}' I go?' ' Yes \' The old man rushed with-
out another word from the house, and made for his own
country with headlong haste ; and it was falsely supposed,
with a heart more touched by the wrong than the redress ;
but when safe amongst his tribe he exclaimed ' The
Feringhee general has given me my life, my land and my
sword, I am his slave/ " The course of this work will show
how he kept his word.

Having thus described the frame of nations and tribes,
of mountains and deserts, in which Scinde was set, it
remains to treat of Ali Moorad, whose dominions, situated
within the boundaries, seemed as a flaw in the jewel; for
this prince still governed after the manner of the ameers,
and though his ruling was of necessity ameliorated, the
contrast between it and the new government offered a
striking contrast. That he was allowed to have any
dominions at all was a constant theme for abuse with the
degraded faction at Bombay, which, loud in reprobation of
the dethronement of the ameers who were enemies of the
British, was indignant that he amongst them who was faith-
ful should be treated with justice. " He was a vile traitor
because he had not fought alongside of the other ameers —
he was infamous, a coward, a liar, a monster, because he
had not aided to destroy the English army! Sir C. Napier
had trusted entirely to him — had heaped presents upon
him — had added to his territories and was his dupe."

These efforts to pervert the public mind were so far

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

chap. III. successful as to produce a vague general notion that Ali
1843. Moorad had been trusted, had conferred and received
presents, and had augmented his dominions. Outram even
asserted, in an official document, that a promise of addi-
tional territory had been made ; having no other foundation
for the tale than the working of a brain, at that time
more confused than ordinary by anger and mortified
vanity. It is therefore fitting here, to give a succinct
sketch of the real intercourse, though involving some
repetition of what has been already told in the Conquest
of Scinde.

When the resolution of Lord Ellenborough to form
new treaties with the ameers was first made known, Ali
was as inimical as the rest to the English alliance, until
he found that Boostum' s eldest son, Hussain, a violent
man, had by threats induced the old ameer to contemplate
a violation of the laws of succession established by the
" Char-yar" which conferred hereditary rights on the
brother in preference to the son. Before that period Ah
had been forced to take arms against Boostum and his
sons, and had defeated them ; yet was so mild in victory
that the others deceived him by feigned reconciliation, and
thus regained all they lost by arms.

When Sir C. Napier took Scindian affairs in hand Ali
demanded a conference, at which he asked for aid against
his family opponents; but was distinctly told to expect
neither aid nor opposition, save what the treaties war-
ranted. Soon afterwards Boostum renounced the turban
in favour of Ali Moorad, and this being according to the
" Char-yar" law of succession, and consonant to the
Mahometan law and the treaties, the English general
was bound to maintain it ; but he first ascertained that it
Appendix XX. was a voluntary act. Boostum subsequently asserted that
he was coerced, and, revoking the instrument, conferred
the turban on his son; but this investiture was con-
trary to the law of the family, and to the Mahometan laws,
and so far from being coerced he had refused the English
general's offered protection at the time.

With the turban went certain possessions in the nature

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

of crown property ; the fortress of Emaum-ghur was in that CHAP. III.
predicament ; and it was under Ali Moorad' s authority as
wearer of the turban that Sir C. Napier took that place — it
was with his concurrence also, for the ameer fired the first
gun with his own hand, that it was destroyed. The desert
expedition therefore, was not, as falsely represented by an
Indian official personage, an act of aggressive war, but the
fulfilment of a formal treaty which bound the British to sup-
port each ameer in defence of his rights; for Ali Moorad was,
against all law and justice, there opposed by his nephews
in rebellion : but Sir C. Napier placed so little trust in him,
that he was compelled to march with the troops lest he
should deny having assented to the operation. Afterwards,
under Lord EllenborougFs instructions, Ali was, as having
been faithful to his treaty, confirmed in all his possessions,
although the English map of Scinde was thereby blotched
and the unity of territory acquired by the conquest broken :
but this example of good faith had a beneficial influence
on all the wild chieftains, who judged from thence that the
restoration of their possessions would not be disturbed.

Lord Ellenborough had also empowered the general
to define and settle the boundaries of Scinde on all sides,
and he had, consequently, negotiations with the khans of
Khelat, Bhawalpoore, Jessulmere, Joudpoore, and with
Ali Moorad. He had therefore to confer land, to grant
and withhold advantages, a power which would in the
days of Clive have been worth many lacs of rupees ; and it
was natural for the Bombay faction, sighing for such
large opportunities, to suppose this had not been thrown
away. Nevertheless the only present received by Sir
C. Napier was a cock and some addled eggs from Ali
Moorad, when in the desert ; and he was so little grateful,
that when the ameer asked for an elephant as a mark of
honour it was given with this characteristic speech and
condition. " I take no presents, and cannot afford to make
any j and if the governor-general objects to this, you must
return the animal or pay its value into the treasury."

To maintain this ameer's right of territory was im-
perative ; yet there was no point of Indian policy more

SIR CHARLES NAFIER's

CHAP. III. condemned by Sir C. Napier, than the having native
1843. sovereigns within the empire. " The princes and nobles
of the East M he said, ' ' hated the British as intruders, but
the people liked them as being better rulers. To the
people then the British should look for the permanency of
their empire; whereas, by leaving them to the ruling of
their own princes and nobles, they were retained in slavish
ideas of obedience to men who were enemies, and who
thus obtained a supporting power which might and ought
to be used against them — and it also retarded civilization/'
In this view he aimed to raise an independent spirit in the
Scindees which would lead them to resist the restoration
of the ameers' or any other tyranny.

Ali Moorad's perfidy to Wullee Chandia, induced the
general to watch him closely. He placed a political agent at
his court, and interfered, though amicably, in the choice of
his ministers ; for the ameer, young and sensual, neglected
business, and it was important not to let an enemy of the
British lead his councils. He was also stringently taught,
as shall be hereafter shown, that on good behaviour his
sovereignty depended ; a teaching essential to the security
of Scinde ; for his territory was so situated on both sides
of the Indus that it commanded the navigation, cut off
Roree, Sukkur and Shikarpoor from Hyderabad, and was
on the north all but in contact with the robber tribes. On
the south-east it approached Sehwan, where the Hala
mountains strike on the Indus ; and it was everywhere
fertile and dotted with forts — that of Dejee-ka-kote being
surprisingly strong from situation. To his court all the
Talpoor princes still at large naturally looked; so did
the Affghan chiefs of Candahar, and the sirdars of Khelat ;
Dejee could cover a large assemblage of armed men, and
Ali had a right to keep Beloochees and Patans in his
pay.

High faculties were required to maintain the conquest,
and they were signally displayed, since it was maintained
without commotions, while a new system of government
was established with so much judgment that the delivered
Hindoos and Scindees were not more attached to it than

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

the vanquished Beloochees ; but the acquisition had been CHAP. III.
made by the sword, and always the general nourished a j^J"
salutary fear of his arms, by keeping his force so efficient,
and so disposed, that neither internal nor external enemies
could draw reasonable hope from its weakness. This
vigilance deprived the Bombay faction — certainly not the
least virulent enemy of tranquillity — of hope from insur-
rection, and therefore a new clamour was raised, that the
occupation of Scinde had weakened the frontier of India.
When noise and falsehood are the main resources of
faction, a dogma, founded on some general truth crook-
edly applied, is always given as a rallying cry to save
the multitude the trouble of reasoning ; here it was said,
"that while Scinde was under the ameers India had a
desert frontier to the west, and deserts are the strongest of
all frontiers." That deserts are generally the strongest
frontier was the small nucleus of truth crookedly applied ;
for the desert frontier of India was not given up, but
strengthened.

Who were the external enemies on the west ? Affghans
and Beloochees of Khelat, who might move of their own
hatred or be pushed on and supported by Persia at the
instigation of Russia.

Who were those on the north and north-west? The
same Affghans stimulated by the same powers ; and the
Seikhs.

But for Persia, the Gedrosian desert of Alexander is
more formidable than the Thur which separates Scinde
from India ; and the Persians must invade by Herat and
northern Affghanistan — to descend afterwards by the Bolan
Pass, or slide down behind the Hala range and enter
Scinde by the coast-line. In the first case they would come
upon Bukkur and Hyderabad, in the second upon Kurra-
chee, three fortified places which they must take, and after
passing the Indus would still have the Thur desert between
them and India.

Were a great combination of nations, Persians, Toorko-
mans, Affghans, Beloochees and Seikhs to be precipitated
upon India, the line of Ferozepoore, where the Sutlej

f 2

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. in. offers but a feeble barrier, would probably be chosen, but
there the vaunted desert frontier ceases. Then, and in
all cases, Scinde under the ameers, and also Bhawalpoor,
would have been forced to place their resources at the
invader's disposal, whether for passing the Thur against
the Bombay Presidency; or for pouring by Ferozepoore
upon Delhi ; but while a British force held Scinde, and
was based on Kurrachee, having a sea communication
with Bombay, how could the invaders pass the Thur?
They would not be able to pass the Indus, guarded as it
would be by steamers and strengthened by fortresses.
Wherefore the conquest of Scinde, which attached a
delivered people to the British government, strengthened
instead of weakening the Indian frontier on the south-
west ; and furnished a secure base for an army to operate
against the flank and rear of invaders moving by the
north-western opening against Delhi. It also rendered it
unnecessary longer to keep troops, as had always been done
before, at Deesa, Joudpoore, Jessulmere and other points,
to watch the ameers, who were significantly called by the
duke of Wellington, the "pirates of the southern Indus."
In fine it was a conquest beneficial to India, to humanity,
to commerce, and all the mental garbage of newspapers
will be unable to sully its reputation; but it may be
assumed as a maxim, that whenever a clamour is raised by
many newspapers together something unsound is at bot-
tom ; for neither oppressed men, nor straightforward men,
have much influence with such publications, and the
concurrence of many in one cry indicates active intrigue.

Sir C. Napier had to guard five hundred miles of com-
munication, and the four great stations of Kurrachee,
Hyderabad, Sukkur and Shikarpoor.

Shikarpoor, being close to the Cutchee hills, required a
strong garrison, which however depended for support on
the greater military station of Sukkur.

Hyderabad, governing all the central parts of Scinde
and the head of the Delta, was secured by the ameer's
great fortress, the intrenched camp, and the steamer
station at Kotree.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Kurrachee had walls, a native fort and an intrenched CHAP. III.
cantonment. !843.

Around these stations, each of which had its peculiar
commandant, the regular forces were destined to move if
invaded, and they were kept well supplied with military
stores and provisions, while the armed steamers preserved
the water communication between them. But to enable
the troops to move freely to a distance, a general system
of fortification was pushed forward as speedily as the
great dearth of workmen and materials would permit, for
Scinde had been a country of destruction not of pro-
duction. The plan was the same for all, namely, one large
fort or citadel as a safe magazine ; and in connection with
it, according to the localities, martello towers to be
defended by a few men. On this plan Shikarpoor, a
walled place and with three native forts, only required
martello towers ; Sukkur having its stores in Bukkur,
which was impregnable to any force not having a mortar
train, was in the same predicament. Hyderabad had the
ameeer's fortress, which was to be connected with the
intrenched camp like Athens with the Piraeus, but by
towers instead of long walls ; and the haven for steamers
on the opposite bank of the river was protected by the
fort of Kotree.

Kurrachee, the point of connection with Bombay and
the place where the last stand must be made against inva-
sion or general insurrection, was to be protected by a
regular fortress having eight or ten bastions, and furnished
with a tank of never-failing pure water. The magazine-
forts at each station were calculated for a garrison of three
hundred men, though capable of holding more ; and
the martello towers were to have twelve men with an
18-pounder. A wing of a regiment therefore sufficed
for the security of each station, and two regiments and a
half would secure all the great points. Each place of
arms was safe, because they were all impregnable to storm,
and no insurgents could have a battering train ; the great
bulk of the army was therefore free to move in mass to
any quarter, which in a country so extended and so inter-

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. in. sected by canals and shikargahs was no mean military
1843. consideration.

It has been before shown bow the police and irregnlar
cavalry were grouped around the masses of regular troops,
to preserve internal tranquillity and watch the robber
tribes ; but with so long a frontier exposed to so many
barbarous plundering hordes some additional protection
was required ; and in that view leave, or rather instructions
were obtained from Lord Ellenborough, for the same
design occurred simultaneously, to form a fighting camel
corps, on the model of the dromedary corps employed by
Napoleon in Egypt; and the general also added to the
Scinde horsemen a second regiment which was commanded
by Captain Malcolm, a young officer of courage and
ability. The camel corps was under Lieutenant Fitzgerald,
whose invincible strength, courage and activity, was admi-
rably suited for the sudden rapid and arduous duties
expected from his corps, which was thus organized.

Each camel carried two men, one armed with carabine
and sword, the other with a musquetoon and bayonet, the
musquetoon being formed by cutting down and repairing
condemned arms found in the Kurrachee stores. One
man guided the animal and fought from its back; the
other was to act as an infantry soldier, because the robbers
were habituated to fire from the fissures and holes in the
plains, where neither lance nor sword could reach them.
If assailed by superior, numbers the camels were to kneel
in a ring with heads inward and pinned down, thus
furnishing a bulwark for the men ; and it was proposed to
give the soldiers spears also, but this was relinquished at
Fitzgerald's desire : the question however remains open,
because the corps never had to break through a body of
swordsmen, which would have been the test of utility for
the spear. On the camels were carried the men's packs,
cooking utensils and beds, the latter forming part of the
saddle ; and thus a body of soldiers capable of acting as
infantry when required, having no tents, commissariat, or
baggage to embarrass them, could make marches of sixty
miles in twenty-four hours even with the bad camels at

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

this time furnished by Scinde ; but of eighty or even CHAP. III.
ninety miles with finer animals, and consequently no ^£
other troops could keep up with or escape from them.
When formed, the camel corps was sent to aid the cavalry
employed to watch the Cutchee hillmen.

With this general view of the condition of Scinde and
its political and social relations to surrounding tribes
and nations, the narrative of events which follow can be
read with a better understanding.

SIR CHARLES NAPIEll's

CHAPTER IV.

CHAP. iv. During the voyage to Kurrachee Sir C. Napier reco-
1843> vered some strength, but his medical advisers still urged a
change of climate, to which he would not consent, because
the great machine he was constructing could not advance
without his superintendence, and he held his life no
counterpoise to that interest in the public scale. " There
are," he said, " many men more competent to govern
this country, but they are not on the same vantage
ground; they have not the influence of victory; the
horses here are wild, but know my hand; with another
they would start off while he was gathering up the
reins."

At first his government proceeded happily, but soon,
as if to try the temper of his spirit, a strange pesti-
lence came raging through the land, bearing down men
and institutions. In the course of October and Novem-
ber, not one person, from the commander-in-chief to
the drummer, in an army seventeen thousand strong,
escaped its visitation : there was nobody strong enough
even to make out a report, and in some regiments no
medical man was able to attend the hospitals. It did not
however assail all quarters at once, it ran as it were
through the forces, and at first was supposed to be the
result of cessation from fatigue and excitement ; but that
notion vanished when the people of the country fell even
more rapidly than the soldiers.

It stopped agriculture, for the people were too ill to
work ; it drove away all the foreign artisans in fear ; it
spread north, east, south and west, and was by all men

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

regarded as a strange unrecognized visitation. Fortu- CHAP. IV.
nately it was not very fatal, but with officer and soldier 1843>
it laid mind and body prostrate ; very few had energy to
rally for a long time, and at one period the Cutchee hill-
men might certainly have sacked Shikarpoor and Sukkur,
and devastated Upper Scinde, for there was not a soldier
on his legs to oppose them, and the moral influence of the
general alone kept those plunderers in check. He was
suffering severely himself, but his spirit did not sink.
Presenting an undaunted front, his language to the tribes
and surrounding nations was even more imperious than
when his army was effective and flushed with recent
victory. But while his official correspondence proves that
he gave himself no relaxation from labour, his private letters
show how hard the bodily struggle was, and how he
yearned for that ease which his sense of duty would not
let him accept.

During this pestilence the Bombay faction laboured to
excite the Beloochees to fall on the sickly soldiers, and
the Bombay Times pointed out in detail the best mode
for killing them ; but these flagitious efforts had no effect;
tranquillity prevailed, and in the Delta so great a change
had occurred, that when all the collector's escort fell ill
the Beloochee peasants of the place voluntarily guarded
him. Everywhere officers travelled or followed the
chase, singly or in company, traversing the country in
various directions, and in safety; to travel in the im-
mediate neighbourhood of Bombay was far more dan-
gerous than to penetrate the wildest tracts of Scinde, and
yet it was shamelessly asserted at the former place, that
the Scindians were panting for an opportunity to massacre
their oppressors ! But the people knew the conquerors
were not oppressors ; they saw that they assumed no
haughty superiority, offered no insult, made no exactions ;
their own customs were respected where not opposed to
morality; taxation was reduced, vexatious restrictions were
abolished, agriculture encouraged, trade fostered — and
as the chief was, so were the subordinates in office.
The money spent by the troops was also felt as a sensible

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. IV. advantage-, because it was not first taken from the labour-
ing man by taxation ; and therefore they bad not to work
twice for it, as the celebrated William Cobbett said in
reply to Justice Bailey, when, with the political folly of an
English judge seeking to prop a harsh sentence, the latter
announced from the bench that " Taxation was a benefit
to the labouring man because the money went back to him
as wages." In fine there was no oppression and therefore
no oppressors to rise against.

Early in December the sickness abated, but it was
followed in the spring by a flight of locusts which devoured
nearly all the rising harvest, scanty in itself from the little
labour previously bestowed during the pestilence. Those
destroyers were succeeded by an anomalous rising of the
Indus which increased the distress, and meanwhile me-
nacing political and military events demanded the utmost
vigilance and extensive preparations.

It has been shown that, strictly speaking, only the eastern
side of the Indus and the country immediately about Kurra-
chee were subdued ; for though the jam of the Jokeas, whose
territory extended from near the latter place to Sehwan,
was entirely controlled, the country above Sehwan belonged
to chiefs who had made no submission, and were intimately
connected by blood and habits with the Khelat moun-
taineers and the robbers of the Cutchee hills. And these
last, though disregarding the Bombay exhortations to a
general insurrection, were not unlikely to be stirred to plun-
dering incursions by the money which the Lion and Ahmed
Khan Lugharee might offer them. External circumstances
also tended to excite those tribes to mischief; for in
December it was secretly known that a great confede-
racy was in progress to overthrow the British power in
India, and the state of Scindhia, better known as Gwalior,
was breaking out into open war. The Mahometan popu-
lation of the empire was not to be trusted ; Nepaul was
more menacing than friendly ; the Seikhs, in a state of
military anarchy, seemed disposed to cross the Sutlej ; and
their kindred in the protected states on the left bank of
that river were ready to join them. The spies said the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Affghans were likewise preparing to move down the Boian CHAP. IV.
pass upon Shikarpoor. isu.

With these stimulants to their natural cupidity, the
Khelat mountaineers and Cutchee robbers could not be
expected to remain quiet ; already one incursion had been
made by the Doomkees near Larkaana, and that tribe
was peculiarly connected with the Khelat sirdars and
Affghans of Candahar, who desired to overthrow the young
khan because of his alliance with the British. There was
fear therefore that a general burst of these wild mountaineer
tribes would devastate the western side of Scinde ; for to
use the English general's words " Gwalior and the Punjaub
were in arms, the independent hill tribes were like ban-
ditti listening for the sound of carriage- wheels, the Scin-
dian Beloochees on that side were between a growl and a
bite, and Ali Moorad apparently turning traitor in the
midst of the sickening troops."

Amongst those who gave secret information was the
Persian prince, Agha Khan, whose real title was the Emir
of the Mountains, he being the lineal heir of the ancient
"assassin." Though no longer the terrible being who
made kings tremble in the midst of armies, this wandering
occult potentate still possessed secret but great power;
and his people, spread over Asia from the Indus to the
Mediterranean, supplied him with a revenue, and with
information sure and varied. He had come to Scinde with a
train of horsemen before the conquest, knew of the ameers'
design to assail the residency, had remonstrated against it,
and afterwards gave such information on that subject as to
render Outranks imbecile vanity on that occasion most
painfully prominent. He and his horsemen had acted on
the side of the British during the war, and he received a
pension from the supreme government ; but his position
and proceedings were suspicious, and he was watched and
even prevented quitting Scinde, when he designed to make
some intriguing religious excursion to Bhagdad. Never-
theless he was on friendly terms with the general, and now
told him the Affghans of Candahar, and the Beloochees of
Khelat were in close amity with the Lion — that all the

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IV. Scindian chiefs west of the Indus had secretly assured that
!844. ameer they were ready to raise a religious cry against the
British and restore him to his throne — that Ali Moorad
had written to the same effect, saying eight thousand of
the troops were then prostrate with fever, the remainder
tottering from debility, and if the Affghans would only
send two thousand men down the Bolan Pass they could
destroy all the Feringhees. To this the government
moonshee, Ali Akbar, whose intelligence and fidelity were
alike unquestionable, added, that there certainly was a
great combination of the Indian powers in progress, and a
secret intercourse going on ; but he thought the nations
in the immediate neighbourhood of Scinde dreaded the
" Bahadoor Jung," the great warrior, so they called the
general, too much to break out unless some remarkable
opportunity tempted them.

Of Ali Moorad the moonshee did not speak, but there
were grounds for suspecting that ameer's fidelity, besides
the report of Agha Khan. He had dismissed his minister
Sheik Ali Houssein, the fast friend of the British, and had
written to the general so insolently as to indicate hostility .
This it was supposed he dared not have done, unless some
great support was at hand, which could only be looked for
towards Gwalior, the Punjaub and Affghanistan — for Ali
knew well the Beloochees alone could not contend against
the British.

Very gloomy was the prospect of affairs, and it must be
admitted that great moral intrepidity and a sure per-
ception of chances were required to control the crisis,
when it is considered that Sir C. Napier, just emerging
from war, and while establishing a new government to
which so many interests and different races of men were
to be reconciled, had his whole military force suddenly
paralyzed in his hands by an unheard-of sickness, which
at the same time nearly stopped the social existence of the
nation — that he was menaced by foreign invasion, by
the supposed treachery of Ali Moorad, and the partial
insurrection of the western chiefs, at a moment when he
was personally reduced to extreme bodily debility by an

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

illness so depressing to the mind, that at Knrrachee CHAP. IV.
alone several officers had become insane for a time, others 1844
childish, and four committed suicide. Finally, that while
struggling under these accumulated difficulties, those from
whom he had a right to expect every aid and support,
were assailing him with secret enmity and the most in-
credible virulence of abuse ! Nevertheless with a won-
derful moral force he carried himself and the people he
ruled, triumphantly and without commotion through all
difficulties.

His first efforts were directed to obtain sure intelligence
that he might regulate his operations justly, and he had
before established several good channels, independent of
accidental sources such as the Persian prince afforded.
The Sheik Ah Houssein, a man of great shrewdness and
wide influence, was one of these channels; and a sure one,
for he knew his own fortune was bound up with the
British supremacy in Scinde. Ah Moorad disliked him,
and by the dethroned ameers he was counted a traitor j
he was also odious to the Patans in his master's pay,
because of his nepotism, the rock on which men in his
position generally split ; but these things made him the
more adhesive to British interests. Through the rich
Hindoo merchants holding jagheers from the Scindian
government, whose interested vigilance never slept, and
whose means of gaining intelligence were extraordinary,
sure intelligence was had, and the military spies were good
and active. Wherefore, feeling he could not be politically
surprised, the general sought to dissipate the storm as
regarded Scinde with a combination of moral and military
influence, founded on his judgment of the barbaric cha-
racter generally and of Ali Moorad' s in particular ; but first
he put his outposts on their guard by the following instruc-
tions addressed to the officer commanding at Shikarpoor,
the point most exposed to an attack from the Affghans
and Cutchee robber tribes.

"Be vigilant, and with your hrmdreds, aided by a fort,
you may defy as many thousands of the enemy ; yet with
British soldiers against Beloochees and Affghans a fort

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. TV. should only be a refuge for sick men and stores. If an
1844. enemy approaches you, attack him and put it clean out of
his head that he is going to besiege you. If he comes
within ten miles of Shikarpoor, get near him in the night
and fall on him at dawn if he is not too numerous ; if he
is too strong let him come closer to the town before you
attack him ; but in any case attack. — The only difference
is that if he is very strong he must be allowed to come
closer to the fortress than if he is weak. If his numbers
be overwhelming you must wait for aid from Sukkur, and .
the commandant there has orders to move to your suc-
cour, yet in a mass, nothing must be done by driblets.
Bukkur must be secured, but every man not employed for
that object must march on Shikarpoor, whence you must
be prepared to sally with your whole force the moment
the guns outside are heard. I do not apprehend any
attack but forewarned is forearmed."

This warning was a precaution against the Lion, who
was among the Affghans of Candahar, and in communi-
cation with the robber tribes, and hence, down the Bolan
Pass and from the Cutchee hills the coming of his war, if
it came at all, was to be expected ; and it would be no
slight one, seeing the robbers alone could bring down
twenty thousand of the fiercest swordsmen of Beloo-
chistan, and if reinforced by Affghans, and aided by any
treachery on the part of Ali Moorad, they could not but
prove formidable.

Ali Moorad's temper and projects were next to be tested.
He had a reputation for courage and hardihood, but Sir
C. Napier, knowing him to be addicted to drinking and
the zenana, thought his intrepidity would not prevent him
from securing his own safety in Dejee previous to the
breaking out of mischief ; for that fortress, perched on the
summit of a lofty isolated rock, was by the Beloo-
chees considered impregnable. It was so to any-
thing but bombardment, and the general, in anticipation,
sent a train of mortars, — some of which he immediately
obtained from Bombay, — up the Indus to Sukkur, which
was only three days' march from Dejee. This measure,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

ostentatiously taken to give notice that he was jealous of CHAP. IV.

the ameers' conduct, being arranged, he asked to have the

regiments most afflicted with the sickness relieved by fresh

troops ; and he would have gone himself to Sukkur, but

that he feared a fresh access of fever, which might from its

peculiarly depressing effects prostrate his energies when he

most needed them. Indeed he was then so weakened

that his medical advisers and all his friends earnestly

pressed him to quit Scinde as the only hope of saving life ;

but to their solicitations he replied thus.

" If it were to save, not mine but a thousand lives I
would not go. Were I to do so there would be wild work
here ; and a man wanting my accidental advantages could
not bring affairs to a happy conclusion. I cannot there-
fore in honour leave Lord Ellenborough in the lurch of
this political sea. I know my team, but a far more able
man could not get on the box before the horses would
start off. Chieftains and tribes who obey me willingly
because of my victories would rise against a new comer ;
from me they would take a kick with more patience than
a sour look from another whose force they had not proved
in battle. f General ! give the word and I follow you
with ten thousand shields against the Seikhs. All Scinde
will rise at your command against them. You are my king,
I will hold your stirrup and never quit it.' This speech
was recently made to me by the Belooch commander-
in-chief who opposed me at Meeanee, and I believe him.
An English general may not try experiments, but were I
a sovereign I could lead all the Beloochees against the
Seikhs, and do many greater things that are not to be
attempted by a servant. With the prestige of victory
anything may be effected with these people ; but a new
man without it, having at this moment the Lion and the
Affghans on the west, the Seikhs on the north, and an
army crippled with sickness, would be lost if a rising
were to take place. Every blockhead would then be
pressing advice on him, he would be unable to distinguish
the right road and all would be confusion. How then
can I consistently with my duty to Scinde, to England,

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. IV. to Lord Ellenborough, throw up the reins at such a time ?
1844> Impossible ! I must stay and bide what will. There are
thousands here in more danger from disasters than I am
in from sickness, and I will sink or swim with those poor
fellows."

In this mood he awaited the crisis, resolved, if Ah
Moorad gave offence, to assail Dejee, and so doing he
judged he should by one and the same blow reduce that
ameer and suppress any general conspiracy of the Belooch
chieftains — such as the Persian prince had supposed to be
in progress — arguing thus. (C If Ali resists me there must
be a general confederacy, for I know he is not, though so
reputed, of that hardihood to fight alone ; and if I take
him in his celebrated fortress, it will so terrify the tribes,
that their confederacy will melt away or they will pre-
maturely break out during the siege, for they think
Dejee invulnerable ; but sixteen heavy shells falling into it
every five minutes will break down that conceit."

To test Ali Moorad' s firmness, when the mortars had
reached Sukkur and attracted his attention, a gentle
recommendation to restore Sheik Ah Houssein was for-
warded. It had no effect, and then so rough an admo-
nition followed, that Sir George Arthur and the com-
mander-in-chief Sir J asper Nichols, who happened to be at
Bombay, objected to its being sent thinking it would force
the ameers into hostility. Sir C. Napier had judged his
man more sagaciously. While the Bombay faction was
representing him as the dupe and rewarder of Ali Moorad' s
treachery, he forced that prince to an entire submission.
The sheik was restored to the ministry with an assurance
that the ameer had never thought of setting aside that
worthy councillor — that his own back had been bent at
the idea of the governor's displeasure, but now finding his
conduct approved, his heart danced like the sunbeams on
the waters of delight — with other like flowers of Eastern
composition, — upon which the general drily remarked that
the " weight of sixteen mortars would have rendered the
complaint in the spine incurable." At this time he
described Ali Moorad as an inebriate, hunting, zenana-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

going fellow, who would, if not stayed by fear, help to cut CHAP. IV.
the English off as readily as any of the dethroned ameers ; 1844
afterwards he judged better of his disposition, though not
of his head, believing drink rather than treachery had
excited him to insolence.

Internal treason being thus restrained, external dangers
were regarded with less anxiety, and by the end of January
the resolution with which the crisis had been outfaced was
rewarded by a change in the aspect of affairs. The troops
were then rapidly recovering strength, the field artillery
had been well horsed, the police all armed, clothed, and
sufficiently disciplined to contend with the wild forces
of any enemy. Colonel Roberts had organized a strong
body of irregulars in Cutch, a thing vainly attempted
before by the Bombay political agents, and the desert
chiefs, bordering on the Run of Cutch, even proposed to
relinquish their predatory habits and settle in Scinde, so
entirely had the new governors reputation subdued their
lawless and fierce tempers. These were events of consider-
able importance, inasmuch as they completely guaranteed
tranquillity along the eastern frontier of Scinde. Shikar-
poore was therefore immediately reinforced from Sukkur
with three field-pieces, a regiment of irregular cavalry and
one of infantry, making up a force sufficient to defy the
Affghans and hillmen united; and the void thus left at
Sukkur was filled up by regular cavalry and a field battery,
which were sent from Kurrachee up the eastern bank
of the Indus. At the same time, Fitzgerald's camel corps,
now organized and able to march sixty miles a day, went
up the western and more dangerous side of Scinde, to
Larkaana ; and between those bodies the armed steamers,
ascending the river, formed a link of connection. Thus,
^hile the important points of Shikarpoore and Sukkur
were being reinforced, the troops destined for that service
acted as roving columns, traversing the country in various
directions, appearing stronger than they really were, and,
as always happens on such occasions, were still more
magnified by rumour.

These complicated movements, the exaggerated numbers,

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. IV. and the whispered ultimate intentions, were all calculated
1844 to distract and keep in a state of suspense, unfavourable
to conspiracy, the western Beloochee chiefs who might be
inclined for commotions. Meanwhile the 13th sepoy
regiment came from Bombay to Kurrachee, and Sir Robert
Sale, the renowned defender of Jellalabad, assumed the
temporary command at Sukkur, bringing with him his
own 13th veteran European regiment, then on its return
to England. Scinde was thus well garrisoned, and the
danger of having to fight external and internal enemies
with an army paralyzed by sickness was removed ; but the
views on which Sir C. Napier acted will be best shown by
extracts from an official memoir, in which he opposed a
proposition to withdraw a European regiment in De-
cember 1843, when the sickness was most prevalent.

" Scinde is now quiet, I know not that Beloochistan and
the Punjaub are so ; and if they become disturbed Scinde
will not be tranquil, because the Mahometan population,
so recently subdued, cannot be expected to remain free
from the external influence of nations having the same
faith. The people of Scinde are like all other people, there
is no mystery in governing them — they will be quiet when
they believe it for their interest, and when that interest
demands an insurrection they will rise. The Beloochees
are robbers by habit, and will probably be disposed to rise
if an attack from without offers an opportunity to plunder
the Hindoos and Scindees. Our troops must cross to the
western bank of the Indus to collect in the north if the
Punjaub becomes disturbed and an attack is menaced
from Beloochistan. It will then be necessary to place
the country, south of a line drawn from Kurrachee through
Hyderabad to the desert, under the guard of troops from
Cutch ; and that is one of the reasons why I wished to
have Cutch under the control of an able military man like
Colonel Roberts, instead of a political agent.

" The question of reducing or strengthening the force in
Scinde depends upon the state of the Punjaub. Scinde
internally is tranquil, but, until the agitation in the Punjaub
subsides and our government is firmly established here,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

two European regiments are necessaiy. The question is CHAP. IV.
one of general politics. If the Punjaub becomes hostile the
mountaineers of Beloocliistan will probably become so
likewise, and if so, Scinde must be strongly guarded."

This was his opinion in December, but in the latter end of
J anuary, when a battle near Gwalior had been fought by
Sir Hugh Gough — when his own adroit policy had stifled
any disposition for commotion amongst the western chiefs
— when he had collected his army in three masses, at
Kurrachee, Hyderabad, and Sukkur, with a strong ad-
vanced guard at Shikarpoore, the whole pointing as it were
in march against the Seikhs of the Punjaub, he again
developed his views of affairs.

" If the Seikhs cross the Hyphasis, I shall move every
man I can spare, without danger for Kurrachee and Hyder-
abad, upon Sukkur, and if possible lead a handy force to
the vicinity of Ooch, to hold Bhawalpoore and Mooltan
in check. If the former is faithful, I shall perhaps act
against Mooltan ; but I cannot cross the Sutlej unless
I have security for the Bhawalpoore man's faith — that is
to say Ms person in my camp — he might otherwise cut off
my supplies from the south, and my Hue of retreat. In
fine any demonstration I can make in favour of Lord
Ellenborouglr's operations on the Upper Sutlej I will
make, without waiting for orders ; for if the battles near
Gwalior have not been decisive, and the Seikhs cross the
Hyphasis, my communication with Ferozepore and Agra
will be cut off.

" The Seikhs, it is said, can turn out seventy thousand
men, of which forty thousand are well disciplined and
armed, and they have a powerful artillery. "Wherefore, if
I can keep Scinde quiet and hold the Bhawalpoore man
firm to our alliance, I shall do as much as seventeen
thousand sickly soldiers can well manage in this hot
climate. I fear my despatch to Lord Ellenborough has
not reached liim, but I shall act without orders if necessary,
and as my movements do not depend on his the failure of
the despatch is of little consequence. If I steady Bha-
walpoore I shall do much ; if I also draw off the Mooltan

g 2

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IV. force I shall do great things — more perhaps than I expect.
1SU> My opinion is however, that the Seikhs will not now
attack, because, if the Gwalior army has been quite
beaten, there will be twenty thousand troops disposable
for the Hyphasis, besides the force already on that river.
Gwalior is indeed a long way from the Hyphasis, and
that may expose the left bank to be ravaged, but the force
left there ought to be and I suppose is strong enough to
defend that river."

That an extensive confederacy against the British power
existed in the latter end of 1843, is certain, but the vigor-
ous policy and military energy of Sir C. Napier stopped it
as regarded Scinde ; and it was extinguished generally by
the battle of Maharajapoor gained near Gwalior. British
India was thus replaced in a commanding position, was
freed from serious internal mischief, and had only the
external hostility of the Seikhs to look for. The opera-
tions which led to this state of affairs were certainly the
results of Lord Ellenborouglr's military policy, which was
so exactly timed as to break at once the wide-spread
conspiracy; and as he was personally engaged in the
battle, a victory gloriously terminated the series of able
measures by which he had dragged the British power up
from the depths of degradation and disaster into which it
had been sunk. The success at Gwalior was not however
necessary to the maintenance of English supremacy in
Scinde. Neither the Affghan nor the Khelat tribes, nor
the Lion's influence, nor the treason of Ali Moorad — if he
had fallen away from his alliance — nor all those things
together, joined to a defeat at Gwalior, could have pro-
duced more than a momentary commotion — except while
the soldiers were down with the fever : for so entirely were
the three races now aware of their advantages under the
British rule, that they would have taken arms to resist a
change sooner than to forward one. Some Talpooree
sirdars might indeed have felt bound in honour to join a
prince of their family who appeared in arms, but the
general feeling in favour of the English was evinced in
an unmistakeable manner. The police were aided by

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Beloochee villagers to arrest armed deserters who resisted CHAP. IV.
capture; and where murders were committed, not of isu.
Europeans for they were never molested, but of women,
or in quarrels, the criminals were delivered up, though the
crime itself was held to be venial. In fine genius had
done its work.

But if Lord EHenborough, following the Indian system,
had restricted his lieutenant's discretion and power by
official rules, misplaced and inapplicable to the circum-
stances and the people, the conquest would have ended as
in Affghanistan, with a terrible disaster, and the treason-
able hopes and efforts of the Bombay faction would have
been realized. For so complicated were Scindian affairs,
civil and military, so nicely depending upon delicate and
timely management of men and interests, that none but
he to whom victory had given a key to the cipher could
have rightly interpreted the characters. In other hands
the massacre of a second British army would have hap-
pened, would have been followed by a Seikh and Affghan
invasion, an insurrection of the Mahomedan population of
India, and the open or secret defection of the preserved
sovereignties within the old frontier. Scinde was therefore
a great acquisition, and its condition and value at this
time were well set forth by Sir C. Napier in the following
condensed extract from a memoir, drawn up in reply to an
official question as to the policy of repairing or destroying
the many native forthwith which the country was spotted
like an angry leopard.

" The forts should be let alone. In this climate dilapi-
dation does not make rapid progress. To repair one fort, if
required, would not be difficult ; to repair them generally
would be very costly, the advantage small ; for the people
here and immediately around us, having no artillery, can
neither attack nor defend a fort with success against the
British.

" This is a frontier country which may be defended
with comparatively few troops ; the large force now here
is required only for the moment, because of the dis-
orderly state of the Punjaub and the conquest being so

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. IV. recent — the present establishment need not be perma-
1844. nent.

" Scinde furnishes a valuable frontier for North- Western
India, in a commercial as well as a military view.

" In a commercial, because of its river, which will facili-
tate the introduction of goods from the north ; and as it
has but one sea-port, that of Kurrachee, the custom-house
duties may be cheaply collected. The desert will also avail
to prevent contraband trade, because the passages across
are few and easily guarded. As a military frontier, it
protects the left flank of an army defending any of the
five rivers of the Punjaub, which as lines of defence may
be said to radiate northward from Mittenkote, on the
upper frontier of Scinde. Any of those rivers would
furnish a well-defined frontier for North- Western India ;
but while Scinde was in the hands of the hostile ameers
the left flank of all those lines could be taken in reverse.

" Reasoning therefore on abstract military principles,
the defence of the Hyphasis or Sutlej — the actual fron-
tier— would have been weak without the close alliance of
Bhawalpoore, which however could hardly have maintained
its alliance if pressed by Sawan Mull of Mooltan on the
north, and by the ameers of Scinde on the south. The
desert would have been no barrier for India against the
ameers — they could have passed it in many places — it
offered a strong barrier for them; because they could
destroy or poison the wells, or defend them by the very
forts which are the subjects under consideration, but
which would have been efficient against an invasion from
India. Now they are of little military advantage, because
we command both sides of the desert. The conquest of
Scinde has therefore strengthened the line of the Sutlej.

" It remains to treat of the military advantages pos-
sessed by Scinde itself for its own defence, on a line of
five hundred miles, traced from Mittenkote to the mouths
of the Indus.

" An enemy invading it north of Hyderabad, would
find the desert before him and a British force on both
flauks ; he must therefore change front to the right or

ADMINISTRATION OF SCIXDE.

left. If to the right, the troops in Southern Scinde would CHAP. IV.

be concentrated at Hyderabad, with a line of fortified 1814

posts behind them on one side, as far as Oniercote, all in

a good state, having been repaired or newly constructed

by me immediately after the battle of Hyderabad with

design to provide a secure communication with the Delta.

Thus concentrated at Hyderabad, the southern force would

have six lines of communication and of retreat, by which

supplies and reinforcements could reach it from India,

according to the season of the year. 1°. To Kurrachee.

2°. The mouths of the Indus by Yikkur. 3°. To Bhoog

the capital of Cutch. 4C. To Guzzerat. 5°. To Deesa.

6°. To Balmeer.

u Three of these have ports which ought to be protected
by works ; the other three are land communications,
and that by Omercote on Deesa I have secured with
fortified stations. But while the enemy thus turned
against the force of Lower Scinde, which from the variety
of communications could move in almost any direction, he
would have his flank vexed by the armed steamers on the
Indus, and they would insure the British communication
with the northern force based on Sukkur; for an army
cannot march very close along the banks of the Indus,
because of the numerous large watercourses and cuts for
irrigation.

" The northern force would be in direct communication
with the army on the Sutlej, and the other flank of the
invader would be pent in by the desert ; he would there-
fore perish, unless he gained a victory by forcing some
of the strong positions furnished, at every half-mile of
ground about Hyderabad, by the nullahs, which could be
easily and rapidly intrenched. The British force could
even then, though defeated, dispute the ground inch by
inch down to the sea ; or go across the desert to the
eastward ; or even cross the Indus, and taking Kurrachee
as a base of operations, and being in communication with
Bombay by sea when the monsoons did not prevail, could
act on the enemy's rear. Thus, all circumstances of
climate and ground considered, to pass the Indus between

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IV. Mittenkote and the sea would be a dangerous operation
1844. for an invader,

" If he turned to the north, after crossing that large and
dangerous river, he would meet with difficulties of a like
nature ; for the Sukkur force would have two lines of com-
munication and retreat open, and reinforcements would pour
down the Sutlej by water and through Bhawalpoore by
land. If he did not move northward, the British troops
at Sukkur, taking a position on the edge of the desert with
Shah-ghur and Jessulmeer in their rear, could menace his
right flank, which would compel him to follow them into
the desert ; while the force at Hyderabad and that coming
down from Ferozepoore, could close on both his flanks and
on his rear, and cut off his supplies without abandoning
their own lines of communication.

"These observations show that Scinde has by the con-
quest become a compact defensible well-defined frontier for
India ; but when it was in the ameers' hands, it compelled
the Indian government to keep large bodies of troops at
the eastern side, on a longer and weaker frontier-line, less
defined and more costly. By that conquest also a native
power, having a regular organized government vehemently
hostile to the British, was put away — a power which could
at any time have passed the desert to attack the Indian
frontier in its whole length; but which could not be so
easily attacked in return, because whoever commands
the watercourses is master of the desert. Upon these
grounds it may be assumed that few regular troops will be
wanted hereafter for the defence of Scinde ; and those less
for the security of the country than to give a strength to
the frontier-line of the Upper Sutlej which it does not
naturally possess.

" Kurrachee, independent of its great importance in the
general system of defence, will become so rich that it may
tempt the hill tribes to rush down and plunder it : where-
fore large fortifications are there requisite.

" Ahmed Khan, in the Hala mountains, should likewise
be made a fortified sanatorium, if found to be as salu-
brious as report makes it. But as yet its quality of

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

climate lias only been tested in cool weather : it must CHAP^l
likewise be tested in the heat of June. Its position is 1844.
good, and it covers the only known north road from
Kurrachee to Sehwan, which runs through the wild tracts
of country formed by the roots of the Hala hills. Those
hills are full of passes and scantily inhabited, yet the road
is one of great traffic, and fever is said to be unknown at
Ahmed Khan.

"All this seems irrelevant to the question of retaining or
dismantling the native forts ; yet it shows that if the main
points be strongly occupied, and yet fortified so as to be
defended by a few men, their usual garrisons can on
sudden emergencies send roving columns to suppress any
insurrection. But if all the native forts are repaired and
garrisoned, the troops in Scinde must be largely aug-
mented, and parcelled in detachments, which a well-planned
insurrection, boldly executed, and so timed as to turn the
raging sun to account, might cut off or starve into sub-
mission if not kept constantly stored with many months'
provisions, which would be a constant expense. If so
stored, the garrisons might indeed resist but could not
march out to quell disturbances : moreover, most of the
forts, having been constructed with reference to the facility
of obtaining water, are situated in low marshy places and
very unhealthy.

" The plan adopted is to keep the troops as much as
possible in masses, and always in readiness to move in any
direction to awe internal enemies. Against an invader
the force of Southern Scinde will assemble at Hyderabad,
and at Sukkur on the Indus ; but if an enemy approach
by the coast road from Soono-Meeanee, on the edge of
the Gedrosian desert, Kurrachee will become the point of
concentration instead of Hyderabad and Sukkur, and
there are to the westward strong positions, on the Arabis
or Hub river, which have been partially examined. If
he forces them he will still have to besiege Kurrachee
before he can approach the Indus, which he will find in
those lower parts without fords, and without boats, save
those armed and organized to prevent the passage — in

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. IV. itself a difficult operation even without opposition — but
1844* what army could bring a siege-train through Beloochistan
to reduce Kurrachee ?

"Our present state of affairs may be thus described,
We are only just getting firm hold of Scinde — we have
had a terrible sickness, and have not yet sufficient cover for
the troops because of the difficulty of obtaining artisans —
we were, previous to the conquest, and are still, very igno-
rant of the country — we have had to contend with
prejudice raised against us by the majority of the Indian
newspapers, which have, though in vain, laboured to
make the officers appear dishonourable, to create mutiny
amongst the sepoys, and to excite the Beloochees to rise
upon us during the sickness. Yet with all these impedi-
ments to overcome, we have obtained a grasp upon the
country which the forces of all Central Asia cannot loosen.

"From the first, the plan developed above, has been
pertinaciously followed with a prospective not a momentary
expediency ; where a fortification could not be constructed
from want of time or means, houses were loopholed, to be
afterwards expanded to permanent works ; therefore all
that has been effected forms, however minute in itself, a
portion of a general plan, and belongs to the system. The
conquest of Scinde does now, and will still more hereafter
add to the security and strength of the north-western
frontier of India, and it covers the south-western fron-
tier. So far from adding to the expense of the Indian
government, it will diminish it and augment the revenue
of the Company ; not only by the excess of receipts beyond
expenditure, but by obviating the necessity of keeping on
the Sutlej, and from Ferozepoor down to Cutch, so large
a force as must have been maintained had Scinde remained
under the ameers.

" The dangerous position of a British army on the upper
Sutlej may be well conceived, if Scinde, Gwalior, Nepaul
and the Punjaub were hostile and united, an event which
was very probable after the disaster at Cabool ; for the
princes of those states did certainly send confidential
agents to arrange treaties by word of mouth, and the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

extent of their secret coalition can never be ascertained, chap. IV.
This danger would have been very great if they had been
allowed time to complete their arrangements : and there
will always be peril, while native princes are left on their
thrones within the frontier. The people indeed are gene-
rally with us ; but the people will follow their native op-
pressors, because they are not civilized enough to think for
themselves.

"An extension of territory is however by no means
desirable. The upper Sutlej is a better frontier-line than
the upper Indus. The conquest of the Punjaub will soon
be forced upon us, but it is not at all desirable. It would
indeed be desirable to possess Bhawalpoore, and Scinde
was certainly necessary to the security of the north-eastern
frontier. The cry raised against the conquest, is as incom-
prehensible as the reasoning on it, which would set aside the
safety and well-being of a hundred millions of people to pre-
serve the power of a few treacherous chiefs, whose rights
were founded on violence and treason of a recent date.

" As we cannot take possession of Bhawalpoore, the next
best thing is to make the Nawab both friendly and power-
ful, he will then have more to lose if he behaves ill.
His dethronement would give us an unbroken frontier-line
from the mouths of the Indus to the sources of the Sutlej,
and the great advantage of having a river for a frontier is
obvious. It furnishes a definite boundary and does not
separate the people on its banks, they mix as civilization
advances. A mountain frontier prevents friendly inter-
course between the tribes on each side ; they pillage each
other to the great inconvenience of the most civilized,
and a state of aggression and hatred becomes permanent
and virulent.

" The western frontier of Scinde under the ameers, was
the Arabis river, which can be traced northwards for about
one hundred and thirty miles; from thence the boundary- See Plan No.l.
line was a chain of hills, forming part of the Hala range of
mountains and also about one hundred and thirty miles
in length, ending near Chandia of the Chandika tribe.
From Chandia it strikes off, for one hundred and forty

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IV. miles in a north-eastern direction, running parallel to the
1844 Indus at an average distance of forty miles, until it
touches the foot of the Cutchee hills and there turns down
to the river, which it falls upon at Kusmore. That por-
tion which joins Chandia to the Cutchee hills is chiefly
desert, and the whole line of boundary is positively defined
by rivers, mountains and sandy wastes : it is generally
well known, and a good frontier to adhere to on that side.
The resources for defence are also very good on the lower
and on the upper parts ; but the Hala range is not known
beyond the general character of mountains, namely that
they have their ordinary passes, and can be crossed every-
where when circumstances require the effort."

Such were the external relations of Scinde, its interior
condition and its intrinsic value shall be shown in the
next chapter.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

CHAPTER V.

Notwithstanding the disturbance of the civil adminis- CHAP. V.
tration, caused by the visitations mentioned in the fore- j^JJ
going chapter, the progress of the public works and the
vigorous repression of crime, taught the people, that while
force was exhibited good only was intended. Inquiries as
to the natural and artificial productions were set on foot,
and it was found that in pottery the Scindians were pe-
culiarly skilful, that the Tattah manufactures might be
in time revived, and the natural productions were rich and
varied. Grain of all kinds, which might be grown in un-
limited quantities, opium, tobacco, soda, indigo, alum and
sugar. Iron was to be found in the Hala mountains, and
near them sulphur of the first quality, easily obtained;
saltpetre was abundant, and in the Delta were discovered
beds of the purest salt fourteen feet thick. Vast tracts
of fine timber lined the banks of the Indus, and every-
where the land gave the lie to the shameless assertions that
Scinde was a "barren waste, incapable of sustaining a
large population." Cotton, indigo, and sugar, only wanted Appendix II.
the advantage of good methods of cultivation to exceed
the same products in any part of India, and Sir C. Napier
endeavoured to improve the sugar cultivation by pro-
curing West-Indian canes from Egypt, where they had
been introduced with success ; but this effort was malig-
nantly frustrated by Bombay officials, who retained the
plants there until they died.

The new police were now creeping over the face of the
country, establishing their power by degrees and enabling
the collectors to organize the judicial system, to obtain

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. V. information, enforce the collection of taxes with greater
1844 impartiality,. and protect the gathering of the autumnal
harvest on which the revenue chiefly depended.

No site for a sanatorium had yet been discovered, and the
want of healthful barracks could not be remedied, because
a scarcity of artisans was renewed by the recent pesti-
lence. A first effort to establish a sanatorium at Ahmed
Khan, the favourite residence of the great sultan of that
name, had not been fortunate, and the failure, conjoined
with want of cover, compelled the hurried building of
barracks — when the artisans returned — at great cost, and
before the best sites could be ascertained. Meanwhile the
soldiers were hutted in various parts, and moved, when
circumstances would permit, according to the season, so
as to avoid the evil influence of the river. But that like-
wise was attended with difficulties ; for during the inun-
dation the waters pursued them everywhere over the
plains, while the mountains were generally without water,
and without roads for the conveyance of provisions and
materials for hutting. These embarrassments, which
were cruelly augmented by the effects of the fever on the
population, had rendered the cool season nearly a blank
for work, and the administration had now to drag itself
along as it could in the raging heat.

Amongst the many vexations to be encountered, none
were more wearisome than the thwartings of official
men — not only those impelled by factious motives but
others, described as good men and honest, but little
men, who sincerely believed the governor of S chide ought
to be gibbeted as an example to innovators; and who,
with their official meshes tied him down as Gulliver was
by the Lilliputians : and whenever he broke loose which
was not seldom, a flight of small poisoned missives were
sure to follow. When all his time and energies were
required to insure tranquillity and the safety of his army,
hundreds of letters, especially from the Bombay govern-
ment offices, civil and military, were transmitted to and
fro three or four times on the commonest matters, while
the most important ones were indefinitely delayed; and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

this immense unnecessary labour was, there is much reason CHAP. V.
to believe, imposed on him in a climate proverbially dis- 1844
tressing and exhausting to European constitutions, pur-
posely, in the villanous hope of destroying life !

Amidst these difficulties the protection of Upper Scinde,
west of the Indus, against the mountain and hill tribes
was become a subject of great anxiety. Many chiefs of
the former had not made salaam, and two were in arms,
plundering. The latter were at open war on the simple
principle of spoil, without pretending a political motive ;
and though the irregular cavalry had been well disposed,
and precise arrangements made for its protective action
along the tormented frontier, the hillmen's forays were
made with circumstances of frightful ferocity, and there
was danger of the example exciting not only the Khelat
mountain-tribes, but the Scindian chiefs of the Hala
range to the same courses. To prevent this, Fitzgerald's
camel corps was quartered at Larkaana, and he was ordered
to construct a strong fort there as a base for his opera-
tions. Soon after his arrival he made a march of one
hundred miles in twenty-four hours, and carried off a
criminal chief from the midst of his tribe, which so awed
the other recusant Scindian chiefs, they offered to make
their salaams. Even the hillmen became alarmed, a mo-
mentary fear as after events proved, yet it gave the poor
villagers a short respite.

At this time all danger of an Affghan descent to raise
the Beloochees in favour of the Lion ceased. For that
unhappy prince having besought the aid of the Candahar
chiefs, was by those perfidious barbarians treated, as he,
a barbarian himself, should have anticipated, and as the
general had foreseen when he described him as a king who
was his own ambassador. Having got all they could from
him by cajolery, they set persons at night to converse with
his servants, telling them to provide for their own safety
as the ameer had been sold for two lacs and a half to the
" Bahadoor J ung." The poor exile thus deceived, mounted
his horse and fled to the Cutchee hills, where he was well
received, and commenced anew his efforts to raise com-

SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S

CHAP. V. motions in Scinde ; but as the Bhoogtees, with whom he
1844. resided, were then at fend with the Murrees his schemes
failed. The hopes of the Bombay faction were thus again
baffled ; and their political prophecies as to insurrections,
were at the same time signally belied by the sudden sub-
mission of all the western Scindian chiefs. These men, who
had hitherto held out, were now induced by Fitzgerald's
vigorous action and the growing influence of the new
government to submit. One hundred and fifteen came
down towards Kurrachee with their armed followers — in
number an army — on the 21st of March, but halted
within ten miles and sent this laconic message — We are
come.

The reply was — Good! but come not with arms or woe
awaits you ! Down went all the weapons and they entered
the camp like suppliants.

Greeted somewhat sternly, they were asked why they
had not come sooner? "We were too much frightened
to appear in your presence."

Of what were you afraid ? — " We do not know, but
we come now to lay ourselves down at your feet, you are
our king, we pray for pardon ! "

Well, chiefs ! Answer this ! Have I done evil to any
person except in fair fight ? — " No ! you have been mer-
ciful to all, every one says so." Then why were you
afraid? — "We do not know, you are our king, pardon
us and we will guard the country from your enemies."

I do not want you to guard anything, you saw my
camel soldiers, I can send as many regiments as there are
camels. I can defend Scinde, I do not want you to
defend it, I want you to be good servants to the queen
my mistress. — "We will be!" — Come then and make
salaam to her picture. They did so, and were thus
addressed. There is peace between us. All Scinde
now belongs to my queen, and we are henceforth fellow-
subjects; but I am here to do justice, and if after this
voluntary submission any of you rob or plunder, I will
march into your country and destroy the offender and his
tribe. Chiefs ! you all know I won the battles when I had

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

only five thousand men, I have now fifteen thousand, and CHAP. V.

a hundred thousand more will come at my call ; you will

believe therefore that this is not an empty threat ; but let

peace be between us, and I give back to all their jagheers,

and what they possessed under the ameers." Then they

all cried out, " You are our king ! what you say is true,

let it be so ! we are your slaves ! "

These terms being settled, they were told the troops
should be shown to them in order of battle. They did
not like that ; few had ever seen a European, they knew
nothing of civilized customs, feared it was a design to kill
them without danger, and their terror, which had been
very evident throughout the conference, visibly augmented.
The general observing this conversed familiarly with
them, and discovering some who had been in the battles
and knew him again by sight, he bantered them, de-
manding why they had run away when his cavalry charged
at Dubba ? ' ' Because we were frightened answered one
with a quiet simplicity ; and that also was the reason I
did not come here sooner ; for it is said that you like the
men who stood and fought better than those who fled —
and I fled." Another shrewd old chief being told he had
been close on the rear of the army with ten thousand
men while Meeanee was being fought, quickly answered
" No ! I had only eight thousand." Then he named
the tribes who were in march to join the ameers, showing
that more than eighty thousand warriors would have
been assembled if that battle had been delayed; and
these statements tallied so accurately with the reports
of the spies at the time as to leave no doubt of their
correctness.

This conversation excited merriment with the majority,
but the general, whose jests and behaviour were all
calculated, observed several stern-looking men who could
not be moved to laughter, and who were evidently ready
for mischief when opportunity offered, bending only to
circumstances: wherefore, persisting in his design to
give them a lesson as to what they might expect in war
by showing them his troops, he drew out two European

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. V. and two sepoy regiments, six guns well horsed, and his
I84Z own gu^ds of one hundred Scindian cavalry.

The reluctance of the chiefs to appear at the review
was not disguised, yet they came to his door on horseback
at the hour appointed, purposely a late one, and rode to
the field, where the troops, after marching past, formed line
and threw out skirmishers. Of this they all seemed to think
little; but when the line advanced their thoughts changed.
" That is the way you came on at Dubba," exclaimed a
brave Lhugaree leader, and the others cried out, u By
Allah ! it is a wall.— A moving wall. Nothing can with-
stand that. Oh Padishaw, you are master of the world !"
A long and well-sustained file fire with a cannonade was
then opened, and continued until the air was so agitated
they could not hear each other speak, whereupon the fire
suddenly ceased and the line charged shouting. These
two things astonished them most ; they had heard of the
great rapidity of the British musketry fire, but had not
believed in it. Soon the artillery sought refuge, as from
cavalry, and the troops formed squares. It was then
dusk and the sheets of bright flame covering those small
masses, with the rapid march of the guns over the rocky
heights in the vicinity, amazed and delighted them.
When their exclamations discovered this temper of mind
they were dismissed with assurance that they had received
the honours paid to kings in Europe, which pleased them ;
and the general was satisfied that fear, and content as to
their future condition, would keep them true, unless events
very unfavourable to the British supremacy should arise to
awaken other thoughts.

Now he felt master of Scinde, as a conqueror and as a
legislator ; for all these chiefs had submitted voluntarily,
and his policemen, who had fought several times success-
fully with the smaller robber bands, had been generally
aided by the Beloochee villagers. They were also become
so amenable to discipline, that one of their native officers,
having robbed by virtue of his office in the eastern
manner, and flogged a villager, was sent under guard of
his own men to the place of his offence, was forced to refund

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

the sum taken, had his uniform stripped off, and received CHAP. v.
in right the number of lashes he had bestowed in wrong. 1844#
A kardar also of great power and influence, possessing a
jagheer of fire thousand acres, being detected in public
frauds and oppression of the poor, lost his jagheer, was
mulcted in five hundred pounds, and sent to work on the
roads in chains. These examples spread far and wide.
" This is justice" exclaimed the people. " When before
this was it ever known that the officers of the government
were punished for ill-treating a poor villager ? The
padishawis great, he is just."

In April, the sick being reduced from twelve thousand
to less than nine hundred, the roads and levels for the
canals, the general surveys, the barracks, and the mole
making good progress, and the universal goodwill to-
wards the government being apparent, the organization
of two battalions of native Beloochee troops was com-
menced, with a view to lessen the number of regular
soldiers employed in Scinde. The general knew those
battalions, although there were amongst them men who
had fought at Meeanee, would be true against the Seikhs j
and if an insurrection happened their defection would be
of little consequence beyond the loss of their arms. Of
insurrection however, he had so little dread, that he would
have restored two regiments to the Bombay government,
being certain, if the Punjaub was settled, he could hold
Scinde in tranquillity ; but the nations and tribes beyond
the frontier were all disturbed by the Seikh commotions,
and some new menacing movements by the Cutchee hill-
men, and the unreasonable alarm which they created in the
mind of the officer commanding at Sukkur gave him at
this time uneasiness.

General Sale had come to Kurrachee on his way to
England, and his temporary successor, conjuring up ima-
ginary enemies, thought and said he should be Cabooled,
though not more than six thousand warriors could come
against him from the hills before reinforcements arrived.
The Cabool massacre had indeed terrified all British India,
and still haunted weak minds j showing how justly Napo-

h 2

100 SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. V. leon assigned the greatest proportion of force in war to
1844 moral influences. Sir C. Napier as keenly sensible of the
truth of this maxim as his subordinate was of the Cabool
influence, sent Brigadier Simpson to take the command
in Upper Scinde ; and meanwhile, as the spring harvest was
gathered and the submission of the hundred and fifteen
western chieftains complete, he resolved to put in execution
a measure commanded by Lord Ellenborough at the close
of the preceding year, but which the sickness and other
events had delayed — namely to issue a summons for all the
Scindian Beloochee chiefs to meet in Durbar at Hyder-
abad, and there do homage on her majesty's birthday.

Such a great ceremony was desirable, as a sign and a
warning to surrounding tribes and nations that Scinde was
irrevocably and willingly a British province; but when Lord
Ellenborough called for it, neither he nor Sir C. Napier ex-
pected more than two or three thousand Beloochees, chiefs
and followers, to assemble. Now it was discovered that twenty
or thirty thousand would appear, and not a Durbar but a
formidable army, which might in a moment take offence
and renew the war, was to be dealt with. The affair was
serious, and recourse was had to policy for rendering it
harmless ; yet the general was proudly confident it would
end in a signal rebuke to the detestable factions, which in
Bombay and in England were then daily announcing that
force alone prevented a general insurrection.

He might however have reasonably feared violence at
such a meeting, for scarcely could a tribe be named which
had not to deplore the deaths of their bravest warriors
slain in the battles : one old man had lost his whole tribe,
none were left but himself ! Yet often he came to see his
conqueror, received presents from him, and would find
consolation in speaking of his own calamity, never show-
ing anger though nearly crazed with grief. Nevertheless
the presence of many a desperate vengeful Beloochee,
brainsick at the fall of his race, was to be expected ; and
as they were all fatalists, careless of life and holding
assassination to be no crime — some of them also religious
fanatics — a sudden death-stroke, covered by a tumult and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

101

followed by a combat, was far from unlikely, even though CHAP. V.
no previous design of violence had been entertained. 1844.
For such risks however his mind was always as well
prepared and braced as it was for open battle ; and the
unshrinking nerve with which he could sustain the ap-
proach of seeming mischief had been previously shown in
the following remarkable manner.

An Indian sword-player declared at a great public
festival, that he could cleave a small lime laid on a man's
palm without injury to the member, and the general
extended his right hand for the trial. The sword-player,
awed by his rank, was reluctant and cut the fruit horizon-
tally. Being urged to fulfil his boast he examined the
palm, said it was not one to be experimented upon with
safety, and refused to proceed. The general then extended
his left hand, which was admitted to be suitable in form ;
yet the Indian still declined the trial, and when pressed,
twice waved his thin keen-edged blade as if to strike, and
twice withheld the blow, declaring he was uncertain of
success. Finally he was forced to make trial, and the
lime fell open cleanly divided — the edge of the sword had
just marked its passage over the skin without drawing a
drop of blood !

But this meeting involved great political interests, and
other than personal dangers were to be apprehended;
wherefore, as before observed, recourse was had to adroit
management. First, under pretence of sparing the chiefs
a long journey, those of Upper Scinde were required to
wait on General Simpson at Shikarpoor, by which a part
of the multitude was thrown off. And at Hyderabad, the
place of conference was appointed between the Phullaillee
and the Indus, the western tribes being to assemble on the
right bank of the latter river, opposite the intrenched camp ;
the eastern tribes on the right bank of the Phullaillee, and
consequently on the left bank of the Indus. The steamers
were to float between the two bodies which therefore
could not unite, and the concentrated British troops were
covered from both by the rivers.

With these precautions the assembling of an unusually

102

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. V. large British force could be avoided, which was desirable,
1844. because of the heat, and because insolence might be excited
by an appearance of fear ; and any show of distrust might
produce panic, seeing that the Beloochees, arguing from
their own customs, were not devoid of suspicion that a
general massacre was designed. There were however to be
four thousand men and sixteen guns, having the support of
a fortress and an intrenched camp covered by two rivers,
on one of which were the armed steamers; and it was
arranged to call the Beloochees over the river by tribes —
none to pass either stream until called. It was also pro-
claimed, that chieftains only should appear at the assembly
armed. Thus preserving the haughty tone and domi-
nation of a conqueror, the general calculated that he
should awe those wild warriors, most of whom only knew
of him by his battles, while he tested their temper, seeing
that any violation of this command would have argued a
readiness for violence.

The Durbar was appointed for May, and meanwhile,
taking an escort of sixty irregular horsemen, Sir Charles
rode to Hyderabad through the Jokea territory without
attending to frequented routes. He had been strongly
advised not to do so, heard of strange difficulties, which
he disregarded, and found as he expected a generally
fertile district with easy passes over the lower ranges
of those very hills which had been described to him
as of terrible asperity. In one of them his attention was
attracted to the colour and great weight of the stones,
indicating the presence of iron, and he was afterwards
informed by a Beloochee chief that iron was there obtained
and used in the fabrication of arms.

While at Hyderabad he visited the field of Meeanee,
where a large tomb was^being raised by the Beloochees
over the body of Jehan Mohamed, the chief killed in
single combat by Captain McMurdo. Another was com-
pleted over the brave swordsman who had assailed himself,
and was slain by Lieutenant Marston. This tomb was on
the spot where the man fell. That of Jehan was advanced
far beyond the line where the British troops fought, as if

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

103

he had broken through — an indication of military pride CHAP. V.
not lost upon the legislator : he viewed it as marking a 1844.
generous love of honour in the Beloochee race which
could be made available for attaching them to the new
government.

Having terminated the business which brought him to
Hyderabad, he returned to Kurrachee by a different road,
taking notes of all that might conduce to the future
welfare of the country ; but while thus engaged he was
disquieted with news of another incursion made by the
Bhoogtees, Jackranees and Doomkees, at the instigation
of the Lion, and executed with unusual ferocity. For it
was not common with the Beloochees to ill-treat women
and children in their feudal wars; yet here they had
destroyed the village of Mean-Ka-Kote, killed forty
people, and cut off the hands of children to get at
their bracelets ! This ferocity, and the dreadful misery of
the frontier inhabitants exposed to such inroads, made
him resolve, if gentler means failed, to compel those tribes
to become quiet neighbours, either by stimulating other
tribes to hostility against them, or by subduing them
with regular warfare, and sweeping them from their hills.
By the first he hoped to make them settle further from
the frontier, and to that he was most inclined, foreseeing
all the difficulties of the second ; one or other was how-
ever imperative ; for the mischief was become intolerable
in itself and pregnant with future evils. Already Cutch
Gundava had been rendered desolate, and the Scindian
frontier was nearly as miserable ; few villages were left
standing; and scarcely any cultivators were to be found
between Shikarpoore, and Poolagee the stronghold of
Beja the Dhoomkee who had made this inroad: with
exception of a few idle men in league with the robbers,
the whole population was preparing to emigrate.

Beja Khan, celebrated for his strength, courage and
enterprise, was embued with an inveterate hatred of the
English, having been, as he asserted, perfidiously entrapped
during the Affghan war by Captain Postans, a sub-political
agent. His wrongs however could not be considered at

104

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. V. this time, because he had, after his liberation, made a
1844, treaty with the British ; and though a subject of Khelat,
which was in alliance., had now ravaged a part of Scinde.
The khan of Khelat himself had received a considerable
sum of money from Sir C. Napier and was inclined to hold
faith ; but he was a boy, unable to control his Durbar,
and being menaced and interfered with by the chiefs of
Candahar was thus openly disobeyed by Beja Khan, who
was also secretly encouraged by the Khelat sirdars.

This state of affairs was very disquieting. The Scinde
frontier was being depopulated, the governor's reputation
must sink in the opinion of the surrounding people if he
did not avenge the injury, and military negligence had
certainly caused the disaster. The irregular cavalry
disposed along the frontier were sufficient to have pre-
vented the foray, or at least met and punished the robbers,
and some signal chastisement was therefore called for;
but as the hot season was rapidly advancing, to take the
field then would cost the lives of many soldiers. The
raging sun had been indeed braved the year before to
break up the Lion's power and effect the sudden conquest
of Scinde — those objects being sufficiently great to justify
the measure — but the punishment of these robber tribes
was not commensurate with the risk, and therefore action
was reluctantly suspended until the cool weather.

The hope of civilizing those wild people by gentle
means, grafted upon a vigorous repression of their lawless
proceedings, was however still entertained; and in that
view it was designed to inform them that past transgres-
sions would be pardoned if they ceased from further
offence ; if not, their country would be devastated ; but
previous to sending this message, an untoward event
intervened to give a new aspect and greater importance to
their warfare. It happened thus. Sir C. Napier had been
importuned to allow of an attempt to surprise Beja in his
town of Poolagee, because Fitzgerald of the camel corps,
who had formerly resided there, thought his knowledge of
the place would enable him to take the chief in his bed.
Such a stroke would have been very conducive to the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

105

general's views and lie consented. He had not been told CHAP. V.
Poolagee was a walled place or lie would have refused 1844>
altogether ; but he knew a watchful barbarian like Beja
was not to be taken by a careless operation, and that
failure would be hurtful in a political view and dangerous
to the troops employed; wherefore he enjoined absolute
secrecy as to the enterprise, and ordered the following
dispositions to be observed.

The camel corps was to make a forced march of sixty
miles to reach Poolagee; the irregular cavalry was to
follow in support, and be in turn supported by infantry
with guns; moreover, not liking to trust the operation
entirely to the sanguine young man who had proposed it,
nor the superintendence of it to the officers in temporary
command at Sukkur and Shikarpoor, he desired that
nothing should be attempted until General Simpson, then
on his way to assume the chief command in Upper Scinde
and well instructed as to this particular enterprise, should
arrive. With these precautions he thought no serious
mischief could happen. But war is never without its
crosses from time, circumstances, and persons ; Simpson
was not waited for, secrecy was not observed, and the
system of supports was entirely neglected.

Five hundred horsemen under Captain Tait, and two
hundred of the camel corps under Fitzgerald, marched
across the desert, lost their way, and arrived at eight
o'clock in the morning, exhausted with fatigue, before a
fortress, defended by a good garrison of several hundred
matchlock-men under Beja, who had obtained accurate
knowledge of the design. Fitzgerald with impetuous
resolution led his men against the gate, designing to blow
it open with a sack of powder; carried by the same
sergeant who had effected that exploit at Ghuznee in
Lord Keane's Affghan campaign; but the Bhooghtees
killed the gallant sergeant with nine other soldiers, and
wounded twenty-one. How Fitzgerald escaped death none
could say, for striding in his gigantic strength at the head
of the stormers he was distinguished alike by his size and
daring, and well known of person to numbers of the

106

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. V. matchlock-men on the walls, yet he returned without a
1844 wound ! Irritated by his repulse, and naturally vehement
he would have renewed the attack, but Captain Tait
ordered a retreat. This was made with difficulty and
could not have been effected at all, if water had not been
found at an abandoned post in the desert called Chuttar,
fortunately overlooked by the enemy when filling up the
other wells to impede the march. From Chuttar the
retreat was continued to Kanghur, the nearest Scindian
post, by an uninterrupted march of seventy-five miles
under a burning sun, which was sustained with noble
energy. Only one exhausted soldier fell during the
movement, and a few moments after a Jackranee came up
and cut him to pieces ; but vengeance soon followed ; the
same Jackranee having tried to spy in a village, was seized
and delivered up by the villagers, and being a noted
ruffian was immediately hanged.

Great had been the firmness of the sepoys in this affair,
and the two young officers who had acted so rashly fell
sick with chagrin; but the intrepidity displayed at the attack
and the hardihood of the retreat, were so conspicuous, the
general smothered his vexation — which was yet so great
as to bring on fever — rather than augment their mortifi-
cation. He was at first inclined to go to Sukkur, but was
withheld by a motive that had actuated him from the
time he won his first battle, offering an illustration of
the subtle combinations of moral and material power by
which he effected such great actions. Once placed in the
commanding position of a conqueror he had resolved never
to appear where he could not strike heavily, lest the fear
of his prowess should abate. After the battle of Dubba,
thinking Omercote would resist and he should not have
time to besiege it, he would not go there in person ; and
now he would not approach the scene of this disaster
until the season should permit him to take the field in a
formidable manner.

While revolving in his mind a remedy for the political
mischief this failure jnight produce, another proof of the
entire ascendancy he had obtained over the Beloochee

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

107

race was furnished by the two powerful chieftains of the CHAP. V.
Chandikas and Mugzees — the first a Scindian, the last a \^
Khelat tribe. Hearing of the defeat at Poolagee, they
proffered their swords to war against Beja and against
their old master the Lion. Wullee the leader of the
Chandians, whose vow of fidelity has been recorded, was
foremost on this occasion to offer his services, and they
were gladly accepted, as certain to occupy the attention of
the robber tribes during the hot weather ; at the termi-
nation of which more formidable combinations could be
made. Nor was the brave old Chandian slack to fulfil
his promises. Before the 15th of May he killed above
forty of the Jackranees and sent in more than five hun-
dred head of their cattle.

Beja's foray — instigated by the Lion and for his
behoof — furnished another proof that the ameers had
no hold over the minds of their former feudatories. No
man assumed arms in their favour ; not a sound of
sedition was heard ; and two of the most powerful tribes
had, as just shown, voluntarily taken arms to punish the
predatory invaders. The fame of the exploit, magnified
by Beja himself, spread however, far into Asia; he was
looked to as a chieftain capable of defeating the Fering-
hees, and thus obtained a swollen reputation and immense
influence ; but for the ameers no man would fight, none
desired their return. Yet this time was chosen by the
Bombay faction to proclaim that the submission of the
people was that which the lamb paid to the wolf, and
that they only watched an opportunity for insurrection !

The condition of Scinde was at this period very happy
in all things save the killing of women in families, and
these predatory excursions ; but Sir C. Napier's determi-
nation to free the country from both those evils was thus
expressed. — "1 have declared that women shall not be
foully murdered, and that merchants shall travel in safety.
I have hanged twelve men to repress the first crime and
I will hang twelve hundred if necessary. For the robbers,
if they will not be quiet and give hostages for their good
behaviour, I will with an army, lay their country waste.

108

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. V. They come with fire and sword into our territory ; they
1844. shall be visited with fire and sword in return ; and I will
undertake that without compunction, because I can save
their women and children although they have not re-
spected ours." There was however another subject of
disquietude thus described.

ce Seikhs and Mooltanees have certainly glided through
the hills with a view to depredations — a strong indication
of what the Punjaub army, which is now gathered on the
right of the Sutlej will do. The lawless state of that
army must bring on a war. It is impossible that the
Indian government can permit seventy thousand armed
ruffians to hang on her frontier, ready at any moment —
without war proclaimed — to rush across the river and
ravage our north-western provinces ; nor can the govern-
ment afford the expense and vexation of keeping up there
and in Scinde strong armies of observation. The frontiers
of Mooltan and Scinde touch, and for my part I will not
suffer the kick of a fly from Sawan Mull. He professes
friendship and he shall keep faith or take the conse-
quences. Yet I pray that he may not provoke me, that
no war may break out, I want to see no more; it is
fearful work in its best form, and revolting to me. I
hate it, though humanity will certainly gain by a Punjaub
conquest as it has done by the Scindian one. What
I rejoice to look at is the zeal with which our young
officers, my soldier-civilians, work, in defiance of the sun
and of fever and the debilitating influence of climate, to
do good and dispense justice to the people ; and I believe
the latter are sensible of their merits and grateful, for
everywhere we meet with civility and all the appearance
of goodwill."

The time for holding the great Durbar having now
arrived, Sir C. Napier repaired to Hyderabad, travelling
under a sun which was beginning to shoot its fiercest
rays. The fortress was restricted in size for holding the
conference, and danger was to be dreaded if it was filled
with fighting men while an army of Beloochees was with-
out ; but the necessity of having shade for all overruled

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

109

this objection, and the chiefs were admitted inside with CHAP. V.
their followers, under the regulation before mentioned. 1844<
Amongst them were a thousand jagheerdars, who, from
fear and distrust, had never before submitted, but now
made their salaams and received pardon. It was a spec-
tacle of great magnificence and still greater interest.
Nearly twenty thousand Beloochees, horsemen and foot-
men, in their bright tinted habiliments, crowded the banks
of the two rivers, on one of which floated the armed
steamers. Under that brilliant sky the many-coloured
multitudes, bearing the flags and streamers of their tribes,
were seen lining the banks of the rivers, while tribe after
tribe passed amidst discordant shouting and the thundering
of guns in salute. All were obedient to the order about
arms, and all hastened to proffer their entire submission
to the man who had, within a few miles of that place, only
fourteen months before covered the ground with their
slaughtered kinsmen.

lie received them day after day, he walked amongst
them, he was closely surrounded by hundreds; yet no
man thought of revenge, none proffered a word of anger —
the battles had been fairly fought, the blows manfully
exchanged, and all remembrance of the hurt was merged
in a feeling of gratitude to the conqueror who had so
promptly stayed the terror of the sword and substituted
for it a beneficent legislation. The speeches of the chiefs,
filled with eastern compliments, were only accepted as
sincere when corroborated by their actions; yet there
were feelings exhibited which could not be mistaken.
One very old man endeavouring to force a way to the
general was pushed back; but he struggled and cried
with a loud voice I will not be put back I have come
two hundred miles to see him and I will do so — let me
pass.

During the three days of the ceremony a hot wind
from the desert struck fourteen European soldiers of the
86th dead, and the regiment afterwards became very
sickly for a time. It was a grievous calamity, and the
Bombay faction did not fail to raise a cry of murder;

110

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. v. saying the deaths arose from exposing the troops to
1844> protect Sir C. Napier; but it so happened, the greatest
number of men stricken were not in any manner con-
nected with the guard of honour, which was by these
malignant persons called a guard of safety — though it
was never near his person — because their hope that his
career would have been ended by an assassin's knife was
disappointed. Accident and the governor-generars orders
had forced him to hold this great meeting in the heat, as
the necessity of putting down the Lion had compelled him
the year before to take the field at the same season — and
these things he did, " because without them results which
appeared to the unthinking as easily arrived at could
not have been attained ; but they are vital experiments."
The cry of blood raised by the Bombay faction was
however only an ebullition of rage at seeing its vile
prognostications so signally falsified.

At this memorable Durbar was arranged that most
delicate and difficult portion of the basis of all government,
— the tenure of landed property. Under the ameers it
had been variable and insecure. The jagheers, some of
which were sixty square miles, had been always granted
on military service tenure; but the jagheerdars were only
tenants at will, and that will very capricious, the whole
system going to foster a community of legalized robbers.
Sir C. Napier had before substituted mattock and spade for
the service of shield and sword, the jagheerdar being
bound to produce labourers for public works instead of
warriors for public mischief. Now he restored to the sons
of all jagheerdars who had fallen in battle against him
their fathers' lands ; and to them and all others he gave
the choice of paying rent instead of holding their land on
the service tenure.

This rent was not based on the value of the jagheer —
that would have been resisted sword in hand, because the
lands had been received as gifts of fortune and favour, not
as estates nicely balanced as to labour and value. It was
calculated on the expense of the military service which had
been attached to it ; and if a jagheerdar said he was unable

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

Ill

to pay the rent, he was offered the land for a life purchase, CHAP. v.
and even longer, on condition that so much of the jagheer 1344.
as would, if let to ryots, pay the rent demanded, should be
withheld by the government. This gave a secure tenure
of the remainder for life ; but when those shrewd men
were told the monthly expense of the retainers they were
bound to produce would be the basis of calculation for
rent, they answered, that when called out in war they had
the chance of booty and the general could not go to war
every month ! No ! nor every year, was the reply; and
therefore, if the expense be eighty rupees, for example, the
government calls upon you, not for that sum monthly,
but for half of it yearly.

Satisfactory to many was this arrangement, and the
portion of land resigned was let to ryots upon terms, to be
hereafter mentioned, which soon furnished the whole rent
originally demanded, and widely extended cultivation.
Thus, with great policy and imperceptibly to them, the
greater jagheer dars were made proprietors, and the smaller
ones yeomen, interested in the welfare of the land, instead
of being savage warriors, prowling robbers and seditious
subjects, always ready to excite commotions for the sake
of spoil. Sir Charles Napier knew time only could con-
solidate such a project; but government lost nothing
save military service which it did not want ; and meanwhile
the jagheerdars, having a secure tenure and no hope from
commotion, acquired an interest in the welfare of their
ryots. He expected also that the successful industry of
the cultivators settled on the government lands, would
stimulate the hitherto predatory Beloochee to seek profit
from agriculture — and the readiness with which many
jagheerdars accepted the terms, the evident disposition of
the poorer Beloochees to traffic, and the eagerness of the
ryots to obtain government grants, led him to think a
generation might suffice to change the character of the
population, and render Scinde one of the richest and most
industrious of the East. To forward this he contemplated
a cautious system of resuming jagheers where there was
default, designing to parcel them out in such proportions

112

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. V. as would raise the cultivators to the condition of substantial
!844. farmers, and thus gradually reduce the territorial power
of the great chiefs and sirdars. And from all jagheers he
took away their royalties ; that is to say, the right which
they conferred of life and death and unrestrained taxa-
tion.

Having thus commenced his system of rent with the
consent of many jagheerdars, for he forced it on none, he
was indifferent as to regular payments for a few years, his
object being, not revenue but civilization; and he foresaw
that a comparison of the holdings on the different tenures
would be entirely favourable to those who accepted his
terms. For on one side would be a tenant for life secured
by law in his rights ; on the other a tenant at the will of
government, and in many instances at higher cost,
because bound to provide labourers for public works,
which the other was exempted from by paying rent. This
comparison he expected to do the work of legislation, and
produce a landed aristocracy interested to maintain ^)rder;
whereas, if the ameers' system had been preserved, the
great feudal chiefs would have paid nothing to the state,
would have remained powerful in arms, and compelled the
government to maintain a large force to control them,
instead of ruling through them with the aid of a few
hundred policemen.

These and other great administrative measures, embodied
in official reports, being laid before Sir Robert Peel, caused
him to express astonishment at the comprehensive views
of government therein disclosed. "No one" he said,
" ever doubted Sir C. Napier3 s military powers, but in his
other character he does surprise me — he is possessed of
extraordinary talent for civil administration." Now it
cannot be supposed that Sir Robert Peel's astonishment
sprung from the vulgar contracted English notion of
military men's intellects ; he must have known that a
consummate captain cannot have a narrow genius, and
that service in every part of the globe must have furnished
such a person with opportunities for observing different
forms of government — hence his opinion thus emphatically

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

113

expressed, must be taken as an assurance that lie thought CHAP. V.
Sir C. Napier's system superior to the general plan of 1844>
ruling in India, for to that, as Sir Robert Peel well knew,
it was entirely opposed. "With civil servants as as-
sistants," said the general, " Scinde would have been
thrown into complete confusion, and the expense of pro-
ducing that confusion would have been immense."

Most of the Scinde administrative measures were
adopted without reference to Calcutta, because of the
distance, and the Scindian sun, which left little time for
action ; but always they were supported by Lord Ellen-
borough ; and if half the year was denied to activity by the
raging heat, oppressive correspondence and all fear of
responsibility was spared to the anxious administrator
by this confidence from a man who only knew him by his
exploits. It was not so with the minor authorities, on
whom, having the troops of two presidencies under his
command, he was in a great measure dependent; the
secret enmity of those meddling subordinates was always
disquieting, and at one time drove him to declare that
he would not be responsible for the discipline of his troops.
These vexations were increased by a vicious habit with
courts-martial, of misplaced leniency towards officers — a
habit which, as commander-in-chief, Sir C. Napier after-
wards endeavoured to reform ; but at this period it was in
such mischievous activity that two surgeons guilty of
constant inebriety while engaged in the hospital duties,
were suffered to remain in the service, a source of misery,
terror and death to the sick soldiers !

And now happened an event surprising to all persons
but the man affected by it, an event which rendered
Sir C. Napier's after career one of incessant thankless
labour without adequate freedom of action. Lord Ellen-
borough was suddenly recalled. Not unexpectedly to
himself, because he knew his government had aroused all
the fears and hatred of the jobbing Indian multitude, and
all the fierce nepotism of the directors ; but to reflecting
men, it did appear foul and strange, that he who repaired
the terrible disaster of Cabool should be contemptuously

114

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. V. recalled by those whose empire he had preserved ; that
1844, England and India should be deprived of an able
governor, at a terrible crisis which nearly proved fatal, to
gratify the spleen of men incapable of patriotism and
senseless in their anger. Sir C. Napier felt for the welfare
of his country too much to be silent on that occasion, and
the following expression of his indignation, addressed to
Lord Bipon, prophetic as it was just, may partly account
for the unmitigated hatred of those whose conduct he
thus denounced.

" Lord EHenborough has opposed peculation, but folly
and dishonesty have defeated ability and honesty, which
being in the usual course of human events does not
surprise me. It seems that the ' suaviter in modo 3 with a
Cabool massacre, is preferred to the c fortiter in re' with
victory. To expend millions in producing bloodshed is
preferable in the eyes of the Court of Directors, to saving
India and the prevention of bloodshed. Lord Ellen-
borough's measures were taken with large views of general
policy, and were all connected in one great plan for the
stability of our power in India. They were not mere
expedients to meet isolated cases. The victory of Maha-
rajapoor consolidated the conquest of Scinde, and the
conquest of Scinde was essential to the defence of the
north-western provinces of India and the line of the
Hyphasis. The whole has been one grand movement to
crush an incipient but widely extended secret coalition —
the child of the Affghan defeats — which would have put,
probably will still put our Indian empire in peril.

" This great defensive operation, hitherto successful in
the hands of Lord EHenborough, has not yet been termi-
nated ; nor can it be while the Seikh army remains without
control ; for I fear that powerful force by no means parti-
cipates in the horror of war which appears to be enter-
tained, very properly, by the Court of Directors and
Lord Howick. Yet there is a time for all things said the
wisest of men, and I cannot think the time for changing a
governor-general is when in presence of seventy thousand
armed Punjaubees. I indeed believe that possession of

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

115

the Punjaub is not desirable for the Company ; the CHAP. V.
Hyphasis forms a better frontier-line for our Indian 1844.
territory than the line of the Upper Indus, and is more
compact now that we have Scinde : we have enough of
territory — more than enough ! Nevertheless this country
of the Punjaub must be ours : all India proclaims that
truth by acclamation. If not taken, the ravaging of
our finest provinces can only be prevented by a large
standing army in observation on the Hyphasis, with the
example before its eyes of the Seikh army profiting by
successful mutiny ! That Seikh army is also recruited
with our own discharged men, who are in correspondence
with our soldiers; for since we have abolished flogging
every crime is punished with dismissal from the Com-
pany's service — none other is now permitted- — and thus
we are daily recruiting the Seikh army with our well-
drilled soldiers; for the men we discharge for trifling
offences go in great numbers to join the Punjaubees.
This I do not think sagacious on our part. The question
therefore is no longer, whether or not we shall increase
our territory, but whether we shall hold our present position
in India, or run the risk of being beaten to the sea.
' Aut Ccesar aut nullus ' applies emphatically to our present
power in India.

"To destroy the Seikh army will not I believe be so
easy as people seem to imagine ; and if we are beaten back
across the Hyphasis, as we were by the AfFghans across
the Indus, the danger to India will be very great ; and it
will, as far as I am able to judge, show that policy to be erro-
neous which leaves native princes on their thrones within
our territory, or rather within our frontier. This policy
was I suppose formerly found useful and safe ; but it is
now replete with danger when our great extent of dominion
compels us to scatter our forces. To return to Scinde.
Some of the Punjaubees from Mooltan may insult our
northern frontier, a portion of which borders on the land
of Sawan Mull. If so I am determined to resent it, and
I hope for the support of the supreme government, because
every insult we put up with is certain to shake the alle-

1 2

116

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. V. giance of the Beloochees in Scinde. I know that I am
1844. accused of wishing for war — that is false ! I have seen
too much of it. I detest it upon principle as a Christian,
and from feeling as a man. I am too old also for the
fatigues of war, especially where the heat is so exhausting.
My wish is to rest. Yet I will not suffer her majesty's
arms and the Company's arms to be insulted, and patiently
wait while the enemy gathers his hordes to attack me. I
take, and I will take all possible military precautions, not
because I love war, but that I do not love to have our
throats cut. A procrastinating diplomacy is the game of
the barbarians, and whoever is blinded by it will be
defeated.

" In the Murree and Bhoogtee hills the predatory tribes
are now fostering the ex- ameer, Shere Mohamed, with a
view to hostilities in Scinde, and if they be not crushed
when the season opens mischief will ensue. We cannot
in the heat do anything ; but I must attack them in winter
if I can, though I well know it is a thing difficult to
accomplish. It has indeed occurred to me to take them
into our pay as the more humane course, but I fear the
supreme government will not consent to the expense : one
or other course must however be pursued, or a very large
force must be constantly maintained at Shikarpoore. An
attack on those people may possibly hasten a war in the
Punjaub; but I am daily more disquieted about our
Scindian frontier ; I do not clearly see how far this border
warfare will go, and I well know it is the most difficult and
dangerous to conduct that can possibly be. All within
Scinde is tranquil/'

When Lord Ellenborough was thus recalled, by an act of
arrogant power so indefensible as to force from the duke
of Wellington the only passionate censure he was ever
known to use with respect to public affairs, the oligarchs
who perpetrated the wrong, proceeded consistently, but
shamefully and ungratefully, in India and in England, to
assail the general whose victories and administrative talents
consolidated that policy by which the recalled nobleman
had re-established their tottering empire. Foully they

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

117

assailed liim through every channel that corruption and CHAP. V.

baseness could penetrate ; that is to say as a corporation ; 1844>

for amongst the directors of the time were men too

honourable to engage in such passages; but as a body

they did encourage expectant parasites to assail Sir

C. Napier with such vituperation as only parasites are

capable of : nor did they confine this enmity, as shall be

shown, to revilings and falsehoods. There is however a

time for baseness and a time for virtue to triumph — there

is also a time for retribution — and it came. Bending in

confessed fear and degradation, these trafficking oligarchs

were afterwards forced by the imperious voice of the

nation, to beseech the commander they had so evilly

treated, to accept of higher power and succour them in

their distress ! God is just !

118

SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S

CHAPTER VI.

CHAP. VI. Untoward as the Poolagee disaster had been, the extra-
ordinary marches made by the troops, unheard of before
in that season of heat, gave the hill tribes an uneasy sense
that where such men were to be encountered, or evaded,
there would be little safety for future incursions. Nor
was Wullee Chandia's enmity a matter of small moment
for them. His power was considerable, he was crafty in
their own method of warfare, he had a blood-feud with
the Doomkees which rendered him inveterate, and from
his stronghold, thirty miles west of Larkaana, he could
launch several thousand warriors against their hills, where
the Murrees were his allies. He had before the Poolagee
expedition done so much, that at the great Durbar the
general publicly gave him a sword of honour, girding it on
himself in presence of the assembled chiefs and sirdars.
Wullee in return promised to press heavily on Beja,
which he could with less fear attempt, because he had the
British posts as well as his own fortress to fall back on.

The spies now asserted that the tribes, elated by the
defeat of the English, were assembling in great numbers
around Poolagee, with design to bring the Lion into
Scinde ; but the general was not deceived ; for though he
knew they had schemes of that nature, he judged this
congregation to be defensive, because they were poisoning
the wells in the desert, and the Murrees were at feud
with and actually fighting the Bhoogtees and Doomkees.
The villagers also, encouraged by the avowed resolution to
repress the robbers were beginning to defend themselves
against small bands, and had even made several prisoners.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

119

Meanwhile a native officer in Ali Moorad's service CHAP. VI.
arrested five Boordee chiefs who though subjects of that 1844>
ameer had plundered some Scindians near the Indus —
these Boordees being indeed as lawless as any of the
hillmen. Thus far all was satisfactory. But notwith-
standing these many favourable circumstances unceasing
vigilance was necessary; for the Lion was hovering in
the hills, on the side of Shikarpoore, with a strong body
of horsemen, and Ali Moorad though he dismissed his
Patans as a proof of his fidelity to the alliance, re-
ceived and entertained with honour four of the exiled
Talpoorees, his nephews and cousins, while the great
Durbar was being held ; and they, thinking Sir C. Napier,
then in the midst of twenty thousand Beloochees, would
be embarrassed to refuse their demands, had the temerity
to claim the restoration of their possessions and the
right of residing in Scinde. They were undeceived by
a peremptory order sent to Ali for their arrest ; but
afterwards, all the Talpoor princes still at large, the Lion
excepted, were received and suffered by the supreme
government to remain at Ali Moorad's court, causing
constant embarrassment.

Affairs remained in this state until June, when two
painful and important events occurred, namely, a suc-
cessful incursion of the Jackranees and Doomkees, and a
mutiny of sepoys at Shikarpoore, both resulting from mis-
management and attended with deplorable circumstances.
The mutiny was thus caused. Several Bengal regiments
being ordered from the north-western provinces of India
to occupy Upper Scinde, refused to go there without
higher allowances, but after some trouble and the dis-
banding of one corps, marched, the 64th regiment setting
the example, for which it was imprudently praised and in
some degree rewarded. Finding Sukkur and Shikarpoore
better quarters than they had expected, these regiments
were quiet for a time, but the 64th, having been as they
said, and truly said, promised the higher allowances before
they marched by their Colonel Mosely, refused the lower
rate at Shikarpoore, and again broke into mutiny.

120

SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S

CHAP. VI. Had this happened when the nations around were
lg44 combining, and the old troops down from pestilence; or
even later when Sale's departure left the temporary
command to a man who feared to be " Cabooled," the
result might have been fatal. The actual danger was very
great ; for the other Bengal regiments were said to be only
withheld from joining the 64th by anger because it had
broken the bond of the first mutiny — a slender thread of
fidelity which must soon have snapped when it became
known that the 64th had been deceived. An undecided
officer in command would have been lost ; but fortunately
Brigadier- General Hunter, a Company's officer sent by
Lord Ellenborough to succeed Sale, was then at Sukkur
— a man of an intrepid temper. He ordered the regiment
down to Sukkur, thinking to quell the mutiny by personal
remonstrances ; but he was assailed by missiles, and finding
the men in that mood brought out the whole garrison of
Sukkur, seized thirty or forty of the mutineers, disarmed
the rest without spilling blood, and compelled the regi-
ment to cross to the left of the Indus, there to await
orders.

Colonel Moseley was afterwards tried and dismissed
the service, but meanwhile, twenty ringleaders being con-
demned to death, six were executed ; yet the regiment
was still insubordinate, and Sir C. Napier taking away
its colours, ordered all men of a second degree of guilt
to be discharged, with an intimation that one step further
in mutiny would cause the discharge of the whole. He
had no other means of making an example, but he dis-
charged the men reluctantly, thinking the system impolitic
and pushed to an unjust extent in the India army. — u The
sepoy," he said, " formerly looked to his regiment as a
home ; but if he is to be discharged after long service,
for trifling offences, perhaps on the complaint of some
passionate young subaltern as the custom is, he can-
not retain that feeling of attachment to his corps
which gives the government such moral power over the
army."

General Hunter was unjustly treated on this occasion.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE,

121

His services were indeed finally acknowledged, but he was CHAP. VI.
at first reprimanded when he should have been com- 1844>
mended without stint, having done much and done it
well, and in good time, as the following summary will
prove. The Lion and Ahmed Khan Lugharee were, during
the mutiny, not far from Shikarpoore with a body of
horsemen from the Cutchee hills, and fifteen Talpooree
princes were then in Ali Moorad's court, distant but a day's
march; some of these had been very forward in com-
mencing the war which ended in the conquest, and all
were ready to fight again if opportunity offered — there
were large magazines at Sukkur and Shikarpoore, and a
considerable treasure at the former place, where all the
European ofhcers were, with their wives and children, at
the mercy of the mutineers : for all the men of the 13th,
the only European regiment there, were then down with
the sickness and could not have resisted five or six native
regiments in rebellion. The artillery and stores would have
been seized at Shikarpoore, and that place sacked and the
Europeans murdered ; the hill robbers would then have
come to share in the plunder, and with the insurgent troops
would have afterwards assaulted Sukkur. Treasure, guns,
stores, lives, all would have been lost, the ameers5 standard
would have been again hoisted, and Ah Moorad compelled
to join it ! This terrible train of mischief was cut off by
the vigour of General Hunter, and in return he was
reprimanded !

Sir C. Napier attributed this ill usage partly to secret
enmity against Lord Ellenborough, who had appointed
General Hunter; partly to a jealousy about Bengal troops
which affected some military functionaries, who seemed
anxious to make the commander-in-chief a grand Lama
only to be known through his permanent staff. Sir Hugh
Gough was always upright, honourable, frank and generous-
minded, without guile or intrigue; but a bad system
enabled the Adjutant-general Lumley and the Judge-
advocate-general Birch to press General Hunter, and they
did so until the governor-general, Sir Henry Hardinge, to
whom Sir C. Napier appealed, corrected the error. Mean-

122

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. vi. while the opportunity for slander was not overlooked by
1844. the Bombay libellers. Lauding Hunter's conduct, as
indeed it deserved, they represented Sir C. Napier, who
was then straining every nerve to defend that officer, as
striving to ruin him and being stopped in that dishonour-
able course by superior authority !

Nearly coincident with the mutiny happened the other
disastrous event.

Captain McKenzie of the 6th irregular cavalry having
allowed a detachment of grass-cutters, and an escort
under a native officer to forage eleven miles from
Khangur, their careless attitude induced a roving band
of robbers led by Beja Khan to surprise them. The grass-
cutters and many of the escort were slain, more than two
hundred in all, and fifty of the horsemen who escaped
were wounded. McKenzie hearing of the event pursued
the hill-men in vain, and after an exhausting march
returned without having seen an enemy. The general
expressed his discontent in a public order, and the more
strongly because McKenzie was connected with him by
marriage. " The detachment/5 he said, " should not have
been sent to such a distance, when an enemy was near,
without strong support and under good arrangements.
No officer should quit his saddle day or night while a
detachment was out of the cantonment ; the commander of
such an outpost should be always on horseback, sword in
hand — he should eat drink and sleep in the saddle — no
outpost officer had a right to comfort or rest until all
was safe ; and that could never be in the presence of such
an active enemy as mountain robbers were in every
country where they existed. It was useless for officers
to gallop their troops over a country after mischief had
been done — that only harassed men and horses, and
was a mark of inexperience — it was to play with the
enemy/5

This action was magnified by the tribes into a victory
over the British, the fame of it spread to Candahar and
even to Cabool, and every encouragement proper to
increase the pride and hopes of the robbers was given by

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

123

the Bombay faction through their newspaper organs. CHAP. VI.
Then the insolence of Beja and his confederates became
unbounded, their inroads more frequent, and the troops
were fearfully harassed, yet unable to give that protection
which the distressed and harried people cried for with
piteous accents. McKenzie asked for inquiry, but it was
refused, and like a gallant gentleman, he sought and
found another and a better mode of sustaining his reputa-
tion. Keeping incessantly on the watch, after one failure
from the heat in an attempt to surprise a hill-fort in July,
he got notice in August that five hundred hill men, horse
and foot, were only sixteen miles from Shikarpoore. With
a forced march of nearly forty miles he got between them
and their own country, and cut to pieces all their infantry,
but then cavalry escaped dining the fight. Two hundred
robbers fell, and then was brought out in full relief, the
slanderous enmity and falseness of the Bombay faction : for
when the reproachful order upon the first disastrous affair
appeared, the hired libellers, thinking to find in McKenzie
a coadjutor, pestered the public with denunciations of the
tjTannical and brutal treatment he had experienced from
his general ; but when he had thus honourably amended
his error, they accused him of having attacked and mur-
dered, in revenge of his former failure, a set of innocent
villagers, calling them robbers !

But Sir C. Napier had an exact inquiry made, and it
appeared, that if any villagers were amongst the slain they
were Boordikas, Ali Moorad's subjects, who had joined
the robbers and fallen in their ranks with like weapons
and dresses. They could not have been distinguished, and
there was no need to distinguish them from their com-
panions, being like them robbers, with the additional
offence of acting against the orders of their prince. The
truth was, the disaster of the grass-cutters, following on
the defeat at Poolagee, had so elated the tribes they
thought the hour for destroying the English was come,
and this inroad was made with a view to plunder Ali
Moorad's territory previous to a general outbreak. Their
hopes were known, and some Boordikas having joined with

124

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VI. arms to partake of the spoil, fell, fighting valiantly, for in
1844# that country all of the Beloochee races are brave. Their
destruction had a great effect. The tribes suspended their
inroads, and the ill-affected villagers, previously surly and
disobliging, came to fair observances, aiding the grass-
cutters to find forage for the cavalry. Meanwhile the
Bhoogtees and Murrees, always at feud, had another battle,
and the latter being worsted called upon their friends the
Chandikas for help, but when the chief Wullee answered
this call he also was defeated. The general then offered
to divide the land of the Bhoogtees, Jackranees and
Doomkees, between the Chandikas and Murrees, if they
would drive those bad tribes away from the frontier
altogether, thinking thus to war down the robbers
by their own kindred. The effect of this offer shall be
shown hereafter, and as no other military actions occurred
at that time, the progress of the civil administration claims
attention.

In the judicial branch, the diligence of the functionaries,
and their efforts to dispense even-handed justice had
produced general content, and emboldened the people in
the assertion of their rights. The women also loudly
proclaimed their approval of the new social system.
" Formerly," they exclaimed, " there was no peace. *
Feuds and family quarrels rendered our lives miserable, —
now there is a f bundobust,' a fixed rule, and we are no
longer so wretched." And as death was rigidly inflicted
for murder, an impression began to prevail that it was
unlawful to kill women from caprice. These and other
proofs that he was largely benefiting his fellow-beings,
sustained Sir C. Napier under the burden of serving a
thankless government. Other crimes of a heinous nature
were not common, and the robbing of merchants and
traffickers, though not entirely suppressed because of the
nearness of the hills, was abated by the police, now become
a solid force. The Beloochee battalions were also ad-
vancing in discipline, and many of the warriors who
fought at Meeanee continued to accept service in them as
sepoys.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

125

Industry of all kinds was reviving ; and so widely spread CHAP. VI.
was the reputation of Scinde for security, that rich mer- i844.
chants and numerous cultivators from distant countries,
were constantly coming there to settle. The population
of Shikarpoore, and still more that of Kurrachee, aug-
mented monthly, and even English and Parsee mercantile
men were beginning to turn their attention to this line for
trade with the interior of Asia. The factious newspapers,
disregarding all these proofs of tranquillity, were still
indeed proclaiming, that inveterate hatred filled the minds
of the people ; but the falsehood became notorious, when
the Bombay government, tormented by insurrections, the
result of oppression, was compelled to recall troops from
Scinde to maintain its own authority by the unsparing use
of fire and sword.

From recent occupation, and the many adverse natural
visitations, the financial resources could only be vaguely
judged at this period, but there was promise of unlimited
future prosperity. And notwithstanding the difficulty of
ascertaining all the sources of revenue, notwithstanding
the time required to examine the ameers' system, to
adapt new rules to the habits of the people, and to organize
the collection over so vast an extent of country — notwith-
standing the numerous frauds attendant on the sudden
rupture of social and administrative habits of laws,
customs and authorities — notwithstanding the plague of
locusts which swept away the revenue by devouring the
harvests — notwithstanding the pestilence which affected
the physical exertions of the new functionaries and sen-
sibly lowered the receipts by checking cultivation, imposts
being chiefly paid in kind, the soldier civilians, amongst
whom the collectors Eathborne, Pope and Goldney, were
conspicuous for zeal and ability, had obtained sufficient
revenue to provide for the whole administrative expenses,
including every salary, from that of the governor to the
lowest servant — including also the camel corps, and more
than two thousand policemen of whom eight hundred
were cavalry. Sixty-seven thousand pounds sterling re-
mained, and were credited in August to the general

126

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VI. treasury in aid of the military expenses and the public
1844. works — a sum more than double the expense of the
barracks, which had been of necessity pushed forward with
least regard to economy. This first development indicated
great prospective advantages when the collectors should be
more able to discover and cherish the resources of the
country. And so economical was the administration, that
all those expenses had been provided from a sum not
much exceeding two hundred thousand pounds sterling,
while the collectors judged four hundred thousand pounds
would be the immediate, and one million the final standard,
without pressure on the people, for to raise revenue with
public suffering was contrary to Sir C. Napier's notions of
government.

" Taxation here," he observed at this time, " is still too
high, but it requires delicate management to lower it;
for the taxes have been so ill arranged, that if a bad one
be removed before a good one is prepared to replace it,
the revenue may be ruined in a moment. The whole
system must be revised, and that cannot be done until we
are more firmly established. Hence I am compelled to
let matters remain as they are for the moment, except
relieving the poor labouring ryot, from whom one-half the
produce of his land is taken ; but that shall be brought
down to one-third, and then increasing comforts will
increase industry and bring up the revenue again in a
better manner. When we first hired labourers here at
very high prices they were lazy, and if checked went off ;
but now, having experienced the increased comforts com-
manded by money, they even submit to punishment rather
than lose employment. The more men get the more they
want, and to this feeling alone I would trust for resistance
to the ameers should the government be so mad as to
restore those tyrants."

This restoration had become a great object with the
Bombay faction when it had no longer hope to plunder
Scinde under the forms of governing. The aim was to
throw it back to the ameers, in the not ill-grounded
expectation that they would provoke a renewed con-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

127

quest, under better auspices for official peculation and CHAP. VI.
nepotism. In this view petitions and memorials filled 1844
with charges against Sir C. Napier, pretended to be from
Koostum and the other ameers, but really framed at
Bombay, were transmitted to England, where they were
secretly countenanced by the Court of Directors, and
openly by some members of parliament. Happily with
no ultimate effect ; for if those princes had been rein-
stated, the Mooltan insurrection under Moolraj, instead
of being suppressed by a British army from Scinde, would
have been sustained by a hundred thousand Beloochees
from that country, and probably by the forces of Bhawal-
poor also.

It has been shown that the regular Indian military
establishment had not been augmented for the conquest
of Scinde, or for the retention of it ; the troops assembled
there having reference to the menacing state of the
Punjaub and the general interests of the empire. The
real strength of the British in Scinde was that the people
could live under the new government; they were well
fed and with their bodily sufferings their abject spirit
was departing. The ameers without a foreign army to
aid them would have been driven forth again by their own
subjects; yet to restore them was seriously proposed in
England and India, and merely from factious motives —
" It would be such a triumph over Lord Ellenborough V
True enough that saying was, but it would also have been
a triumph over England and over humanity.

The public works came under two heads, civil and
military. The first, founded on rigid calculation as to
their prospective advantages, were profitable investments
for the Company. The second were profitable investments
for England ; because to save her soldiers' lives by building
good barracks, and to secure the frontiers by well-dis-
posed military works, are profitable even when commer-
cially viewed. Moreover Sir C. Napier's measures were
profoundly calculated for laying a solid foundation to
sustain the superstructure of a great community, which
he was striving by moral influences to establish on the

128

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. VI. banks of the Indus. Under the fostering care of Lord
Ellenborough this project would assuredly have been
accomplished in all its gigantic proportions ; but as many
of the most essential parts were afterwards stopped, both
by the interference and the negligence of superior power,
it will be here only necessary to give a general indication
of their nature and design.

" When I can master the sun, the river and the rob-
bers, the people will turn their rich country to account,
for themselves and for the revenue." This observation
showed the extent of Sir C. Napier's views and his
difficulties; but to that he added "It is difficult to get
engineers, for there is in India an abundance of civil
servants with enormous salaries, while to provide officers
is less regarded and there is a dearth of engineers."
This obstacle was the more serious, because Scinde had
been the country of feudal chiefs, and consequently the
military establishments of civilized nations were not to be
found in it at the period of the conquest. " We are more
like a colony in a desert than a civilized community,"
was his forcible expression. Everything had to be created,
and it was truly marvellous that in so short a time, not
merely the semblance of but a really energetic and to
the people satisfactory system of administration had been
established. It was however only by incessant labour and
pains that result was obtained ; for the springs and wheels
of the great machine did not fall at once into their right
places, like soldiers at the bray of a trumpet — the trum-
pet's sound was indeed heard throughout the land, com-
manding, but the strong skilful hand was also there,
organizing and compelling.

Most sorely felt among the difficulties springing from
the paucity of resources, was the want of large buildings
in which to lodge the troops; and the construction of
barracks had been the most serious charge on the surplus
revenue and the least satisfactory, because there was no
time to choose sites when every day lost was a soldier's life
lost. Moreover the Company's system which forces officers
to become accountants rather than engineers, was, and is,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

129

in India defective, and incredibly expensive. At Kur- CHAP. VI.
rachee the barracks, projected on a bad model when that
town was occupied during the Aflghan invasion, had been
with the usual official inattention to the soldiers' well-
being, built with wood, sent from Bombay, but previously
used in other edifices and unfitted for its purpose. And
there were other impediments to a remedy which were
thus described in November 1843. " Public works go on
slowly in this country. The people are idle, the climate
enervating; the materials are brought from a distance
with great difficulty; the working hours are few, and
everything is against the engineer even if he has health.
The sickness has hitherto prevented progress. Everybody
has been ill and very ill. Nor have we workmen now —
where four hundred were previous to this sickness pro-
cured at Hyderabad by the engineer he cannot now pro-
cure fifty ! The country people are more sickly than the
soldiers, and until this great and unparalleled sickness
passes away nothing can be done \"

Kurrachee, the seat of government, was to be fortified
so as that no Asiatic assault could succeed; yet in
such a manner as not to prevent its expansion into the
emporium of trade for the nations bordering the Indus
and its great confluents. In this view the plan embraced
a large extent of ground, including the town the canton-
ments and the port; and the flanks of some near hills,
called the Pub and Ghisree mountains, were probed for
springs, with a view to conduct their waters by a natural
fall to the cantonment, in addition to the stream of the
Mullear river. It was contemplated also to procure Chi-
nese immigrants, whose skilful industry might forward
the establishing of gardens around Kurrachee, and stimu-
late the natives to improvement : a wise plan but derided
by those who pass their lives in condemning works which
they have neither the energy to undertake nor the capacity
to understand when undertaken by others. It was said
"The Scindians won't learn, they are wedded to their
own ways." A trite observation and true enough in most
things, was the reply, but not as regards luxuries and

130

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VI. vices; they are learned rapidly and good vegetables here
]844 are luxuries !

The badness of the port has been noticed. The ships
lay near an exposed point,, while the troops or merchan-
dize were passed across a creek in open boats, which had
often to remain out all night ; and always the soldiers had
to wade far, after landing, through deep mud, to the detri-
ment of their health. To obviate this, a military road to
the shore was constructed, and from thence the mole was
to be cast across the mud and waters of the creek to the
distant point, to enable vessels to load and unload at all
times without difficulty. The sickness had disabled the
few workmen available at the beginning of the year, but
four hundred were afterwards obtained from Bombay, and
progress was made in this great work, which was to
run two miles through mud and water, and was become
important for the future destiny of the town. For it was
now proposed by the supreme government to send the
Bombay reinforcements and stores for the army on the
upper Sutlej through Scinde, thus furnishing a decisive
argument in favour of that country having become the
frontier of India.

To connect the port of Kurrachee with the nearest
branch of the Indus, was essential to rendering the latter
the great artery of trade — which was not then the case, the
richest traffic coming by caravans from Sehwan, by Ahmed
Khan, along the road under the Hala mountains. Where-
fore to give the great river its due importance, the
unfinished choked channel, called the Gharra Canal, be-
fore mentioned as running towards the Indus from the
Ghisree creek near Kurrachee, had been surveyed, with a
view to restore its navigation and form a station near its
junction with the river at Jurruck. Meanwhile the mili-
tary communication with Hyderabad was by land, through
Gharra to Tattah, where the troops embarked to pass
up the Indus, but subject to many difficulties ; for the
embarkation and navigation of the Indus were difficult,
and the river so capricious at Tattah, that vessels would in
the evening have deep water close to the shore and next

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

131

morning find a high sand-bank. Three days were usually CHAP. VI.
required afterwards for the voyage to Hyderabad when the
current was strong, and often the men had to wait a day
and a night or more at the unhealthy Tattah station.

To remove these embarrassments a carriage-road from
Kurrachee was projected, to run northward of Gharra to
Khotree, opposite Hyderabad, by which the land-march
was augmented thirty miles, but the troops at once reached
their final destination, and could cover the additional
distance in two days or even in one on emergency; it
was designed also to conduct a branch from this road to
Jurruck where the rocky banks always insured the em-
barkation. On this road, of about a hundred miles, were to
be erected sheds, to contain the wing of a regiment and
to mark the halting-places, by which the labour and time
of pitching striking and loading tents would be saved and
the marches made in the coolest time ; an advantage to
be appreciated by those who know how helpless and phy-
sically weak inexperienced troops are when first disem-
barked in a strange country.

Such were the works proposed for the district of which
Kurrachee was the centre ; all of immediate and obvious
utility, yet having reference to the future wants of a rising
community; but they and many other great projects
were for the most part set aside or stopped by the general
government which, though continually importuned, would
not give the sanctions necessary, or even answer the letters
addressed to it on the subject.

Taking Hyderabad as the next centre, the plans were
on the same great scale and with the same reference to
the future.

The brick barracks have been noticed, the improvements
being lofty rooms, double roofs, good ventilation, and the
securing of the lower story from the pestilent night
exhalations of the earth.

The restoration, strengthening and cleaning— -no slight
labour — of the ameers' great fortress has also been men-
tioned ; it was now complete, and so strong as to be nearly
impregnable. To besiege it in summer or autumn would

k 2

132

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VI. be destructive to an army from malaria ; and as it was
1844 built on a precipitous rock, fifteen feet high, it could only
be breached above that line, which would be difficult from
the softness of the bricks, and the opening would still be
inaccessible. It contained seven wells of fine water, which
had been choked during the ameers' occupation but were
now discovered and cleared out by the British. A new
gate was also opened, and the place furnished outside with
a clear circuit wall, for which many buildings had to be
removed. The road of communication between the camp
and the fortress was likewise made, but a sanction to build
martello towers for connecting the fortress with the camp
was never given.

These works had only a military object, those designed
for the advancement of civilization were of far greater
magnitude. They were. Firstly. The filling up many pools
of water round the town, and constructing in place of them
large stone tanks ; for the pools, though furnishing the
principal supply of water for Hyderabad and annually
replenished by the inundation, were pestiferous in the
heat. Secondly. The formation of a road through Meer-
poore to Omercote, a distance of ninety miles, and mvolving
the casting of many bridges in a country intersected with
watercourses like network. The principal structure was
to have been over the Fullaillee, and the whole line, though
useful as a military communication, was chiefly designed
to open the capital of Central Scinde as a market for agri-
cultural produce. Thirdly. A road running a hundred
miles southwards to Cutch, having also administrative as
well as military objects; for it was to open the Delta, the
most fertile, the most barbarous, and most dangerous part
of Scinde ; and to give facility for watching over and pro-
tecting the Hindoos, who were there more numerous and
more oppressed by the Beloochees than in other quarters.
Fourthly. A northern road, passing the Fullaillee also by
another great bridge at Meeanee, which would have com-
pleted the military communications between Kurrachee
and Sukkur.

To strengthen this long line, loopholed houses or towers,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

133

having a wall-piece and a garrison of two or three men, CHAP. VI.

were projected for each wood-station on the Indus; not ^44.

only to provide secure residences for the agents and enable

them to protect the wood and guard the navigation of the

river from robbers, but to give them an importance in

the eyes of the people on the right bank, who were poor

and barbarous. Now also, taking into consideration the

mutability of the river, Sir C. Napier, with that foresight

which marked his military operations even more than his

daring, and was perhaps the cause of that daring, had a

large model of Caesar's bridge made, that its nature might

be perfectly known to his engineers and workmen ; for he

anticipated the necessity of having control over the Indus

in the event of an invasion, and chose this model from its

intrinsic excellence, and because the capricious river might

change its bed and leave the bridge, which could then be

easily taken to pieces without damage and follow the

water.

At Sehwan, the point on the river nearest to the Hala
range and therefore the most imposing to the mountain
tribes for offence, and in defence well placed to take in
flank any force descending from the hills upon Larkaana
or Hyderabad, he was still desirous to establish a military
station, but accidental circumstances forbade it at this time.

At Shikarpoore, Bukkur, and Sukkur, the great bund
or dike, for shutting out the inundation between those
places ; the barracks ; the serais ; the river port and
dock and the magazine, had been either commenced or
marked out, but progress was slow, because the pestilence
of 1843 there, as elsewhere, had struck down engineers
and workmen. In the Affghan campaign, a military
bridge had been thrown over the Indus above Bukkur ;
but it had been removed, and the only passage was by a
ferry extremely difficult from the violence of the stream ;
wherefore Sir C. Napier, contemplating the time when
Roree and Sukkur should rise to be cities, designed to
cast two suspension-bridges of great span, from Bukkur
on each side, and felt assured of succeeding, yet at this
time contented himself with improving the ferry. Mean-

134

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. vi. while, the general survey had been making rapid progress,
1844 the regulation of the shikargahs or state forests was com-
pleted, and many thousands of ryots were settled on
government lands : numerous nullahs, great and small,
were cleared and new ones opened to aid agriculture : a
scientific scheme for general irrigation was perfected, and
the construction of some prisons finished the long list of
public works designed for 1844.

An immense correspondence and constant application
were necessarily attendant on these schemes, for, as before
said, neither men nor things fell into their places of
their own accord ; and the energy which compelled
them to do so would have been remarkable even for a
young man, acting in peaceable times under a temperate
sky ; but here they were superadditions to battles of the
most terrible nature, policy of the most intricate elabora-
tion, and conducted amidst all manner of vexations and
crossings, all foul revilings and calumnies from men,
who with a spark of patriotism or honour should have
been the foremost to support them. And those men, not
satisfied even with the mendacity of the Indian press,
aided by many equally foul English journals, had recourse
to the French press to spread their libels. Thus, amongst
other articles, evidently supplied from India, there
appeared in the National a fabricated report from a
committee of the House of Commons — a committee which
never sat — pronouncing a formal condemnation of Lord
Ellenborough and Sir C. Napier, and an approval of Colonel
Outranks conduct ! The Siecle French newspaper also,
denounced Sir Charles as having committed atrocities
surpassing those French burnings at the caves of Dara !

At Bombay, when the fear of Lord Ellenborough was
removed, it became difficult to say whether malignant
ferocity or spiteful meanness were most predominant in
the hostility displayed. Vessels which previous to that
nobleman's recall had been regularly despatched with
the mail for Scinde, were on his departure stopped, and
the public correspondence, continually delayed, accumu-
lated so as to make it nearly impossible to conduct it with

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

135

propriety; while with respect to private correspondence, CHAP. VI.
Sir C. Napier had to endure frequent loss of letters, and 1344<
to find in the Bombay Times, the avowed organ of the
faction, sneering allusions to the contents of some which
never reached him! The enmity of the official people
even descended to harass him by demanding forty pounds
sterling daily for his simple food, without wine, on board
a government steamer when going up the Indus to hold
the great Durbar; a charge designed, not so much to
obtain money as to impose an additional heavy corre-
spondence on him ; and when he successfully resisted this
attempt at extortion, worthy of a Swiss innkeeper, the
newspapers were directed to impute avarice ! Avarice to
a man who was at the moment proposing to the supreme
government a reduction of his salary ; and who in a long
life has only regarded money as enabling him to confer on
others the ease and comfort he denied to himself ! It is
thus they make war on me, he wrote on this occasion "It
is thus they endeavour to prevent the success of Lord
Ellenbor oughts policy; but that policy is good, and if
necessary I will die sword in hand to support it — when I
shrink let them sing their song of triumph over me and
over their country."

Continued tranquillity in Scinde was his consolation for
all these vexations ; but it would be erroneous to suppose
that was obtained without a personal superintendence and
labour beyond the ordinary habits of government ; for the
people, finding law and justice synonymous, took an eager
pleasure in the first, and the number of cases, continually
augmenting, became at last nearly overwhelming. This
was endured however in preference to having the aid of
lawyers, with their enormous expenses and their fixed
rules, neither giving nor taking, which the fierce Beloo-
chee race would not bear; for even in the commonest
matters they could scarcely be convinced that justice was
done if the Padishaw's autograph was not attached to the
decision. In serious matters the nicest political discrimi-
nation was required. Two men might be, and in the eye
of the law would appear similar in guilt — hang one, and

136

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VI. all would bow in submission; hang the other and the
1844e whole country would rise in arms. Thus Wullee Chandia
and another chief might commit the same crimes ; but the
first was a holy man as well as a robber; to touch him
would have aroused all the fanaticism of the neighbouring
tribes, would have brought forty thousand men to his aid
and produced a great war. It was by such considerations
Sir C. Napier was governed in his internal policy, and no
amount of personal labour would make him deviate from
it. He was compelled also to apply the same mixture of
force and subtilty to the surrounding independent tribes,
for which one illustration will suffice.

The jam of Beila, ruling beyond the Hala range on the
south-west, allowed some of his people to make a slight
foray in Scinde ; he was powerful, but not in a condition
to raise a war ; wherefore the general, accepting the plun-
dered ryots' word for the amount of their losses, sent his
moonshee with an escort of horse and a letter, demanding
repayment, and intimating that delay would cause the
governor to come in person, which would be more costly.
The money was instantly paid, though the jam was forced
to pawn his sword to raise the sum ; he said indeed that
the ryots5 claim was far too large, but added, " the general
is a king, and what the king does is good." To the
moonshee however he complained that one of the Scindian
commissaries had defrauded him of his just taxes; and
that being found true, the offender was arrested and forced
to refund the amount. It was greater than the ryots'
claim and the jam gained by the whole transaction. The
overplus was however paid with a subtle turn, to show that
justice not weakness had prevailed. An officer of gigantic
stature and daring temper, escorted by a selected body o£
the Scindian horsemen carried the money as an ambas-
sador, with this message, "the jam's friendship is the
more prized as it saves the governor the grief of being
compelled to plunder Beila, and gives him the happiness of
being able to attack the jam's enemies if they come into
Scinde," thus indirectly giving him hopes of British
protection.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCIXDE.

137

These negotiations furnished an opportunity to exa- CHAP. VI.
mine the Beila conntiy and ascertain the prince's true 1844.
position. He was the most powerful chief of Southern
Beloochistan, and though nominally subject to the khan
of Khelat, was in fact independent, despotic., and odious to
his subjects. His country extended to the coast and
contained the port of Soono-meeanee — a better one at that
time than Kurrachee — where much smuggling was carried
on, to the equal detriment of the jam, and of Scinde
and Bombay. It was therefore proposed to the supreme
government to purchase this port, which it was thought
the jam would readily sell, as his revenue also suffered
from the smuggling. But to put down the contraband
trade was only a part of the general's design; he hoped
finally to draw the trade of Central Asia down by Khelat
and the plain of Wudd, behind the Hala mountains, to
Soono-nieeanee, without going through the difficult and
dangerous Bolan Pass, where it fostered the plundering
habits of the tribes bordering Scinde. " These are castles
in the air, he observed, but if I can fix a few good
foundations the floating castles will settle down on theni,
and the nations will look back on my battles as whole-
some alteratives, which have produced freedom and compa-
rative affluence in place of miserable slavery and a fitful
existence by rapine/'

Xotwithstancling the general adherence of the Belooehees
to the new order of government, they were too fierce to
yield implicit obedience in all matters, and their con-
queror was too wise to exact by violence a submission
which ought to be the result of policy and time. He well
knew the whole race still carried arms, and he was content
to let that pass, if they regarded his edict so far as to hide
them in the presence of the British authorities. He knew
also, although the slaves generally had defied their masters,
that many rich people and chiefs still held persons, prin-
cipally women, in slavery but treated them gently, fearing
to lose them, liberty being a morsel greedily snatched at.
Hence, only when complaints of ill-usage reached him did
he directly interfere, acting indirectly however, with great

138

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VI. perseverance and subtilty to insure their final emancipa-
wu. tion, as shall be shown further on.

But while engaged in these matters of civil administra-
tion, he was continually meditating on the great and
difficult scheme of operations necessary to reduce the
Cutchee hill-tribes when the season would permit action,
for the obstacles were formidable. Troops could not move
from Sukkur and Shikarpoore until the inundation, which
always flooded the country between those places, had sub-
sided ; and that subsidence was generally followed by sick-
ness, which was already discovering itself at the latter
town in a severe form. It was therefore necessary to
ascertain whether a general pestilence would again prevail,
before any measures could be even taken to open the
campaign, and then the following difficulties were to be
overcome.

A great desert was to be passed, a surprise effected
and many warlike men to be encountered, who, brave
even to madness, had an immense space of mountains
behind them for prolonging a dangerous warfare; they
had also to back them a multitude of other tribes, brave
as themselves and as lawless, ready to aid, either in fight
or in retreat, until the conflict should bring the British into
collision with the Seikhs and Affghans. In that desert a
heat destructive to Europeans prevailed; and in those
mountains a cold equally destructive to sepoys ; for the
breezes which the former would rush eagerly to meet the
latter would shrink from as bringing death. Failure
would cause the loss of all the troops engaged, and be
dangerous for S chide, which would be immediately overrun
by the victorious barbarians, and by all their kindred tribes
of the Khelat and Hala mountains. The pestilence was
to be dreaded therefore in Upper Scinde while prepara-
tions were being made ; and those preparations had to be
made with secrecy, or the surprise of the hillmen, which
was judged essential to success, could not be effected. It
was essential also to deceive the organs of the Bombay
faction — ever on the watch for doing mischief — as they
would be sure to give the enemy timely notice of prepara-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

139

tions and projects, and give advice also as to counteraction. CHAP. VI.
How all these obstacles were overcome shall be shown here- 1844
after, for many serious crosses and forced changes of plans
happened before the warfare was in activity: but the
first general notions may be thus sketched.

The Murrees though warlike were not ferocious, nor
very predatory, and it was hoped to separate them from
the others. The Kujjucks, lying beyond the Murrees
on the west, were too distant to make incursions on
Scinde, and being avowed subjects of the khan of Khelat Plans 1 & 2-
might through that prince's influence be kept neutral.
The hostile tribes would thus be confined to the range of
hills running from Poolagee to the Indus, if by surprise, a
body of men sufficient to fight them when altogether
could be thrown into the hills near that place, cutting off
the Kujjucks on the west and uniting with, the Murrees on
the north. In this view it was designed first to assemble
troops, as if in defence and fear, at Khanghur and Rojan
on the Scindian edge of the Khusmore desert; then to
invite the khan of Khelat to a conference at Dadur near
the mouth of the Bolan Pass, under pretext of arranging
Khelatian affairs ; if he accepted the proposal to proceed
there with two thousand selected men and twenty field-
pieces, but instead of returning by the same road, to
strike suddenly off into the Cutchee hills and sweep the
defiles in all their length towards the Indus, while the
forces at Rojan and Khanghur made a simultaneous march
upon Poolagee. In this manner it would be possible to sur-
prise and surround Beja Khan, who was now the avowed
chief of the hill confederacy for the war ; and if, as was
very probable, that wily warrior should detect the snare of
meeting the khan and save himself in the western moun-
tains, his places of Poolagee, Oolagee and Llieree could
be destroyed, and their forts occupied, which would give a
command of the wells and consequently of the desert.

Though the plan and time of execution were confined to
the general's breast, his resolution to punish the robbers,
sooner or later, was made no secret of ; because neither the
Bombay faction nor Beja could divine the final scheme,

140

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VI. and in their eagerness were likely to conceive many false
1844 notions, which would in the end perplex themselves and
conduce to the public interest ; but the matter being thus
noised abroad, displayed in a very remarkable manner the
influence which as a conqueror he had acquired over
the barbarian nations of Central Asia. For it was sup-
posed the expedition would be the commencement of a
career of general conquest, and there came from the
traveller Wolfe, then at Bokara, a letter, saying the
general's anger was dreaded there ; and at the same time
presents and assurances of goodwill arrived from many
other quarters ; amongst them from the Affghan chiefs of
Candahar and Herat ; and it was at this time the khan of
Khiva, whose dominions border the Aral and Caspian seas,
See Conquest sent a prince of his family to negotiate an alliance with
ofScmde. the victorious governor of Scinde. To all these mes-
sages and ambassadors fitting answers and presents were
given, and Sir C. Napier, ever watchful to augment his
moral influence, caused his horse-artillery to gallop up
some difficult rocky heights and open a fire in presence of
the Herat and Khiva men ; well knowing the exploit, really
remarkable and to them astonishing, would be magnified
by eastern hyperbole into something marvellous, and as
such spread all over Asia.

From the chiefs of independent tribes came offers to
join the expedition with their mounted warriors, and this
general indication of respect for his power in arms, was
seen by the general with pleasure, as giving moral force; but
in the difficult enterprise projected he would not accept the
service of men sure to turn upon him if a reverse happened.
He preferred trusting to his own genius with fewer but
surer men, and only drew from those offers the inference,
that he might act with even more audacity than before in
his intercourse with the surrounding nations.

While revolving these matters, one of the bad effects
of Lord Ellenborough's recall was felt in the separation of
Cutch from his command. The secret committee in
England, on Bombay instigation, had it restored to that
presidency, alleging grounds in language pompous and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

141

pretending, and disclosing a vulgar desire to give all pos- CHAP,
sible personal offence, combined with all possible ignorance
of the subject. The command over Cutch had been
voluntarily given by Lord Ellenborough, and to lose it
again, when he was almost overwhelmed with labour, was
for Sir C. Napier personally a great relief; but for the
public very injurious. Firstly. It deprived Scinde of the
support of Colonel Roberts, whose influence over the Rao
of Cutch was unbounded; and with Roberts went the
action of the native force which that able officer had organ-
ized to aid in controlling the Delta. Secondly. Cutch
belonged politically and militarily to Scinde, and had no
natural connection with Bombay. The people of Cutch —
more especially the outlaw tribes on its border — were at
once attached to and afraid of the Scindian government,
whereas they despised and laughed at the Bombay govern-
ment, probably the most oppressive and incapable of any
under British domination ; hence the error of taking Cutch
from Scinde would have had to be repaired at great cost
of life and treasure if any after-commotion had happened
in the unhealthy and intricate Delta. Nothing of that
kind occurred indeed, because Sir C. Napier proved himself
a conqueror in every way; subduing the Belooch fierceness
in battle, bending their pride by just laws, and winning their
affections by unmistakeable anxiety for their welfare ; but
with less policy on his part the folly of the act would have
been made manifest. His reasoning on this occasion clearly
developed his own views, and exposed all the ignorance
and insolence of the minute in which the change was
advocated.

(C Of Cutch, its local history and past government he
might," he said, " know little, as asserted in the minute ;
but the treaties of 1816-19-32 were enough for the pur-
pose. The civil government of Cutch had been conferred
on him when he was ill and only prevented by a sense of
duty from resigning that of Scinde. It was however by
its geographical position and features separated from, not
connected with Bombay, as the minute averred; and it
was, on the contrary, closely connected geographically with

142

sir chirles napier's

chap. vi. Scinde. The great rhin or run of Cutch was a continu-
1847. ation of the Gulf of Cutch, which being connected with
the desert boundary of Scinde, cut off Bombay and Guz-
zerat, and united Cutch to Scinde.

" As to their ' moral positions * If two countries under
different princes, divided also by strong natural features,
were united by fortuitous circumstances it would be an
anomaly, and did not exist here. Under his government
no correspondence as to 6 social connection * between
Cutch and Guzzerat had taken place, but a great deal as
to disputes between them ; which, coupled with the three
treaties, sufficiently indicated their mutual feelings of
hostility : Cutch seemed to be as inimical to the Guicwar
of Guzzerat as it was to the Bombay government, which
it hated.

( ' Why was it supposed that the Rao of Cutch had ' more
confidence in the government of Bombay than in that of
Scinde ? 3 It would be indeed surprising if the Bao desired
to resume his connection with Guzzerat and Bombay — ■
the contrary was the fact. The Bao had full confidence in
his tried and acknowledged friend Colonel Boberts ; and
that excellent officer had given him entire confidence
in the governor of Scinde, who had done nothing to
forfeit it.

" That some connection should have existed, previous to
the conquest of Scinde, between Bombay and Cutch was
natural; because Scinde had been hostile in the extreme,
Bombay friendly ; but it was the ameers only who had
been hostile — not the Scindees, who were connected with
the Cutchees in social life, by mercantile and religious
ties, and by marriage. This was proved in the trials of
offenders where all those ties were made known, though
not always of a moral character.

" If a military government had its disadvantages, and it
unquestionably had so, it had also its advantages ; one
being, that the chief knew most of what passed, and
acquired a general knowledge of what in civil govern-
ments is absorbed or lost in departments. Hence he was
enabled to say, that if the rooted hostility of the ameers

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

143

to Cutch, had not been able to separate the two people; CHAP. VI.
the friendly intercourse now established and rapidly in- 1844
creasing, would soon incorporate them as completely in
their ( moral3 as in their 'geographical relations3

" There was however an administrative view also to be
taken. Many of the robbers of the desert bordering the
Rhin of Cutch were Scindees, defying equally the ameers,
the Rao and the Guicwar; but who yet found, when
pursued by any one of those governments, an asylum with
their social friends in each country. Lord Ellenborough,
who thoroughly understood the whole subject, had enjoined
a conciliatory policy with these outlaws, and that was one
reason for employing Colonel Roberts ; because he knew
them well, and he had persuaded numbers, driven by the
tyranny of the ameers to become robbers, to return and
settle as ryots in Scinde. Barbarism had however long
ruled, and those wild tribes cared not for the Bombay
government, nor confided in its protection, nor feared its
anger ; but the military governor of Scinde they did fear,
knowing he could and would be amongst them in arms if
they offended him. They were essentially warriors and
held civil government in contempt ; a corporal in Hydera-
bad would have more moral influence with them than the
governor- general in Bombay. They were all submissive
from the day the battle of Hyderabad was won, because
from that field they had been informed by the victor that
he would extirpate them if they were not so. Yet before
that action they had despised the English government at
Bombay.

" Colonel Roberts' influence with the governor of Scinde
they knew, and that the latter decided all appeals by
strict rules of justice and not by favour : — hence they, and
the Rao himself, had great confidence in the Scindian
ruler. The Rao personally had more than once found the
Scindian paramount power meant only paramount justice,
protecting alike himself and his people ; and being a just
and good man this gave him pleasure and a confidence in
the Scinde governor which he did not feel in that of
Bombay : and with respect to administrative acts the

144

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VI. former was also closer for reference and communica-
1844. tion.

" 'Religious connection.1 This had been touched upon in
the minute without much knowledge of the matter. The
Hindoos in Scinde, and especially in the Delta, were very
numerous — the majority were Hindoos, and there existed
no 'religious bar* to an intimate connection between
Scinde and Cutch : nearly all the artificers attracted to
Scinde since the fall of the ameers came from Cutch.

e{ With respect to the military view, no wise man could
in his political arrangements assume as a basis that a new
conquest would be peaceful; no man rejoiced more at the
tranquillity of Scinde than he did, because he was respon-
sible for it ; no man had more confidence in its perma-
nence ; but he was not blinded to the fact, that accident
might at any moment disturb that tranquillity — he had
shaken hands with the Beloochees, but they were bloody
hands ! Scarcely a family in the land but had to deplore
losses, and these things were not forgotten; yet they
were, he believed, forgiven, because a Beloochee glories at
the death of his relations in battle. Besides he had given
the chiefs back all they possessed under the ameers, none
had suffered in property and many had gained — the poorer
people had done so enormously.

c< One old man had, after making submission, grasped
his hand and said f I am here to make my salaam to you
as my chief ; but I fought at Meeanee and eighty of my
own family died in that battle ! Now I am ready to die
fighting by your side and under your flag/ Such were
the military feelings of these men, but would not that
old warrior in a moment draw the sword again, if he
thought there was a chance of victory — a faithful subject
only while it was convenient. For some years nothing
else could be expected, and to legislate, to administer on
the bond of such a man's loyalty would be gross folly.
He bowed to the conqueror, to the man who returned his
possessions. Let that conqueror be replaced by a civil
government, and let civil servants affront him and he
would take to arms instantly; but he would not do so

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

145

where a victorious general was to be dealt with. Hence, CHAP. VI.
' the tranquillity prevailing could not be a reason for J^J
reuniting Cutch to Bombay*

" He had recently given Bombay help, yet reluctantly ;
not from wanting the troops, but lest their departure
should give Dr. Buist of the Bombay Times an oppor-
tunity of calling down the hill tribes, by saying the force
was weak and the time favourable for destroying the
English. In the Delta also, insalubrious and blotted with
jungles desert tracks and sand-hills, were tribes that,
having such fastnesses and a retreat open into the great
desert and to Cutch, had been always wild and resolute,
and a revolt there would be very difficult to quell. But if
the force in Cutch were in good hands, like Colonel
Roberts/ it could co-operate with troops from Kurrachee,
Hyderabad and Omercote ; and the revolters thus attacked
on all sides would lose the game. They knew that, and
were quiet ; but if Cutch were again placed under the Bom-
bay government, and a political agent replaced a military
man, the hold of the Delta would at once become morally
weakened : for the people there could not understand the
troops being under one man the civil government under
another.

" Such countries could not be governed by the mere
official arrangements of a civil governor; their ruler for
some years must be a military man, who must have
frequent intercourse with the chiefs to gain an insight
to their characters ; and they also would form a tolerably
correct one of his. In fine, unsophisticated human nature
and military nature must both be studied in dealing with
barbarians ; they would not bear from a civilian arrange-
ments suited to civilization but crossing their prejudices ;
yet to the stern behests of a soldier chief they would bow
in submission.

" A comparison of the last year's administration of Cutch
under Colonel Roberts with any other political agency under
the Bombay government, would show the superiority of the
former ; and the wisdom of Lord Ellenborough's arrange-
ment would be made manifest. Colonel Roberts knew

146

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VI. much more of Cutch its ' history, treaties, and peculiar
1844 circumstances' — so emphatically and ignorantly adverted
to in the minute — than any government could know;
his knowledge being derived from many years' residence
amongst them. And as to ' records/ Scinde and Bombay
being equally under the one supreme government, no
public advantage could accrue from their custody being
with one or the other, seeing they were only deposits for
rare references on unimportant matters of detail.

" It was asserted in the minute that the ' governor of
Scinde was necessarily and completely ignorant of what
had been previously done, and of the peculiar circumstances
of the country.3 An opinion thus given as to his peculiar
ignorance was not worth disputing; but that he was
( necessarily ignorant ' could not be sustained ; because
only a little energy and reading was sufficient to ascertain
what had been done, and what ought to be done under the
' peculiar existing circumstances/ However, whether well
or ill acquainted with that matter, if ' he must, even though
perfectly informed, be incapable for a long time to come, of
acquiring the confidence of the prince and people, in a
degree comparable to that in which it was possessed by the
Bombay government/ he agreed that Cutch should not
be left to his ruling. He would only remark, that recent
events and the insurrection then going on in the presi-
dency of Bombay, did not seem to prove that c long and
intimate connection with the Bombay government was syno-
nymous with confidence in it?

" If Cutch was not annexed to Scinde the troops in the
former should not have their commander in the latter
province. In peace it was not necessary, and it would
cause a useless inconvenient separation of the Bombay
troops from their own government. But in contradiction
to the positive and ill-founded assertions in the secret
committee's minute, Cutch ought to be annexed to Scinde ;
because those countries were united geographically and
in every relation of life, civil, religious, commercial and
military ; because Cutch was naturally severed from Bom-
bay as regarded its internal arrangements; and because

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

147

the Rao had not any particular desire to belong to that CHAP. VI.
presidency." ^

This view of affairs, unanswerable, and unanswered save
by the exercise of dogged power, was, at the very moment
of its being proffered, confirmed in an unquestionable
manner by an application from several hundred families
in Cutch for land in Scinde, accompanied with certificates
from a British sub-collector to say, they were not bar-
barous, but an industrious people and skilful cultivators !
Nevertheless Cutch was reannexed to Bombay, because
Lord Bipon, to whom this foolish and insulting minute
was addressed, feared and flattered the Court of Directors
instead of controlling it ; and that short-sighted and
malignant body was swayed by personal feelings. It is
thus the world is misgoverned !

l 2

148

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAPTER VII.

CHAP. VII. In October the 13th European regiment came down the
Indus to Kurrachee, in progress for England, and accord-
ing to custom left volunteers for other corps, some of them
to finish their many glorious actions with deaths as heroic
as ever graced the best soldiers of Rome. To replace the
13th at Sukkur, the 78th were sent up the country, a
fine body of Highlanders from whom gallant service was
expected in the Cutchee hills, but an overruling power
had decreed that a tgrrible calamity should frustrate
that hope. Meanwhile a practical crushing reply to
the calumnies of the Bombay faction, as to the unquiet
feelings of the Scindians, was furnished by Sir C. Napier.
Though on the point of engaging in a difficult campaign
beyond the frontier of Scinde, he spared, at the earnest
entreaty of the Bombay government, one European and
one native regiment to aid in quelling an insurrection
in that presidency ; and that no kind of reproof might be
wanting, he supplied the loss of those regiments with the
Belooch battalions, composed of the men said to be his
deadly enemies !

In November, the annual sickness after the inundation
being much less than was expected, and most places
entirely healthy, the general resolved to repair to Sukkur
in furtherance of the contemplated operations against the
hillmen ; and as the north-western part of Scinde, which,
as before observed, was rather conciliated than conquered,
had never been visited by him, he resolved to take that
line, and, making his journey one of inquiry, exploration
and reform, to impress the full action of his administra-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

149

tion on the people. He took with him the volunteers of CHAP. VII.
the 13th regiment, formed as a guard, and with them a
detachment of the Scinde irregular horsemen, called by
the country people, as they do all irregular cavalry,
Mogullaees — Moguls — and by that name they shall in fu-
ture be distinguished. Steady in faith and conduct they
were, though a congregation of adventurers from every
country ; fierce and daring in battle also, and true in every
way were those men ; and that was shown to all the world
afterwards at Goojerat, where the Scinde Mogullaees sur-
prised friend and foe alike by their surpassing discipline
and courage.

While preparing for this journey, a strong detachment
was ordered from Hyderabad to Ahmed Khan, once more
to test the salubrity of that place ; and one advantage
was immediately discovered, namely, good water, plentiful
and pure, a thing of great moment ; for in Scinde the soil
was so impregnated with different salts that scarcely ever
could good water be found. This time was chosen for
testing Ahmed Khan, in the hope that such various
movements of troops — those from Hyderabad going west-
ward, while the 78th went northward up the river, and the
general with his escort roved through the north-western
parts — would give rise, as the same policy had done the year
before, to exaggerations, and powerfully affect the fears
and the imaginations of the hill tribes. The sanato-
rium project was however finally abandoned, because the
Clifton hills and the Munnoora point, near Kurrachee,
were found to possess a more excellent climate close to the
seat of government, whereas Ahmed Khan could only be
reached through the strange region now being explored
by the general.

It was a series of dead levels, five, fifteen, and twenty
miles broad and from fifteen to a hundred long; each
flat was bounded by limestone rocks, in ranges running
nearly north and south, and rising perpendicularly from a
thousand to three thousand feet. The strata were of
every inclination, horizontal, perpendicular, oblique and
even circular ; but the faces of the ranges were like walls

150

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. vii. crowned with huge castellated battlements ; and though
1844 watercourses from eighty to one hundred yards wide
were sometimes found, the plains were otherwise as flat and
united as a billiard-table.

Sick men could not be safely moved across these flats
because of the sand-storms, common enough in Scinde,
but here of peculiar vehemence. One which assailed the
head- quarters on this journey had no parallel in any per-
son's previous experience. The air was calm, but suddenly
everything, animate and inanimate, became overcharged
with electricity, and the sand, rising violently, adhered
to the horses* eyes, nearly blinding them ; the human hair
stood out like quills, streaming with fire, and all persons felt
a strange depression of mind until the evil influence passed
away. Invalids could not have lived under the oppression.
The people said there was no water in the rocks, and
though this was discredited, it was certain that water
would be difficult to find, and the making of roads expen-
sive : moreover the reflective power of those natural walls
was very great, and untempered by the cool monsoon
breezes, which are found to render Clifton one of the most
healthy stations in the East.

In the country above Sehwan Sir C. Napier found a
tribe of Rins, not the Belooch tribe of that name
but Scindees, in a miserable condition. They had been
driven from their dwellings in the Delta by the ameers
because of their fidelity to the Kalloras, and had taken to
a robber life in the western mountains, where, in the
midst of Beloochees incited to attack them, they lived
entirely by force. These poor people were transferred
with their own consent to Jurruk on the Indus, and
they became honest cultivators and faithful subjects*
This was the first of the reforms which this wild quarter
of Scinde required ; and there were many violations of
law to be corrected and false applications of political
economy by subordinate administrators to be suppressed.
The task was difficult, yet, having previously caused all
the collectors, sub-collectors, and military magistrates to
keep minute diaries of their proceedings, which with

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

151

enormous mental labour he had constantly perused, Sir CHAP. VII.
C. Napier was prepared to discover what was ill judged, 1844
and to apply checks.

Everywhere the goodwill of the people and the im-
mense natural resources of the country were apparent;
but the administration had been much embarrassed and
retarded by the absence of the chief collectors and many
sub-collectors, who, debilitated by the fever of 1843, had
gone to other countries for the recovery of strength. In
their absence, errors, frauds, oppressions and irregularity
of various kinds, had sprung up, as was to be expected in
a country where such disorders had been so recently
the general rule of government. Amongst other mischief
many fishermen of the great lake in that quarter had
been nearly ruined by having their taxation raised on the
false principle of improving the revenue and the land-tax
still practically amounted to half the produce. These
follies were suppressed in spite of all remonstrances, as
being morally wrong and fundamental errors in govern-
ment, though not so judged generally.

Mistakes of this kind the general was not surprised at ;
but he was amazed and incensed to find himself sur-
rounded by numbers of slaves praying for liberty, the edict
against that wrong having been wholly disregarded. He
instantly seized twelve or thirteen of the most guilty
slaveholders, and carried them with his camp in irons.
His subtle dealing with this matter shall be explained
further on. Meanwhile he was surrounded by the popu-
lation, praying protection against the robbers, and espe-
cially against two chiefs, or rather tribes, who vexed the
country in a terrible manner. These men he had long-
been watching and they were at this time captured. The
first, named Sowat Guddee, was taken by Fitzgerald,
who hearing that the robber swordsmen were abroad for
spoil, only forty remaining with the chief as a guard,
made a march of seventy-five miles with the camel corps
and surprised his mountain camp. Guddee fled, Fitz-
gerald launched men in pursuit, and the robber with his
son, his two nephews and some others turned at bay.

152

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VII. Lieutenant James of the police, speaking their lan-
guage, said to four who stood separately, Surrender and
you are safe. One leaped forward and seized his bridle,
James saved him, and cried out again, You see I do
not hurt him ! Surrender. No ! exclaimed the other
three, No ! we are Guddee's son and nephews and we
will not surrender. They stood, and clashed their arms.
But there was amongst the police present a lad, son of
Ayliff Khan, the strong Patan swordsman who captured
See Conquest the Lion's brother ; this youth, scarcely inferior in strength
of Scmde. courage and comeliness to his father, rushed with a com-
rade to the duel, and though the Beloochees had sword
and shield, while young Ayliff and his companion had
only swords, the latter slew all three. Meanwhile Ayliff,
the father, rode up to Guddee saying Yield thee, Guddee,
or I will slay. Are you Ayliff Khan? Yes. Guddee
flung down his weapon ; for these eastern swordsmen are
all well known to each other, and no man was more
formidable than Ayliff Khan. Grieved the general was
for the death of Guddee' s son and nephews ; but their
resistance was rather the result of desperation than high
feeling; they gave no quarter and expected none; even
the man who surrendered to J ames attempted to kill him
immediately afterwards.

Nowbut Khan, the second robber chief, was a terrible
savage of great personal strength, who had recently plun-
dered a Persian cafila within the borders of Scinde, and
murdered six poor unarmed camel-men. He had five
hundred swordsmen, and was the terror of the upper
plains. A thousand rupees had been offered for his
apprehension, and Wullee Chandia, always true to his
word, captured and brought him to the general, who paid
the reward in the presence of all the chiefs, at a Durbar
held in Larkaana. He also gave Wullee, Nowbut's
sword, that robber's name being inlaid in gold letters on
the blade ; and with subtle policy he did so ; for the
acceptance of such a sword was the public acknowledg-
ment of a blood-feud which must end in the death of one
or other chief.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

153

At this Durbar, sharply and even vehemently did he CHAP. VII.
address the assembled chiefs, inveighing against slavery 1844
and giving the greater men indirect intimations that the
persons he had arrested were not the only violators of the
law. He told them likewise that he knew of their secret
thoughts as to plundering ; and he adduced the fates of
Nowbut and of Guddee, who were to be put to death, as
proof of his power and resolution to enforce his authority.
Tighter than this he did not think fit to draw the cord,
until the great robber tribes of the Cutchee hills were put
down. However he so awed the chiefs present, that
voluntarily they assured him they would in future keep
their followers from robbing, and they fulfilled that pro-
mise. On these occasions he regretted his ignorance of
the Belooch tongue, a knowledge of which would he said,
have been equal to an additional force of a thousand
soldiers; but he endeavoured to supply this want by
significant actions ; and in that view had, as before said,
carried with him in chains the rich men arrested for
having slaves.

Many sirdars, conscious of like offences, seeing this,
came to beg the guilty men off, and some were pardoned ;
but others more guilty were still retained in irons as an
example. There was here unequal justice, but he thus
explained his policy. " It is true Wullee and Hadgee, the
great chiefs, are just as guilty, but they treat their slaves
gently ; and were I to make them prisoners, at least one
battle with forty thousand mountaineers would have to be
fought, and probably slavery would be perpetuated : now
I shall by indirect means destroy it. This is the way to
deal with these barbarians. Meanwhile I fortify places,
build barracks, form police, relieve the poor and en-
courage them to defy their own chiefs. No person knows
my whole policy, it comes out in my public discourses, as
if unpremeditated, and is only gradually unfolded. If it
was known beforehand it would lose its effect. It is in-
deed so little understood, that I have had trouble to keep
some of my superior officers from driving Wullee Chandia
to revolt, by expressing anger at his being a robber, as if all

154

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VII. natives were alike in all things — but they are not alike
1844# in dispsoition, or power, or habits. Robbery has been
the vocation of Wnllee and others, and in their notions
an honourable one. Hence I never justify punishment
of any person by saying he robs — he murders — he is
immoral. I say I punish you because you have dis-
obeyed my orders which were that you should not rob,
should not murder, should not hold slaves. This they
understand, it is the Padishaw's will. They do not under-
stand our notions of honour and morality. The chiefs
think I am a man who is taking time by the forelock,
making my fortune, and as I hit them hard in the battles
they offer no opposition ; but the people find I am their
friend ; they live well, and in a few years will be so inde-
pendent as to defy a return to slavery and misery. Even
now, if the ameers were restored I could drive them out
again by the aid of the people only, without a soldier.

The gift of Nowbut's sword rendered the Chandian
chief a sure check on that robber's remaining band and
friends, which, conjoined with the promises made by the
other chiefs, gave good hope that the right bank of the
Indus would be tranquil during the operations against the
hill tribes. Wullee did not shrink from the dangerous
honour of the sword, but knowing that Nowbut, if let
loose again would seek to slay him, he, when departing,
turned and in a low earnest tone said You will kill
Nowbut. Yes I will kill him. Good ! and the old man
left the tent. But this killing of Nowbut, Guddee, and
inferior robbers, was not done without a sore mental
struggle, which was thus described.

" I shall hang all my prisoners, there is no help for it ;
if I did not do so Scinde would be a sheet of blood !
The villagers are coming in crowds around me, com-
plaining of devastations and murders by these robbers
and their confederate in the Cutchee hills. Women have
been killed; children's hands cut off; the innocent un-
armed camel-men cruelly put to death; great tracts of
country have been laid waste, and twenty-five villages
destroyed. They shall have a fair trial, but if murders

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

155

are proved they shall die. Were deliberate murderers to CHAP. VII.
escape from weakness on my part, the consequent dis- jg44.
orders would lie on my head and I could never quiet this
country. All the people are rejoicing that these men
have been captured. In fine, a man placed as I am must
have nerve for his work ; but it is very painful and makes
me wish I had never put a sword by my side, or used any-
thing but a spade. However I pray God to make me
just in my decisions, and my mind being once fixed I
strike ! And if social laws are to exist at all, if we are not
to hold our throats to the assassin's knife, if self-defence
is permitted, I am justified in what I do as much as I
should be in struggling for life with an assassin and killing
him.

F Some think this contrary to the Christian religion;
perhaps it is so; but then government must cease, and
the greatest ruffian be the greatest man. Human
nature cannot go this length, and I am resolved as to my
course, feeling my heart free from all motive but doing
what the interest of society demands, namely, that the
robber shall be put down in Scinde. I said this from the
first, and I have done it, or will do it ere three months
more be passed. If it be God's will that the robbers shall
not be put down, I shall fail ; but he has, by overthrowing
the ameers, apparently given his sanction to the course I
pursue. I could neglect my work and get more praise,
but if I did this I should not see Scinde prosper, and my
conscience would be ill at ease : now I sleep well for I do
my best. Yet I please not the Court of Directors. For
that I care not, they are but cunning fools, and I am a
man whose daily occupation is to deal with the lives of his
fellow-men ; and if I do not deeply consider before I act I
go down as a murderer ! I allow no margin for men who
rule — they may give up. I pray night and day and every
hour in the day to do right, and I believe I do so in the
sight of God. If not I am criminal, for error in judg-
ment in rulers is crime. Nations should not suffer because
individuals are vain and self-sufficient."

During this journey Sir C. Napier had occasion to

156 SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VII. observe with what an infelicitous derision Scinde had
1844> been called Young Egypt, as if the comparison were a
folly, when in fact the two countries have a striking
similarity. In their flatness, fertility, deserts, moun-
tains, single river and annual inundation — in their deltas,
their scarcity of seaports, their frequent change of rulers,
their three races — Copts, Arabs and dominant Mamelook
swordsmen in Egypt; Hindoos, Scindees and dominant
Belooch swordsmen in Scinde — in their former greatness,
their decay under a bad government and their present
chance of resuscitation. In all these things the resem-
blance is complete : and it is not a little curious, that at
this time was found, westward of the Indus, a river of
Appendix VII. petrified trees like that which exists westward of the

paragraph A. ^

Vast tracts of fertile but uninhabited land, and many
anciently-peopled sites, were also discovered, showing that
the riches and magnificence attributed to Scinde in former
days were not exaggerated, and that the right road was
being followed to restore them again. One of these
ancient posts was very remarkable. Noted on the map
as Mohun Kote, it is called by Sir Alexander Burnes a
fortified hill ; but the country people know it only by the
name of Rennee Kote ; and it was found to be a rampart
of cut stone and mortar, encircling not one but many
hills, being fifteen miles in circumference and having
within it a strong perennial stream of the purest water
gushing from a rock. Greek the site was supposed to be,
yet no Greek workmanship or ruins were there, and the
ameers having repaired the walls had the credit of building
them.

Of the position of Alexander the Great's towns as given
by geographers, Sir C. Napier was sceptical, unless where
he found rocky basements which the river could not have
washed away; such as Sehwan, where there were con-
siderable mounds, the work of distant ages though not
Greek. Neither could he understand the Macedonian
hero's march as described by the historians, unless the
country was then much more advanced in civilization

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

157

than those historians record. For as Scinde now is, and CHAP. VII.
this must have been from greater cultivation still more 1844#
the case in Alexander's days, not even a small army, much
less the hundred and twenty thousand men led by the son
of Philip, could have marched down either bank of the
Indus within from ten to sixteen miles of the stream : the
numerous nullahs or watercourses would have barred his
progress, unless they had been bridged permanently, which
would indicate even greater civilization than that noticed
by ancient writers. These things had however only a
passing consideration ; he was more occupied with investi-
gating the effect of his administration upon the welfare of
the people. •

There was much to amend, especially with respect to the
imposition of injurious taxes, which one collector, Captain
Preedy, had adopted in the false hope of raising the revenue.
These mistaken views chafed him, and when he discovered
how the poor lake fishermen's taxes had been thus raised
from thirteen to forty per cent, by the same collector, who
had before sought to force the pearl-fishery, his patience
forsook him. Jesus of Nazareth! he exclaimed, How
far well-meaning men will go in mischief ! The absence
of the chief collector of this district, Captain Pope, driven
from his duties by sickness, had indeed opened a door for
many follies, many peculations and oppressions, the more
extensive at first, because the European collectors and their
subordinates had been plunged suddenly and by the force
of arms at once into a chaos of revenue affairs, of jagheers
and different modes of taxation, in a country where all the
minor and most of them corrupt native functionaries had
from policy been retained in their offices. Light was
however now breaking on all these matters, and each day
showed that future prosperity depended entirely on the
wisdom and vigilance of the government.

At the commencement of the journey the spies, who
were spread in all directions, said the robber tribes were
assembling with the object of supporting the khan of
Khelat in the proposed conference. The general thought
they would fall on him, either coming or going if occa-

158

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VII. sion offered, and therefore he resolved to appear at Dadur
1844> with a force capable of beating them ; but though they had
so determined, they soon fought amongst themselves, and
the Murrees were twice defeated by the Bhoogtees, first
singly, and then in conjunction with the Chandikas, who
made an unsuccessful attempt on Poolagee. The stimulus
before mentioned, of offering the land of the Doomkees,
Bhoogtees and Jackranees to the Chandikas and Murrees
if they would drive them back from the frontier, had
therefore failed ; and it was evident that only by a great
combination and the employment of British troops could
the hill robbers be put down. The difficulty of doing this
was indeed felt each day more strongly, but the general
had decided on his policy, and as new obstacles arose
nerved himself more rigidly for the enterprise.

The fame of his march, and the wiles he used to influ-
ence the fears of the barbarians had a great effect. Beja
Khan became so alarmed as to send his two sons to
General Hunter with an offer of salaam, but his recent
incursions, the mutilation of the children, and the killing
of the unarmed grass-cutters, were acts of unprovoked
warfare and cruelty not to be passed over ; hence, Hunter
was directed to give the sons reasonable time to go back,
but to hang them if they did not depart; and Beja was
told he also would be executed when taken. Then as-
suming black habiliments he declared himself gazee, or
religiously devoted to the destruction of unbelievers ; and
these gazee fanatics were very dangerous — once declared
there was only to kill or be killed.

Beja was not the only enemy to be menaced. The
Lion was amongst the tribes, urging them with gold and
promises, and sometimes appearing on the frontier of
Scinde with a strong body of horsemen. To him therefore
this message was sent. " Hitherto, ameer, I have looked
on you with respect as an open and brave enemy. I now
find you mixed up with robbers and murderers, and if you
continue to be their companion, as a robber and murderer
I will treat you." Soon afterwards the Lion took refuge
in the Punjaub.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

159

Thus continually advancing towards the execution of CHAP. VII.
his enterprise Sir C. Napier arrived at Sukkur the 19th
December, exactly two years after he had quitted it to
commence the campaign which gave Scinde to England.
But no joyful state of affairs greeted his arrival, the pesti-
lence was abroad, the European artillery was entirely
disabled, two hundred of the 78th dead, and others daily
falling into graves that seemed destined to swallow all.
With anguish of mind their general was compelled to send
the survivors to Hyderabad, instead of leading the whole
as he had hoped to a glorious service — nor did even this
save them, nearly as many more perished ere the sickness
ceased.

This terrible calamity was seized upon by the Bombay
faction to declare, that it arose from Sir C. Napier's igno-
rant wilfulness, and a desire to make a military display as
if he really was going to assail the hill tribes — that he
ought to have known fatal sickness would attend a move-
ment at the time of year chosen for the march of the 78th
— that he would not consult the medical men, and the
consequent deaths were on his conscience ; it was a case of
aggravated murder — he was the murderer of the sol-
diers ! And not content with proclaiming these things
in India, where men knew the libellers too well to regard
their malevolence, they with detestable wickedness sent
like statements to Scotland, to work upon the feelings of
the deceased soldiers5 friends and clansmen, and raise there,
if possible, a hatred of the general. He however, at once
showed the foulness of the accusation, and the careful
consideration he had given to that and every question
affecting the soldier's welfare.

" He was, he said, attacked in the papers ; that gave
him no pain, but the death of the soldiers grieved him to
the heart's core. Blame could not however attach to him.
The usual course of the fever at Sukkur had been to attack
in September and half of October, after which few new
cases appeared ; but the first cases were very apt to relapse,
and those relapses were very dangerous. Superior orders
had directed him to bring down the 13th European regiment

160 SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VII. from Sukkur to Kurrachee, and to send the 78th regiment
1844. up. It was done with cautious care, so as that the
13th, which had already been assailed by the epidemic,
might get away from Sukkur before the time for relapses
arrived, and the 78th reach that place after the same dan-
gerous period had passed. Thus he hoped to save those
regiments both from attacks and relapses ; for continual
movement at that season was by the medical men judged
good. In that view the 86th had been marched from
Hyderabad, and he had himself moved up the country,
at a later and worse period, with an escort equal in
strength to the 78th. He had likewise sent troops to
Ahmed Khan, and all had escaped fever and gained
strength, thus confirming the medical judgment.

ff The 13th did escape relapses, reached Kurrachee, and
went to England in a healthy state ; and the volunteers it
left behind, two hundred in number, formed part of his
escort up the country, thus making this so-called dan-
gerous march both ways, and yet remaining in perfect
health. The 78th reached Sukkur in a good state on the
25th of October, and remained healthy until the beginning
of November, about which time the fever burst forth with
unheard-of violence, and continued to the end of the
year.

" It was true that the marches of the 13th and of the
78th might have been delayed until the whole of the
sickly season had passed away; and could the calamity
have been foreseen they would have been delayed ; but it
was not from what afterwards happened that a judgment
could be formed. There was at the time no prospect, but
the contrary, of a sickly season; Kurrachee, Hyderabad,
the intrenched camp on the edge of the river, Kotree on
the opposite bank, the steamer stations, and lastly Sukkur
itself were all healthy ; Shikarpoor alone had sickness, and
that appeared to be local, accidental, and subsiding. But
these considerations did not embrace the whole subject.
A mutiny of the Bengal troops, in which the men had
called aloud for their officers' blood, had just been quelled
by General Hunter. The Lion was then stirring up the

ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE.

161

hill tribes on the frontier, and fifteen Talpoor princes were CHAP. VII.
in Ali Moorad's court close at hand. Was it proper then j^jj
to leave Hunter in that critical state without a European
regiment ? Suppose the Bengalees had again mutinied ?
The 64th had twice seized their colours within the pre-
ceding four months. Suppose they had a third time
mutinied, had murdered their European officers, as hap-
pened at Vellore, had seized the magazine at Bukkur, and
the treasury, and gone over to the Lion and the hill tribes ;
or to the Seikhs of Mooltan, among whom they had
numerous friends and relations ?

" These things might not have happened, but they were
within the bounds of probability. Many of the mutineers
of the 34th Bengal regiment, which had been just before
disbanded, did go to the Seikh army ; and if such a train
of evils had happened, would it not have been said, ' Sir C.
Napier left the murdered Hunter and his unhappy comrades
without the protection of a European, although he must have
foreseen the catastrophe from what had passed* How could
that have been answered ? There could be no justification,
and he must, conscious of error, of crime, have hid his
head in sorrow and shame the rest of his life. Hence,
though inexpressibly grieved for the 78th he felt no sense
of error."

The proofs that the march of the 78th had not been the
cause of the sickness were numerous and conclusive. The
78th fell sick, but so did all the troops which had remained
quietly in Upper Scinde; the European artillery were
attacked more fatally even than the 78th ; and of the
towns, Sukkur and Shikarpoore alone suffered, the other
places in their neighbourhood escaped, and the crews of
the steamers which brought the 78th up from Hyderabad
also remained at Sukkur and had no sick ! In fine the
imputations cast by the Bombay faction were but the out-
pourings of weak brains disordered by the working of
peculiarly malignant dispositions.

This pestilence, by some attributed to a neglect of the
canals, was generally supposed to be caused by an un-
usually high and anomalous inundation, and an equally

162

sir charles napier's

CHAP. VII. anomalous fall, which brought on an extraordinarily fertile
1844. hut premature vegetation. The early and entire sub-
sidence of the waters left this vegetation to be withered
up by the sun, which produced, as it always does in Scinde,
malaria ; and it was particularly active at Shikarpoore and
Sukkur, because the basin between those towns was still
open to the overflow, the great dike being only nascent.
This was clearly shown — for while the wind blew towards
Shikarpoore the pestilence was there most virulent; but
when it blew towards Sukkur, sickness commenced at that
place and ceased at Shikarpoore.

Dr. Kirk of the Bengal service, who bestowed great
attention upon the subject, attributed the sickness to ex-
halations from the limestone rocks on which the barracks
were built, and it is probable that both causes were com-
bined. It may also be, that this and other epidemics
which prevail at irregular periods in Scinde, arise from
exhalations produced by volcanic action ; for the country,
though alluvial, is so subject to sudden and extensive
changes from earthquakes, that in 1819 nearly the whole
surface of Cutch was changed. Minor imperceptible shocks,
opening fissures in the surface of Scinde, may therefore
give vent to the escape of deleterious gases, producing
sporadic pestilence, or epidemics according to the extent of
the subterranean disturbance. But to whatever cause, in-
scrutable or otherwise, the sickness itself may be attributed,
there was little difficulty in accounting for its extensively
fatal ravages amongst European regiments. The habit of
officers and soldiers in India is to drink copiously of beer,
wine and brandy, of the first especially. The soldiers' ra-
tion is a vile potation, falsely supposed to be distilled from
rice, but really obtained from other substances, chiefly
from a liquor procured by incising the date-tree. Four
soldiers' rations make a bottle of this deleterious drink,
few are the soldiers who content themselves with their
Appendix V. rations, and though this general use of strong drinks
does not produce the pestilence, it predisposes the con-
stitution to receive infection and always renders it more

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

163

fatal. Doctor Robertson of the 13th reputed as one of CHAP, vii.

the best informed practitioners for Indian maladies, said,

that during the siege of Jellalabad he had no sickness,

and attributed it entirely to the impossibility of obtaining

liquor.

As Sir C. Napier had now returned to Sukkur after
making as it were the round of Scinde in conquest, a re-
capitulation of his labours will not be misplaced. Short it
shall be, yet thick with great actions. Two years only had
elapsed since he had quitted Sukkur to war on the ameers,
and in that time he had made the march to Emaumghur
in the great desert, gained two great battles, reduced four
large and many smaller fortresses, captured six sovereign
princes, and subdued a great kingdom. He had created and
put in activity a permanent civil administration in all its
branches, had conciliated the affections of the different
races inhabiting Scinde, had seized all the points of an
intricate foreign policy, commenced a number of mili-
tary and other well-considered public works, and planned
still greater ones, not only suited to the exigencies of
the moment but having also a prospective utility of
aim. In the execution of these things he had travelled
on camels or on horseback, at the head of troops, more
than two thousand miles, had written, received, studied and
decided on between four and five thousand official des-
patches and reports — many very elaborate — besides his
private correspondence, which was extensive, because he
never failed to answer all persons who addressed him
however humble or however unreasonable. He had besides,
read, not hastily, but attentively, all the diaries of the
collectors and sub -collectors, and had most anxiously
considered the evidence in all capital trials. And these
immense labours were superadded to the usual duties
imposed by the command of a large army belonging to
different governments, namely, of England, Calcutta, Bom- •
bay and Madras. They were sustained without abatement
under severe attacks of illness, at the age of sixty-three,
by a man covered with wounds, and in a climate where

m 2

164

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. VII. the mercury rises to 132° in artificially-cooled tents. They
1844 were sustained also amidst every mortification, every viru-
lence of abuse, every form of intrigue which disappointed
cupidity could suggest to low-minded men, sure of support
from power, to him ungrateful but to their baseness
indulgent and rewarding.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

165

CHAPTER VIII.

To chastise the robbers of the hills was now become CHAP. VIII.
imperatiye ; for their successful incursions had so raised lQU
Beja Khan's reputation that the ultimate consequences were
to be dreaded. The confederates could, without reckoning
the western mountain tribes, bring down twenty thousand
of the most daring meu of Asia ; and behind them were
races of the same blood and temper in greater numbers.
Scinde contained many tribes, who could not be expected
to remain submissive if continued incursions gave the hill
robbers a promising position ; and a short impunity would
have rendered the latter* s warfare as formidable as that of
the celebrated Pindaree freebooters, who were only stronger
by twelve thousand men when the marquis of Hastings
thought it necessary to assemble eighty thousand troops
to quell them. Yet they were but isolated rovers, having
no mountain fastnesses to retreat to, no great Seikh
army to look to for support ; nor were they held to-
gether by any sentiment but the love of plunder, being
men of different nations and tongues. The hillmen had a
common language, a race, a gallant pride of ancestry, and
a country which for ruggedness in defence is not surpassed
in all Asia.

It was then boast that for six hundred years no king
had ever got beyond the first defiles in their land, though
some had tried with a hundred thousand men ; and in
those fearful passes the British arms had also been fatally
unsuccessful. There Clibborne had been defeated, there
the heroic Clark and others had fallen, and there the un-
shaken firmness of Brown but just sufficed to preserve

166

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VIII. the lives of his men, in a chivalric defence of a fort, against
1844 the Murrees alone. To allow snch a people to gain a
head, and by degrees raise the hopes and warlike spirit of
the Khelat and Scindian mountain tribes, until a hundred
thousand uncontrollable warriors should rage over the
plains, when the Seikh army was menacing a formidable
warfare, would have been madness. And yet the putting
of them down was fraught with risks which might startle
the boldest general, while a failure would be sure to
accelerate the danger sought to be averted. For though
called robbers, these hillmen were not such in the European
acceptation of the term. It was with them no ignoble
title, and like the Greek " klepte" they thought them-
selves, and were by others thought, to be a race of
courageous haughty men who would not let the world
pass without paying them toll. Their peculiar customs
and warfare shall now be described.

The desert of Khusmore extends from near the Chan-
dian's capital at the foot of the Hala mountains, in a
north-eastern direction towards the Indus, and with its
northern edge binds in the Cutchee rocks. This desert,

Plans l & 2. about eighty miles broad, has a hard surface, sprinkled
here and there with tamarisk-bushes but for the most
part destitute of water. Where water did appear it was
at this time surrounded by a few mat huts, and in
some places commanded by clay forts with round towers.
These forts, seemingly despicable, were formidable from
circumstances. In summer, the unendurable heat of
the desert rendered it difficult to attack them, as the
troops would have to carry water with them, to fight
for more. In winter they could not be stormed without
loss, because barbarians and half-disciplined warriors are
always excellent in defence, brave as any soldiers, and
more expert with fire-arms, being always practising. The
matchlock also, though very inferior to the musket, fur-
nishes means for steady aim, requiring no disturbing force
for the discharge like a musket. Perilous therefore it is to
assail those desert forts of clay, and the more difficult that
the clay when hardened by the sim is elastic, and, without

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

167

being shaken, lets a cannon-ball pass through. — there is a CHAP. VIII.
round hole of less dimension than the shot and no more. 1344#

As soldiers, the robbers were, like their forts, strong
and terrible to deal with from circumstances. Robust
and adroit with their weapons, and having the desperate
courage of fatalists, they perfectly comprehended all the
advantages of their position, and trained their animals as
well as themselves with unceasing pains to their mode of
warfare. On horseback or on foot, the Belooch robbers
of the hills were men able and willing to encounter any
foe; but like the Scots in Bruce' s time, they generally
moved as cavalry, being mounted on small but high-
blooded fiery mares, swift and enduring to a marvel. These
little animals were so trained for the desert service as to
surpass the British cavalry, regular or irregular, in retreat
or pursuit : the latter could not get near them save by
stratagem. The mares were taught to drink only at long
intervals, and were at times fed with raw meat, which is said
to increase their vigour for the time, and create less thirst.

TvTien an expedition across the desert was to be under-
taken, the mare's food was tied under her belly ; the man's,
consisting of a coarse cake and sometimes a little arrack,
was slung across his shoulders, and was generally suffi-
cient for ten or twelve days' scanty fare ; but it was used
only in necessity, for to the spoil the robber looked for
subsistence. Every warrior carried one sword, many
carried two, and so sharp they would mend a pen, for
professional sword-whetters attended all their forays.
These swords, broad, short, not much curved and heavy,
were either of fine Damascus steel, or of the ditch manu-
facture which is much esteemed. Each man carried a
matchlock, of a small bore but long in the barrel and
heavy, a weapon so inferior to the musket that it is Sir
C. Napier's opinion it must soon be discarded in the East
as in the West, and that very serious consequences will
result from the change. The matchlock in common use
cannot be judged of by the fine specimens sent to Eng-
land ; there is as much difference as between a common
musket and the sporting rifle of London.

168

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. viii. Powder the robbers carried in flasks slung over the
1844> shoulders,, some of them bore a long spear, and all carried
large embossed ornamented shields, a knife, a dagger,
flint and steel. Thus equipped, and strong in the prin-
ciple of fatalism, to which they impute all events all
crimes, they sallied forth resolved neither to spare nor to
yield. " Wug" is their name for plundered cattle, but they
call themselves Lootoos, which might be more properly
translated spoilers than robbers ; and with all their ferocity
they had noble qualities and customs. It was seldom they
hurt women or children, and the recent instances had
been generally reprobated. Nationality in the European
sense they did not possess, but their attachment to their
religion — the Mahometan — to their families, and to their
tribe, was strong; blood-feuds were common, yet if two
tribes were at war and an irresistible foreign power
assailed either, the one so pressed would send their wives
and children to their kindred foes as a mark of despair :
then the feudal war ceased, and the families thus sent were
honoured as guests. When beaten by strangers, their
customs were terrible. Going to battle with design to
die sword in hand, they, acting as barbarians have always
acted from the earliest records, left trusty agents to kill
the women and children if the fight was likely to be lost —
a fearful custom which had a powerful influence upon Sir
C. Napier's operations.

When a foray was designed, the hillmen assembled at
some watering-place, filled their leather bottles called
" chaguls" crossed the desert, plundered a village and
returned with such celerity, that before the frontier
cavalry-posts could hear of the inroad the robbers were in
full retreat. If pursued, so extreme is the reflected heat
of the desert, from April to October, that no Europeans
could sustain it : even the sepoys and camel-men sunk
under its deadly influence; no effective protection could
therefore be given during those months, although acci-
dental surprises, such as, Captain McKenzie had effected,
might happen.

After the campaign it was ascertained that the tribes

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

169

could bring altogether to the field eighteen thousand eight CHAP. VIII.
hundred warriors, besides their armed servants ; and if J~
those behind, and those on the western frontier, including
the two great jams of the Beila and Jokea countries,
had joined in one confederacy, which impunity would
surely have caused, more than a hundred thousand men
would have been in arms, whose mode of fighting was
thus described by their conqueror. — " Every man has his
weapon ready, and every man is expert in the use of it.
They cannot go through the manual and platoon like her
majesty's guards, but they shoot with unerring aim ; they
occupy a position well, strengthen it artificially with inge-
nuity, and their rush on a foe with sword and shield is very
determined. They crouch as they run, cover themselves
admirably with their protruded shields, thrust them in
their adversary's faces, and with a sword like a razor give
a cut that goes through everything.""

In the Cutchee hills, every discontented Asiatic could
at this time find employment, if he had money or could
wield a sword, and the last were not a few ; for in all those
countries, besides the regular tribes, which may be consi-
dered as municipal bodies, there was a very numerous class
of gentlemen, having a following of from four to a hun-
dred armed men, roving condottieri, who offered their
services in every feud and every war, for food and leave to
plunder all persons save those in whose momentary service
they engaged. Beja Khan's renown was great, it rose
each day of«impunity that he enjoyed, and in another year
he would have been able to collect many thousands of
these wandering swordsmen ; and then he would, because
he could, if an epidemic happened to rage at Shikarpoor,
massacre the garrison there. Lastly in those hills were
four pieces of captured British artillery a trophy stimu-
lating to the pride and arrogance of the barbarians.

To the young khan of Khelat most of the robbers
acknowledged a nominal allegiance, which they would
readily have made real if he would have aided their war-
fare ; and though he was personally inclined to the British
alliance, it was against the wishes of his nobles. He was

170

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. VIII. therefore only such a friend as a boy prince could be to
1844, those who had killed Ins father, stormed his capital, and
plundered his treasure — for so had the British done to
him in the Affghan war. When restored he was governed
by men attached to his family, who thought that during
his minority the English were the safer support; but
those men, secretly detesting the ally thus chosen for their
prince, longed to revenge the death of Merab his father.
Like the ameers, these Khelat sirdars had, before Sir C.
Napier's arrival in Scinde, deceived the discarded political
agent Outram, playing with his vanity, but they only
awaited a reverse to the British arms to display their real
feelings.

Reflecting long and deeply on all these matters, the
English general had proceeded very cautiously from the
first with respect to the enterprise in hand ; and with his
wonted prudence had combined all the subtle policy, and
all the military force he could command to effect his
object, counting on discipline and his own skill for the
rest. In this view he had kept a heavy hand on Ali
Moorad; had treated the recently submitted western
chiefs with generosity; had awed the jams of Jokea and
Beila ; had both aided and menaced the khan of Khelat's
court, and had admonished the chiefs of Candahar. For
this he had endeavoured to spread through Central Asia
an exaggerated notion of his military power, had made so
many complicated movements in Scinde, and used the
camel corps to convince the western tribes that he was
able and ready to avenge any hostility on their part. For
this also he had publicly given Nowbutt's sword to Wullee
Chandia, and taken some of the latter^s followers into
pay ; giving the money to the chief as a retaining fee,
and offering to him and the Murrees, the Doomkee and
Bhoogtee lands.

It was this subtle policy, coupled with the growing
attachment of the whole Scindian population, which had
brought the hundred and fifteen western chiefs to make
salaam at Kurrachee, and the display of force there had
acted powerfully on their after conduct ; but their previous

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

171

recusancy had been principally caused by the falsehoods CHAP. VIII.

of the Bombay faction published in the Bombay Times. 1844t

Continually announcing the restoration of the ameers, that

faction had disquieted all the chiefs and sirdars, and had

actually prevented Nowbutt and Guddee from accepting

the frequent invitations made to them for becoming good

subjects. Those chiefs therefore died, the first in prison

the second on the gallows, criminals indeed, but also

miserable victims to the infamous arts of Dr. Buist and

his employers. Nowbutt and Guddee corda1 have been

captured at an earlier period ; but that event was purposely

delayed ; partly in the hope they might submit, partly that

their sudden seizure, when the general was in their country,

might produce a greater effect on the surrounding tribes,

which would conduce to tranquillity while the army was

beyond the frontier.

During the march up the country the spies had brought
varying intelligence of what was passing with the robber
tribes, and with the' khan of Khelat. That prince was
vacillating. Afraid to hold the conference at Dadur and
equally afraid to refuse, he took a middle course, avoiding
the meeting, while, to deprecate anger, he assembled troops
and pretended to drive Beja Khan from Poolagee. This
was easily seen through, and therefore the general's march
was delayed under various pretences until the khan should
be compelled to abandon Poolagee again from want of
water; it being judged that Beja would then, if the whole
were not a concerted fraud, harass him in his retreat.
These proceedings were very embarrassing, because the
plan for a surprise required that Beja should be at Poo-
lagee, and nothing could be undertaken until he returned ;
but from Fitzgerald at Larkaana, such information was
finally obtainec^as produced a modification of the original
scheme, and gave rise to new combinations, which cannot
be understood until some strange and some unexpected
obstacles have been noticed.

Both Lord Ellenborough and Sir Henry Hardinge ap-
proved of the projected campaign, and both had given dis-
cretionary power for the execution ; but when Lord Ripon

172

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. VIII. was informed of the matter, a scene of odious arrogance
1844 was opened. Sir C. Napier had told him of the great loss
of human life and property caused by the incursions of
hillmen — had told him of the disgraces and losses which
befel the troops, of whom and of their followers more than
three hundred had been slain — had told him of villages in
ashes, of whole districts abandoned by the wretched inha-
bitants— of hundreds of murdered women and mutilated
children I IJe had pointed out the evils to be apprehended
from a continuance of this state of affairs, not only to
Scinde but to all India, and shown him, that ultimately
those robbers, then above eighteen thousand strong, besides
their armed servants, would infallibly increase to a power-
ful army, and force the supreme government, either to
abandon Scinde, and with it the navigation of the Indus
and all its prospective commercial and military advantages,
or to keep up a great force in Scinde at an enormous
expense, and yet still be subject to continual losses from
the same cause. To all these representations Lord Ripon' s
answer was, " You make too much of these trifling outpost
affairs, which are insignificant 1 '!"

. Such arrogant imbecility impels history beyond the
bounds of passionless narrative. What to Lord Ripon,
satiate with luxurious ease, were the unceasing labours of
officers and soldiers under a sun which shrivelled up brain
and marrow as a roll of paper is scorched up by fire?
What to him was their devotion, what their loss of life ?
What to him were devastated districts, ruined villages, the
cries and sufferings of thousands driven from their homes
by those remorseless robbers ? What to him were outraged
women, and the screams of mutilated children, holding
up their bleeding stumps for help to their maddened
mothers? They were trifling, were insignificant ! For
a moment indignation was excited in the lofty mind thus
insulted, but it soon subsided to contempt. Lord Ripon
was disregarded as a man devoid of sense and right feeling,
and the expedition went on without his concurrence.

At Bombay the reduction of the hill tribes was treated
with ridicule. " Sir Charles was talking big — was angry —

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

173

would destroy Poolagee when he could get there — would CHAP. VIII.
catch Beja as children are taught to catch birds. " But 1844>
when it became certain the attempt would be made, not
only the Bombay Times but nearly all the other news-
papers of India, especially the Delhi Gazette, announced
it as a folly, a chimera, and to the utmost of their power
endeavoured to make it so. The Agra Uckbar indeed, and
the Bombay Gentleman's Gazette were mindful of truth and
decency on this occasion, and it is due to the last to say
it always was so, justifying its title ; but the other papers
made India echo with their folly and falsehoods. Sir
C. Napier was ignorant, he did not know how utterly
unfit his army was to contend with the tribes in their moun-
tains— and this trash was forced on the public in England
also by the parasites of the Court of Directors. Even
Indian officers of experience thought the enterprise one
not to be effected. "Sir C. Napier was too confident
from his previous successes — he did not know how terrible
those mountaineers were in their fastnesses."

So universal was this notion as to pervade even the
army with which trial was to be made ; for though full of
courage and willing to make every effort, there was scarcely
an officer, high or low, who did not anticipate failure,
and the general forbore even to mention the subject, save
to those of his staff to whom certain preparations were
necessarily confided. This state of feeling disquieted him ;
for though entirely possessed with an overbearing will
to make all things bend or break before his energy, he
secretly trembled at the danger to the public interests
which must ensue if he died during the campaign, seeing
that he had no successor who viewed the enterprise as he
did, or thought it feasible. The troops also were sure to
have many severe trials, and the previous notion that the
enterprise was hopeless might produce despondency at
small failures ; but on the other hand, as the robbers had
vast herds of cattle, which could not stand hard pursuit,
the soldiers were as sure to make frequent prizes, and he
trusted that stimulus, conjoined with their innate desire to
fight, would carry them on.

174

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. Viii. Another serious embarrassment was felt in the still
lg44> smouldering insubordination among the Bengal troops in
Upper Scinde. The mutiny had been caused by injustice
and bad management in the first instance, and neither
Colonel Moseley's dismissal from the service, nor the exe-
cution of so many men, had entirely suppressed it ; hence
the experiment of marching with disaffected soldiers
against an enemy required deep reflection. The Ben-
galees could be sent indeed to Lower Scinde, and Bom-
bay regiments brought up; but that involved a great
delay ; and a disgrace which the English leader, who had
been so well served in his battles by other Bengal troops,
shrunk from inflicting upon men whom he knew to have
been misled and ill treated : he preferred danger to him-
self, and decided to employ them : but this was one of the
reasons for bringing up the 78th, that a strong Euro-
pean regiment might be ready to sustain accidents. His
generous resolution proved the advantage of a good name
with soldiers. The 64th Bengalee regiment, so recently in
mutiny, whose leaders had been executed, and whose
colours had been taken away, were now so ready to serve
under Sir C. Napier that even their sick men petitioned
from the hospital to be allowed to join the ranks, saying
they would find strength to fight when he led them !

The unceasing efforts of the Bombay faction to excite
insurrections in Scinde — efforts sure to be redoubled if
a large force went beyond the frontiers — was another
cause of embarrassment, because partial commotions
might be created if any minor failures in the hills gave
weight to the treasonable exhortations. For counteraction,
the general trusted to his previous policy and the good-
will of the population ; and however great these difficulties
and obstacles were, they sunk in comparison with those
caused by the fever, which left him not only without
power to move against his enemies, but exposed him to
imminent danger of being attacked and overwhelmed by
them. His strength of mind in bearing up under so
many and such dire impediments, always resolute to fulfil
his mission, was not the least indication he gave of an

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

175

overbearing energy ; for not the 78th only had been over- CHAP. VIII.

whelmed, the sepoys and the artillery were in a similar 1844^

condition, and he was forced to keep his volunteers of the

13th at Larkaana, lest they also should be assailed by the

sickness. To that place likewise he sent the European Appendix V.

artillery, without horses or guns, the men being too weak

to take them. In fine he had only two hundred of his

army able to stand up under arms at Sukkur, and those

were but convalescents ! Nevertheless, firm to his purpose,

and having obtained from the upper Sutlej the Company's

2nd European regiment and the Bundlecund legion of all

arms as a reinforcement, he made his final arrangements,

as follows.

The troops sent from the Sutlej were halted aboveBukkur
on the left of the Indus, to form his right wing.

The camel corps, the volunteers of the 13th and theScinde
horsemen, stayed at Larkaana, to form his left wing.

The irregular cavalry, artillery, engineers, sappers and
commissariat, the reserved men of the 4th, 64th, and a
detachment of the 69th native regiments, stationed at
Sukkur, Shikarpoor and Khangur, composed his centre.

\Yullee Chandia, and Ahmed Khan Mugzee who though
a subject of Khelat offered to serve in conjunction with the
Chandikas, were engaged to fight against all the hillmen
save the Murrees, for with that tribe they had amicable
relations, and the general meant to deal with it in a friendly
manner. Wullee Chandia was thus secured as an auxiliary
on the extreme left ; but he had no intimation of the plan
of operations, and was led even to suppose none would
take place that year.

On the extreme right, Ali Moorad was to assemble his
contingent force ; being called upon, not so much as an
auxiliary as to keep him from mischief during the expe-
dition; and in that view, Captain Malet, stationed as
political agent at his court, was to accompany him in the
field, to which he promised to move with five thousand
men but did not bring more than two thousand.

The cavalry of the British army was composed of the
Scinde Moguls, the 6th and 9th irregulars, and the horse-

176

SIR CHARLES NAPIER* S

CHAP. VIII. men of the Bundlecund legion, about two thousand

m inaU* .

The infantry was furnished by the Company's second
European regiment, two weak native battalions, the foot
of the Bundlecund legion ; and the camel corps, altogether
two thousand five hundred. Eleven hundred convalescent
infantry and the ordinary cavalry posts remained for the
defence of Shikarpoore and the frontier towards the desert,
in the event of the robbers passing between the columns
of invasion to make a counter war.

The siege artillery was composed of twenty-one pieces,
of which thirteen were mortars or howitzers; the field
artillery consisted of sixteen pieces, nine being howitzers,
three mountain guns, and the rest six-pounders.

During the Affghan war the tribes had been unsuccess-
fully attacked, although they were then surrounded by
the British armies and the allies of the British. Now they
were sure to find towards Khelat, Afghanistan and the
Punjaub, supporters, not enemies, and there was little
hope to attain complete success, unless by surprise, for the
danger of stirring up a great war would prevent pursuit
into those countries. These obstacles were great, but ex-
aggerated by the objectors and libellers, and the following
extracts from the English leader's journal of operations
show how profoundly he had considered the subject while
those who pretended to a thorough knowledge of the
tribes and their resources, assumed that he was ignorant,
and predicted that his troops must be starved if they
were not cut to pieces.

" These barbarians must be attacked on a principle the
reverse of that which prescribes the keeping your own
force in masses and dividing your enemies. To drive the
hillmen together must here be our object — their warfare
will be to evade attacks and to surprise. They must, in
opposition, be driven to concentration and defence ; for all
history points out that neither barbarians nor civilized
warriors of different tribes, or nations, agree when com-
pressed together; and these Cutchee hillmen are pecu-
liarly incapable of doing so, because the tribes adopt

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

177

the personal quarrels of each member. Another rea- CHAP. VIIJ.

son for thus operating is that they possess great herds isu.

of cattle,, which will thus be driven together in a country

where water is very scarce, and food for the animals still

scarcer. These herds must then perish or fall into our

hands at the watering-places, and the hillmen will starve

instead of starving us, while we shall be encouraged by

constantly recurring spoil, which will give us food ; and at

the same time we shall get water, which, though not to be

found in abundance, will probably be sufficient to sustain

life during the operations. These tribes are however a

people as well as an army, and their families and furniture

must move with them. They cannot, as when making

incursions into Scinde, fly about like demons on their little

blood mares, but, pushed into masses, will feel all the

wants and difficulties of regular troops, without having the

same supplies and redeeming arrangements or force."

Thus reasoning, he felt sure that with vigilance caution
and perseverance, he could turn the difficulties of the hills,
which the tribes trusted to, against them, and render their
hardy habits and quickness of no avail. There was how-
ever still a difficulty, before alluded to, and which will
be found continually embarrassing his operations ; these
desperate men, capable of any terrible action, might
when pressed, cut the throats of their wives and children,
and falling sword in hand upon the divided troops defeat
them. To this could only be opposed great caution. The
columns were to be strongly constituted with all arms, and
forbid when advancing to send out detachments, but to
employ in preference, patrols occasionally, and spies always,
to ascertain where the masses of the enemy were. A few
robbers might then indeed steal at night, or even by day,
between the lines of march and be troublesome, but no
great body could do so in such a rugged country ; where-
fore, after due consideration of all the difficulties to be
apprehended, General Napier thus summed up his plan of
action.

"To drive men, women and children, baggage and
herds together in masses ; to use their tracks as guides ;

178

SIR CHARLES NAPIER?S

CHAP. VIII. to cut off their food and water. That will make them
1844 quarrel amongst themselves, and compel them either to
fight a general action or surrender. On open ground they
cannot stand before the British troops, for not more than
eighteen or twenty thousand can appear in arms, and not
above five or six thousand need be expected at any point.
The result of a battle cannot therefore be doubtful, but
I will never press a fight when the women and children
are gathered near the armies lest they should perish."

It was not with reference to the chances of a battle,
but to the extensive range of hills which were to be
assailed at all their passes simultaneously, that the number
of troops for the campaign was fixed. Those passes were
however of stupendous strength, and it was to be expected
the barbarians would defend them now as they always had
done before. Hence it was, that the artillery had been
organized with so many mortars and howitzers, for the
design was to dislodge matchlock-men by firing on a
range beyond their reach, and by this distant fighting,
at once save the troops and avoid driving these ferocious
people to kill their wives and children. In fine the enter-
prise was one sure to have terrible concomitants if any
mistake was made, and therefore every resource was
employed that a subtle genius and an overbearing will
could bring into activity.

In the middle of December the scheme of operation
was ripened; but the khan of Khelat still remained at
Poolagee with his army, and thus two native princes were,
the one on the right the other on the left flank of the
British force, and each sure in case of reverse to aid in
destroying it : it might be that they would not wait for,
but cause that reverse. To counteract mischief on the
right the general trusted much to Captain Malet, who
was political agent with Ali Moorad ; but still more to
Mr. Curling, a very bold man and a distant connection of
his own by marriage, who being in that prince's pay, was
commander of his troops, and had great influence with
them. Security in that quarter was however of so much
importance, that Sir C. Napier proposed a hunting of Wild

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

179

boars to the aineer, expecting that in the familiarity of CHAP. VIII.
the chase he should be able to gain more insight into his 1844<
true character than he had yet obtained. The result was
a conviction that his good-nature and frankness were
greater, his abilities and energy less than previously
supposed, and no treason lurked beneath. Ali had indeed,
when Sir H. Hardinge first arrived in India, sent a secret
vakeel with complaints, thinking a new power would,
according to eastern habits, overthrow all that Lord Ellen-
borough had approved ; but he was terrified to find his
accusations were transmitted to the general, and his vakeel
sent back. Sir Charles, remarking that this was only
barbarian nature, made it a subject for raillery when
he met Ali at the chase, and the effect convinced him
that the ameer was only weak, not treacherous or ma-
lignant.

To obviate mischief on the left of the army, more subtle
measures were resorted to. The khan's movement to
Poolagee being, as before noticed, judged a concerted
affair with Beja, the general was desirous to draw him so
far to the south, that he should not be able easily to com-
municate with the robber chief, or embarrass the contem-
plated operations. In this view, pretending to think the
prince meant still to hold the appointed conference^ a
letter was written to entreat that the place might be
changed from Dadur to Gundava, because the general was
old and feeble, and wished to be spared the fatigue of a
long journey ; his troops also were very sickly, and dying
so fast he could not with them undertake the enterprise
against the hill tribes that year, but would send the Chan-
dikas and Ali Moorad in his stead.

This letter, delivered by the moonshee Ali Acbar, was
calculated either to draw the khan to the south, or force
him to disclose his real intentions ; and as it was certain
to be made known to Beja by the Khelat sirdars, that
robber chief would conclude that the English leader was
really too feeble of body for such a warfare, and so be
misled. But to insure this last object, a duplicate was
transmitted by a channel which Beja was certain to inter-

n 2

180

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. VIII. cept, and thus have the same story from the intercepted
1844. letter and from his friends in the khan's court ; and to
give greater weight to this wile no visible preparations for
war were made at Sukkur.

Ali Acbar, was, if the conference was still refused,
publicly to demand reasons, but secretly to ascertain, if
possible the designs of the sirdars by whom the prince was
held in pupillage. Of their enmity there could be no
doubt, for they had recently induced the khan to excite
Wullee Chandia to rebellion, and the stout old chieftain
answered " I have sworn fealty and will not draw sword
against the English sirdar." Very soon the clever and
bold moonshee contrived to gain a private interview with
the khan, and thus discovered that there were two factions,
each headed by a great sirdar. The most powerful was
openly inimical to the British ; the other had the prince's
confidence and was not disposed to break the alliance at
that time, but was too weak to display its real policy.
It had therefore consented to the simulated attack on
Beja, which the stronger party had, as suspected by the
general, concerted with that formidable robber, of whom
all were afraid. Indeed his implacable ferocity was so
well known, that dread of him overbore for the moment
even the fear of the " Sheitan-ka-Bhaee" the title now given
to the general — in English " The Devil's Brother" But
at this period, British and natives alike, thought Beja
could not be subdued, and the spies and Scindian people
were therefore very reluctant to give intelligence as to the
nature of his country or his movements.

The reasons assigned in private by the khan for avoiding
the conference were conclusive. Partly founded on the
state of his Durbar, partly on the hostile disposition of
the Canclahar chiefs, they taught the English leader that
if he failed at any point of his operations all the men of
Cutchee, the Kujjucks and Khelat tribes, those of Seebee
and the Bolan Pass, and the Affghans of Candahar, would
be down on him like a whirlwind. The latter indeed only
waited for an excuse, which a friendly conference with a
Feringhee would give them, to plunder the khan's territory

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

181

of Shawl on the west, and Beja had already virtually CHAP. VIII.
deprived him of Cutch Gundava by laying it waste. 1844.

Want of water soon caused the khan to retire to Bagh,
and Beja returned to Poolagee; whereupon, as the troops
were then nearly ready to act, it was judged advisable to
send another negotiator to persuade the khan to go still
further back to the heart of his dominions, and place
himself beyond the reach of those wild tribes who it was to
be feared might force him to some act involving hostility
to the British government. This advice was enforced to
his highness by pointing out that he would thus be ready
to make head against the Affghans who were menacing
him, and be more sure of support from the British army.
The principal object however was to remove him so far
from Ah Moor ad's line of operations, that no combination
for uniting and falling on the British rear could be easily
effected. Such an event was indeed unlikely, but always
Sir C. Napier extended his precautions in war beyond the
immediate and probable. He designed also by this and
Ah Achats mission, to give a mysterious character to his
proceedings which might embarrass Beja and his friends
in the Khelat court ; and with these views, and that all
forms might be observed, he sent on the 27th of December
the government secretary Brown, who was an intimate
friend of the khan, with a public mission to demand his
assent in writing to the British army entering his domi-
nions for the punishment of Beja and his confederates.
This assent was given, but Brown on his return narrowly
escaped a band of robbers sent by Beja to intercept him :
they had come eighty miles without a halt, and he owed
his safety principally to the intelligence of Aliff Khan, the
strong swordsman, who was with the escort.

In January 1845, all things being ready for the cam-
paign, Sir C. Napier issued a manifesto embodying a de-
claration of war against the Jackranees, Doomkees, and
Bhoogtees. It stated their offences and their disregard of
their own prince's alliance ; then announcing the measures
taken to obtain an interview with the khan, it declared
the reasons given by that prince for declining it were

182

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. viii. satisfactory. It announced that the young khan, avowedly
1845. unable to coerce his subjects, had consented that the
English should repay their inroads on Scinde, and an army
was going to chastise them in their hills. The causes
of war, the means taken to avoid it, their failure and the
justice of a recourse to arms, were then set forth with a
force and clearness which left Beja and his confederates
nothing but their fierce courage and their strong fast-
nesses to rest on. It was also announced that the
Beloochees, opponents at Meeanee, were now fighting on
the British side : and lest the Seikhs and the distant tribes
should take alarm, as thinking he was commencing a new
scheme of conquest, the manifesto finished by declaring
that when the robbers were suppressed the British army
would return to Scinde.

Previous to issuing this document, the Bundlecund
legion and the other Bengal troops sent from Feroze-
poore, had been directed to form a camp at Subzulcote,
where General Simpson, and Colonel Geddes, commandant
of artillery, went privately to ascertain their condition;
because Sir C. Napier, carefully avoiding all military
show, sought by all means to mislead the enemy's spies
and induce them to believe he was, as his double letter had
said, disposed to defer the campaign. Meanwhile he des-
patched a letter to Major Broadfoot, political resident
with the Seikhs, desiring him to demand a strict neu-
trality, and that the hillmen should be debarred entrance
to the Punjaub, unless the dewan of Mooltan would allow
the British troops to pass through that country to Deyra.
This condition was made because the Bengal troops were
in very fine condition, and he designed that Simpson
should take the command and pass the Indus at Subzul-
cote, with a view to cross the Mooltan country and enter the
Cutchee hills from the east, in combination with the main
attack from the south. But just then became known
Heera Sing's death at Lahore, and that the Punjaub was
all in commotion ; wherefore, vexing as it was to change
a well-considered plan at the moment of starting, Sir
C. Napier felt that in such a state of affairs to pass

ADMINISTRATION OP SC1NDE.

183

through the Seikh territory, even with leave, might pro- chap. viii.
duce a collision embarrassing to the governor-general, and
possibly produce a war. He foresaw indeed that a war Appendix x.
must soon happen, but resolved not to be a cause of
it, and calling Simpson down, fixed the point of concen-
tration for the whole army on the edge of the desert.

A short time before this, the Murrees and Bhoogtees
had fought again, and the Murrees, declaring themselves
victors, agreed to aid the British expedition, an event
which now determined the new mode of attack.

The hills to be invaded, approached the Indus on the
east, but on the north-west joined the great Soleyman SeePiansi&2.
and Khelat mountains. Northward they touched the
Mooltan country, and between them and the river was
thrust the narrow Mazaree district belonging to Mooltan.
On the south was the desert of Kusmore, and from that
side they could only be entered by terrible denies. But
these hills, or rather rocky ranges were narrow though of
great length, and if an army could pass the desert by sur-
prise, seize the denies, and throw its left across the ranges so
as to command all the gorges of the long ravines between
the ridges, the hillmen would be cut off from the western
mountains and must either fight, retreat into Mooltan, or
be driven on to the Indus. For the Murrees would hem
them in on the north, and it was only necessary for the
left of the army to connect itself with that tribe to render
a subsequent advance between the long ridges towards the
Indus effectual.

In this view, Wullee Chandia and Ahmed Khan Mugzee
were suddenly ordered to cross the desert on a given day,
so as to reach Poolagee at dusk; and it was calculated,
that so arriving, Beja, who was known to have intercepted
the letter to the khan of Khelat, seeing in accordance
with its contents only Chandikas and Mugzees, would be
little disturbed and await the dawn to go out and attack
them. But three hours' march behind Wullee, who had
orders to sweep all spies and scouts before him, Fitzgerald,
moving from Larkaana, was to approach with the camels,
carrying his own men and two hundred volunteers of the

184

SIR CHARLES NAPTER5S

CHAP. VIII. 13th regiment. From the same place also, at a fixed time,
1845 Jacob's Moguls, five hundred strong, were to follow Fitz-
gerald; and it was thought these British troops might
perhaps, in the night, file unobserved, so as to place Beja
between two fires when he came out in the morning to
fall on the Chandikas. Head-quarters, with an advanced
guard, were to precede the main body, which from Sukkur
was to move the same day that Jacob quitted Larkaana ;
and both were to reach the frontier simultaneously, at the
moment when all communication between Beja and his
spies would be cut off by the advance of Wullee and
Fitzgerald. All the supplies of food and spare ammu-
nition, and camels to carry water in case the enemy
poisoned the wells in the desert, had been previously pre-
pared to attend the troops as closely as possible; and a
corps of artificers, pioneers and well -sinkers, had been
organized to mend broken gun-carriages, open roads and
seek for water. They carried with them an abundant
supply of iron punchers, steel rods to repair them, and
quick lime, which in blasting rocks saves powder ; and the
army was also attended by the Kaherees, a small tribe
driven from Poolagee, their own country, some ten years
before by Beja: they were now serving as guides, and it
was intended to restore them to their lands. The prepara-
tions for opening the campaign were however necessarily
contracted, having been made very secretly to confirm
Beja in the belief that no general movement would be
undertaken; but to counteract this defect the general
trusted to moral influences and was not deceived. And
here also, as on his first assuming command, he accepted
omens of success ; for like many great captains his ten-
dency was to augur good or ill from natural events.

On the 16th of January 1809, he had been desperately
wounded and taken prisoner in Spain. On the 16th of
January 1843, he had crossed the Scindian frontier to
war with the ameers ; Wullee Chandia was then menacing
his rear, and a brilliant comet was streaming in the sky.
Now, on the 16th of January 1845, being again crossing
the Scindian frontier in a contrary direction for another

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

185

contest, Wullee Chandia was leading his advanced guard CHAP. VIII.
instead of menacing his rear, and the effulgence of 1845>
another comet was widely spread on high ! " How these
things affect the minds of men" he observed "at least
they do mine. They have not indeed much influence
with me, but they have some and it is useful. Well !
God's will be done, whether evinced by signs or not. All
I have to think of is my duty." And with that feeling,
conscious of having a just cause, he commenced the war.

186

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAPTER IX.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HILLMEN.

CHAP. IX. Towards the desert, the Cutchee hills presented in
1Mb. their length several points of entrance, five of which
were immediately within the scope of the operations,
namely, Poolagee, Tonge, Zurekooshta or Zuranee, Gon-
dooee, and Sebree, reckoning from left to right of the

Plans l & 2. British front. Beyond Tullar was the defile of Tonge ;

beyond Zurekooshta the double defiles of Lnllee and
Jnmmuck.

Fronting these entrances and nearly in a parallel line,
were the watering-places of the desert. Chuttur on the
west leading to Poolagee ; Ooch more eastward leading to
Zurekooshta ; Shahpoor, between them, a walled village
from whence either Poolagee or Tullar might be assailed.

Bojan and Khangur on the Scindian side of the desert
were the permanent English cavalry posts; they faced
Poolagee, Shahpoor and Ooch, but had the waste between
them and those places.

Behind Rojan were Larkaana and Jull, from whence
Fitzgerald, Jacob, the Chandikas and the Mugzees, were
to start for the surprising of Poolagee.

Behind Khangur, were Shikarpoore and Sukkur, from
whence the head- quarter column and AH Moorad's con-
tingent were to move against the hills.

The frontier was not crossed before the 16th of January,
but the campaign was opened the 13th by an advanced
guard of cavalry and guns, which marched under the
general from Sukkur to Shikarpoore, a distance of twenty-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

187

six miles. Colonel Geddes had previously organized the CHAP. IX.
artillery park and a corps of artificers at the former 1845
place, whence a detachment of sappers, miners, and
well-diggers pushed forward the same day to Khangur,
under the indefatigable Lieutenant Maxwell of the Bengal
Engineers, an officer of extraordinary hardihood, mental
and bodily. The infantry the artillery and the com-
missariat remained under the Brigadiers Hunter and
Simpson, but with instructions to march at a stated time,
* and to be followed at a later period by Ali Moorad.
Meanwhile Jacob and Fitzgerald, the Chandikas and the
Mugzees, had orders to commence their march also on the
13th to surprise Poolagee: thus the troops were put in
sudden and rapid movement to the front, simultaneously
from the right and left of the long line of frontier.

On the 14th a march of thirteen miles brought the
general with his advanced guard of cavalry and a battery
of horse-artillery to Jaghur, and on the 15th he reached
Khangur after a march of sixteen miles. Jacob had that
clay reached Rojan, fourteen miles west of Khangur, but
by a terrible march through the desert, men and horses
sinking from fatigue and thirst, because the camel corps,
which preceded them, had exhausted all the wells in the
desert, and many horses had died.

, At Khangur the spies came in with news that Beja
Khan, deceived by the intercepted letter, knew nothing
of the British movement, and had forces at Shahpoor
thirty-five miles in advance. This unexpected informa-
tion, and Jacob's distress, rendered the first plan of sur-
prising Poolagee inapplicable; and Sir C. Napier like a
great captain instantly changed his whole scheme of
operations — arguing thus. U If Wullee Chandia be true,
he will this night attack Poolagee, and though Jacob's
horsemen are too distressed to reach that place for the
morning combination, they can reach Shahpoor; and an
attack there, coupled with that of the Chandikas at Poo-
lagee, will still drive the hillmen eastward and cut them
off from the western mountains, which is the first great

188

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. IX. object of the campaign. Ooch is the next watering-place
1845. east °f Shahpoor, and only sixteen miles from it : to Ooch
then, the enemy will naturally retire unless he defeats
Jacob at Shahpoor, and Beja may still be intercepted."

The head-quarter troops had then marched sixteen
miles, and the distance to Ooch was forty, through heavy
sand, where a single shower of rain would wash out all
traces and bewilder the most skilful guides. This distance
and difficulty seemed to forbid the effort ; but the perma-
nent irregular cavalry post of Khangur under Captain
Salter, and two mountain-guns under Lieutenant Pulman,
being fresh, were forthwith despatched against Ooch, and
Jacob received orders to move against Shahpoor. Scarcely
had Salter been lost to the sight, when fresh intelligence
arrived ; many chiefs with a strong force were already in
possession of Ooch, and Shahpoor was still occupied as
before. This news alarmed the general for Salter, whose
ability he had not proved in action ; he feared he might
be beaten, and notwithstanding his own previous march,
the great distance to Ooch, and the chance of losing his
way, having as guides only two Kaheree chiefs whose skill
was doubtful, he followed with two hundred of the 6th
irregular cavalry and two pieces of horse-artillery under
Captain Mowat. And these high-spirited soldiers, excited
to enthusiasm by the energy of their leader, actually,
added those forty miles over heavy sand to their previous
march, within the twenty-four hours !

At daybreak on the 18th the vicinity of Ooch was
attained, but the general, who had then been above
twenty-six hours on horseback and oppressed with con-
stant thought, had fallen asleep in his saddle. A sudden
halt of the advanced guard, with which he was moving,
awakened him; lights had been perceived not far off
and the enemy must be close at hand. Although un-
easy not to have found traces of Salter, he resolved to
wait only for his own main body, form a column of
attack, and gallop at daylight headlong into the midst of
the enemy supposed to be in front. But during his very
short slumber, the column and guns had gone astray, and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

189

he was left with, only fifty tired horsemen close, as he CHAP. IX.
imagined, to a numerous and formidable enemy. 1845.

At daybreak Captain McMurdo, who had ascended a
sand-hill in front, returned hastily with intelligence that
he had seen Beloochees firing in the plain beyond ; this
was embarrassing, for the general somewhat doubted
the firmness of the native horsemen with him in such a
perilous crisis ; yet he would not retire, but merely moving
out of matchlock-range from the sand-hill ascended by
McMurdo, awaited the coming event, and at that critical
moment his lost troops and guns suddenly emerged from
behind another sand-hill ! This happy accident having
rendered him again master of his movements, he sent
scouts towards the firing, which was dropping not con-
tinuous, and found that not the enemy but Salter was
in front. He had engaged and defeated seven hundred
hillmen in the night, and the shots were from his videttes
to keep off prowling parties, seeking to steal back some of
the spoil. He had found the robbers, under Deyrah Khan
Jackranee, in a position covered on three sides by the
rocks but open on the fourth, and had vigorously charged
them. At first, from the darkness, he missed their line,
sweeping along the front instead of plunging into it, but
soon recovering he rode straight upon them and they
dispersed, leaving many dead. Some prisoners were taken,
with above three thousand head of cattle, and twice that
number of cattle would have been captured but for the
extreme fatigue of men and horses, for the hills in front
were covered with scattered herds.

When the second camp was pitched, a knowledge of the
prowling warfare and ferocity of the robber warriors
induced Sir C. Napier to order that no man should go
beyond certain precincts. But always a certain thought-
less negligence where personal danger is involved, cha-
racterizes young British officers and soldiers. Captain
John Napier, the general's nephew, McMurdo his son-in-
law, and Lieutenant Byng his aide-de-camp, seeing small
bands of the hillmen assembling on a rocky height in
front, as if to save the distant herds, went towards them.

190

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IX. As they approached, fearing an ambuscade, Byng was
sent back for some cavalry, but the two others soon had
occasion to acknowledge the prudence of their general;
for round a rocky knoll came galloping a gallant robber
mounted on a small mare of great activity, himself of a
fine presence, clothed in a wadded armour, and bearing a
matchlock and two swords : he had a fine courage also,
or he would not have hovered so close to the camp
with such a pageantry of weapons immediately after a
defeat.

McMurdo fell upon him sword in hand, and some time
they fought, wheeling in circles and closing without ad-
vantage on either side, save that the mare was wounded.
Napier looked on, too chivalric to interfere in so fair a
fight, but at last McMurdo, who had already ridden the
same horse sixty miles, said, John, I am tired, you may
try him. The other, of a slight make, but with as bright
and clear a courage as ever animated a true English youth,
advanced, and all three were soon at fall speed — the
Beloochee making a running fight. Suddenly the latter
turned in his saddle and aimed with his matchlock,
being then only a horse's length in front ; it missed fire,
and as Napier rapidly discharged his pistol, McMurdo, a
man of ungovernable fierceness in combat, thinking the
report was from the matchlock unfairly used, dashed
pistol in hand past his comrade — who in vain called out
not to kill — and shot the daring fellow as he was drawing
his second sword. Then ensued a scene singularly cha-
racteristic. The young men alighted, McMurdo reproach-
ing himself for using a pistol when they were two to one,
and both with great emotion tried to stop the blood flowing
from their dying antagonist, while he, indomitable, clufeched
at his weapon to give a last blow : he was unable to do so
and soon after expired.

From the camp now came succour, for the two officers were
in danger from the vicinity of the dead man's prowling
comrades, but to view the body of the fallen Beloochee was
all that remained to be done. The general's first impulse had
been to gallop out hinself, but the recollection of his high

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

191

calling checked him, and he left the result to fortune — CHAP. IX.
expressing afterwards his displeasure at the whole pro- 1845.
ceeding as contrary to discipline, contrary to prudence,
and in his mind contrary to a just principle, which forbade
even in war the shedding of any blood not absolutely ne-
cessary for the general success. He had however another
scene of more painful interest to endure. Having found
a native officer of the 6th irregular cavalry, named Azeem
Beg, lying on the ground mortally hurt, he alighted and
endeavoured to alleviate his suffering and give him hope
of recovery. " General, replied the dying hero, "lam
easy, I have done my duty. I am a soldier, and if fate
demands my life I cannot die better- — your visit to me is a
great honour" So he died ! " These are the things,"
Sir C. Napier wrote in his journal just after this touching
event, "these are the things which try the heart of a
commander ; and accursed, he adds — alluding to the slan-
derous assertions of Lord Howick and his coadjutors — See Conquest
" accursed be those who in the House of Commons accused of Scmde-
me of seeking war in wantonness." They were not worth
this passing invective, their miserable calumny was scorn-
fully rejected and crushed at its birth by the English feeling
of their auditors.

About midday, when the camp had been pitched, came
a horseman from Jacob to say he also had surprised and
defeated the hillmen under Wuzzeer Khan, Beja's son ;
whereupon the general, notwithstanding his previous
fatigue rode to Shahpoor and found that the enemy had
been, as at Ooch, completely deceived by the letters written
to the khan of Khelat. At both places, supposing the
troops attacking them in the night were Chandikas and
Mugzees, they had resisted until the vigour and skill of
the fighting convinced them of their error ; then they fled;
and Jacob had so disciplined his wild Moguls that not a
hillman who surrendered was hurt, although the Moguls
had been forced to storm one house defended by sixty rob-
bers, who after killing or wounding six assailants threw
down their arms when the door was broken. It was a
fine example of generous discipline.

192

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. IX. Two chiefs and eighty men had been captured, a new
1845 phase in Scindian warfare, for hitherto remorseless slaugh-
ter on both sides had marked every fight. Six chiefs and
above a hundred men had been killed or wounded in the
two attacks, which cost the British only eighteen men ;
and it was reported that while battling at Ooch the
robbers, until then firm, on hearing Salter's artillery cried
out " The Sheitan-ka-Bhaee himself is there," and instantly
fled — so great a dread had his actions created. Thus the
desert was overcome by a finely-conceived and masterly
change in the operations, suddenly adopted, enforced with
astonishing energy, and wonderfully sustained by the
troops, whose enduring strength may be compared with
that of any soldiers ancient or modern. For the men with
the general had marched without halting, fifty-six miles ;
those with Jacob fifty miles; those with Salter forty
miles, through deep sand. For forty miles also Jacob's
cavalry had been followed in the waste by a body of
police infantry under Lieutenant Smallpage ! And while
all these hardy soldiers thus broke through the desert,
their general was in the saddle for thirty hours, riding over
seventy-two miles of ground — the last sixteen during a
violent sand-storm, very oppressive to exhausted men
and horses. It was only in Shahpoor, after writing
his despatches and issuing orders for concentrating the
infantry and artillery, which were now to close up, that
he first took rest !

Tins triple success — for the true and valiant Chandian
had at the same time taken Poolagee — again induced a
change in the plan of operations. The enemy had volun-
tarily thrown himself into the eastern hills, and the
original design of moving direct upon Poolagee and con-
necting the left of the army with the Murrees, was entirely
relinquished. The principle of cutting off the hillmen
from the west, and driving them up their long ravines
remained indeed the same, but they had themselves short-
ened the operation by abandoning the western ranges.
Salter therefore remained at Ooch and Jacob's cavalry was
detached to Poolagee and Lheree, to hold those places,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

193

and in concert with the Chandikas to awe the Khelat CHAP. IX.
tribes. The infantry, the artillery, and all the supplies i845.
were directed upon Shahpoor, where a magazine for
fourteen days' consumption was formed, which would have
been twice as large, if the necessity of keeping Beja and
his confederates deceived as to the movements had not
restricted the previous preparations.

Jacob's cavalry and the Chandikas being thus thrown
across the hills towards the Murrees, the army occupied
two sides of a square, one of which menaced the passes
from the desert on the south ; the other was in posses-
sion of the western mouths of the long parallel valleys,
or rather ravines, which split the hills in their length
towards the Indus.

Looking from Poolagee, to the east, those ravines were Plans l & 2.
as follows : —

On the right hand, the ravine of Tonge was prolonged
eastward, until it was lost in the crags of the Mazaree
district near the Indus. It could only be entered from the
south by the cross denies of Zuranee, Gondooee and Sebree,
leading through an almost perpendicular wall of rocks.

Next to and parallel with Tonge, was the ravine of the
Illiassee river ; into which the only cross entrance was the
defile of Jummuck leading over a rocky range, impassable
save at that point.

From the Illiassee ravine several defiles gave entrance to
the parallel ravine of the Teyaga stream, which, in the
centre, was called the Valley of the Tomb, and more east-
ward the Valley of Deyrah. Into this ravine a shorter
one opened, down which the Sungseela torrent came from
the north-eastward, to fall into the Teyaga, flowing west-
ward. These rivers are however mere beds of torrents,
dry except in heavy rain : the Teyaga, the only continu-
ally-flowing stream, was but a yard wide at Deyrah, and
the whole region is horribly arid.

Northward of all these ravines was a rocky range, sepa-
rating the Murrees from the other tribes but pierced by
the defiles of Sartoof and Nufoosk.

With the desert behind, and this arid region, these

194

SIR CHARLES NAPIER?S

CHAP. IX. craggy passes before him, the desolate nature of which
1845* can onty ^e comPrenen(ied by reference to the plans and
views, the English general, while impatiently awaiting the
arrival of his infantry, his guns and stores, thus described
his position on the 18th of January.

" To-morrow all the gorges will be plugged up by the
cavalry, and Beja Khan is, I am sure, on this south side of
the rocks, between a low ridge which hides him from us
and a higher range on the north. I have examined Yarroo
Khosa, the guide, this morning, and he says there is plenty
of water at Tullar and very little at Tonge, but at Zuranee
it is excellent and plentiful. I think it scarcely possible
that water should abound at Tullar and Zuranee, and yet
be scarce and bad at Tonge, wherefore I believe Yarroo is
in Beja's hands, and that chief is at Tonge : however Yarroo
and I have agreed that we cannot go there."

This double-dealer being thus blinded, Jacob was directed
to block the gorges of the ravines opening on Lheree and
Poolagee, with six hundred horsemen and two guns, while
Ahmed Khan Mugzee moved up the Teyaga into the
Tomb ravine. Wullee Chandia was to scour that of Tonge,
the Chandikas being, as the general observed, good feelers.
He designed to move himself by Ooch upon the Zuranee
pass, he directed AH Moorad on the Gondooee, there to
wait until the enemy was pushed upwards. By these
dispositions he secured the western entrances of the hills,
and could block the cross defiles from the south, while
the Chandikas and Mugzees explored two of the ravines
in their length and ascertained the real positions of the
hillmen ; and always he expected to capture cattle at the
watering-places and so deprive the enemy by degrees of
subsistence. Nor did he judge it dangerous to push for-
ward the Chandikas and Mugzees in this isolated manner,
because the recent surprises would inevitably lead the
enemy to think they only masked the approach of the
British forces as before.

From some negligence or error, the infantry, the artil-
lery park, and the commissariat stores, did not come up
in due time, and nothing could be done in the hills without

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

195

the first. Nevertheless,, on the 20th, having first permitted CHAP. IX.

the families of the prisoners to join them, making arrange- 1845

ments for their support with a liberal regard to humanity,

he began his movement on Ooch, his intention being to

force all the rocky passes on the south front immediately.

But never did a campaign more entirely depend upon the

prompt genius of a commander than this. There were no

maps, the country was inexpressibly intricate and austere,

the movements were governed by the finding of water, the

spies all dreaded Beja and the guides were from fear,

rendered his agents. Each day brought a new difficulty,

or new information to cause a change in the plan of

operations — and to all this was added an embarrassment,

before alluded to, which seldom troubles generals in war,

namely, the dread of forcing the robbers to a decisive

battle near their families, lest they should butcher them

when the day was going hard. This indeed he dreaded

so much, that between the 20th and the 22nd, stoically

humane, he twice rejected opportunities of destroying Beja

while moving across the British front, because his family,

and the families of his sons and chiefs, were with him.

At Ooch, the spies said that Tonge, into which the
Doomkee chief had first thrown himself, was a place of
singular formation ; being an immense basin, formed by
rocks whose summits were inaccessible on the outside but
easy of ascent from the inside. The only inlet was a small
tunnel, made by a streamlet of pure water, which fell
from the higher part of the rocks on the opposite part of
the basin inside ; in former wars it had been turned tempo-
rarily by the hillmen so as to fall fourteen miles from the
tunnel by the outward circuit, and the assailants, having
the desert at their backs, were thus forced to retire from
thirst : the more provident English leader was furnished
with water-skins and well-diggers for such an occasion,
and designed to block the tunnel and starve the defenders.
Meanwhile Wullee Chandia, having swept the outer valley
leading up towards Tonge, killed several Bhoogtees and
captured a large flock of goats, so alarmed Beja by these
movements, that he abandoned his fastness and fled across

o 2

196

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

3AP- IX- the front of the troops at Ooch towards Zuranee ; escaping
1845. capture, as noticed above, because bis enemy was more com-
passionate for the women and children than he would him-
self have been. During this flight however, his followers
left him in great numbers, and went to Belooch Khan of
Lheree, who pretended to be friendly with the British ; but
the general, thinking this reception of the Doomkees no
proof of friendship, suspected a concerted scheme to or-
ganize a force on his flank, and therefore directed Jacob
to treat Belooch Khan roughly, and even, if necessary,
arrest and send him to head-quarters.

The Chandikas, reinforced with a squadron of cavalry,
were now placed at Tullar in observation of the Tonge
defile, because the latter was a good watering-place not-
withstanding Yarroo's tale; and though more correct
information had stripped it of the marvellous strength at
first reported, it was a fastness great and difficult to assail.
Colonel Geddes was then sent with a column of all arms
to Zuree-Kooshta, opposite the Zuranee defile, and the
troops were becoming eager for battle ; yet the march of
head-quarters was deferred, because hourly varying circum-
stances presented new combinations—" There is no need
for haste," observed the general on the 21st in his journal
of operations — " A check at any point might force me to
retrograde ; that would be dishonouring, and weaken the
effect of the first surprise. My army hems the enemy in
on the south and west — the Murrees hem him in on the
north — Ali Moorad ought to be now marching on the Gon-
dooee defiles, and the hillmen's provisions are decreasing,
while mine are increasing by the arrival of supplies and the
captures of cattle. All the young men are eager for
fighting, but I will not indulge them unless Beja goes to
the Zuranee defile, — for I must force the passes there —
meanwhile every man's life ought to be as dear to me as
my own, and I will not lose any by provoking fights with
small detachments, to hasten results when my measures
are, it appears to me, sufficient to insure final success."

In this mood he remained at Ooch until the 25th of
January, intent to spare life as much as possible, and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

197

always dreading that a premature advance should bring CHAP. ix.

the robbers to action while their families were with them, ~~T

an event the contemplation of which filled him with

horror, His movements were thus clogged, and many

advantages designedly let slip ; for nothing could shake

his resolution not to have the blood of women and children

swelling the red stream which the terrible actions of the

robbers had forced him to set flowing. Nor did he spare

moral means to avoid so horrible a catastrophe. After

Salter's action, eleven men and sixteen women, amongst

them the mother of Deyrah Khan J ackranee and the wife

of Toork Ali, were found in a cave, and transferred with

marked respect to the care of a Syud or holy man, who

held a jagheer on the tenure of applying its revenue to

the succour of the poor — and such obligations of charity

are seldom violated amongst the Mahometans. By this

Syud the humanity of the English leader was made known,

and, coupled with the previous good treatment of the

prisoners' families at Shahpoor, not only abated the horror

felt by the hillmen at having their women fall into the

power of Caflir enemies, but finally influenced Toork Ali

and Deyrah Khan to surrender.

On the 18th Ali Moor ad should have been in front of
the Gondooee defile, but he had halted for the feast of
the Moharem and did not arrive until the 31st — a very
serious failure, as will be seen further on.

On the 23rd rain fell, which was useful for filling the
wells, but otherwise inconvenient ; on that day however,
Hunter reached Ooch with a sepoy battalion and the 2nd
Bengal Europeans, the latter, strong well-set men, " not
biff, but with a big spirit " was the remark of their chief
whom they now saw for the first time. Simpson about the
same period got to Shahpoor with the other sepoy bat-
talion, and the Bundlecund legion : thus the whole army
was assembled on the north side of the desert, and the
magazines were now filled for two months.

On the 25th the general, unable to ascertain either the
real numbers or the positions of the enemy, but supposing
them to be assembled for the defence of the Zuranee and

198

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. ix. Gondooee defiles, marched on the first point, but with
1845 design closely to examine the positions before he assailed
them. Meanwhile he directed Simpson to march with a
column of all arms combined, from Shahpoor upon Poolagee,
and from thence push up the Tomb valley upon Deyrah, a
distance of seven marches. Scouring that valley in its
length, he was to turn the cross defiles of Lullee and
Jummuck while the main body assailed them in front.
The army was thus disseminated in many columns, on
the principle of warfare originally designed; but each
column was so strongly constituted, and the hillmen were
still so dispirited by the first surprises at Ooch and Shah-
poor that no counter attack was to be dreaded: it was
expected also that rumour would exaggerate Simpson's
numbers, and the movements were not made without a
military connection calculated to secure the army against
any great disaster. Simpson, while moving up the Teyaga,
had Jacob's cavalry and guns behind him in support, and
the places of Lheree and Poolagee to fall back upon.
The Chandikas and the squadron of cavalry, when at
Tullar, were supported by Shahpoor, where a garrison of
all arms under Captain Jamieson remained to guard the
magazines : Shahpoor indeed, from its central position,
gave equal support to Simpson and to the Chandikas, and
was the place of arms for the whole movement.

No longer counting on Ali Moorad, the general now
resolved to assemble at Zuree Kooshta a powerful force for
offensive operations, and he effected this on the 26th ; but
only by forced and distressing marches, which nearly
destroyed the sumpter camels; the nights also were so
cold that the shivering sepoys could scarcely endure the
change — three died — but the Europeans became more
vigorous.

At Zuree Kooshta, it was ascertained that Beja had gone
through the Lullee defile, that he had been joined by the
Bhoogtees and Jackranees, that he was prepared to fight,
and his ground was surprisingly strong. Wherefore,
thinking sufficient time had been given for the women
and children to gain distant fastnesses, the English leader

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

199

resolved to attack. He designed however, following his CHAP. IX.
original notion, to dislodge his foes by powerful mortar 1345.
and howitzer batteries if possible, and thus spare an in-
fantry fight which could not fail to prove murderous for
his own army.

On the 28th the troops advanced, but found no enemy
to deal with. Simpson's movement had been, as foreseen,
magnified into the approach of a great army, and the
defiles of Lullee and Jummuck had been abandoned
when he had only made three marches, one of which,
from the extreme ruggedness of the ground was but of
four miles. The English camp was now pitched between
the Lullee and Jummuck passes, the space between them
being about five miles. Good water was found, though
not enough for a large force ; but afterwards, near the
summit of the Jummuck range, or ghaut, an abundance
was discovered ; and as these passes were points of great
importance, a redoubt and other works were immediately
traced for securing them. The defiles being thus gained,
a trusty cossid was despatched to Simpson with orders to
continue his march to Deyrah, by which his column was
again linked to the main body, and thus the general
movement was as successful in all its parts as the first had
been ; for the rocky region had been penetrated without
loss, and an irregular transverse front was thrown across the
parallel ravines, so as to block up all the western gorges
and connect the left of the army with the Murrees. But
though the tribes had abandoned these almost impregna-
ble passes, showing their ignorance of scientific warfare,
their prowling murderous bands infested the camp, and
soldiers and followers who strayed beyond the sentries
were killed without mercy. It was in vain to order that
no man should go beyond the lines, the orders were dis-
obeyed and daily losses ensued.

To ascertain the enemy's course was now the object
to attain. His strongest hold was said to be amongst
the desolate crags of Trukkee, but though celebrated all
over Asia their real situation was at this time a mystery
which neither guide nor spy cared to disclose ; so fearful

200

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. ix. were they of Beja's after-vengeance, and so sure that he
1845. would be finally victorious : Trukkee was however at no
great distance from the Jummuck pass, being ensconced
in the ridge which separates the Deyrah valley from the
Sungseela ravine. In this state the following questions
were to be considered. Would the robbers throw them-
selves into Trukkee and fight their last desperate battle
amongst its terrible rocks ? Or would they make a push
to break or evade Jacob's and Simpson's forces, and so
getting through the western gorges gain the Khelat
mountains, whither they could not be followed? This
last was not much to be feared; the hillmen were too
numerous, too much encumbered with their families, bag-
gage and herds, to slip between the columns ; moreover,
issuing from Tonge they would be met by the Chandikas
and Mugzees ; and issuing from the Illiassee they would
be met by Jacob ; in the Teyaga ravine Simpson would
oppose them, and at Sartoof they would have the Murrees
to fight. They were indeed more numerous than any of
these separated divisions, but the country was so strong
for defence there could be no fear.

Trukkee remained, but it was soon ascertained that
Simpson's column, which had frightened them from Jum-
muck, had also deterred them from going across the
ravine of the Tomb, which, as it approached Deyrah,
spread out into a spacious valley. Trukkee therefore was
not their object then. There was a third course open,
namely, to make eastward for the Mazaree hills, which
abounded with fastnesses even more inaccessible and aus-
tere than the rocks they had just abandoned ; and there
the general desired to drive them, for the following rea-
sons.— Barbarian communities, having less to spare of the
necessities of life and less confidence in each others' faith,
are more sensitive to intrusions than civilized communi-
ties ; and here the Jackranees and Doomkees would be
driven refluent upon the Bhoogtees, who were already
suffering from a dearth, and were more likely to quarrel
with than receive them amicably. They could then be all
pressed closely until they surrendered, or were compelled

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

201

to break, half-starved and desperate, into the Mooltan or CHAP. IX.
Keytrian countries, the last an eastern continuation of the \si5.
Murree hills.

To discover the true direction of their retreat, the
narrow ravine in which the army was then encamped,
was on the 29th explored eastward by a strong column of
troops ; and soon a recent camp was discovered, where the
fires were still burning, and where women's camel-litters
called cujavds, being left on the ground, showed that both
chiefs and their families had been there. This sufficed,
and the column returned.

Very remarkable and desolate was the rocky solitude
into which the operations had now brought the troops.
The ravine, up which the exploring column had gone, was
formed by two ridges running east and westward, the
ground between being fertile though uncultivated; the
northern ridge, pierced by the defile of Jummuck, was
highest, broadest, and extremely rugged ; yet of less as-
perity than the southern ridge, through which the defile
of Lullee had given entrance ; for this last, extending from
Tonge to the Mazaree hills, got mingled and lost amongst
the prodigious rocks of the last-named region, and in its
whole length presented, as it were, a battlemented wall
some hundred feet high. It offered several narrow defiles
or rather fissures, none more than thirty yards wide and
with perpendicular sides eighty or ninety yards high;
and it was impossible to employ flanking parties above,
from the difficulty of gaining access to the summit and
because their progress would have been stopped by
transverse fissures of great depth, so narrow as to be in
darkness and choked with bushes : but so terribly wild, so
rugged" so desolate is the face of nature there, that a
soldier, sublime in his homely force of language, exclaimed
on seeing it " When God made the world he threw the rub-
bish here"

Between Lullee and Jummuck the camp was of neces-
sity pitched, although a dangerous place ; but the enemy
had no guns, the field-works traced out would command
both the defiles, securing a communication with the

202

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IX. plains behind, where the cavalry was stationed to oppose
1845> and give notice of any outbreak from the other passes.

Moreover the reports of spies, and a calculation of
probabilities, soon showed that the confederate chiefs,
when deterred by Simpson's march from passing the
Jummuck range, had moved eastward until the austerity of
the ravine barred progress ; and then issuing by the Gon-
dooee defile into the plain of Muth, had skirted the desert,
until they could enter the hills again at Dooshkooshta the
most eastern defile. This they could not have done if
Ali Moorad had been true to his time and place, and his
failure was a serious mishap ; it rendered nugatory all the
previous able and finely-calculated combinations to finish
the war at this point, the campaign was indefinitely pro-
longed, and suspicion was excited as to his fidelity.

While Beja was thus making for the Mazaree hills by
the plain of Muth, Captain McMurdo was detached with
a squadron and two guns to find Simpson, and ascertain
if the Bhoogtee town and fort of Deyrah were defended ;
they were empty, and Simpson, an officer peculiarly exact
in following his instructions, was at hand to take posses-
sion ; hence McMurdo returned to camp, Salter's cavalry
were charged with the advanced communication between
the main body and Simpson, and the rear communication,
between Shahpoor and the Lullee pass, was delivered to
Smallpage and his policemen: still the lurking robbers
grievously infested both the camp and the rear of the
army, murdering all stragglers and carrying off many
camels.

Reflecting on this state of affairs, the general thought
some bands and herds must have been overpassed in the
previous operations ; and as the vital principle of the
campaign was to seize all the cattle and drive the people
in heaps upon the most sterile fastnesses, he sent Captain
John Napier with the camel corps and volunteers of the
13th regiment, to scour the ravine of Tonge, while a
squadron of cavalry from Zuree Kooshta skirted the
rocks outside in concert. Doing this, he said, that herds
would certainly be found near the watering-places, and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

203

he was right — John Napier, who united zeal and intelli- CHAP. IX.
gence to great resolution and enterprise, returned on the j.845.
31st, without having seen an enemy indeed, but with two
thousand cattle. The voice of the camp had foretold
entire failure, for notwithstanding the previous successes
light opinions were still expressed as to the ultimate
result of the war, and the English leader was continually-
chafed by predictions of failure, anticipations of difficulties,
and calculations too ill founded to have any influence on
his convictions. " Hitherto, he jocosely said, he had proved
himself at least a better robber than Beja, having taken
six thousand of his cattle and a great deal of grain, killed
many of his men, and forced the remainder to seek safety
in sterile fastnesses where they must suffer want."
Meanwhile Ali Moorad arrived at Zuree Kooshta with
two thousand men and ten guns, being then twenty-seven
miles in rear of the camp, whereas he should have been
ten days before at Gondooee, barring that defile against the
confederates, who would thus have been entirely enclosed
and compelled to surrender.

All the forces designed for the campaign were now in
hand, yet the camp remained stationary, for the counter war
of the hillmen had commenced and precluded movement.
Their emissaries in rear of the army had diligently con-
firmed the notion inculcated by the. Delhi Gazette and
the Bombay Times, as to the folly and danger of the expe-
dition, and panic was widely spread. " Beja could not
be subdued — he laughed at the English leader, who
with his army would be starved — would be cut to pieces
— the hillmen were invincible." To this the emissaries
added, that " Sir C. Napier's successor would shrink from
defending Shikarpoore" — a lesson they had learned from
Buist, who was continually objecting to its retention — »
"that the confederates would come down and plunder
that town and wreak Beja's vengeance on all men who
had aided in the invasion of their hills."

Terrified at this prospect, the camel-men, first refused
to pass Shahpoor with the supplies, and the next night
deserted with their animals, five hundred in number.

204

SIR CHARLES NAPIERJS

CHAP. IX. The contractors and owners of camels in Scinde also
1845. refused to complete their contracts, hid their beasts from
the government agents, and in every way evinced their
belief in the coming destruction of the army, and their
profound sense of the Beja's ferocity. The troops were
thus suddenly stripped of carriage, as sumpter camels are
called in India; for the commissariat animals had been
overworked by the previous rapid marches and the camel
does not quickly recover. The idle talk of the army also
became louder — Beja could not be hunted down, the
thing was impossible — and at the same time the warfare
on the communications became more active. The dawk
was twice intercepted, the bearers were killed, and sixteen
commissariat camels were taken. The camp was still more
vexatiously tormented. Sixty baggage-camels were car-
ried off at once, and many followers were murdered.

This loss of carriage entirely precluded movement, and
the apparent check thus given to the operations might, it
was to be feared, induce neighbouring tribes and nations to
think the expedition had failed — a conclusion more likely
to be adopted, because five times before within four years
British troops had been cut to pieces in those hills, and
the robbers, hitherto unconquered, were judged uncon-
querable. The Murrees and the Brahooe Belooch tribes
of Khelat were most likely to be thus influenced to mis-
chief, and though such a defection had been contemplated,
and means to meet it prepared, much spilling of blood
would have necessarily occurred, which the general strained
every nerve to avert, by still greater exertions and giving
vent to a more determined expression of his will.

The government camels, he observed, had plenty of a
shrub on which they loved to feed; the cavalry horses
throve on a kind of grass found in tufts at the edge of the
desert; and common grass had been discovered in abundance
at the foot of the Jummuck ghaut. Water could be had
along the waste for digging. Two months' provisions had
been stored in Shahpoor before the hired camel-men
deserted, and twelve days' supply was in the camp ; where-
fore, when complaints came that there was no water, he

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

205

sent well-diggers to search for it ; and when told the yield CHAP. IX.
was sulphureous, he desired the murmurers to boil it. If
he was assailed with anticipations of famine he answered,
that to sustain want was a soldier's duty. In nothing
would he yield. " Sooner than flinch before this robber
Beja, he exclaimed, I will eat my horse, I will starve,
and I will not be put from my enterprise by the talk of
men who have not considered the subject so deeply as
myself. Nor am I without resources. The government
camels are still capable of some work ; the cavalry can
be dismounted to supply sumpter animals, and so can the
fighting camel corps : patiently therefore, but unrelent-
ingly, I will go on, and these murmurs only make my
feet go deeper into the ground. Why should I give
way? Deyrah with its fort is in my hands, furnishing a
fixed pivot, round which the army can move, contracting
by degrees the space occupied by the enemy. The Mur-
rees confine the robbers on the north, while the cavalry
and Ali Moorad watch them from the plain south of the
rocks. The Seikhs are influenced by my menacing lan-
guage towards the Mooltan man, and by Major Broadfoot's
diplomacy on one hand ; on the other by a natural dislike
to have three starving ferocious tribes boring in upon
their territories, bringing after them a victorious British
army in pursuit. They will therefore probably hold by
their neutrality. On the Keytrian side also there will
be a bar ; for the spies say, Hadgee the khan of that tribe
has told his son-in-law, Islam Bhoogtee, he will receive
him if pressed, but not his followers : he will not there-
fore receive Doomkees and Jackranees."

But this want of carriage, a perplexing embarrassment
in itself, involved the chance of very serious consequences.
It rendered the army powerless when success was almost
certain, for a hot pursuit at this time would have inflicted
great loss on Beja if it did not entirely destroy him ; only
twelve days' supply of food was in the camp ; and if at the
end of that time the army was compelled to retrograde to
Shahpoor, a shout of victory would peal from tribe to tribe
through the hills, even to the Bolan pass ; that would be

206

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. IX. echoed along the crests of the Hala mountains as far as
1845f Sehwan, and then shield and sword and matchlock would
pour down on the Scindian plains with a wild and merci-
less storm ! The Keytrian man's resolution, which was
only known through spies, might alter ; and thus the line
of operations would be dangerously extended, even though
fresh carriage should be obtained ; for beyond the month
of March the troops could not keep the field under the
extreme heat of the desert. At that moment all the troops
were eager to fight, though convinced that ultimate success
could not be obtained ; but they were not all British ; and
would those young soldiers sustain half-rations in a halting-
place ? would not sickness be induced, and despondency
also, from inaction, when assassins and thieves vexed their
camp, murdered their servants and stole their baggage
animals? Before them were inaccessible rocks, around
them a solitude, and all their own discourses turned upon
the impossibility of warring down Beja !

Such were the reflections made at the time, and the
prospect was not bright. One evil however had already
been avoided by prudence. Had a rash pursuit of the
hill chiefs over the Jummuck pass been adopted when the
army first entered the ravine in which it was now en-
camped, the convoys could not, when the camel-men
deserted, have followed over that ghaut ; the troops must
then have come back for food, and would have found Beja
and his confederates again in possession of the twin defiles.
For it was afterwards ascertained that they had gone up the
ravine towards Gondooee, persuaded that the British leader
would cross the Jummuck Ghaut and leave them to seize
the passes behind him ; an able and shrewd combination
but baffled by superior prudence. The campaign was
indeed one of the utmost danger and difficulty, for,
amidst arid deserts and stupendous rocks, Sir C. Napier
had to war down a powerful people, ghding around him in
craft like serpents and fighting like lions when beset.
Fortune however, that great arbiter in war, was not adverse.
At this critical time a vakeel from the khan of Khelat's
Durbar reached the camp, charged with submissive and

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

207

friendly messages. The surprises at Ooch and Shahpoor, CHAP. IX.
at the opening of the campaign, had alarmed that court ; 1845>
and the chief minister had a personal cause to plead ; his
brother's treacherous correspondence with Deyrah Khan,
had been taken at Ooch ; it proved his own complicity, and
he had been told that if such hostility was continued the
English leader would destroy both of them, even if they
fled to Bokhara for safety. This vakeel, whose secret in-
structions were to plead the minister's cause, was merely
made to remark the fortifications in the pass, with charge
to assure the khan the English would remain in the hills
for six months, and were raising these works for permanent
possession. But the moonshee, Ali Acbar, was sent to
Khelat, ostensibly and really to demand aid in procuring
fresh camels; privately to assure the minister, that his
brother and himself would be pardoned and obtain the
friendship of the English government for ever, if they
behaved well; and that a jagheer in Scinde would immedi-
ately be given to him if he provided camels, and held true
to the alliance. This policy, good to obtain animals, was
also designed to restrain the Khelat tribes from commotion
during the actual crisis.

Ali Moorad was now directed to move to the Gondooee
pass, for at Zuree Kooshta he was on the line of communi-
cation with Shahpoor, and his men were likely enough to
act hostilely and lay their deeds on the outlying roving
bands of hillmen. The ameer obeyed, to the great
content of the general, who would have sent the English
cavalry to occupy all the watering-places after him, as a
further security, if the desertion of the camel-drivers had
not precluded even this movement. Meanwhile to fix the
Murree chief, whose faith he thought wavering, and whose
enmity would be dangerous, he offered five thousand rupees
for the capture of Beja; and at the same time, to free his
force from all doubtful friends, he desired Jacob to send
back to their own countries the Chandikas and Mugzees,
as having fulfilled their mission; for he wished to have
in this crisis as few tribes about his army as possible.
Resorting likewise again to the stratagem which had before

208

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. IX. deceived Beja, he directed Jacob to write a letter to a
1845 friend, and cause it to fall into the hands of the Bhoog-
tees, the contents being, " that fresh forces were coming
up, that the fortifications at Jummuck were to be very-
powerful, that the intention was to stay in the hills until
Beja was killed, but the genera? s benevolence made him
desire rather to have him a prisoner, and he would richly
reward any chief or tribe who delivered him up."

Having thus employed all moral means at his command,
the English leader, desirous to clear the vicinity of the
camp and keep the troops in full activity, sent a column
under General Hunter to scour all the adjacent ravines
and rocks; for so daring were the lurking robbers that
five of them, passing the pickets in the night, cut down
two men not far from the head-quarter tent. Hunter's
soldiers killed these men, but they fought desperately, and
one of them, when pierced by a bayonet, continued to cut
at his antagonist until the latter discharged his musket,
the bayonet being still in the robber's body ! About the
same time the police under Smallpage captured cattle
south of the rocks, and a despatch from Ali Moorad an-
nounced, that at Gondooee he also had taken six camels
and three hundred head of cattle after a skirmish.

In this state of affairs a Kyharee spy arrived with intel-
ligence, that the confederate chieftains, having ensconced
themselves in a fastness only twenty miles distant, were
starving: and next day Captain Malet came from Ali
Moorad, to say that Beja wished to surrender. Here was
an opening to emerge from a critical and dangerous
position with apparent honour ; but the unbending will of
the English leader was then manifested. Instead of
snatching at this occasion to terminate a war becoming
hourly more difficult and dangerous, he answered thus.
u Let the khan lay his arms at my feet, and be prepared
to emigrate with his followers to a district which I will
point out on the left bank of the Indus, and he shall be
pardoned. If he refuses these terms he shall be pursued
to the death, and the hundred Doomkees who are my
prisoners shall be hanged."

ADMINISTRATION 0~F SCINDE.

209

There was a right, but no intention to hurt those pri- CHAP. IX,
soners, the threat was merely to strike terror; but the 1845>
emigration condition was real, being founded on a policy-
resembling that of Pompey when he removed the Sicilian
pirates from the sea-coasts ; for like that great man, Sir
C. Napier thought the robbers, if removed from the scene
of their depredations and settled as cultivators, would
relinquish their lawless habits. He saw they were fero-
cious, yet chivalric and capable of just reflection, being
spoilers as much from necessity and ignorance as from
liking, and he earnestly desired to reclaim not to slaughter
them.

On the 5th of February a patrol again discovered and
killed several armed hillmen between the passes, and three
hundred horsemen were brought up from the rear to
enable Simpson to scour the plain about Deyrah. But
famine was now menacing the army, for though the cap-
tured cattle, always sold by auction in the camp, furnished
a considerable resource, this was an Indian army, with at
least three followers to every fighting man, and conse-
quently that supply soon disappeared. No sumpter camels
had yet been procured, and the general, thus pushed to
the wall, detached Fitzgerald's fighting camel corps to
fetch food from Shahpoor, with orders to scour the ravine
of Tonge once more during his march, and even to attack
that place if it contained enemies. The military excellence
and power of this anomalous corps, was then strikingly
shown. With hired sumpter camels the marches alone
would have occupied six days and nights; and a strong
escort must have been employed to protect the convoy.
Fitzgerald's men, self-supported as a military body, not
only scoured the ravine and reached Shahpoor in one
night, after a march of fifty miles, but loaded their camels
with forty-five thousand pounds of flour, and regained the
camp on the morning of the 8th, having employed but
three days and two nights in the whole expedition !

On the very day this supply came, another message was
received from Ali Moorad, to say, not Beja only, but all
the chiefs were ready to surrender. To this slight cre-

210

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. IX. dence was given by the English leader when he considered
1845. the state of affairs ; but prompt to seize every opportu-
nity, he marched a few hours after Fitzgerald's return
towards the defile of Sebree, eastward of Ali Moorad's
camp; leaving General Hunter with a small force at
Jummuck to hold that and the Lullee defile. By this
movement he designed to contract the pressure on the
confederates and increase their disposition for yielding;
but when passing Ah Moorad's camp the ameer entreated
that no advance beyond Sebree should be made, saying it
would alarm the chiefs and prevent their surrender. At his
desire, the general, anxious to avoid bloodshed, agreed to
halt at Sebree until the 4th, yet with a misgiving that the
matter was a concerted design to gain time for mischief —
I cannot, he said, trust these serpents of the desert. And
the next day his dawk, though guarded by twelve troopers,
was surprised and many of the men slain by a band of
Jackranees two hundred strong. Pretending to belong to
another irregular cavalry regiment, some of these robbers
had entered into friendly conversation with the escort, but
suddenly each man cut down the soldier he was talking
to, and among the victims was a son of the soubadar who
had died so nobly at Ooch.

Alarmed by this event for the safety of Captain
McMurdo, who had been sent a few hours before with
twelve troopers to examine the country beyond the defile
of Sebree, the general rode hastily to his succour, but
met him returning with a herd of cattle. A matchlock-
fire had been opened on him in the pass, but instead of
abandoning the cattle and galloping through, he had skil-
fully drawn back and enticed the enemy into low ground,
where he was going to charge when a new band came
upon his rear. His troopers, though Moguellaees, had
been for a moment panic-stricken when the fire was
first opened on them, but now, stimulated by the bold
demeanour of their leader, they charged and sent the
robbers to their rocks, where several fell under the fire of
their carabines : McMurdo with able contrivance then
passed the defile in safety. It was a gallant and well-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCJNDE.

211

managed affair, and the troopers were rewarded with the CHAP. IX.
price obtained for the cattle in camp. lg45

This happened on the 9th; on the 10th Salter's cavalry
was detached to communicate with Simpson ; on the
11th the adjutant -general Major Green moved with a
column to scour the hills towards Deyrah, in concert with
a detachment which marched from Hunter's camp, and
they killed some robbers and brought back eight hundred .
cattle. On that day also, certain expert men, called
" Puggees" were employed to pug or track the robbers
who had seized the dawk, it being suspected that the
Boordees of Ali Moorad's force, who were at feud with the
6th irregular cavalry, because of McKenzie's action in
which some of their tribe had been killed, were the perpe-
trators of the murder and robbery. The trail however
went into the hills, fortunately for the ameer, as the
general, chafed by his previous misconduct, declared his
intention, if treachery had been detected, to take Captain
Malet and Mr. Curling out of the prince's camp, and
send in exchange a shower of grape from ten pieces of
artillery.

On the 12th, hearing nothing more of the chiefs' coming
in, Sir C. Napier began more strongly to doubt the faith
of Ali Mo or ad, and thought the offer of surrender was
only to gain time for a Seikh force to join the hillmen.
Yet, when he considered that he had thirteen hundred
good infantry, ten guns, and six hundred cavalry in hand,
and that his reserves towards Shahpoor would give him
two thousand more troops, he judged that Ah dared not
be treacherous : and for any force Beja and his new allies,
if the Seikhs were really coming, could bring to the fight,
he cared little. However, always prudent, he brought
Hunter's column up from Jummuck, leaving the defiles
there to the care of Fitzgerald's camel corps. Then
writing to the Mazarees on the Indus a menacing letter,
to deter them from giving the tribes any aid, he chose
a position of battle where he could defy twenty thousand
enemies and awaited events.

The 13th Hunter joined the camp, and that day also
r 2

212

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. IX. the confederate robber chiefs sent their near relations to
1845. Ali Moorad, saying, As they were treated so would be
the conduct of the khans, the English leader might put
their relations to death, but then the war would
continue : and it was intimated that Mohamed the
Lion might come to aid the tribes with five thousand
men.

Inflexible as steel the general replied, that he would
have all prisoners, or none — they might choose. On
the 14th, they demanded another day for reference —
Not an hour, was the answer ; " and if the whole do
not come in, the British army will march to-morrow
embattled into your hills, but mercy will go back with
the heavy baggage to Shahpoor. With respect to Shere
Mohamed, his highness will be welcome, I have as many
men here as fought at Dubba and shall be sorry if the
Lion comes with fewer numbers than he had there."

This sternness induced the relations of the chiefs to
quit Ali Moorad and come to the English camp on the
15th. They came however as ambassadors, pleading dis-
tance and customs and the recent death of Beja Khan's
wife for delaying the surrender until the 19th, which they
affirmed was the earliest day possible. Sir C. Napier
would not alter his terms as to Beja, but to the others he
offered new conditions. Islam Khan Bhoogtee might, if
he was content to do so, take an oath never to invade the
British territory, but he must make his salaam to the
khan of Khelat, his lawful sovereign. Deyrah Khan
Jackranee was desired to settle in Scinde, but he might
take Islam's oath instead, if he would be surety for all
his tribe. If he could not do that, Deyrah himself should
be received in Scinde, endowed and protected, but his
tribe should be warred down : these also were the terms
for the minor chiefs.

Had he known at that time where the confederates
were, he would have marched against them notwith-
standing these negotiations; observing, that the loss of
his camels and fear of the tribes finding a refuge in
Mooltan, were the two great fountains of his generosity.

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

218

But it was with hini a fixed principle never to hesi- CHAP. IX.
tate or appear to hesitate, much less go back, with bar- 1845<
barians, whether in the field or in negotiations ; hence he
repeated his declaration that he would, God loilling, march
the 16th to Dooz Kooshta, yet in consideration of Beja's
domestic affliction would wait there until the 19th. In
the night of the 15th however, so much rain fell the
camels could not carry the tents, and he was not dis-
pleased to be thus forced to give a longer day ; yet true
to his policy, he made the ambassadors remark this
natural impediment as a divine restriction, and not any
wavering on his part. God was not willing. Their eastern
imaginations would have otherwise found many imperti-
nent causes to encourage them in further resistance, such
as want of food, orders from the governor-general, or
a fear of Ali Moorad's power. This last notion the
vain- glorious ameer was diligently inculcating amongst
his followers, and through them amongst the hillmen,
assuming an appearance of superiority upon every favour-
able occasion; he even declared that he would march
on Dooz Kooshta though ordered to move to Heeran on
the border of the desert. His first delay had enabled the
enemy to escape at Gondooee when the war might have been
terminated ; now he was pretending great personal anger
at receiving orders, and was assuming an independence of
command which might produce disaster ; but he was quickly
taught another lesson. A peremptory order not to go
near Dooz Kooshta was transmitted, with this message ;
that if he were found in possession of that watering-place
a cannon-shot should go through his pavilion as a signal
to decamp.

At Sebree, on the evening of the 16th, notwithstanding
the rain of the evening before, the wells were dried up,
and the troops all gasping for water, when suddenly
from the rocky hills in front came down a torrent sixty
yards wide and two feet deep, pouring through the middle
of the camp. Most of the soldiers, astonished and rejoicing
at this unexpected relief, looked on it as a special provi-
dence, and the general, who had from his knowledge

214

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. IX. of hilly districts foreseen this event, thus noticed it in
his journal. " How many phenomena there are in these
countries which admit of being turned with a little fore-
cast and ingenuity into seeming miracles ! This torrent
was one which I could have foretold and employed to
advantage. And on the march from Shahpoor, when
manna was found in the desert, the soldier who first
brought it to me said, ' Sir, this is a miracle — it is on
the bushes — it is food — it comes from God, it comes
down from heaven — it is a miracle ! } He was right it
was a miracle — What is not V3

None of the hillmen opposed him in the defiles of the
rocky wall which, from Lullee, extended as before observed
to this point, where it was beginning to mix with the
Mazaree hills ; Dooz Kooshta was therefore attained after
many hours' marching without opposition on the 17th of
February. Ali Moorad had not dared to come there, and
when the camp was pitched the general, who had been
in the saddle for ten hours, entered his tent and thus
recorded the strong feelings which the date of the day
had called up.

" This is the second anniversary of the battle of Meeanee,
and I am again in the field ! Am I doomed to constant
war and bloodshedding ? Well ! This is a righteous war,
and so was that against the infamous ameers. But this
day two years ! What heaps of dead were around me —
what numbers of friends were dying — what shrieks from
the hospital-tent of men undergoing amputation ! Peace be
with them, they behaved nobly, those who died and those
who survived that terrible conflict. And I am here now
waiting for the surrender of the robber chiefs at Dooz
Kooshta, which, translated, means The Thief 's Death.
Singular coincidence ! "

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

215

CHAPTER X.

At Dooz Kooshta the camp remained until the 19th, in CHAP. X.
pursuance of the promise to Beja Khan; but it was appa- 1845i
rent that Ali Moorad had been deceived by the chiefs
and their secret allies amongst the ameer* s councillors, and
that the negotiations were only to gain time. The robbers
had spies and emissaries in all places and were perfectly
well informed, when no tidings of their positions or designs
could be obtained by the British leader. Even his personal
attendant, a Hindoo, who had been with him for years,
transmitted all that his master uttered in his presence to
some employer, who was not detected : yet passages in the
Bombay libels indicated a connection with this treachery.

On the 19th the campaign recommenced, but ere the
events are related, the positions and their military bearings
must be laid down, for a new front of battle had been
adopted, and the line instead of facing northwards looked
eastward.

Simpson being now at Deyrah, near which he had captured
a string of camels, formed the extreme left ; behind him,
to the westward, was a cavalry post at the Tomb ; a good
watering-place, from whence the patrols could communi-
cate with the Murrees by the defile of Sartoof, and scour
the Sungseela ravine.

South of the Tomb, and connected with it by patrols,
Fitzgerald's camel corps was at the Jummuck pass; and
both those posts were in communication with Jacob at
Poolagee : thus the ravines of Tonge, of the Illiassee, and
the Teyaga were commanded, and that of Sungseela
watched.

216

SIR CHARLES NAPlER^S

CHAP. X. Shahpoor, always strongly garrisoned, contained the
f845 magazines.

Head- quarters were in centre of the first line ; Ali
Moorad formed the right wing at Heeran, touching on
the frontier of the Mazaree country ; and between these
principal posts the cavalry and police maintained the com-
munications by patrols.

This disposition of the army restricted the hillmen to
half their original occupation of those desolate regions,
cooping them up in the north-eastern corner ; and though
their fastnesses there were the most rugged, and they could
from thence descend finally into the Mooltan territory if
the Dewan was faithless, the English leader had employed
moral means to prevent that, and the foHowmg^skilful
combinations debarred them of any successful counter
attack.

J acob, holding the forts of Poolagee, Oolagee, and Lheree,
on the west, could not be easily hurt ; and his cavalry and
guns entirely awed the Khelat tribes in the Bolan hills,
who being secretly inimical would otherwise on the first
opportunity have extended the war along the Hala moun-
tains down to Sehwan.

Simpson having the Deyrah fort, impregnable to any
attack from the Beloochees, formed a pivot on which the
main body could securely turn for offensive operations ; he
also commanded the principal valley and was connected by
the cavalry post at Tomb with the camel corps at Jum-
muck, and with Jacob at Poolagee.

Ali Moorad watched from Heeran the Mazarees, and was
within call from head-quarters if wanted for a battle;
meanwhile, excised from the operations and exposed in an
open country to the action of the British cavalry, he was
debarred opportunity for treachery. The principal force
under the general was thus free to act offensively in any
quarter.

In this state of affairs the troops lived hardly from hand
to mouth, and as the captured herds furnished much of the
subsistence, the campaign was one of great privation as
well as fatigue. However the hillmen fared worse. Their

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

217

stores of grain had all been taken at Poolagee, Shahpoor CHAP. X.
and Ooch, which forced them to feed on flesh, an unusual 1845>
diet producing disease, and numbers died. Some supplies
indeed they got from the Mazarees of Rojan on the Indus,
but they paid exorbitantly for them ; and here it may be
explained that there were two Mazaree tribes — a river
tribe subjects to the Seikhs, and a hill tribe. From both
of them the robbers expected aid, but Sir C. Napier's
letters to the dewan of Mooltan had not been fruit-
less. The river tribe, the Dewan said, had been strictly
forbidden to receive any of the robbers, and had been
directed to send supplies to the British ; but for the hill
Mazarees, they were enemies to the Seikhs and he hoped
for their destruction — they were not only robbers like
Beja, but half of the depredations attributed to that chief
were perpetrated by them.

These hill Mazarees were however those the general
most desired for friends, because their country was known,
and to enter it would dangerously extend his hue of opera-
tions. Fortune again befriended him. The Bhoogtees,
just before the commencement of the campaign, had plun-
dered some hill Mazarees, and that offence coupled with
the general's personal menaces, induced the latter to send
several chiefs with three hundred followers as voluntary
hostages. But they went first to Ali Moorad, and he
from a desire to appear great induced them to remain in
his camp. This insolence, the English leader, having
other means of evincing his paramount authority, took no
notice of at the time, justly observing, that the greater
AH pretended to be, the more powerful would his superior
appear in the eyes of the hillmen when his dependence
became known ; and the Mazarees indeed, soon finding who
was master, hastened to do homage to real power.

On the 18th Captain Salter brought advice from Deyrah,
that the hillmen's camp was at Groojroo, or Shore, twenty-
four and twenty-one miles in front of Dooz Kooshta; that Plan 2.
they were about eight thousand strong, and lying close on
the hill Mazarees' frontier, which they were now forbidden
to pass ; but whether they designed to fight the British or

218

SIR CHARLES NAPIER?S

CHAP. X. to surrender was not known. This intelligence involved
1845. new considerations. Would the robbers, if pressed in their
actual position, go into the Seikh territory ? Would it be
right to follow them ? The conclusion was in the affirma-
tive for the last. They could only go there with secret
permission, or in violation of the neutrality avowed by the
dewan of Mooltan: moreover, the frontier being rocky
could not be well defined, and pursuit of a flying enemy
would not admit of nice distinctions. Ali Moorad's credu-
lity and falsehoods had already caused the loss of six days,
at the most important crisis, and the whole object of the
war was not to be further endangered by delicate respect
for national rights which were totally disregarded by the
enemy. The Seikhs said they had not admitted, and
would not admit the tribes; the latter might then be
pursued ; because, either the assurance was false or they
would not be within the Seikh boundary.

These reflections made, and the term of delay promised
to Beja having terminated, on the 19th. the troops were
secretly put in motion to surprise the enemy. The camel
corps had been previously called up, and orders were sent
to Ali Moorad to bring forward his forces, because a great
and decisive stroke was contemplated. The road to Shore,
running through the defiles of Lotee, was long, rugged and
difficult — in the night-time peculiarly so — but the march
was so well combined that the confederates would have
been surprised in their camp, but for one of those minor
insubordinations which no commander can guard against,
which so often mar the finest combinations, and render
war the property of fortune. The movement was to have
been in darkness and silence, the orders to that effect were
peremptory; but some camp-followers lighted afire, Beja's
videttes saw it, and that chief instantly fled from his posi-
tion. Hence, after being twenty-two hours on horseback
without taking food, Sir C. Napier pitched his camp in the
afternoon of the 20th at Shore, a baffled general for the
moment ; but a quantity of grain and a hundred and fifty
camel-loads of baggage were captured at Shore, and the
last was given as a prize to the soldiers. Hindoo merchants

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

219

had come from the Mazarees of Rojan with this grain, on CHAP. X.
speculation, hut they lost life and goods together, for they 1845>
and their followers fought bravely and were killed. These
captures showed that the tribes were moving as a people,
not as warriors, and that finally the English operations
would inevitably circumvent and destroy them.

On the 21st Ali Moorad arrived with his wild warriors,
stout and brave men ; and the same day a hill chief, Ali
Shere Khosa, came in and made salaam. He was quite a
youth and disliked the robber life; but his lands being
surrounded by those of the other chiefs, he had no free
action until that moment. Sir C. Napier gave him a
government employment, observing, that to punish the
robbers was only half his object, to reclaim them was his
aim; and despite of the universal impression to the con-
trary he judged that he could do so, and was resolved to
try, founding his hopes upon his extensive experience of
mankind. He had dealt, in peace and war, with many
nations, British, Irish, Americans, Italians, French, Ger-
mans, Greeks, Turks, red Indians, Hindoos and Beloo-
chees ; and he thought military persons, having principally
to do with the soldiers and peasantry of each country, had
the natural characters of men in those countries, most
openly exposed to their observation. By the peasantry
because they are unsophisticated and have no motive for
concealment with soldiers who are not enemies ; and there
is a curious similarity of military law and usage in all na-
tions, indicating a distinctive general character, exclusive
of what is imposed by customs and religion, and very per-
ceptible to an observant officer. The military life forces
observation of character upon the mind. All soldiers,
men and officers, must study the temper and character of
those above as well as of those below them ; they are more
or less in the position of courtiers with Eastern despots,
and none are more shrewd in detecting character, though
none are more skilful in hiding it, than Asiatic court-men
— the one quality generating the other.

It is pretended, said Sir C. Napier, by men who
assume to themselves all knowledge and competency for

220

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. X. governing in India, that something occnlt exists in the
1845> Indian character ; but the distinctive general character of
man is as pronounced with them as with others, when
clothed in uniform. There are indeed modifications to be
remarked, yet easily to be traced to conventional causes,
the general character remaining the same. The sepoy for
example, is sober, and cleanly as far as ablutions go, the
European not so — that can be traced to religion and
climate, the last being father to the first. But as a
recruit, the sepoy is vaunting and eager to fight, so is the
European; as a veteran he is cool and daring like the
European; and like him he is fond of being smart in
dress, of having a military bearing, and is proud of being
a soldier. If undisciplined he is easily panic-stricken, so
are Europeans, but when well drilled both are fierce and
intrepid. The Indian, having been a slave for ages, is a
liar — so is the European slave — but, like the European,
the Indian as he grows in civilization and freedom adopts
truth as the better policy. This is proved by the existing
character. The old and respected soldier is more truthful
than the recruit, and a native officer of low rank in the
British service can be believed when an officer of Ah
Moorad's cannot, however high his rank.

Finding fear, pride, vanity, courage, honourable ambi-
tion, ostentation and self-respect, common to both races,
Sir C. Napier judged that in their avarice and generosity,
and in their susceptibility to the impressions of skilful
leaders, the eastern men in no way differed from their
western brethren ; wherefore with hope and resolution he
looked forward not only to subdue but to reclaim and
civilize the wild tribes now opposing him in arms — feel-
ing assured that a life of murdering and robbing, with
continual danger, could not be really one of choice.

As the march against Shore and Goojroo had been
made in the expectation of fighting a great battle or
receiving the tribes in surrender, General Simpson had
also been called in, and he arrived in camp on the evening
of the 20th, having left a garrison in the fort of Deyrah.
Thus nearly the whole army was concentrated, and the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

221

first thought was to push on in pursuit ; but the extreme CHAP. X.
fatigue of the troops prevented this; those of the main 1845^
column had been twenty- two hours under arms, and
Simpson's column nineteen hours, seven of which were
employed to descend one ghaut. It was absolutely
necessary therefore to rest ; but next day a strong detach-
ment being led out to examine the pass of Goojroo in
front, the enemy was both seen and felt at no great
distance, and some of his men were killed. Fame had not
exaggerated the extraordinary ruggedness of the country.
With infinite difficulty the precipitous rocks on each side
the entrance of the Goojroo pass were scaled, but all
beyond was desolate, and impracticable from the transverse
chasms. The defile itself being penetrated for about a
mile was found absolutely stupendous ; there was no mode
of passing it save by the cavalry galloping through ; a des-
perate expedient ; for the guides said it was in length four
leagues and without change, being only fifty feet wide,
strewed with large loose stones and having perpendicular
sides several hundred feet high : it was also without a drop
of water after the entrance was passed. The flanking
parties therefore came down again, not without danger
and difficulty. While above, they had discerned the smoke
of the confederates' camp twelve miles off, and the
hillmen were evidently waiting until the British should
enter the terrible defile ; they would then have barred all
egress, and using their knowledge of the bye-ways have
closed round and destroyed the entrapped soldiers.

This state of affairs demanded new combinations uniting
the utmost caution and vigour. The enemy had been at
last found, and though his position was unattackable it
could be turned ; his back was to the Seikh territory and
he could not retreat further if neutrality was observed ;
nor could he for want of provisions remain long where he
was. But the question as to where he would go had to
be revolved with more care than ever, for on the next
movement the success of the war was likely to depend.
It was probable indeed that Beja would push suddenly
upon Deyrah and from thence throw himself into Trukkee;

222

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. X. yet, though the name and strength of that celebrated
~: fastness were familiar in the British camp, no man, guide
or spy, could or would tell exactly where it was situated.
In this doubt the English leader formed new combina-
tions with a sagacity marking his mastery in war.

The Bundlecund Legion was ordered to remain at Shore,
under the command of Major Beatson, a stern determined
soldier ; Ali Moorad was sent back to the Lotee pass ;
Hunter went to the J ummuck defiles again, and the general
marched with Simpson's troops to Deyrah. These dis-
positions brought him nearer to the magazines without
seeming to retreat ; but they could not have been made if
the Mazaree merchants' wheat had not been captured, and
it was no small part of the difficulty of this campaign, that
the army had to win its food from the enemy and dig
for water day by day ; it was no slight proof of genius
either, thus continually to change the whole scheme of
operations in such a country, and on such accidental
circumstances.

There were two courses in the enemy's choice especially
necessary to guard against. First he could turn the
British left by a defile which led down towards Lotee, and
Plans 1& 2. then moving by Deyrah break through the Jummuck
defile and regain Tonge. Second he might avoid the
Jummuck, after passing Deyrah, and moving by Marwar
to the ravine of the Tomb, break through Jacob's posts,
and make for the Kujjuck and Bolan country. Both of
these movements would indeed be desperate efforts, but
the hillmen were in a desperate situation, and any wild
and furious effort might be expected from them.

If they did not adopt one of these courses, four opera-
tions remained for them, namely, to fight in the narrow
plain, which being behind their actual camp could be
reached by the British from Deyrah — to descend into the
Seikh territory — to surrender when their food, of which
they could not have much, was expended — to throw them-
selves into Trukkee. Any of these operations would be
their ruin; but it was possible there might be minor
defiles about Groojroo unexplored, and at this time unex-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

223

plorable, through which they could pour upon Beatson at CHAP. X.
Shore. In fine the war had now reached a crisis and the 1845
problem to be solved was become very complicated.

1°. The British line of communication with Shahpoor
was more than a hundred miles long, and passed through
many dangerous defiles.

2°. To the supplies of food, it might be, that supplies of
water were to be added ; for the habit of poisoning wells
and pools was an understood practice amongst thehillmen.

3°. Strong escorts were required to guard the convoys,
because roving isolated bands of well-mounted robbers
were still lying in most of the nullahs and smaller ravines
behind the army, watching for spoil.

4°. Provisions were already scarce, and the government
camels had again failed from overwork ; the troops were
on half-rations, and at Shore only two days' supply was in
the field magazine. Hence the principal reason for sending
Hunter back to Jummuck, was to protect and shorten the
line of communication with Shahpoor, by turning the
convoys through that pass instead of continuing their
movements by Sebree and Dooz Kooshta.

Grass and water for the exhausted camels could be
obtained at Deyrah, and from thence new offensive opera-
tions could be undertaken, but as it was essential to parry
counter blows during the movements the following combi-
nations were arranged.

If the enemy, who knew very exactly from his emissaries
everything that was passing, should, when the main
column marched upon Deyrah, find means to overpower
Beatson, that officer was to fall back on Ali Moorad at
Lotee, and Hunter's column, though in march, was to
turn in support.

If the hillmen were deterred from pursuing Beatson by
this accumulation of forces at Lotee, and should from
Shore follow the head-quarters to Deyrah, Beatson and
Ali Moorad had orders to close in on their rear, and place
them between two fires ; Hunter was then to change his
direction and move on Dusht- Goran by which the enemy Plan 2.
would be entirely enclosed.

224

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. X. • Having arranged these combinations, the general marched
1845# from Groojroo towards Deyrah on the 22nd. He had little
fear for Beatson, and was anxious that Hunter should
arrive at Jummuck on the 25th, not only to secure the
shorter line of communication with Shahpoor and have the
convoys turned, but that he might be in a position to sup-
port the cavalry at the Tomb — an object of importance, as
the enemy could from the Murrow plain descend on Deyrah,
or by the Sungseela ravine pour down on the Tomb. In
the former case the general's column could, moving by
Tussoo, reach Deyrah first, as it would march faster
than a heterogeneous mass of warriors, women, children
and herds. The rugged defile leading from the Murrow
plain on Deyrah would thus be barred ; or, if the hillmen
were first, they would in the plain of Deyrah fall an easy
prey to a compact army assailing them while still confused
and issuing from the defiles. But in the second case
Hunter's aid would be required at the Tomb. That officer,
however, halted a day at Dooz Kooshta, and so far the
nicety of the combination was marred; yet with no ill
effects, because the enemy did not adopt the operation to
be guarded against.

Head- quarters reached Deyrah the 23rd, having marched
through a country of astonishing asperity, where the troops
were dangerously embarrassed by the multitude of camp-
followers and quantity of baggage. Deyrah itself was
however in a fertile, though at this time uncultivated
plain, having a fine stream of water flowing through it.
Here rest was obtained, and after a time, vakeels from the
Murrees arrived to make salaam, induced thereto by a
previous menacing communication — their recent conduct
having become suspicious.

On the 26th Hunter reached Jummuck and the whole
army was thus re-established under the new combinations.
Beatson, if driven from Shore, could, as shown, retire on
Ali Moorad at Lotee, where their united forces could hold
the robbers in check until the main body from Deyrah,
having only a march of fifteen miles, fell on their flank —
and from Jummuck Hunter could also move to the support

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

225

of Lotee, in case of disaster. But if Beja attempted to CHAP. X.
enter the plain of Deyrah instead of assailing Lotee, after 1345.
driving back Beat son, he would be met in front by the
general's column, while the passes in his rear would be
closed by Beatson and Ali Moorad. Nor could he gain
any advantage by moving across the Murrow plain, north-
wards, and so pouring down the Sungseela ravine, because
the cavalry post would oppose him at Tomb, being sure of
support from Jummuck which was only twelve miles dis-
tant, and from Deyrah which was not much more.

The great difficulty remained : Sir C. Napier had twice
let Beja and his tribe pass before his army without attack-
ing him, because the women and children of the tribe
being present he feared for their lives. This feeling still
governed his operations, and with more power, because of
a painfully interesting experience he had on entering
Deyrah, where some poor deserted children were found
starving. They were taken care of, but for a long time,
demanded each day when they were to be killed, having
no other expectation : thus indicating too plainly the fero-
cious habits of their tribes. Hence with more than his
usual resolution the English leader sought to avoid battles,
and keep the masses shut up in the rocks, where want of
food and water might compel them to yield without fight-
ing. Still he could not forego final success, and had now
to decide on what would most conduce towards it.

The confederates had, during the recent marches, retired
from the Goojroo defiles to Partur, north of the MurroAv Plan 2,
plain and touching on the Key trian frontier ; but this was
judged a wile to draw the army from Trukkee, of which,
though then close at hand, no information had yet been
obtained, save that it was not very far off and was amongst
rocks through which a narrow fissure led northwards
from Deyrah to the Murrow plain. It appeared certain
however that the chiefs had been refused an asylum in the
Key trian and Seikh territories, and were thus delivered
over to the British operations; hence, changing as it were
the fixed point of his compasses, the general now resolved
to make Beatson's position on the right his pivot, and

226

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. X. sweeping round with his left and centre, as he had before
1845i swept with his right, to hem in the robbers and finally
attack them if warranted by circumstances. To effect this
he only waited for his convoys, which were now being
brought up, though slowly, because the loss of the hired
camels had been as yet but partially restored, and the
troops had been for many days on half-rations.

On the 28th, while preparing for the new movement,
Sir C. Napier secretly heard that Trukkee was really close
to him, on the north-west and not amongst the rocks before
indicated. Wherefore, hoping that sooner or later he
should find the tribes in that fastness, he forbade all strag-
gling or explorations . towards the mysterious quarter, lest
the hillmen should be thus deterred from going there ; for
he was well assured that, once in Trukkee, he could by
famine, drought, or force of arms, or all three combined, re-
duce the robbers to submission. While ruminating on these
things a trooper galloped into camp, saying that a convoy,
which after depositing a supply was on its return, had been
attacked only three miles off and was defending itself.
Instantly the general made for the scene of action with
his Mogul escort, leaving orders for a regiment of irregular
cavalry to follow ; for that such a daring attack, so close
to his camp, would not have happened unless a refuge was
at hand he felt assured, and that refuge could only be
Trukkee.

In this conviction, when he reached the ground, he
wished to keep the enemy in play, but his staff seeing
only fifty mounted robbers in the field galloped against
them and caused a retreat. This unmilitary procedure
was very displeasing, but his judgment was quickly con-
firmed ; the retiring horsemen suddenly rode into a chasm
amongst the rocks, and a guide at his side involuntarily
exclaimed as they disappeared, Trukkee ! having only the
evening before declared it was two marches distant ! This
exclamation, coupled with the confident retreat of the
robbers, gave warrant that the long-hidden fortress was
found, and the confederates brought to bay ; wherefore the
irregular cavalry were instantly posted opposite the chasm

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 227

through which the horsemen had disappeared, and the CHAP. X.
English leader went back to camp exultant. It was then 1845 *
dark and the troops were merely warned to support the
cavalry, if any alarm was given, but at daylight both
infantry and guns marched, and the discovered southern
entrance to Trukkee was blocked up.

In his tent the general had found a spy, come to report,
that all the confederate chiefs, with four thousand fighting
men, had gone into Trukkee by the northern entrance
two days before, having quitted their camp at Partur for
that purpose, and there were no other entrances save those
now watched by the cavalry. This advice, agreeing with
what had just occurred, was confirmed by the ambassadors
from the Murrees, and Sir C. Napier, seeing he had
the game at last in his hands, instantly detached the
camel corps and the volunteers of the 13th regiment,
also mounted on camels, to reinforce Beatson at Shore;
carrying orders for that officer and Ali Moorad to move —
Beatson by the Goojroo defiles, Ali by a route leading
westward of that pass on to the Murrow plain, whence pjan 2.
they were to track the hillmen, and seize the northern
entrance to Trukkee.

This reinforcement was sent to enable Beatson to act
alone, for Ali was habitually neglectful of orders, and his
camp was full of traitors ; but he was not perfidious, and
his services were thus described. " He was faithful and
useful, but too vainglorious, and his people were so many
spies for the enemy. I had some trouble to keep them
clear of us and carry on the operations independently, yet
apparently in unison.-" Ali did not now obey promptly,
but finally he and Beatson blocked the northern entrance
on the morning of the oth, and thus the renowned fortress
of Trukkee, hitherto hidden as it were by enchantment
from the search of the British leader, was suddenly found,
and as suddenly sealed up; and all the robber tribes, a few
roving bands infesting the communications of the army
excepted, were imprisoned like the Afreets of their eastern
tales under the signet of Soliman. It was a masterly
stroke of generalship, an astonishing physical effort and a

q 2

228

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. X. fitting climax to the cautious and calculated though
1845. vigorous operations which had preceded and enforced
such a termination. The chiefs were amazed. They had
imagined that Trukkee itself, involved and blended with
the other rocks of that desolate and savage region, would
remain a mystery, baffling the search of their antagonist ;
and that from its wild intricacies they could emerge from
time to time on their murderous excursions, until the
invading army, dwindling under starvation and a partisan
warfare, could no longer keep the field. With these hopes,
like hawks as they called themselves, they had gathered
on their rocks, ruffling their wings and peering for their
quarry, but the fowler's net was thrown, and like hawks
they were taken to be reclaimed.

Thus shut up, the robbers were without the means of
lengthened existence. Their herds were reduced in
numbers, their stores of grain, no longer to be replenished,
were scanty, and famine awaited them, to vindicate Sir
C. Napier's prescient scheme of operations against the loud
idiot cry raised in derision of the expedition. Nor was
the execution unworthy of the conception. The marches

App.xix. had been efforts of no ordinary kind. Beatson and Ali
Mooracl had threaded terrible defiles, had moved along
tracks covered with huge rocks and loose sharp stones,
for nearly sixty miles almost without a halt, and on half-
rations ; the men therefore arrived nearly naked and
barefooted, and the animals unshod : a horse-shoe was sold
for thirty shilhngs, and their progress was truly described
by the general as climbing not marching ! This also had
been the character of all the movements, without a
murmur being heard.

While awaiting news of the arrival of Beatson and the
ameer, the infantry had encamped opposite the southern
entrance, and the cavalry were moved further to the west for
the watching of another entrance which was now heard of.
Then the general after examining with great labour and
fatigue all the approaches, scaled a high rock from whence
he looked into the interior of Trukkee and formed a plan of
attack — to be executed however only in the last extremity,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

229

for the place was indeed worthy of its reputation. Resem- CHAP,
bling an extinct crater, it was twelve miles long, by five or 1845j
six broad, and nature had most curiously contrived it alike
for secrecy and strength. For strength, because exter-
nally it presented a belt of rocks many hundred feet high
and nearly impracticable of ascent on the south side ; and
though it was less austere on the north, the inside there
was precipitous while on the southern side it was compara-
tively easy of descent. Thus the whole circuit was equally
impervious to assault ; and the interior was a vast collec-
tion of rocky hillocks with chasms of different depths, yet
all precipitous.

For secrecy, because on the south was a second wall, or
screen of perpendicular rocks some hundred feet high, form-
ing with the actual belt of Trukkee a restricted valley, or
rather lane, which was to be entered by narrow fissures before
the passes into the crater could be approached ; and all the
country for miles around, beyond that screen, and adjoin-
ing the true wall, was a chaos of huge loose stones which
it was hardly possible to cross. The entrances to this
hidden fastness, which seemed like some ruined colossal
amphitheatre, were mere cracks in a wall of rock, so
suddenly opened that the upper parts seemed still to touch
and refused to let in the light. There was abundance of
water inside ; and just outside the fissure by which the
robbers retired after their attack on the convoy, there was
a copious hot spring, wholesome to drink yet forbidden to
the troops by matchlock-men, perched on landing-places
in the side of the precipitous crags.

It was impossible to discover exactly what stores of
grain and cattle the tribes had introduced, or had pre-
viously laid up ; and as there might be more entrances
and many of their warriors must still be abroad, the length
of their resistance to a blockade could not be calculated.
Wherefore at first the cavalry were merely spread to the
west until they were connected with the horsemen at
Tomb, and the latter, patrolling round the western point
of Trukkee, communicated with Beatson and the ameer ;
but when all the entrances were thus ascertained and

230

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. x. secured, and the investment completed, the general pro-
J^jT ceeded to arrange a plan for forcing a way in and fighting
the human hornets in the midst of their stony cells ;
a terrible prospect of slaughter on both sides and uncer-
tain of success, for the interior was as formidable as the
exterior. This had been ascertained at the northern
entrance, where the exterior belt of rocks being more
accessible than the southern, was scaled and some progress
made in the defile itself; but the interior precipices were
then found impracticable, and from the heights thus
attained, the hillmen were seen moving from one place
to another, with such labour and difficulty as plainly
showed what the ground was; for they had to draw up
and let down their camels and cattle by ropes, and in
places even to swing them across gloomy chasms, offering
defensive positions at every hundred yards, and of
infinite intricacy, spreading like a network over sixty
square miles !

The scheme of attack, though not finally executed, was
planned with such subtilty and caution, and was yet so
daring, that being afterwards laid before the duke of
Wellington it drew from him strong expressions of appro-
bation. It was as follows. The lane between the southern
screen and exterior belt of Trukkee was only three hundred
yards wide, but nearly forty miles in length, extending
from beyond the Tomb on the west to the eastward of
Deyrah. Being widest opposite the main entrance to
Trukkee, it was proposed to establish there all the field-
batteries and mortars, to fire directly at short range upon
the entrance, and to throw shells on to the ledges, where
the enemy's men were perched with levers to cast down
rocks when the assailants should enter the fissure. These
projectiles, it was hoped, would not only dislodge the lever-
men, but also bring away masses of the rock ; which in
conjunction with those shells that rolled off the ledges
and exploded below, would help to clear the defile of its
defenders. The infantry meanwhile, formed on the left of
the batteries, were to open a brisk sustained musketry
against the matchlock -men lining the crest of the rocks

SOUTHERN ENTRANCE FROM EXTERIOR.

ADMINISTRATION OFSCINDE.

231

on the robbers' right of the entrance ; but no person CHAP. X.
was to go or be seen on the enemy's left of the defile. 1845<

A detachment, ostentatiously moving westward, was
to offer a false attack, the commander having a discretion
to turn it into a real one if he could find any practicable
ascent. But during these demonstrations, a selected body
of men under the command of Fitzgerald, were to lie in
ambush near the rocky heights on the enemy's left of the
defile, with orders to scramble up in a direction previously
examined, and — correctly as it afterwards proved — judged
accessible to active and resolute men. For this dangerous
service the whole of the Company's 2nd European regi-
ment volunteered, and three hundred had been accepted ;
but to them were added a hundred volunteers from the
64th native regiment, to whom the general wished to give
an opportunity of regaining their colours, having found
them on trial very gallant soldiers. These volunteers
were sworn to silence even under wounds, and with the
strong and daring Fitzgerald at their head, would have
encountered anything. The ascent would have taken
about two hours, and very subtle arrangements were made
to prevent the enemy from either seeing the troops or
hearing the noise of the loose rocks rolled down by
them as they scrambled upwards.

Previous to the time being fixed for this attack, Sir
C. Napier and General Simpson, and their staff-officers
had anxiously watched the hill for several nights in succes-
sion. At first they saw a large fire burning through the
night, and many hillmen about it ; but the third night it
was allowed to go out about ten o'clock ; indicating that
the undisciplined warriors had become tired of sending up
pickets to such a height, where the cold was at this time
very severe for eastern constitutions. At last the fire was
not seen at all, it was evident the hill was no longer
guarded in force, and then the attack was fixed to take
place with the following accessories. All the great guns
and musketry were to open at once, in the expectation of
filling the narrow valley with smoke, and causing such
an uproar by the reverberation of sound from the perpen-

232

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. x. dicular rocks, that the robbers' attention would be entirely
1845. drawn to the entrance-fissure being thus menaced, and
they would also be prevented from seeing Fitzgerald's
storming party or hearing the noise of stones rolled down
in its ascent. His attack would be too far off to be disclosed
by the transient flashes from the guns, but, if discovered,
his men were to rush on and endeavour to obtain a footing
above — if undiscovered, they were, on reaching the summit,
to light a fire as a signal and then attack whatever was
before them.

The entrance-fissure was meanwhile to be stormed
or not, as circumstances dictated, that is, if Fitzgerald
made his footing good above, the whole of the infantry
were to file up after him ; but if he was beaten, the en-
trance was to be stormed before the disaster could become
known along the enemy's line. This desperate sanguinary
operation it was desirable to avoid if possible; yet the
men were so confident and eager, that the general, always
mindful of moral force, designed to give no positive order
for the storm, but merely keeping a reserve in hand, to
push the troops by degrees towards the entrance ; trusting
to their natural fierceness and bravery, excited by the
astounding noise and smoke, for plunging them voluntarily
into the defile with such vehemence that nothing could
stand before them. And what his troops were capable
of attempting had been already evinced at the northern
entrance, where Beatson and the ameer were to second the
main attack by a simultaneous assault.

Those commanders had, as before related, entered a short
way into the defile, but from some error, a sergeant and
sixteen privates of the 13th volunteers got on the wrong
side of what appeared a small chasm and went against a
height crowned by the enemy, where the chasm suddenly
deepened so as to be impassable. The company from
which the sergeant had separated was on the other side, and
his officer, seeing how strong the hillmen were on the rock,
made signs to retire, which the sergeant mistook for ges-
tures to attack, and with inexpressible intrepidity scaled the
precipitous height. The robbers waited concealed behind

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

233

a breastwork on a landing-place until eleven of the party CHAP. X.

came up, and then, being seventy in number, closed on 1845.

them. All the eleven had medals, some had three, and Appendix XI.

in that dire moment proved that their courage at Jellala-

bad had not been exaggerated by fame. Six of them fell

stark, and the others being wounded, were shoved back

over the edge and rolled down the almost perpendicular

side of the hill ; but this did not happen until seventeen

of the robbers and their commander were laid dead

above.

There is a custom with the hillmen, that when a great
champion dies in battle, his comrades, after stripping his
body, tie a red or green thread round his right or left wrist
according to the greatness of his exploit — the red being
most honourable. Here those brave warriors stripped the
British dead, and cast the bodies over; but with this
testimony of their own chivalric sense of honour and the
greatness of the fallen soldiers' courage — each body had a
red thread on both wrists ! They had done the same
before to the heroic Clark whose personal prowess and
intrepidity had been remarkable. Thus fell Sale's veterans,
and he, as if ashamed of having yielded them prece-
dence on the road to death, soon took his glorious place
beside them in the grave. Honoured be Iris and their
names !

Although Sir C. Napier was resolute to storm Trukkee
in the manner described, if no other resource remained, he
loved his soldiers too well to risk such slaughter until
every minor influence had been tried on their brave but
ferocious enemies ; and much he trusted that want of food,
and the despondency which the failure of all Beja's well-
devised operations and negotiations must have produced,
would bring them to terms. Yet beyond a certain time
he could not persevere in the blockade ; he had to bring
up water as well as provisions to those barren regions ;
and the troops, thirsty and hungry, were almost naked and
quite barefooted ; for long marches over sharp loose stones
and through low bushes, had torn their clothes and en-
tirely destroyed their shoes : short of those terrible visita-

234

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. X. tions which have swept away whole armies from existence
1845. at once, they were suffering as much as soldiers ever did.

Yet not a murmur was heard, their general' s skill was
apparent, and they were content to die by fatigue, by
starvation, or by steel as he commanded. "When I see
that old man incessantly on his horse, how can I who am
young and strong be idle? By G-od I would go to a
cannon's mouth if he ordered me/' was the high-souled
expression of a youthful officer in this campaign.

Gallant officers, generous hardy soldiers, they were, and
now their day of power was come, with this consolation
for past national mishaps, that from their tent doors they
could see the very places where former expeditions had
failed, and could even mark the wild crags where the
skeletons of Clark and his brave comrades seemed to wait
in grim expectation of this avenging hour. And sternly
they would have been avenged had the hillmen awaited
the assault, for the murder of the camp-followers in the
previous operations had rendered the soldiers gloomily
resolved to give no quarter ; yet such is the influence of a
great leader, that while they swore to be as merciless to
men as the robbers had been to them, they were avowedly
fixed to save women and children, even from the knives of
their own remorseless kindred.

Happily all slaughter was avoided. It was on the
28th of February that Trukkee had been discovered,
and on the 4th of March Beja Khan Doomkee — Islam
Khan Bhoogtee— Deyrah Khan Jackranee— Houssein Khan
Mundooanee, and two smaller chiefs of dependent tribes,
having with them Beja's brother Mundoo, who appeared
the master-spirit although till then unknown, entered the
English general's tent under truce, but with the Khoran on
their heads and submissive accents on their lips, at the very
moment he was giving orders to storm their rocky hold.
Tall and strong men they were, and of warlike aspects
and proportions, bigger men could scarcely be found, with
exception of Deyrah, who was of moderate size and gentle
look, and much beloved by his tribe for his honour and
mildness. Yet this chief, not undeservedly respected,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

235

according to their notions, was prone to murder and CHAP. X.
spoliation, being only more ready when passion subsided to 1845>
make reparation. Beja, aged, but of Herculean dimensions,
had a pre-eminently imposing appearance, answerable to
his reputation as the most powerful and daring robber
of the hills : but his spirit, though fierce, was scarcely
answerable to his appearance and reputation.

They demanded terms. Submission, emigration, and a
quiet settlement on the plains, far from your wild crags.
We wish for time to consult our tribes. Take it.

Next day came Mundoo to demand modifications. The
general was inflexible. Then Deyrah Jackranee — Toork
Ali — Denana Mundooee — Suleyman Randanee and J umal
Khan Doomkee, brother of Beja, came with most of their
followers and laid down their swords in submission — the
first and second induced thereto, as they said, by the
honourable treatment of their women at Ooch. These
men were protected from plunder, and retaining all their
property moved with the army as a caravan. The others
held aloof. Beja they said, had been so perfidiously treated
by Captain Postans the political agent that they could
not trust English honour ; and when told by General
Simpson — who was sent into Trukkee as a hostage for
Beja — that Sir C. Napier's faith was undoubted, they
pointed to their ancles and wrists and cried out, Postans !
Postans ! Thus forced to reneAred action the general
ordered a column of three hundred infantry to open the
communication with Ah Moorad and Beatson, by the
western end of Trukkee; and at the same time, as the
submission of so many chiefs had put him in possession of
the southern entrances, he sent a number of smaller
columns through them with orders to scour all the in-
terior of the fastness and pursue with fire and sword
whatever they came across, always sparing women and
children. This was on the 7th, and soon two more of
Beja's brothers and their families were captured without
opposition, and consequently without bloodshed; but Beja
himself was nowhere to be found, whereupon the scouring
columns, the camel corps, and the cavalry and even the

236

SIR CHARLES NAPIERJS

CHAP. X. head-quarters escort of Moguls, were launched in pursuit,
1845. with orders to bring him in dead or alive.

Thus hunted, the recalcitrant chief, his brother Mun-
doo, a nephew, his son Wuzeer and a minor Bhoogtee
chief, with all the followers still adhering to them, sur-
rendered on the 9th. As a punishment the soldiers were
allowed to plunder their goods, and they did plunder the
men ; but true to their honourable compact, molested no
woman or child either in person or property; where a
woman's dress was seen, or a child's voice heard, all was
safe. Islam Khan escaped with his Bhoogtees, but his
father-in-law, the Keytrian, whose tribe was one of culti-
vators not robbers, would not receive his followers. Driven
to desperation by hunger he then plundered the Mazarees,
but they retook the booty and killed a hundred and twenty
of his men. With the remainder he fell on the Murrees
who killed a hundred more, and the poor remnant became
miserable wanderers — for with those tribes there was no
charity. Thus the war ended after fifty-four days of
incessant exertions.

" I have had great anxiety during this difficult cam-
paign was the observation of the successful leader. I
know not if I shall get credit for it ; but I think I have
done well. However the play is over."

No credit did he get from any person save Sir H. Har-
dinge, who behaved as a brother soldier and a public man
should behave ; but no thanks came from power in Eng-
land, and strenuous efforts were made and successfully to
prevent this great campaign becoming known in all its
worth to his countrymen. The skill of the general, the
devotion, the hardihood of the officers and men, the heroic
deaths of the veterans on the rock were all withheld from
public approbation : and the persons who sought to stifle
the fame of such actions were those who should have been
foremost to proclaim and reward them. History however
cannot be stifled, though from natural baseness its post-
humous vengeance may be disregarded. None of his staff
received any promotion. Lord BApon long withheld his
despatch from the public, and when asked why he did so ?

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

237

answered He had forgotten it ! A day, an hour of the CHAP. X.
dangers and fatigues of that campaign would have ren- 1845>
dered his memory less treacherous, his luxurious existence
more noble ; it would have furnished at least one passage
in his public life unmarked by public derision or public
indignation.

During the operations to reduce Beja, the Murree
vakeels had remained in camp, and in fear, because the
conduct of the tribe had been so suspicious that the
English general, as before noticed, had menaced them.
And he could now easily reach them, because the sur-
render of Beja left him free action, and there was a
cannon -road within his power, which, turning the defiles
of S art oof and Nufoosk, led upon their town of Kahun.
It was that danger which had brought the vakeels to
camp, and meanwhile the tribes removed their families
and herds forty miles northwards. The general however,
finding them so submissive, renewed the alliance, and
offered them the Bhoogtee fort of Deyrah, with the
fertile plain around it; but they refused, influenced by
the fear of after-feuds if the British should give up
Scinde. — An event which the Bombay faction continually
assured them was inevitable.

Short as this campaign had been, the greatness of the
enterprise considered, it would have been terminated much
sooner, if the fear of a collision with the Seikhs had not
precluded the execution of the first design, namely, passing
through the Rhojan Mazaree's country and invading the
hills from the east and west at the same time : the con-
federates would thus have been early debarred retreat to
the defiles of Goojroo, and have been thrown at once into
Trukkee. Nor could they have so long baffled the actual
operations, if Ali Moorad had been true to time when
Beja abandoned ihe Lullee and Jummuck passes to make
for Gondooee; for wily and clever as the hillmen were
in their warfare, the superiority of the Englishman's
generalship over barbarian art was pre-eminent — illus-
trating a passage in Plutarch's life of Philopoemen, where
he says that great man " adopting the Cretan customs and

238

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. X. using their artifices and sleights, their stratagems and am-
1845> bushes against themselves, soon showed that their devices
were like the short-sighted schemes of children when com-
pared with the long reach of an experienced general"

With less than five thousand men Sir C. Napier had
crossed a desert of more than eighty miles, had surprised
the enemy's first line of forts and watering-places, had
seized their strongest passes without a stroke, had baffled
all their counter schemes, and in fifty-four days subdued
tribes having four times his number of fighting men,
without giving them even an opportunity of delivering
battle in an advantageous post. He had starved them
where they thought to starve him ; and by fine combina-
tions and unexampled rapidity overreached them in their
own peculiar warfare, in a country more than a hundred
and forty miles long, from eighty to one hundred and
twenty broad, and of such desolate strength and intricacy
as can scarcely be equalled in the world — chasing them
amidst crags and defiles, where a single error would have
caused the total destruction of his army merely by the
casting of stones down on the columns. All other in-
vaders had ever met with destruction amongst those wild
rocks and terrible passes, whose impregnable nature had
become proverbial throughout Central Asia; and hence,
the sudden conquest of warriors, honoured as unconquer-
able by all surrounding nations, spread wonder and awe.
The conqueror was by his own Bengal sepoys called a
Deota or spirit ; and tribes hitherto dreading and obeying
the Cutchee hillmen as demons, now earnestly desired to be
accepted as subjects of Scinde; while the wildest Scindian
tribes became more contentedly submissive to a govern-
ment thus proved to be equally powerful and protective.

These results were not easily obtained. " War in these
deserts, said the successful leader, is very embarrassing.
To get up supplies is difficult; to move is difficult ; to find
a road is difficult ; in fine it is a chain of difficulties such
as I believe no other country presents — rocks, mountains,
wastes ! — all barren, wild, and full of frightful defiles, every
step through which was over sharp stones, that lamed half

ADMINISTRATION OY SCINDE.

239

our animals — horses bullocks asses camels — all were crip- CHAP. X.
pled, and the soldiers went barefoot. It was very severe 1345.
work for man and beast. Napoleon said that war in
deserts was of all wars the most difficult, and my experi-
ence leads me to the same conclusion."

Nor was the courage of the hillmen unsuited to their
rugged country. In the hand-to-hand fight, where the
volunteers of the 13th fell so heroically, one of the robbers
being pierced with a bayonet, tore the musket from the
soldier's hands, drew the bayonet from his own body,
repaid the stroke with a desperate wound and fell dead !
In another action twenty-five robbers, meeting with twenty
of the Moguls in the desert at dusk, instantly attacked ; the
horsemen had the advantage and offered quarter after a
sharp fight, but the gallant barbarians refused it, and died
side by side, fighting to the last !

To have warred down such men in their own desolate
hills, without a single reverse, by the mere force of genius
and hardihood was a noble exploit ; and factiously to hide its
lustre from public admiration was essentially base and
un-English ! For if the surmounting extraordinary diffi-
culties by a union of extreme caution with extreme daring
and firmness be looked to, rather than the number of troops
employed, as the test of generalship, there are few re-
corded exploits in war more remarkable than this cam-
paign. And perhaps nothing in it was more remarkable
than the resolution with which it was undertaken, and
persevered in despite of the universal cry of derision
raised by a faction but responded to with an incredulous
feeling as to success in the army employed — despite also
of the terrible loss of the 78th regiment, the arrogant
imbecility of Lord Bipon, and the certainty of personal
ruin if it failed of success.

Regarding the execution it is unnecessary to point out
the subtilty with which the robbers, the khan of Khelat,
and even the friendly Chandian chief were misled as to
the opening of the campaign ; or how Ali Moorad and his
ill-disposed Beloochees, were at once debarred of opportu-
nity for mischief and forced to push a war against their

240

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. X. own race ; but when was ever a surprise effected under
1845* greater difficulties, with greater physical exertion, or more
prompt and able combinations than that by which Ooch,
Shahpoor and Poolagee fell, and the robbers were cut off
from the western mountains ere they knew even that the
war was begun ? Can the skill be denied, with which the
terrible passes of Lullee and Jummuck were rendered
nullities for the confederates, by the vigorous march of
Simpson's column, combined with that of the head-
quarters ? Was it ordinary resolution under adverse
circumstances that maintained the camp between those
passes, until the surprising expedition of the camel corps,
relieving the distress for provisions, facilitated the third
great movement of the campaign, namely the taking of
new positions at Sebree and Doosh Kooshta, and from
thence attempting a second surprise at Shore, which only
failed from an accident that no human foresight could have
prevented. And was he a common general who with
one stroke then changed the plan of operations, extricated
his army from the embarrassment caused by that failure,
and at the same time placed his enemy in difficulties from
which he could never escape ?

Let the intricacy and military accuracy of the combina-
tions there made, be examined. The confederates had been
by the previous operations forced into a corner of their
hills ; but they had escaped the surprise designed, and had
taken refuge behind a defile through which it was impos-
sible to penetrate ; it was equally impossible to remain in
observation because the troops were nearly starving and
the magazines distant. Meanwhile the confederates could
break out by denies in their own rear, to regain the country
they had been before driven from and renew the war;
thus rendering all the previous able operations null. To
have turned such difficulties to the entire disadvantage of
the enemy, to resign the offensive for a moment, and by
seemingly retrograde marches, illustrating the saying,
' ' draw back to, make the better leap," force the confede-
rates to receive battle in a bad position, or abandon their
impregnable one altogether and take the offensive on a bad

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

241

line which could only lead to their ruin, was surely the chap. x.
mark of a great general. 184 5.

Ali Moorad, Hunter, and the commander-in-chief seemed Plan 2.
to be retreating when marching on Lotee, Jummuck and
Deyrah ; but no part of the country previously gained was
thereby relinquished. Beatson still blocked the southern
end of the Goojroo defile, living on the grain captured
from the enemy, while the rest of the army got nearer to
the magazines. Thus the supplies were assured, and the
head-quarter column, without losing its connection with
Hunter's detachment for more than two days, was placed
where it could by a new road turn the terrible Goojroo
defile, and assail the confederate chieis at its northern end,
while Beatson and Ali Moorad still blocked the southern
end. If the hillmen had waited for that attack, the war
would have been brought to the decision of a battle on
ground favourable to the British ; and there was no escape
from defeat by the confederates, because the neutral terri-
tory of Mooltan was behind them and on their left flank ;
and if they had come down the defile it has been shown
they would have got between two fires. It was then they
felt all their opponent's generalship and took refuge in
Trukkee, where he shut them up with potential skill.
Surprisingly rapid also were his movements, for though
his fighting men were few, his was an Indian army and
the whole mass was heavy. Not less than twenty thou-
sand persons and their innumerable animals were to be
provided for, and handled amidst those barren rocks.

242

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAPTER XI.

CHAP. xi. During the campaign Sir C. Napier had not neglected
1845 the Scindian administration. " This negotiation with the
chiefs in Trukkee,"*he writes in his journal, "has only
kept me from the business of civil government for a few
days, and already the pile of trials is two feet high on my
table ; I dare say not less than thirty are there, several
from fifty to ninety sheets of foolscap — and life or death
depend on some \" Yet with all tins unceasing mental
labour he had found time and thought early in the opera-
tions, to give an elaborate opinion for the government upon

Appendix vi. the reformation of the Indian Articles of War; and while
propounding terms of capitulation to the robber chiefs, he
was treating with the jam of Beila for the purchase of
some choice fruit-trees to plant in the public garden at
Kurrachee. Attentive also to the claims of science he
had placed carriage at the disposal of Captain Vickery — a
qualified person of the Company's service — for the collec-
tion of geological and mineralogical specimens, which were
transmitted with a memoir to the London Society and

Appendix xil. acknowledged as valuable contributions. He would have
extended these researches if the army had remained in the
hills ; but to avoid that public expense, the moment Beja
was captured, the fort of Deyrah was destroyed, Oolagee
and Poolagee were restored to their former owners the
Keyharees, Lheree was given to Belooch Khan, and the
army was put in motion for Scinde. The general then re-
paired with an escort to Shahpoor to meet the khan of
Khelat, whose leave he designed to obtain for putting a
garrison in that place to watch those outlying robbers who

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

243

had not entered, or had escaped from Trukkee; and well CHAP. XI.
content he was to have finished the war so soon, for 1845.
already the heat of the desert had become nearly unendu-
rable by Europeans.

At Shahpoor the khan was found, for like all the sur-
rounding powers he was so awed by this sudden reduction
of the hitherto invincible hill tribes, as earnestly to seek
that conference which he had before carefully evaded. The
campaign had however been entirely to his profit ; his re-
bellious subjects were effaced as tribes, his unruly sirdars
humbled and alarmed, and his desolated but fertile plains
of Cutch Gundava could now be repeopled and cultivated
in safety. He still complained of the hostility of the
Candahar chiefs, and on that ground asked for a subsidy ;
but the general, though anxious to give him political
weight to press down the loose materials for commotion
which abounded around, thought a subsidy would only
tend to enrich his scheming sirdars, and substituted for it
an austere warning to the Candahar men not to molest an
ally of the British. He also proposed to the governor-
general that a Khelat force should be raised, officered and
paid by England for a time, as a means of awing the
Affghans and discontented nobles, and strengthening the
alliance. This suggestion was not attended to, but the
Candahar chiefs gave an earnest assurance — for they were
in great fear — that they had no hostile designs, and the
khan readily assented to the occupation of Shahpoor.

The Englishman now adopted a singular expedient for
protecting the frontier of Scinde against the outstanding
robbers. Planting the captive Jackranees and a minor
tribe of Doomkees on fertile government land, near the
southern edge of the Kusmore desert, he made Deyrah
Khan their chief, allowing him to reject the violent spirits
whose quietude he could not warrant; but those were
immediately taken into pay as policemen, and removed to
the south where they served well and willingly. The
people under Deyrah were compelled to build houses and
cultivate lands, being fed by the government until their
first harvest was reaped ; then house and land were be-
lt 2

244

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

chap. XT. stowed on the military tenure of opposing the incursions
1845. °f tneir kindred robbers still in arms — yet with this stern
admonition, that if they themselves robbed any one, or
failed to oppose the incursions of others, their lands would
be taken away, the chiefs hanged, and the followers set
to labour in chains. Deyrah Khan was selected for this
settlement because he had always been averse to the
robber life, and amongst the first to surrender ; under him
therefore it was hoped, if the experiment failed to reclaim
the fathers, that the children would have better customs. It
failed with neither, only Houssein Bhoogtee and his brother,
fierce violent men, who had betrayed the heroic Clark and
his comrades to death, refused work, and they were in-
stantly put to labour on the public roads in irons, without
a murmur from the rest. Civilization triumphed !

It was designed to hang Beja Khan for the murder of
McKenzie's grass-cutters, but Ali Moorad prayed for his
pardon, and Beja's barbarian nature and customs, joined
to 'the fact that he had been admitted to negotiation
during a campaign which had annihilated his power for
mischief, gave weight to the ameer's intercession. The
old chieftain and his immediate followers, were therefore
placed under Ali Moorad' s guard as settlers eastward of
the Indus, on the conditions given to the Jackranees. Sir
C. Napier was also moved to clemency by hearing that
when the confederates expected their last fight at Trukkee,
and had left servants to kill their wives and children, they
thus modified the bloody injunction. " Unless you see
the English chief in person, for as he saved the honour of
the ameers' women so will he do with ours — yield to
him ! " Neither was Beja's complaint of perfidy without
weight; for though Captain Postans afterwards made a
long defence, said to have satisfied the governor-general,
he certainly had not satisfied the men who accused him,
as their conduct at Trukkee proved.

These matters being arranged, the general reached
Kurrachee after five months of incessant marching and
fighting, added to laborious administrative duties, the
pressure of which he thus laconically described. " Climate

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

245

and work have weakened me, but one cannot live for CHAP. XI.
ever." He returned however to encounter anew the 1345
enmity of the thankless oligarchs he was so efficiently
serving. His astonishing campaign, derided at first as im-
practicable, had been during the operations assailed with
a ridiculous fury; the death of every camp-follower had
been announced as the forerunner of a direful termi-
nating calamity, which the organs of the Bombay faction
strove hard to produce. Their cry had always been that
"Sir C. Napier knew nothing of government — that the
people abhorred him — that they were only kept down
by an overwhelming army." Yet here he had carried
away his main force, attended by auxiliary Beloochee
tribes, one hundred and fifty miles beyond the frontiers of
Scinde, and six hundred miles from Kurrachee the seat of
government, to war down a kindred population. Public
opinion and even the feelings of his own army had been
against the enterprise, yet he pursued it for two months,
and during that time no movement of insurrection had
taken place in Scinde, no conspiracy was formed, no
discontent was shown, no murmur was heard !

This successful campaign cut away the foul hopes of
disaster cherished by the Bombay calumniators ; but
then, with inexpressible effrontery, they declared that
nothing had been done and that a large force had been
employed at enormous cost without the slightest gain :
they even described Beja Khan as still ravaging the fron-
tier at the head of his victorious tribes, when he was
actually in prison trembling for his life. Such were the
factious ravings in the Bombay Times.

History appears degraded while recording the practices of
these hirelings ; but it is because they were hirelings, the
organs of power, that they must be noticed. Buist boasted
of the support of official men ; and persons of his stamp
cannot be neglected in history when peace and war have
been influenced by their publications. He announced at
this time that Sir C. Napier was urging the governor-
general to a war in the Punjaub, and had publicly detailed
the plan of operations ! And Major Carmichael Smith,

246

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. XI. in his work upon the reigning family at Lahore, expressly
1845 asserts that a speech — a forged one — published in the
Delhi Gazette as spoken by Sir C. Napier, was the prin-
cipal cause of the Punjaub war. For the general being
there made to say his army would immediately invade the
Seikhs they resolved to be first in the field, and crossed
the Sutlej ! This statement has been corroborated by
another writer, Captain Cunningham, and verbally by the
French Colonel Mouton, who was a general in the Seikh
service — wherefore the baffling of the governor-general's
peaceful policy, and the terrible battles on the Sutlej, with
their train of consequences involving a second war, may
be traced directly to the flagitious forgeries of two con-
temptible editors. The following extracts from a letter to
the governor-general, written two months before the
breaking out of the first Punjaub war will show with what
indifference even to probability these forgeries were
promulgated.

" It is very hard upon professional men, that it is
always put down as a settled thing that they want to
make war, though history proves that is not the case.
They make it indeed better and govern better than the
civil servants of the public ; but nothing in history proves
that they are more, or even so desirous of war as civil
servants are. Nothing can make me believe that any man
who has ever been in one battle can wish to be in a second
from personal feelings, if he has those of a man or a
Christian. If a battle must be fought we like to be side
by side with our companions — reptiles only try to get
away — but no man loves danger, except as producing
honour. Woe to the ruffian who fights a battle that
can be avoided, he is a wholesale murderer for his own
private selfishness. Two of the most miserable days I ever
spent, were those after Meeanee and Hyderabad — not
from the slightest doubt of my own conduct being right,
but because of the loss of my companions. I venture to
say that no man ever more rigidly questioned himself as
to the need of risking those battles than I did, or more
entirely felt convinced; and subsequent events bore me

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

247

out, as I believed they would. No man of common sense, CHAP. XI.
or knowledge of mankind, can suppose that another would 1345.
fight with an enemy so immensely superior in numbers,
except from necessity.

"These reflections come up on reading your letter,
saying you had to prove to your employers, that a mili-
tary man can honestly resist professional temptation, the
indulgence of which without an absolute necessity would
be criminal, in which I cordially agree with you. But
the proper military precautions are deemed to spring from
a resolution for war, though originating in a resolution
for peace! And what is more, the only way of main-
taining it. Lord Ellenborough was forced by an insen-
sate, I should rather say an unprincipled clamour got up
by the Whigs, to leave Gwalior independent, the result
will be another war probably. Peaceful Hume ! One
would think peace was sold by the yard and Hume had a
monopoly of the article/'

" My brother thinks the Indus ought to be our frontier
in its whole course now. I do not think we are ripe for
that. I agree with you that the Sutlej is our wisest
boundary just now. I would go on to the Indus when
we have gotten rid of our foolish system of keeping native
princes on their thrones, within our territory ; until then
it is impossible to trust to internal safety. But while
I am decidedly of opinion that the Sutlej is our proper
boundary-line now, I am equally certain that to keep
within it is impossible. The revenue will not allow of
such a line of defence in existing circumstances, and you
will be the conqueror of the Punjaub before 1847 if you are
alive and governor-general. Solomon was a wise man and
a peaceful prince, but he had a very full treasury, and
such credit with the merchants of Egypt and Tyre that
to make war on him would have been dangerous — his
frontier was safe. Had he been governor-general with a
Seikh army prowling like a wild beast along his frontier,
and requiring thirty thousand men to watch it, he must
speedily have made war, or postponed the building of his
temple'/'

248

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

chap. XI. Such were the sentiments of the man represented as
thirsting for war ; but he, unshaken in his course of right,
was only seeking the prosperity of Scinde, and expressing
his contempt for the factious folly, and the folly exclusive
of faction, which tainted the minds of men in power, who
could not, or would not, form any just or even sane idea
of the resources of the country, or of the measures re-
quired to work them beneficially. Because the land had
not sprung up into a garden by magic — because the Indus
was not at once covered with merchant-boats jostling for
want of room in the pursuit of enormous profits — because
all the wild Beloochees, and all the degraded Scindees, had
not suddenly changed their nakedness and ignorance of
everything but robbery and oppression, for a scientific
knowledge of the earth's products and a persevering en-
lightened industry in the manufacture of them, Scinde
was called a desert and thought to be irreclaimable !
" How V3 he exclaimed " can rational beings, if such per-
sons can be called rational, expect miracles ? Because we
have succeeded in keeping the heterogeneous population in
peace and tranquillity, these men expect a high state of
civilization to spring up on the instant \" With a master
mind however he laboured to realize their first dreamy
expectations.

Prominent amongst the moral obstacles were the wile
ferocity of the Beloochees, the Mahometan religion, and
the want of a language to communicate with the multi-
tude, for there were many dialects, but neither Persian
nor Hindostanee was known. He meddled not with
man's faith or religious rites, save where the Hindoo
would burn women, and hence the Mahometans had no
fear of conversion ; but they dreaded contamination, and
would not mix with unbelievers ; he could not therefore
conciliate them by the gentleness and honours of society
as he wished to do. Yet one faith he proclaimed, one
social comfort he administered, one language, by him
accentuated with peculiar force and clearness, he used,
and the multitude understood him. They required no
priest to expound his general beneficence, his protection

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

249

of life and property, his prompt unadulterated justice. CHAP. XI.

The rich needed no interpreter to explain the generosity 1845>

which assured to them their possessions and dignities.

The poor were content, that without speaking their

dialects he should break down the ameers ' cruel system

of government farming, in all its branches, whether of

taxes or rent.

At this time he gave to every person, natives or immi-
grants, who would cultivate land, leases for fourteen or
twenty-one years with exemption from rent or taxes for
the two first, the holders being responsible only to the
government collectors without the intervention of zemin-
dars or kardars. This was his appropriation of the land
retained when the jagheers were regranted, and of the
greater part of the ameers' accursed shikargahs : and to
give the stimulus to industry more effect he made small
government loans to the poorest to enable them to start
in the course of cultivation. Infinite pains also he be-
stowed on the general irrigation, observing that health,
revenue, food and civilization depended upon controlling
the waters.

His minor measures for improving the public condi-
tion and awakening men to advantages before unknown,
or unheeded, were many and judicious. He formed a
breeding establishment at Larkaana with the female
camels taken from the hill tribes ; he endeavoured to
set up windmills at Kurrachee, and with the profits of the
government garden, which now supplied several thousand
persons with vegetables, he stimulated industry in various
branches ; the mills indeed failed ; for being made at
Bombay under the superintendence of Dr. Buist who as
secretary of the agricultural society there was charged
with their construction, they were very costly, and so
defective they could never be set up,

Through the collector of customs Mr. McLeod, and
Major Blenkyns, a sheep and grass farm was established
for which merinos were obtained,, and it soon produced
Guinea grass and lucerne in such abundance, as to give
promise of entirely providing forage, which had hitherto

250

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. XI. been obtained for the army from Cutcb at enormous cost.
1845. Through Mr. Curling, who had been long in Egypt, tutor
to one of the pacha's sons, he also sent for fine West
India sugar-cane plants, and they arrived in a thriving
condition at Bombay; but official people detained them
there until they died, for any improvement of Scinde was
to them as wormwood. However, cereal agriculture was
in Sir C. Napier's judgment the only sure foundation on
which to rest Scindian prosperity, and there was no real
knowledge of it possessed by the people, even the most
industrious ; yet the Beloochee and Scindee were alike so
eager to acquire knowledge of any kind, that he saw their
civilization would be certain if means of teaching were
provided, the regimental schools were besieged by them
praying to have their children instructed. To satisfy this
craving for knowledge he proposed to Lord BApon the in-
stitution of agricultural schools on a plan first established
by Captain John Pitt Kennedy, at Loch- Ash in Ireland.
It had been entirely successful there, and was afterwards
pressed by that gentleman upon the Irish government.
And it is no hyperbole to say, that had his plan been sup-
ported against the intrigues of pretended patriots, the
famine and misery which has desolated that unhappy
country would have been very much abated if not entirely
averted. That great and useful project was stifled to
satisfy corrupt influence in Ireland, and in like manner
this proposition for Scinde was set aside : it did not con-
duce to factious interests !

While the regeneration of the poorer classes was thus
urged forward, the just claims of the high-born people of
the land were not overlooked. Though a conquered race,
Sir C. Napier regarded them only as English subjects,
and resolved to open for all places of trust and dignity
without objection to colour or religion, demanding only
qualification. Mohamed Tora, one of the greatest sirdars
who fought at Meeanee, was made a magistrate, at his
own request, the appointment being thus justified. " The
nobles of Scinde must have the road of ambition opened to
them, or they will not have their rights in the honourable

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

251

sense of my proclamation — that is, if they qualify them- CHAP. XI.

selves for the offices demanded. But in questions of 1845.

general interest like this, even qualification should not be

required before enjoyment — we must give first, we can

turn out afterwards for incapacity. The class-right will

be thus acknowledged while the man is removed ; and if

one Beloochee gentleman becomes a magistrate many will

qualify themselves. I want to go beyond this, if the

Indian system will allow me ; but that system, a rotten

fabric of expedients for the supporting of robbery, is

equally destitute of humanity and knowledge of human

nature, and will I suppose certainly debar the Scindian

gentlemen of the rights possessed by Englishmen. I will

however give them all I can. The Beloochee gentleman

may likely enough abuse his power for ten years to come ;

but we who have conquered the country can surely keep

half a dozen of such persons in order ; and the great men

of the land must have a door open for their ambition, their

virtues and their industry, or they will become rebellious

or vile : I know not which is worst, but the government

which produces either is a detestable tyranny."

In virtue of powers granted by Lord Ellenborough,
Sir C. Napier now negotiated with Ali Moorad a treaty,
which that prince ardently desired, though he objected to
one article, which gave a right to all persons to settle in
either state, and provided that none who fled from one to
the other should be given up, save for treason or murder,
when the proof of guilt was to be satisfactory to the pro-
tecting state. Against these provisions the ameer cla-
moured— "They would ruin him, his people would all
depart, his country be rendered desolate ! " — " Truly have
you spoken ameer if your design is to be a tyrant." This
silenced Moorad, yet his fears were not unfounded. Not
only his subjects, but the cultivators of Khelat and those of
Candahar, and traders from all the surrounding nations,
even from the north-west provinces of British India, were
crowding to Scinde as to an asylum against oppression.
Kurrachee had swelled too big for its walls, and new streets
were rapidly springing up beyond the gates. Many people

252

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XT. of Cutcli Gundava liad come across the frontier, more were
1845. coming ; and two independent tribes of the Gedrosian
desert, the Hedgees and Punjeurees, who could bring
eight thousand swordsmen to the field, entreated to be
accepted as subjects, and were strangely disconcerted
when denied.

Meanwhile the rejoicing for the fall of the robber tribes
spread for hundreds of miles beyond the immediate neigh-
bourhood of their stony fastnesses, indicating the extent
of Beja's depredations and of his ferocity. Nor were the
robbers themselves the last to proclaim their conqueror's
prowess. " The Emperor Aekbar, the great Ahmet Shah,
and other kings, had, they said, failed at the head of armies
to penetrate beyond Tonge — and though at times British
detachments had got through the first passes, they were
invariably cut off in the end ; and no large force had ever
before been able even to approach Trukkee : they had now
been subdued, but by a man no one could resist." The
fame of the exploit was thus spread even to Toorkistan,
where the traveller Wolfe found the wild warriors of
Central Asia expectant of Sir C. Napier's coming and
hoping for the spoil of kingdoms under his leading, being
all willing to join him in arms. And strange to say the
town of Bunpore, on the confines of Persia, being besieged,
actually surrendered on receipt of a forged letter of com-
mand, having his name affixed ! But so vivid is the
Eastern imagination, especially in warlike matters, that
had he been master of his own actions he could at this
time have overrun all Asia as a conqueror, and arrived on
the Mediterranean with half a million of wild horsemen.
Little did those fierce plundering Asiatics think, that the
chief whose military prowess had thus excited their admi-
ration, was then bringing into activity a new, a simple and
a beautiful principle of contention totally opposed to their
notions — the contention of rulers, competing for power
and riches and grandeur indeed, yet not by war, not by
negotiation, nor by commerce — but by a benign sway,
attracting the oppressed of all nations to come under his
government.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

253

Amongst the essential means to attain that noble object, CHAP. XL
was the reduction of imposts, that comfort might soothe 1845>
the poor man's industry. Yet a strange difficulty attended
this amelioration. The Beloochees would often prefer an
onerous tax, if it was one of custom, to a lighter one which
disturbed their habits ; and being men of violent impulses
there was always danger of their resenting changes
however beneficial. Cautiously therefore were financial
reforms introduced, for the general desired more to make
the people understand his desire to benefit them than to
obtain the fame of a rapid regenerator ; holding the first
to be the vital principle of permanent legislation ; the last
an ephemeral distinction suitable only to a reforming
tyrant — a Mehemet Ah of Egypt. But while seeking in
all ways to amend the moral condition of the people, and
to forward their national prosperity, he considered the
repression of Belooch ferocity to be a holy work, and pur-
sued it with stern resolution though he writhed under the
means necessary to effect it ; for having to combine the
lawgiver with the judge, and the executive office with both,
there was no salve for a wounded conscience if error were
committed.

" I put men to death/* he said, " for murder only, and
generally it is for the murder of helpless women or
children : and having deeply considered the justice and
necessity of doing so my conscience is clear as an adminis-
trator, since no labour or pains, no care or reflection, have
been spared by me to arrive at a just conclusion in each
case. I do not flinch from this painful duty, but I do not
like to be a judge. I would rather be a private person.
Yet being here in authority I must do what should be
done, and the cruelty of those ferocious men can only be
stopped by force. Even Deyrah Khan whose countenance
bespeaks his natural goodness — he who for years expressed
his abhorrence of the robbers' habits and at once closed
with my offers — even he is capable of fraud and murder.
Bred in a bad school, the tendency of all the Beloochees is
to starve from idleness and rob and murder from habit —
but that habit I will break."

254

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. XI. A few months after this was written, Deyrah beat one
1845. of his followers to death, and though he was from some
accidental cause only sentenced for manslaughter by the
military commission, the trial gave infinite disgust to the
Beloochees. — " Who ever before heard of a chief being
blamed for killing a follower? Well ! God is great and
will in time remedy what cannot be now accounted for ! "
Such was the language of this fierce race of blood-spillers.
Nevertheless their propensity to murder sensibly abated,
and the good-will of the labouring classes towards the
government as sensibly advanced.

With the general prosperity the revenue also improved
so rapidly, that after defraying the whole expense of the
civil government, a surplus of one hundred thousand
pounds sterling was paid into the treasury of India : subject
only to the cost of constructing the new barracks which
did not much exceed one-third of that sum, was not
a permanent charge, and was sure to repay tenfold in
the saving of soldiers' lives. Meanwhile so assured was
the tranquillity of Scinde, that Sir C. Napier proposed to
hold it with five thousand men ; a proposal not adopted
by the supreme government, because the Seikh troubles
were so menacing. Scinde did not require an army, the
general interest of India did; but so far was Sir C. Napier
from desiring war at this time in the Punjaub, or anywhere,
that he expressed his dread of it, saying, age had incapa-
citated him for the labour — that in the hills, he had been
indeed several times more than twenty hours on horseback,
and once twenty- six hours with only the support of a crust
of bread and some tea carried in a soda-water bottle — such
was his simplicity of living — yet old men do not recover
rapidly from fatigue, and to do well in war a general
should be always in the saddle — that his will was strong,
but his worn-out body dragged it down, like a stone tied
to the tail of a kite. That with the duke of Wellington
body and mind seemed to have made a compact; with
him they were as cat and dog.

These expressions as to his bodily powers were but indi-
cations of momentary lassitude after extreme exertions in

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

255

a debilitating climate, for his continued labours evinced CHAP. XI.

his iron hardihood. However at this time he was compelled 1345.

by the great augmentation of juridical business to alter his

system of revision, and permit the judge-advocate-general

to decide finally on the trials for certain specified offences,

still allowing the accused an appeal to himself. It was

full time, for between January and June he had studied,

written notes upon, and passed sentence in four hundred

criminal trials, some of ninety folio sheets ! in addition to

the military trials !

This relief enabled him to devote more time to other
branches of administration, especially the system of taxa-
tion; and he had8 ample proofs that his recent campaign
had been effectual and beneficial. Before the hill expe-
dition the protection of the frontier had required three
regiments of cavalry, and they could scarcely hold their
ground. " We can do nothing against the robbers, they
come and go and our men are exhausted." Such was the
substance of all previous reports. Now a single regiment
of cavalry and some horsemen of the Bundlecund legion
more than sufficed for the duty. The presence of any
cavalry was even declared unnecessary, and the officers
complained of having nothing to do. There were no
incursions to drive the Scindian cultivators from their
lands, and those of the Cutch Gundava plains had again
rendered that fertile district a sheet of grain — an unusual
but truly glorious result of war, and the more glorious
that those very people, driven to desperation before the
campaign, had at one time actually resolved to join the
robbers in a mass as the only mode of avoiding utter
destruction. The khan of Khelat's revenue was thus aug-
mented by two lacs and a half, which gave him a personal
interest in the preservation of tranquillity.

While this peaceful scene was exhibited beyond the
frontier of Scinde, the captured tribes within it had joy-
fully taken to agricultural labour, and even Beja only
complained that Ali Moorad watched him too closely ;
but the ameer sarcastically replied — alluding to his own
expenses in the recent campaign — that it had cost him

256

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. xi. two lacs to capture so great a chief, and it might cost him
1845. more to let him loose. In truth the general's policy had
been rather to put Ali Moorad to charges than to have
his aid, thinking it a good means to keep him from enter-
taining Patan adventurers who always desired war and
disturbance. Beja was however now allowed more liberty
which he did not abuse, and afterwards paid a visit in
friendship to his conqueror at Kurrachee.

In the course of the summer the Murrees announced
that they had again defeated the wandering Bhoogtees
under Islam Khan, and had killed so many of them and
taken so many arms, and so much cattle, that the tribe
was nearly extinguished. This seemed to be confirmed by
the arrival of a number of isolated Bhoogtees seeking a
home amongst the settled tribes in Scinde, and by an offer
of submission from Islam himself ; but when the former
terms were again proposed he rejected them with great
insolence, and continued to haunt the hills with a con-
siderable force : yet only as a bandit, his power of raising
commotions was gone. The Murrees complained that the
Kyharees had from Poolagee aided the Bhoogtees, and the
general menaced the Kyharees so sternly that they were
heedful not to provoke his wrath ; for being a tribe odious
to all around them, the simple withdrawal of British pro-
tection would have been their destruction. These minor
troubles were not unexpected. While any robbers
remained in the Cutchee hills, want would compel them
to make incursions, and it was to bridle them that Shah-
poor had been occupied; but no pains were spared to
bring them to a peaceable disposition, and it was hoped
the flourishing condition of the tribes, under Deyrah Khan,
would finally prevail over the predatory habits and pride
of those who still roved for spoil — for very clearly did the
contentment of those settled tribes prove, that the robber
life was not one of choice.

That he had saved the subdued and reclaimed ones from
slaughter, was a constant source of satisfaction to Sir
C. Napier, and could he have had his own way, he would
at once and for always have ended the robber system, by

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

257

planting sepoy regiments at Deyrah as a military colony. CHAP. XI.
The Bhoogtee fort there was ready for occupation, and the 1845>
air remarkably pure, the water good and copious, the land
fertile, the hills around full of mineral riches. Trukkee
was a vast quarry of fine white marble, the transmission
of which to the Indus for exportation would have been
easy. This was a noble scheme, but necessarily relin-
quished, because no disposition existed with the high au-
thorities to adopt useful projects, and Sir Charles Napier
had to struggle for every public amelioration, against the
folly and enmity of the oligarchs in whose ungrateful
service he was wasting strength "and life. From Sir
H. Hardinge indeed, when applied to personally, he
received a just support against his secret enemies — and he
needed it; their hostility being as unceasing as it was
unscrupulous — but from the councils and superior boards
of India he experienced opposition, official delays, thwart-
ings, and denials, little according with the requirements
of a new government, which had to create the means
of regenerating as well as to administer to a conquered
nation.

From the robbers nothing serious was now to be dreaded,
and even the Lion asked leave to reside with Ali Moorad,
but the reply was " Surrender." This he was too high-
spirited to do, and went to the Punjaub ; but his tried
friend, Ahmed Khan, the Lhugaree chief, seeing all hope
gone, yielded, pleading truly that he had only obeyed the
prince's orders in his previous career : the plea was ad-
mitted by the general, who obtained pardon, and restored
his possessions. This terminated all Scindian enmity;
but in June the frontier touching the Mazaree district
was molested by a Seikh band, which under pretence of
pursuing robbers had crossed the boundary. Sir C. Napier,
to avoid embarrassing the governor-general's policy to-
wards the Lahore Durbar, refrained from punishing this
invasion, but he sent four hundred men and two guns
under Major Corsellis in steamers from Hyderabad to
Khusmore, with orders to fall upon any armed foreign
body within the frontier-line if they did not instantly

258

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XI. retire, yet to abstain from any violation of the Seikh
1845> territory even in pursuit. At the same time the Mazaree
chiefs were admonished with reproachful sternness to
beware of further offence. This promptitude, and the
prudent conduct of Corsellis, put an end to a dangerous
affair, which might otherwise have precipitated the Pun-
jaub war.

Meanwhile the public works of Scinde were pushed as
fast as adverse circumstances would admit, and amongst
the most adverse was the dearth of good engineers. How-
ever the dike designed to keep out the inundation between
Sukkur and Shikarpdore, was now finished by Captain
Scott ; it had given way to the violence of the flood at one
time, and there was some doubt as to the final success ;
but it was restored on a new plan of execution supplied by
the general, and thus completed in despite of these serious
obstacles : then the yearly epidemic which had before
ravaged those places ceased.

To obtain this result Sir C. Napier willingly endured a
temporary loss of revenue ; for with him the people's wel-
fare always had precedence of state opulence ; but many
rich proprietors were discontented, for being fatalists they
laughed at the notion of sickness averted by human
efforts; and they would not take the trouble to sink
wells, though a very few, in addition to the sluice-gates
practised in the work for partial irrigation, would have
compensated the loss of water from the checked inunda-
tion. They even menaced to cut the dike, but a distri-
bution of cavalry met that threat, and meanwhile the
labouring population obtained full employment, and high
wages from government without pestilence or oppression
— the high wages being perhaps the chief cause of the rich
men's discontent. This sanitary state of Sukkur became
permanent, and as to the annual pestilence, this year, it
was not very prevalent in any part; but in July and
August cholera appeared at Shikarpoore, Sukkur and
Larkaana, and then descended to Hyderabad. To meet
this visitation hakims — native physicians — and in their
default, intelligent men were appointed with salaries in

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

259

every district, and they were furnished with medicines, CHAP. XI.
and instructions for the relief of the poor : they had power ^7
also to enforce sanitary precautions.

Thus ceaselessly Sir C. Napier watched and laboured in
all directions, yet the course of his administration was
rendered slow from the impediments continually created
by official men and boards ; and so artfully were those
managed that he could make no specific complaint, save of
delay, though the public service languished under the
effects. He had now been for nearly two years soliciting Appendix III.
a sanction for bringing the Mullyeer river to Kurrachee
and was still without even an answer ; though the want of
pure water was so grievously felt in that place, and the
cost of conducting the river, only twelve thousand pounds,
would have been quickly repaid by a small water-tax.
Still more vexatious was the delay in sanctioning the
formation of a camel baggage-corps, to the organization of
which he had early attached the greatest importance; and Appendix VII I.
he was especially earnest to have it ready for service before
a Punjaub war should break out. It was a great mili-
tary creation, which had been suggested by observing that
in India armies were appendages to their baggage, instead
of the reverse. He resolved therefore to reduce the latter
to its proper rank as an accessory, to render it capable of
regular and timely movements, to correct its tumultuous
character by a military organization, and no longer per-
mit it to be a confused host of men and animals — rolling
about in misery, wasting the country through which it
passed, and by its disorder helplessness and weight break-
ing down the finest combinations, and menacing nun at
every movement to the troops it was designed to sustain.

During his first campaign in Scinde the multitude of
men and animals gathered under the name of baggage,
weighed as a millstone on his movements. In the Cutchee
hills the safety of the army was more than once endangered
by it ; for the camels being all hired, their drivers natu-
rally sought to avoid danger, not in the military meaning
but according to their personal interpretation of the term ;
and when then rude generalship was at fault, they con-

s 2

260

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. xi. eluded all must go wrong and deserted. No order was
1845 or could be maintained in the hills, where the narrow
ways crowded with baggage forbade the corrective action
of cavalry ; and no rigour of punishment could restrain
the camp-followers and camel-men from straying beyond
the lines for forage or plunder, generally the last. At
Jummuck the loss of life from this cause was considerable,
and on the march from Goojroo, the troops having gone
Plan 2. forward to secure the head of the defile of Toosoo, the
baggage choked up the road for ten consecutive hours,
liable the whole time to attack; and yet beyond aid,
because for three miles the pass was so wedged with men
and loaded animals that the general could scarcely pass
himself or send orders to the troops, and he was finally
compelled to move his artillery and cavalry, which were
in the rear under General Simpson, by another way and
with great fatigue.

To make the baggage of his army fulfil the conditions
of its existence — a help instead of a burthen — was now
Sir C. Napier's object, when after two years' constant
solicitation he obtained a tardy sanction to form a bag-
gage-corps. The pervading principle was, that the carriage
of baggage should be a government matter, and organized
with as much care and order as a regiment. On this basis,
he formed divisions, giving to each six hundred govern-
ment camels, and uniforms to the drivers. Each division
had a directing animal, which was to carry a flag by day
and a lantern by night — the flag, the light, the trap-
pings of the camels, and the uniforms of the drivers corre-
sponding in all points. Remembering the Israelites' march
in the wilderness, he also placed an elephant at the head
of all, carrying a larger flag by day and a larger lantern
by night, a star to lead, and a sign of command which
none were to disregard.

The camel-drivers were enlisted, disciplined armed and
paid as soldiers, and commanded by regular officers ; and
the general knew human nature too well not to invest
them with every title to respect and honour which the
bravest soldiers could claim. Their animals, classed as

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

261

strong and weak, bore round their necks tablets, engraved CHAP. XI.

with the maximum load of their class, as a protection from 1845>

oppression in overloading, an injustice to which the poor

beasts are very sensitive. One man was appointed to each

camel instead of three camels to one man, as the practice

was, a change saving baggage guards ; for one man still

led three animals while two flanked the march as soldiers,

and were yet at all times skilled and ready to help in

loading and unloading.

To aid the passage of baggage and guns in difficult
places, five spare elephants were attached to the corps, and
the whole mass was placed under the command of a supe-
rior officer, who had power to enforce all regulations, and
move his cumbrous masses as a second army in conformity
with the operations of the fighting men. If the enemy's
horsemen, sweeping, as was their wont, like a whirlwind
round the flank, should fall on the baggage corps, the latter
instead of fettering the action of the troops, or flying
confusedly towards them for aid, was practised to cast
itself by command into orbs or squares, the camels kneeling
down with their heads inwards and pinned together, while
from behind that living rampart the drivers defended
themselves with the carbines they carried.

Minor regulations completed the system, and the result
was superiority of movement, saving of animals and
expense, with increased comfort for the troops and conse-
quent diminution of sickness ; and withal so great a relief
to the field operations as to make the creation of the corps
a signal epoch in military organization. It was in truth
an enlarged and perfecting application of that principle of
order which first dictated the substitution of disciplined
forces for feudal levies and armed mobs. Its creator well
observed at the time. "That it was the way to obtain
rapidity in war, which did not result from bugling, double
quick marching, and galloping of horse-artillery, but from
incessant care, the raising and supporting the moral feeling
and physical strength of the soldier, the rendering the
baggage conducive to his wants, and as little of an impedi-
ment as possible."

262

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. XI. When this corps was organized Sir C. Napier may be
1845. said to have given wings to his army ; for he had before so
horsed his batteries that they were capable of any exertion
— had created the fighting camel corps with its surprising
power for sudden and distant expeditions — and had in a
manner also created the Scinde horsemen, the Moguelaees,
whose matchless ability for irregular warfare did not keep
them* from being foremost in the field charge when solid
hosts were to be broken. They had indeed existed nomi-
nally previous to his arrival, yet, neglected and undisci-
plined were falling to pieces and an order for disbanding
them had been issued, but he interfered ; reforming
their organization he increased their numbers and placed
them under Captain Jacob, an artillery officer, but selected
with a sure judgment for this service. The army of
Scinde was therefore emphatically an army of movement ;
swift to assail, terrible to strike ; and if the formation of
the Belooch battalions, now well organized and fit for
service, be added to the institutions mentioned above,
the military creations will be found to have kept pace with
those of the civil administration in Scinde.

By the Bombay faction the baggage corps was neces-
sarily decried — "It was an expensive folly — a complete
failure — so had the conquest of Scinde been — so had the
administration been — so had the hill campaign been/''
Colonel Burlton, a Bengal commissary-general, also pub-
lished a work against the baggage corps, striving to
prove that waste, disorder, extravagance and oppression of
the native population, are as profitable to armies in the
field, as they are by some supposed to be for persons in
his situation. But every advantage gained by Sir C.
Napier in war, every stroke of successful policy, every
undeniable proof of enlightened government, naturally
produced a storm of passionate calumny from men whose
incessant predictions of failure were as incessantly belied
by results. India was well described by Chief Justice
Roper at this period, as a press-ridden community; and
yet with a few exceptions, such as the Gentleman's Gazette,
which did justice to its title, there was not, and there is

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

263

not, a free press for the many. There is only a licentious CHAP. XI.
press for certain factious persons having wickedness 1345.
enough to protect the editors from legal consequences :
a few instances of this immunity for libel enjoyed at
Bombay will suffice for illustration.

Dr. Buist published, as a regular official document, a
reprimand to a naval officer, which had indeed been written
by Sir C. Napier, but for reasons affecting the public
interest had been cancelled and locked up in his desk,
from whence it could only have been obtained by infamous
means! He also published a forged letter from Sir C. AppendixXin.
Napier to the governor-general, in which the former was
made to return Sir Henry Hardinge's personal kindness
with foul abuse ; and though the Bombay government was
officially called upon to prosecute for these two offences,
Buist committed both with impunity, and boasted of having
information and support from men in power, in such a way
as to indicate very plainly that members of the government
council itself were intimately connected with his libels.
Lieutenant-Colonel Outram likewise, published in the
newspapers such slanders against Sir C. Napier that the
governor-general desired the latter to leave the correction
of them in his hands, but with an overstrained delicacy
he referred them to the home authorities. His motive
was that as the slanders were also directed against Lord
Ellenborough, Sir Henry Hardinge in dealing with them
might be embarrassed by his family connection with that
nobleman. It was an error of which he was soon made
sensible. The secret committee in England passed indeed
a severe censure privately on Outram, but with a miserable
cunning, falsely assuming that Sir C. Napier had entered
into a public controversy with that person, instead of
having, as the fact was, sent in a formal demand for justice
to the government, condemned such controversies gene-
rally and refused to notice the official appeal. But Outram,
thus privately reprimanded, was immediately appointed to
a lucrative civil office, in the view no doubt of giving
weight and currency to his vituperation. That error was
however in time corrected by the public voice, which forced

264

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XI. the Court of Directors to bend with abject submission to
the general whose reputation it had thus basely sought to
lower.

There was yet another authority — Lord Bipon — who
declared that Outranks proceeding was right, that it was
what men in power must expect, and should excite Sir C.
Napier to greater zeal ! ! In fine he plainly disclosed his
own connection with the assailants of the man he was
bound to protect. There is however a moral as well as an
official standard of right, and Lord Ripon's authority is
not of force to establish the one or to efface the other. It
was not right that a violation of the Articles of War, and
all just authority, should be, not only left unpunished but
encouraged; that truth should be outraged and public
decency outraged, by loathsome calumnies — that soldiers
in the field should be told their general was entirely igno-
rant of his duty, and the murderer of their comrades —
and it could not be right that a minister of the crown
should countenance such insults to real greatness, at the
dishonest behests of a body he was appointed to control !

Dr. Buist in support of his libels boasted that his
informants were men high in office, a boast never con-
tradicted, and of weight when coupled with these facts
that secretary Willoughby was, as men say, one of the
proprietors of his journal; and when reeking from the
acknowledged slander about the ameers' women having
been dishonoured by the officers of the army, Buist was
received as a guest in houses whence he should have
been especially spurned for that foul falsehood. Those
official informants therefore told him " That nothing had
been effected in the hill campaign, and that the robber
tribes were more formidable than ever, though the
greater portion were then settled as quiet cultivators in
Scinde — that Beja, when actually in prison, was a victo-
rious chief and ravaging the frontier at the head of his
Doomkees — that Sir H. Hardinge, though he had given
his express consent to the expedition, and warmly ap-
plauded the successful execution in public orders, entirely
disapproved of it — that Scinde was a wasting drain upon

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

265

the resources of India, when it was paying a large surplus CHAP. XL
to the general treasury — that Sir C. Napier had refused to 1845#
hold the country with less than sixteen thousand troops,
when he had actually only twelve thousand — that he had
applied for a reinforcement of a thousand men to meet
the sickly season, when he had in fact sent away three
regiments to enable those ' sovereign authorities ' to
quell a rebellion caused by oppression in the Bombay
presidency ; and instead of demanding reinforcements
had proposed to spare seven thousand of the twelve thou-
sand under his command, and hold Scinde with five
thousand \"

Such was the hostility evinced towards a man who was
wasting life in exertions to serve the government that thus
encouraged and protected his assailants ; and that nothing
of baseness or absurdity might be wanting, the Bombay
faction endeavoured to confer the character of a martyr
on the savage filthy criminal Ameer Shadad, fawning on
and licking his hands, red with the blood of the murdered
officer Ennis. They concocted also a petition to the
Queen from the Ameer Nusseer, which Sir Henry Pot-
tinger undertook to present. Every line of it contained
some notorious falsehood forged by the faction. The
attempt was however too gross to succeed in England
though Nusseer' s cause was adopted by Lord Ashley, whose
profound and deplorable ignorance of everything relating
to Scinde affairs did not prevent him from meddling and
countenancing to the utmost of his power, the efforts of
these conspirators against the interests of England and the
fame of Sir C. Napier.

But while Buist's high official authorities were so ready
to give this kind of information to injure the governor of
Scinde, they were totally insensible to the just pride and
welfare of the gallant troops who conquered that country ;
and so also were the authorities in England ; each seeming
to strive for pre-eminence in heartless scorn of the soldiers'
claims, rights and honour.

Lord Ripon took more than two years for striking off
the Meeanee medals, and it was believed they would never

266

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. XI. have been struck but for the strenuous interference of
1845. Lord Ellenborough ; thus numbers of gallant men died
without the consolation of having those honourable marks
of merit attached to the manly breasts they had so bravely
presented to the sharp swords of the enemy. When struck
the medals were sent to Bombay without riband s, and the
government there, with a like scorn of honourable feeling,
transmitted them, as bales of common goods amongst
commissariat stores to Scinde, with such contemptuous
irregularity that the commander-in-chief received his from
the hands of a lieutenant -colonel, whose subaltern officers
had obtained theirs long before !

When the 25th native regiment, whose courage had
been so conspicuous in the battles, was recalled to Bombay
— against the general' s wish, and apparently because
against his wish — it was, after five years of foreign service
treated on landing with insulting neglect ; as if it had
come back stained with dishonour instead of beaming with
the lustre of heroism.

Sir C. Napier's representations to the Bombay autho-
rities that the widows and children of the Scinde horsemen
who fell at Meeanee in 1843, were still in 1845 without
any provision, were treated with indifference, though he
stated that those poor claimants were living on the charity
of their fallen protectors' comrades! Even the sacred duty
Appendix vii. 0f forwarding the living sepoys' remittances to their fami-
paragraphA. hes was so shamefully neglected, that he was compelled
to represent the matter to the governor-general.

Sensitive enough however they were upon other points ;
for a memorial was framed by some civil servants, avowedly
under an official stimulus, praying the interposition of
the directors to make the governor of Scinde declare
why he called some of their body jackals ! And this
singular folly was clamorously pressed until he, admitting
wrong to the jackals, intimated an intention to call for a
statement of work and salaries, and institute a comparison
between those of the memorialists and his soldier civilians.
The cry then ceased. But in truth he had not assailed
the civil servants as a body at all, he had only said in a

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

267

private letter, with the publication of which he had no CHAP. XI.
concern "The general opinion was that c certain civil ggT
servants' were corrupt." And it is not a little singular
that this "general opinion," thus quoted, had come to him
from some of those very persons at Bombay, when speaking
of their brethren at Calcutta, who were now rendering
themselves subjects for derision by a simulated indig-
nation.

But by a singular coincidence, always some proof of the
superior government of Scinde was publicly furnished
when its maligners were most boisterous in condem-
nation.

Thus it was predicted that a ten years' partisan warfare
would be established on the right of the Indus, and im-
mediately after more than a hundred chiefs on that side
of the river voluntarily proffered their salaams.

When it was clamorously asserted that the whole
Belooch race abhorred their conqueror, all their chiefs
and sirdars eagerly came to the great Durbar at Hyderabad
in sign of submission and good will.

It was proclaimed that Scinde was tranquil only because
it was kept down by a large force ; and a portion of that
force was immediately sent to aid in quelling an insur-
rection in the Bombay presidency, leaving Scinde tranquil.

When it was announced that the population of Scinde
only awaited a favourable occasion to restore the de-
throned ameers, the general marched to war beyond the
frontier of Scinde ; and this favourable occasion could not
induce a man to stir in aid of the Lion, or of the forty-
eight Talpoor princes who were still at large and actually
in Scinde, calling on their former subjects.

Striking as these facts were, none were more so than a
partisan warfare undertaken in the autumn of this year by
Deyrah Khau, against Islam and his roving Bhoogtees. The
general had foreseen, when he planted his captives near
the frontier, that the outlying rovers would soon be forced
to make forays for food, and he judged their first attempt
would be on the settled Jackranees ; because from them
less resistance was to be expected \ and they could be thus

268

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XI. sounded as to resuming the robber life. So it happened.
1845> The Jackranees were plundered. But instead of hankering
for their former vocation, fiercely they rose and demanded
leave to retaliate. Nothing could be more in accord with
the general's policy, and he directed some cavalry to
support them while crossing the desert, yet to leave them
to their feud when within the rocks.

He had no doubt of their return to the plains, for being
now industrious cultivators, he had the double hold on
them, of their interests as proprietors, and their vengeful
passions as warriors ; nor was he without hostages, having
previously taken the most energetic and influential of the
tribe into government pay. Deyrah Khan's warfare was
therefore the consummation of a profound scheme of policy,
which had in nine months subdued and reclaimed the
spirit of men previously regarded by the world as more
akin in ferocity to wild beasts than human beings — a policy
which had so changed their habits, that being peaceful
agriculturists when not injured, they were now marching
against their former confederates in the interest of civili-
zation; and invading those very fastnesses from which
they had been so recently torn themselves by force as
robbers !

This was a result the greatest of men might be proud
of; but it was carefully hidden from the English public,
and he who had achieved it was more foully and voci-
ferously vilified and calumniated than before. Indeed
the secret practices of his official enemies had become
so dangerously unscrupulous, that he was now compelled
in self-defence, to avoid all financial responsibility, and
decline all public works until superior sanction could be
obtained — and that was always delayed by official forms —
for he well knew that men and boards were on the watch
to effect his ruin. The Bombay council had already pri-
vately sent letters to the governor-general insinuating
charges against him, and though they were returned with
great indignation, and an intimation that such accusations
should be made publicly and sustained, or not made at
all ; the council continued its hostility in secret, and in a

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

269

mode so flagitious, that the wronged man's own words CHAP. XI.
must be used in exposition. The necessity of frequent 1845
references to libellous publications will then be compre-
hended, and Buist's boast, that he had eminent and unques-
tionable authority close to the sovereign power in Bombay
will be understood. Sir Charles Napier speaks.

"The Bombay Times has asserted, and entered into
details, that I was driving the people of Scinde mad with
excessive taxation, and that I had even dared to re-esta-
blish the impost called the transit-duty. These assertions
were accompanied with abusive epithets such as the sordid
and shameless leader of Scinde — The autocrat of Scinde
— The Scinde czar — The unscrupulous murderer of the
soldiers — The liar at the head of the Scinde government
and so forth. India was kept ringing for several months
with accounts of my infamous attempts to make up a sham
revenue.

"As I never put on a tax and never laid the value of a
mite upon any article in the way of impost ; and as I have
taken off a number of taxes, I laughed at what I knew
must in time he found an invention as pure as that of the
people said to have been seen by Sir John Herschel in
the moon. But how could I laugh, when, after India had
resounded with these charges, I found, by the mistake of
a clerk at Calcutta who sent to me what was designed to
be kept from me, that the Bombay government had sent a
secret note of council to be registered at Calcutta — contain-
ing accusations against me of making up a false revenue,
not only by levying excessive taxes, which they only hinted
at, but by a monopoly of grain ; the price of which the
minute said I had raised by my command of the produce
and sold dear to the troops, and made the loss fall on the
Bombay government ! In fine that my conduct had been
so infamous, that, one iota of it being true, hanging would
be too good for me !

" Had the clerk not made this mistake — if mistake it
was and not a generous disgust at such villany — there
would have been in the Bombay and Calcutta archives
heinous crimes secretly but officially registered against me

270

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XI. by my bitter enemies. And when I was no more they
1845 would have been given to the world as irrefragable proofs
of my flagitious government of Scinde ! And these accu-
sations were so ingeniously concocted by two members of
the Bombay council, Reid and Crawford, who are old
practical accountants, that it cost me a week's hard work
to prove the villany of the men ; and that so far from
increasing the expense of feeding the troops, if there was
one point more than another to which I had devoted
myself during the three years of my ruling in Scinde, it
had been that of reducing the price of grain to all, by
destroying monopolies and lessening the pressure on public
revenue.

" But this was not all, the secret minute was recorded,
and the authors of it chuckled at having thus shot their
assassins' bolt, but not content, they manufactured their
minute anew for an article in Doctor Buist's publication —
the words only slightly changed to suit a newspaper. Not
knowing its source I only laughed at it as one of his usual
attempts to make me out a scoundrel ; but when I received
the minute from the Calcutta clerk I answered it, and
gave my opinion to the council freely; disproving by
document after document every he they had advanced.
Was that all ? No ! Enough in conscience, but not all.
I got a letter from Lord Ripon, saying, 1 he had heard of
the accusation but hoped it was not true ! ' And then he
gave me all sorts of reasons to prove that I ought not
to reimpose the transit-duty — thus showing that he
believed I had done so, notwithstanding his hope ! To do
Lord Ripon justice, he gave me but little trouble to answer
him, for he discovered such entire ignorance of the sub-
ject, that I saw he did not know what a transit-duty was.
Yet again a day was lost to me in answering him, and my
real work thrown into arrear — and what work ! Long
trials to read and to decide upon, putting five men to
death. Horrid work ! requiring calm thought, great and
concentrated thought and resolution not to err. At such a
time, with my mind stretched on the rack to attain right
in the sight of God, I was to force myself to examine, to

ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE.

271

write, and to dwell upon villany past all belief, and beyond CHAP. XI.
my power to chastise ! Fortunate that I bave escaped from 1845>
tbe snares of those who, while profiting from my ebbing
life, are seeking my destruction!

" No sooner had I answered Lord Ripon, thinking I
had been sufficiently tormented, than there came from
Calcutta a letter written by the secret committee, Lord
Kipon's colleagues, to demand why I had restored the
transit-duty ? which from ' various sources ' they heard I
had done. I have asked why they did not name their
( various sources 9 or any one of them, that I might
expose their secret informer. This they won't do, but
were we of Venice in the days of the Ten, these men
would soon put me out of the way : and things of this
nature happen weekly."

To expatiate upon this almost incredible proceeding,
not indeed of a council, for the governor Sir G-. Arthur
opposed it and was outvoted by the others, that is to say
by Reid, Crawford, and the secretary Willoughby — a man
who upon every occasion stimulated the hostility shown to
Sir C. Napier — to expatiate upon such a proceeding would
be an insult to the honour and sense of the English people
to whom this work is dedicated. Nevertheless it is
fitting to observe that when this secret minute was being
concocted, the price of grain was in Scinde absolutely more
dependent on demand and supply than in England, all
taxes on its importation being abolished in Scinde and not
in England, and Sir C. Napier's real views on the subject
may be judged by the following instructions to his
collectors.

" There is but one sound way to make grain cheap, viz.
encouraging cultivation and not taxing importation. I
took off the importation-tax last year, and I have been
liberal to cultivators ; these are the only radical cures for
want of grain — expedients there may be besides, but these
are the foundations for having cheap food. As to the
effect produced by monopolists, the correction is to make
grain so plentiful they cannot forestall ; if they attempt it
they will be ruined, or at least lose greatly where they

272

SIR CHARLES NAPIERJS

CHAP. XI. seek to gain greatly. I at first thought it might, in this
1845 case, be good to fix a maximum, but reflection renders me
sure that government had better not interfere, except by
providing plenty of grain. I dread direct interference of
government with men's private affairs, and it seems to me
government must be to blame, directly or indirectly, where
a whole people suffer want of food. Slavery indeed jus-
tifies the summary interference of government ; for if a
man deals in human flesh, human flesh has a right to deal
with him ; but cheap food, good wages and plenty of
labour ; these are the three essentials of good government
and they produce each other if the taxes are light ; with-
out that the machine will not ply freely.

" As to the occupiers of ground, government ought to
take a fair share of the produce of land and no more. If
we legislate for bad land, taxing good land to make grain
rise to a remunerating price for that bad land, we pull
down the good land to the level of bad land ; that is to
say, we raise the cost of food to the poor, to enable
zemindars to cultivate bad land. That was done by the
ameers, and look at the result ! Half Scinde lies waste,
and good land too ; for why should any one seek for good
land so heavily taxed that it could only make the profit of
bad land. My reduction of imposts on land is an equal
benefit to all, and is proportionate to produce ; hence if
bad land could pay when the impost was high it can do so
now when lower, and the sale of its produce is secure
while Scinde imports grain — when it exports, the demand
will raise the value of bad land, if it is worth cultivating at
all. Nor must it be forgotten that the great difficulty of
cultivation in this country is to get water, and the
wider cultivation is spread the more readily will water be
obtained."

Grain was however high-priced in 1845, and the causes
were amongst the extraordinary difficulties through which
Sir C. Napier dragged Scinde to prosperity.

1°. The war of conquest had continued in different
parts until August 1843, which was nearly too late a period
to commence cultivation for that year, and plundering of

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

273

grain just previous to and during the military operations CHAP. XI.
was general ; for the people seeing a strange army descend
on the land knew not what might happen, but fearing
the worst stole and concealed all they could, neglecting
agriculture.

2°. The sudden conquest cast the whole administration
of an unknown country and people at once into the hands
of the British authorities; and before light could be
thrown on the system of imposts and collection, govern-
ment was easily defrauded; law also was so little regarded
that most men were occupied with pillage instead of
agriculture.

3°. The canals were that year left uncleared, the
ameers being only intent on war ; and when the canals
are choked neither health nor harvests are to be expected
in Scinde.

4°. A dreadful epidemic raged from August 1843 to
January 1844 destroying thousands and leaving the
survivors, for nearly everybody had been attacked, too
debilitated to labour. Thus agriculture was nearly aban-
doned in 1844 ; men had not strength to work ; and
though the troops were less fatally affected than the
people, only two thousand feeble tottering convalescents
were at one time capable of bearing arms. And as this
terrible calamity was rendered more oppressive by a
wide-spread visitation of locusts, scarcely any produce
remained in Scinde.

5°. The Indus fell suddenly that year in an unusual
manner and did not again flood, thus the poor remnants
of vegetation which had escaped the locusts perished for
want of water.

It was under these frightful visitations, these terrible
calamities Sir C. Napier's energy and ability lifted and
shielded Scinde from famine and commotion, and placed her
on a solid social basis in the end of 1845. And it was with a
knowledge of these dreadful miseries that the Bombay
councillors complained of grain being high-priced — that
they secretly accused the governor of causing that high
price by infamous arts, and at the same time themselves

274

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XI. endeavoured to make it higher by imposing an export
Jgjr duty on all grain leaving the port of Bombay — thus
putting the finishing touch to their intolerable baseness by
doing themselves what they were falsely accusing him of
doing! Scinde was however in the latter part of 1845
unmistakably prosperous even to eyes ofFuscated by these
vile arts. The population had been increased by immi-
grant cultivators, besides the forcibly- settled tribes ; and
a very large accession of inhabitants had swelled Kurrachee
and Shikarpoore to cities, thus augmenting trade both
ways, by the sea-board and by the river. Wealthy mer-
chants were now also seeking to open new commercial
channels in a country considered by them as that one of
all the East where justice was most surely and cheaply to
be had.

Meanwhile the revenue had so increased that in De-
cember another ten lacs were paid into the general
treasury, making a gross surplus of two hundred thousand
pounds ; and it was the opinion of the collectors that the
same system would in ten years produce one million
sterling without pressure on the people, or very sensible
increase of administrative expenses. But the most re-
markable proof of good government and personal reputa-
tion was, that the whole people of Cutch Gundava in the
north, and the tribes of the Gedrosian desert on the west,
now asked to be received as subjects ; while on the east
the nawab of Bhawulpoor, who did not disguise his dis-
like of the political agents with whom he had hitherto
dealt in his political relations, demanded to be placed
entirely under the control of the Scindian conqueror,
whose government had been so suddenly thrown by the
shock of war into the midst of these wide-spread popula-
tions. Like a rock cast from a volcano into a lake, it had
come, and like the waters they had receded tumultuously,
like them to return and tranquilly subside.

But none of his great administrative services, nor all of
them combined with his surprising exploits in war, were
of any avail to cool the malignant heat of enmity in the
Court of Directors, nor warm Lord Bipon to a momentary

ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE. 275

sense of what was due to a great man from a minister CHAP. XI.
of the Crown. Vexatiously he had delayed the soldiers5 1845
medals, had insulted the general, and endeavoured to
stifle the despatches announcing success in the hill cam-
paign — had applauded Outram/s slanders — had adopted
the secret accusations of the Bombay councillors, without
daring to name them as accusers, and had refused, or at
least neglected, to expose the false official statements foisted
on the public as to the expenses ; thus without inquiry —
to which he was invited — countenancing the industriously
inculcated notion that it was a worse than useless con-
quest. Scinde is nevertheless a great and beneficial
acquisition which has opened a high-way for commerce
with Central Asia ; and if governed on Sir C. Napier's
principles will become an opulent province and a power-
ful bulwark on the south-west for India. If governed on
the usual system of the Company it will become one of
those lasting shames for the directors, which made Lord
Wellesley call them the "Ignominous Tyrants of the
East."

-a.

t 2

276

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAPTER XII.

CHAP. XII. While Scinde was thus happily ruled, the state of
Indian affairs beyond her frontier was perplexing and
menacing. An embarrassing and costly insurrection had
long tormented the Bombay presidency, and in the north-
west a war with the Seikhs was hourly impending ; yet the
prevalent opinion in India was adverse to the occurrence
of this last event ; and joined to that incredulity was the
arrogant assumption, that if it did happen, an easy
triumph awaited the British arms. Judging very dif-
ferently on both those points, Sir C. Napier reflected care-
fully upon every possible phase of such a contest, the
danger and difficulty of which he foresaw and foretold
from a distance, with a surer military and political compre-
hension than others who were closer. He had, under the
governor-general's orders, equipped, and in September
sent to the upper Sutlej, pontoons for bridges, and he was
vigilant to keep his own military administration so organ-
ized that no sudden call, however onerous, could cause
confusion though its extent might embarrass his resources.
He had therefore unceasingly pressed the progress of the
camel baggage-corps, as the most powerful spring to insure
regular and rapid movement in that great and complicated
machine, an army in the field. Constantly also he medi-
tated on the force to be employed, and the operations to
be adopted when required — as he foresaw he would be —
to act as an auxiliary to the main army on the upper
Sutlej.

His speculations, transmitted to the governor-general,
were found to coincide in a remarkable manner with the

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

277

transmitted opinions of the duke of Wellington on the CHAP. XII.
same subject, and thus mentally fortified, he awaited 1845>
the course of events. It was not long before his sagacity
was vindicated. The governor-general, trusting too con-
fidently to his own strenuous efforts to preserve peace, had
certainly adopted — it might be caused — the public opinion
as to an amicable termination of the Punjaub difficulty,
and the Seikhs commenced the contest before the British
forces were prepared ; so unexpectedly they did so, that
only a fortnight before the battle of Moodkee was fought
Sir H. Hardinge assured Sir C. Napier he would give him
six weeks' notice of hostilities. The war was therefore an
unlooked-for event which made India tremble ; the veil
of falsehood, woven at Bombay to cover Scinde from
public estimation, was thereby rent asunder; and the
great importance of that acquisition was comprehended
when the announcement of the battle of Moodkee was
accompanied by an order to assemble at Roree, with all
possible speed, an army of fifteen thousand men equipped
for the field, and with a siege-train. To do this was im-
possible from the resources of Scinde ; but reinforcements
were to come from Bombay, and soon ten thousand men
of all arms, with guns, waggons, horses, camp-equipage
and camp-followers were marched from the interior of
that presidency to the coast, and embarked at all the sea-
ports of Western India. From Mandavie, Surat, Bombay
and Yingorla, on every description of floating craft, from
the steam-frigate to the open country boat, men and
materials were poured into Scinde with a promptitude
showing, that Sir George Arthur, and Sir Robert Oliver
the commander of the Indian navy, had no sympathy
with the factious sentiments of the Willoughbys, Reids
and Crawfords.

Had the policy of the supreme government permitted
Sir C. Napier to obey the dictates of his perception that
the war was inevitable, a Scindian army could and would
have been equipped for the field three months before, and
cautiously quartered from Hyderabad upwards, ready at a
moment's notice to concentrate at Roree and move into

278

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. xii. the Mooltaxi country. This could have been effected
1845. without attracting the attention of the Seikhs ; but it had
been forbidden to move a soldier, to purchase a camel, or
in any manner to prepare for a contest; and when the
order for war came, only the eighteen hundred camels, of
his newly-organized baggage-corps, that is to say, carriage
for a column of three thousand persons was available, when
carriage for nearly fifty thousand was required; and when
the general spread agents abroad to purchase, the jam of
the Jokeas endeavoured to thwart them. Sir C. Napier's
vigour of command to meet the campaign thus violently
thrust upon him was not to be so impeded. He arrested
the jam in the midst of his tribe, awed all insidious ene-
mies, redoubled his own efforts, and soon obtained twelve
thousand camels; meanwhile he equipped and pushed
men and guns up the Indus with incredible rapidity;
for his battering-train was advanced a hundred miles
two days after he had received the governor-general's
orders !

Then he met the influx of the multitude from Bombay
with a power of order and resources never surpassed.
Every department worked day and night and on the right
road, without jostling or confusion. The artillery in addi-
tion to their numerous field-batteries formed a siege-
train complete of thirty-two pieces, with a thousand rounds
a gun; the engineers under Captain Peat, an officer of
unbounded talent, organized a park, said to have been a
model — so complete was it in arrangement and all things
essential for war — although collected under great diffi-
culties, and where genius was taxed to supply the absence
of regular arsenals and the resources of civilization. The
commissariat carried up two months' provisions; the
medical department was amply furnished; and though
the Bombay reinforcements had to be marched to the
coast and embarked with their equipage and followers, in
all not less than thirty thousand persons; though their
voyages were of five hundred and eight hundred miles,
and the troops when disembarked again had to march
nearly four hundred miles, the whole army was concen-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

279

trated at Roree on the forty-second day after receiving CHAP. XII.
the order !

On the 6th of February more than fifty thousand men,
if the camp-followers be included, were assembled at
Roree with every department well ordered, well combined
and completed. Eighty pieces of artillery were gathered
with all materials and ammunition for a campaign in
abundance. A powerful armed flotilla was on the Indus
freighted with stores and three months' provisions, and
having on board three hundred yards of flying bridge. A
zealous body of officers worked like men anticipating and
resolved to merit success, and an almost frantic enthu-
siasm pervaded the soldiers — they fought with the air and
could hardly be restrained from shouting to the charge as
they marched — yet a careful discipline was everywhere
apparent.

This rapidity, unexampled if the scanty resources of
Scinde, the suddenness of the order and the completeness
of the equipment be considered, could not have been
attained if the camel baggage-corps had not been previ-
ously organized; nor could this powerful, war-breathing
army, when assembled, have dared to move in advance but
for the previous campaign in the hills — that campaign
which Lord Ripon with official imbecility stigmatized as
an insignificant affair of outposts. Had it been neglected
the army would now have had as many enemies on its
flank and rear as it had in front, and could not have moved
a step in advance — fortunate if it had not a separate war-
fare to sustain for the defence of Scinde !

About five thousand men remained for the protection of
that country.

Three thousand with six field-pieces and fifteen heavy
guns were appropriated to Kurrachee as the principal
place of arms, and key of the whole system.

At Hyderabad the fortress and intrenched camp, the
latter armed with six twelve-pounders, were furnished
with three months' provisions and garrisoned by a sepoy
regiment and eight hundred police.

The steamer arsenal at Khotree on the Indus, had its

280

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. xil. own fort with two guns and a hundred marines,, aided by

the armed workmen and some policemen for garrison;
this was however a small force to secure so extensive a
district, wherefore troops were brought from Cutch to
Wangar Bazaar, on the borders of the Delta. Detachments
from Deesa were also directed to garrison Omercote in the
desert, but Meerpoor and Aliar-ka-Tanda were guarded by
policemen only. Larkaana and Sehwan were likewise left
entirely to the native police, and the five thousand regular
troops presented but two formidable masses.

Shahpoor, Kanghur, Sukkur, Shikarpoore and Bukkur,
were guarded by a regiment of regular cavalry and one of
infantry, with six field-pieces ; Sukkur had also its arma-
ment of heavy guns, and all these places were to be aided
by the northern policemen who were now as formidable as
the sepoys, and so resolute that Ayliff Khan, the swords-
man, had recently with only six men defeated a predatory
band of Seikhs, and ignorant of the general's order not to
pass the frontier, had crossed and pursued his enemies for
twenty miles.

To resign the whole country, during war, to the keeping
of so few troops was in itself an answer to all malevolent
libels on his government, but Sir C. Napier had other
and surer warrant for tranquillity. Belooch Khan, the
independent hill-chief near Lheree, whose suspicious
dealings during the campaign against the confederates
have been mentioned, now offered to join the army with
a hundred horsemen. Khan Mohamed made a like offer,
and to serve at his own expense, adding, that for a small
pay he would bring five thousand of his " tenantry 33 to
the field ! Now Mohamed was the most powerful sirdar
in Scinde, and a Talpoor, being nephew to the Lion, at
whose side he had fought bravely up to the latter' s defeat
by Jacob ; yet was he earnest to march with the man
who had dethroned his kindred ; and he had so entirely
adopted the new order of things as to talk of his warriors
as his tenantry ! To him Sir Charles spoke frankly,
saying how willingly he would have given to the world

this proof of the contentment

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

281

Scmdians; but as the Beloochees and Bkawulpoores were CHAP. XXL
enemies of old, the nawab would have just cause of com- lg46^
plaint if the British brought foes into his territory. He
would think some sinister design to deprive him of his
possessions was entertained, and would become a suspicious
ally, perhaps a secret enemy. Mohamed acknowledged
the force of the argument, and so the matter ended.
Secretly the general' s policy was to quell, not to stimulate
the warlike habits of the Beloochee race; but this offer
from a man so resolute and powerful, and of such lineage,
coupled with the sentiment of fear which the strongly-
organized army now assembled was calculated to produce,
left him without fear of commotion in Scinde. He had
therefore only to consider his plan of military operations,
and the disposition of the neighbouring powers in Khelat
and Afghanistan, both of which he treated with cautious
sagacity.

The Khelat sirdars, thinking to make a stroke of policy
demanded money in the khan's name, to resist the
Affghans, who were, they said, prepared to invade Khelat
and even Scinde when the general entered the Punjaub —
adding, that the money would enable them not only to
hold the Candaharees in check, but even to win them over
as auxiliaries in the war. Thus artfully they sounded his
fears as to that contest, but the reply was sternly explicit.
" I will not give a rupee. I want no aid against the
Seikhs, and if the Affghans give offence an English army
can go again to Cabool, and perhaps remain there j if the
khan is molested the troops at Hyderabad and Shahpoor
shall march to his assistance." This sufficed for the
sirdars; and the Candahar chiefs, instead of menacing
Khelat offered to join the British army — an offer received
with thanks, but declined as being likely to embarrass the
operations with wild plundering warriors, who troublesome
in success would become enemies if a reverse occurred;
indeed at this period Sir C. Napier could, if so inclined,
have led half Beloochistan and Affghanistan into the
Punjaub.

Now also AH Moorad tendered his services thinking to

282

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. XII. get back some territory formerly taken from him by Run-
1846. jeet Sing; and his offer was accepted, on the condition
that he moved np the right bank of the Indus, and supplied
a garrison for Mittenkote when it should fall, an arrange-
ment which promised the following advantages.

1°. The ameer would sweep away the bands of match-
lock-men that were sure to infest the right bank of the
river, and interrupt the communications.

2°. There would be an appearance of two armies, one on
each side of the Indus, the fame of which would be exag-
gerated by the Asiatic imagination, and spread even to
Constantinople !

3°. Mittentoke would be held by an ally, whose aid in
the field of battle was not required, whereby the British
line of operations would be shortened by the distance from
that place to Roree.

4°. If the ameer proved treacherous, which was scarcely
to be expected, he could do no serious mischief, because
the left bank of the Indus and the river itself would still
be commanded by the British army and flotilla ; and
Mittenkote would be under the control of Captain Malet
and Mr. Curling, whose influence with Ali Moorad's hired
Patau s was sufficient, with an offer of higher pay, to draw
those adventurers altogether away from that prince's
service.

The general's plan of operations was framed with sin-
gular care and foresight. Mittenkote was the first place
of importance capable of resistance, the Seikhs were busily
strengthening the works, and its situation within the
confluence of the Punjaub rivers, adapted it for a place of
arms to sustain an invasion from Scinde, and to facilitate
the sieges of Soojuabad and Mooltan, the fortresses next
in succession. The design was therefore to make a rapid
movement on Mittenkote in two columns, throw a flying
bridge over the river, and crush it at once by the concen-
trated fire of eighty pieces of ordnance. This the general
observed was like "killing a gnat with a sledge-hammer,"
but, besides the value of time he knew how dangerous
irregular warriors like the Seikhs were behind stone walls,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

283

and his policy was to terrify Soojuabad and Mooltan by CHAP. XII.

this sudden overwhelming of Mittenkote. The movement 1846<

against Mittenkote was to be up both banks of the river

with the flotilla between, because, after passing Kusmore,

the right bank belonged to the Mazarees — enemies — and

as some of the troops were already on that side and the

whole would have to be there at Mittenkote, two passages

and time would be saved by the double movement which

would also awe the Seikh Mazarees.

Ali Moorad was then to be launched with all of his
men, not required to garrison Mittenkote, against Deyrah
Ishmael, a rich town to the westward. For with a nice
appreciation of character the general judged that the
ameer's desire for plunder would lead him to advance
several marches, that his fears would then make him halt,
and thus, without misfortune to the town of Deyrah, a
powerful diversion would be effected, which would draw
off troops from the right bank of the Sutlej, Meanwhile
the army, moving up the left bank upon Ooch, was to form
a field depot there, fortify the place, and prepare to force
the passage of that river; an operation judged of easy
accomplishment, if Ali Moorad's diversion was effectual ;
but always mindful of that great principle of war, that as
an enemy is never to be despised all available strength
should be applied to every effort, the English leader
resolved not only to place the whole of his siege-guns and
field-artillery in battery on the bank, but to transfer the
guns from the steamers to small boats to insure a prepon-
derance of fire. When the passage was effected, he
designed to construct a double bridge-head, armed with 4
steamer guns, and by intrusting it to the Bhawulpoor
auxiliaries, keep his own force and battering-train entire
to move against Soojuabad or Mooltan.

He had fifty-four field-guns admirably horsed, and on
these he chiefly depended for defeating the Seikhs, ex-
pecting by rapid movements to put their heavier artillery
sooner or later into a difficulty, and then with his active
army to break their cavalry and infantry without being
crippled, for his intention was to go far, yet not wildly.

284

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. xii. He knew his ground. He had prepared means to raise all
1846^ the population along the Indus as far as Deyrah Ishmael
Gazee against the Seikhs ; and had he been permitted to
assemble his army as he desired, at an early period of the
eool season, he would have shown the world a great game
in war, and burst upon Lahore at the head of fifty
thousand fighting men long before the battle of Sobraon
was fought. The siege of Mooltan in the second Punjaub
war, perhaps that war itself, would thus have been spared.
It was otherwise ordained.

While the Scindian British army was being assembled,
the battle of Ferozashur was fought on the upper Sutlej,
with so little advantage that the contending forces re-
mained in observation on the English side of the river,
and a powerful corps was necessarily detached under Sir
Harry Smith to protect the communications, then menaced
near Loodiana by an auxiliary Seikh force. In this state
of affairs the governor-general suddenly ordered Sir
C. Napier to direct his army on Bhawulpoor, and repair
himself to the great camp on the upper Sutlej ; a journey
not to be safely made without an escort for several days,
which would have been slow for the occasion ; but the
fighting camel corps was here again made available and the
speed was as a courier's. He reached the camp at Lahore
on the 3rd of March, yet only to find that the battle of
Sobraon had been gained, that a treaty was in progress,
that his well-devised campaign was nullified, and his life
endangered by the combined action of mental and bodily
fatigue, for no object ! Anticipated fame, health and
independent command had been snatched away at once ;
and, worse than all to his spirit, he found that when the
Punjaub was actually lying bound at the feet of England
if he had been allowed to conduct the operations as he
had projected, the war was not to be continued by the
main army — peace with the certain contingent of another
war was to be substituted for complete conquest. He was
received by the governor-general with honour and very great
kindness ; by the soldiers with enthusiasm ; and in Durbar
he was treated by Goolab Sing, then going to be raised to the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

285

sovereignty of Cashmere, with such a marked respectful- CHAP. XII.
ness of demeanour, as to indicate that he had adopted the 1846>
general opinion as to the " nusseeb " or fortune of the
Scindian conqueror, which the Beloochees rudely expressed
by saying it was " a cubit longer than that of any other
man." But his mission was naught, and after a few days'
stay he had to return to Kurrachee, where he arrived in
April, suffering in health from this useless continuous
journey of eighteen hundred miles under an Indian sun.

While at Lahore, he saw and reflected on the difficulties
arising from the advanced season, and the absolutely
denuded state of the British army, and as his own pro-
jected auxiliary invasion of the Punjaub, which would
have insured entire conquest without imposing further
operations on the main army was set aside, he judged
negotiation advisable ; but his opinion was adverse to the
general policy pursued. He had before hostilities com-
menced, declared his belief that the British empire in
India was not ripe for a frontier on the upper Indus ; yet
as circumstances had forced on this war and the Punjaub
was virtually subdued, he thought the conquest should
and might have been consolidated without further blood-
shed ; whereas — " if a puppet king like Duleep Sing, and a
real monarch like Goolab were established, the battle would
have to be fought again, rivers of blood would flow, and the
result might be doubtful" He said so, and in two years
Mooltan, Eamnuggur, Chillianwallah and Goojerat, bore
red-handed testimony to the truth of the prediction.

It has been said, with sufficient authority to assume the
fact as historical, that his projected campaign was thus
stifled, to have his aid on the upper Sutlej, where, previous
to the victory of Sobraon, the war bore a dark aspect.
This was a flattering recognition of merit, but having been
productive only of mortification and evil to the object of
it, gives the right of examination as to the possible public
benefit.

Sir C. Napier with fifteen thousand men, so well
organized, disciplined and provided, and wrought to such
frenzied eagerness for battle, was, his great reputation

286

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. XII. with the nations around considered, worth another man
l846^ with thirty thousand; and his line of operation was,
politically and militarily the true one for an auxiliary
force. He had a sure base and retreat on well-furnished
fortresses, his power would have been magnified extrava-
gantly when he had crushed Mittenkote and invested
Mooltan, and as nearly the whole of the warlike population
on the left bank of the Indus were in secret communication
with him and ready to join him in arms, he would have
decisively influenced the operations on the upper Sutlej.
Indeed the mere appearance of his army at Roree had so
terrified the southern Seikhs, that the Dewan had secretly
treated for the surrender of Mooltan ; and an influential
native in another quarter being ready to obey his secret
orders, he was very justly confident, of reaching Lahore
without a check, and with the Dewan and Mooltan Seikhs
as auxiliaries. In fine the campaign was in his hands,
that is, using his own words, " as far as man could know
of war, for if fortune take offence she can make a straw
ruin an armyP

Was it wise to cast away such moral and material
advantages, to call such a general from a country and a
people so perfectly known to him, and, no slight consider-
ation, knowing and fearing him as though he were a
demon in battle — to call him at a critical moment to a
country and people of whom he knew nothing. And for
what ? To have one man more in a council, where per-
haps there was already one too many; and where unless
some very unusual arrangement was contemplated, he
must naturally be regarded with jealousy. Ignorant of
the resources on either side, he could only have advised
hesitatingly, and could not act at all. Meanwhile his own
army was thrown entirely out of the scheme of operations
by being moved to Bhawulpoor, where it was palsied and
without sure communications ; for the river was thus
rendered useless as a communication, and an invasion of
Scinde was invited, which would have thrown all the
incumbrances of the force upon the grand army. This is
not conjectural. It was subsequently ascertained that a

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

287

Seikh force was actually prepared for such a counter inva- CHAP. xil.
sion, and was only stopped by the negotiations after the \s46.
battle of Sobraon.

To overrule all these considerations, simply to have a
third general in council, would seem to argue a state of
much greater peril and nakedness on the Sutlej than has
yet been made known to the public; and without pre-
suming to censure or even to analyze the plan of campaign
followed, it may be permitted to indicate another scheme
of operations, which might possibly have been as effectual
with less bloodshed; and would certainly have obviated
the necessity — if there was a necessity — for blotting Sir
C. Napier and his army out of the campaign.

For two years the state of the Punjaub had indicated
a coming war ; and though the governor-general might
hope by policy to avoid that extremity, there was always
sufficient danger to warrant preparation up to the verge
of action. To say such preparation would have provoked
that event, is a conclusion to be reasonably denied; and
it is certain a contrary system did not avert the cata-
strophe, though it did deprive the army of the resources
required to give human confidence in the result. Taking
then as a basis, that hostilities should from the first have
been deemed inevitable, it follows, that the most powerful
military means to sustain a war should have been com-
bined with judicious policy to prevent one ; and the time
required for warlike preparation, could certainly have
been most easily gained by negotiations to stave off a
conflict altogether. A war and peace policy would thus
have marched together for a certain time, and the following
dispositions would have placed the army in a better con-
dition as to its communications, than it was previous to
the victory of Sobraon ; they would also have enabled it
to decide the war by one great action, instead of fighting
five times ere its own safety was insured.

Lahore was the Seikhs* base of operations, and they had
several lines of invasion open.

First. To pass the Sutlej near Ferozepoore, or at
Hureekee, as really happened.

288

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. XII. Second, To pass the Beas, and the upper Sutlej near
1846. Loodiana, as the force defeated at Aliwal did do.

Third. To pass the Sutlej below Ferozepoore, and,
crossing the desert by Seersa, menace Delhi.

In the first and second cases, the Seikhs might have
marched forward in mass, or, intrenching themselves,
have detached their numerous cavalry to ravage the
country up to Delhi. The problem to be solved was
therefore how to dispose the British army, that, while
remaining on the defensive, it could yet baffle those three
courses of invasion without losing command of the initia-
tory impulse if circumstances gave it the right to strike
first. To effect this solution, Ferozepoore should have
been considered, not as the key and pivot of the operations
upon which the army was to gather, but as an isolated
point to be thrown on its own resources. It should have
been furnished with stores as a place of arms, and with
the means of bridging the Sutlej ; it should have been
strengthened with an intrenched camp to be occupied
with a moveable corps of all arms, ten thousand strong at
the lowest, and so have been left to itself.

This arrangement would have obviated the necessity of
the flank march from Loodiana down the left bank of the
Sutlej to succour it, such as occurred. Certainly an un-
military march, for that river did not cover the British
army, being fordable in many places, and it was actually
passed by the enemy during the movement ; in fine it was
a line of march which could not have been adopted before
a skilful enemy. The Seikh general showed no ability,
and yet that flank march enabled him to fight the danger-
ous and indecisive battles of Moodkee and Ferozashur,
and involved an after-necessity on the British side for
Smith's operations to clear the communications. But if
Ferozepoore had been originally shaken off as a detached
point, the main army could have been assembled in masses
at and about Loodiana and Sirhind ; using those towns
and Umballah as secondary places of arms and communi-
cating with Delhi. In this position, having the cavalry
thrown out on the wings to protect the country on each

faceFageZ8S.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

289

flank against any sudden action of the Seikh irregular CHAP. Xlf.
horsemen,, the army, provided with means for throwing a 184Gi
pennanent bridge over the Sutlej and having a flying bridge
for further operations, might have calmly awaited the de-
velopment of the Punjaub troubles after giving notice to
the Lahore Durbar, that any Seikh movement towards the
Sutlej, or even the tunaishing of their troops with means to
take the field, would be considered a declaration of war.

Thus prepared with a declared policy and a powerful
army, the British chief, when the Seikhs, as really hap-
pened, issued pay and ammunition to their troops and
consulted astrologers as to the fortunate hour for action,
could have called in his cavalry, laid his permanent bridge
over the Sutlej, avoided the left bank altogether, and
taking post on the Beas, have thrown his pontoon bridge
and fortified a head on the further side of that river. This
movement would have inevitably stopped the Seikh army,
and yet have permitted further negotiations, not unlikely
to succeed when thus vigorously supported.

If those negotiations failed, the command of all the
movements offensive or defensive would have remained
with the British army. For if the Seikhs attempted to
pass the Sutlej below the confluence of the Beas, they
could be opposed in front by the corps at Ferozepoore,
while the main army, crossing the Beas, fell on their flank
and cut them off from Lahore. If they attempted to
force the Beas itself, the main army could receive the
attack with every advantage ; while the corps from Feroze-
poore, by means of their bridge and the fords, either passed
the Sutlej at Hureekee to menace the enemy's flank, or
at Erareese to support the defence of the Beas.

But the Seikhs would never have attempted such diffi-
cult operations, and must have remained passive in defence
while Sir C. Napier's army was operating from the side of
Mooltan on their flank and rear ; and if, as is most pro-
btible, the Seikh general intrenched a position to cover
Lahore and Umritzer, the British army on the Beas and
the auxiliary force at Ferozepoore, passing the Sutlej and
the Beas simultaneously by means of their respective

290

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. XII. bridges and at the fords, could have united to deliver a
1846# decisive battle which would have given them the capital,
possibly the whole country, and would certainly have
brought them to the Chenaub, or the Jelum, where Sir
C. Napier's force could, if necessary, have joined.

If the battle was adverse to the British, their retreat
over the Beas and Sutlej was secure ; and if driven from
those lines, Ferozepoore offered a refuge for its own corps
while the main body took a new line behind the upper
Sutlej as at the opening of the campaign : meanwhile Sir
C. Napier's operations would prevent the Seikhs from
vigorously following up their victory. Now quitting this
hypothetical campaign to resume the story of the adminis-
tration of Scinde, it shall be shown that the field of battle
is not the only place where heroic conduct can be dis-
played by an officer.

At Kurrachee Sir C. Napier, although suffering from ill-
ness, resumed his unceasing cares for the people committed
to his charge. He could not indeed help seeing that he was
a man looked to in danger and difficulty, but overlooked in
the distribution of honours and treated with contumely
when fear did not enforce respect ; but with a noble scorn
he pushed base usage aside in his pursuit of the real great-
ness belonging to a discharge of his duty to a whole people.
" I do not pretend " he said " that I am not chagrined at
being a man marked by the government. This has been
made evident in many ways. Nothing has been done for
my staff in the hill campaign ; which would not have been
the case I imagine under any other general, and I receive
no redress or even answers to my complaints of injuries.
As to rewards I can only act as I have always professed — -
namely that those who are to receive them are not the
men to dictate. Hardinge and Gough are both my seniors,
Smith however is only a colonel, and is made a baronet —
that is very marked, why I know not nor do I care — I
have worked and do work from motives of honour and
right feeling, and because I love work, and if the minis-
ters have not the same right feeling I cannot help it."

It was his fortune that while thus personally maltreated,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

291

nearly every possible natural ill should be accumulated to CHAP. XII.
bar the progress of Scinde under his government, as if to 1846
prove the unyielding energy of spirit which could sus-
tain both burthens and still work through to good. It
has been shown how war, pestilence, locusts, anomalous
overflowing of the Indus, scarcity, predatory invasions,
and the previous tyranny of the ameers, were combined
with the hostility of the Court of Directors and the foul
practices of the factious Bombay authorities to produce
disasters, thus tormenting his administration during the
first three years — and how the fourth year was opened by
the mortification of being called away from that gallant
army, which with such unexampled pains and surprising
rapidity he and his officers had organized for the field, at
the moment when with a natural ambition he looked for
increase of reputation.

There was still a crowning ill in store. In June the
cholera came to Kurrachee with more than its usual
terrors and havoc. It had appeared amongst the natives
in May, not severely, but gradually acquiring intensity
until the night of the 14th of June, when it struck all
people, soldiers, Europeans and sepoys, with such a sudden
fearful mortality, that to feel it was to drop, and to drop
was death. Fear seized every breast, the cooks, butchers
and bakers died or fled with the panic-stricken mass of the
population to the open country, where without food, water,
help, or cover from the sun, then in its raging season,
nearly all perished and the land was covered with carcases.

The soldiers rushing, some to the hospitals others from
them, were very much excited, and in one place some
commissariat carts laden with spirits, which were imagined
to be an antidote, were on the point of being seized when
the town and cantonments would have been overwhelmed
with madness as well as death. Soon the general appeared
with his staff, issuing the necessary directions for re-esta-
blishing order and system, and recalling men to their senses
and duties ; for seeing that some panic prevailed in a
quarter where the utmost devotion was necessary, and
some drunkenness amongst the hospital attendants, he

u 2

292

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

chap. XII. infused new vigour by aiding the sufferers himself, helping
*° carrv ^ne dying to the wards, rubbing their convulsed
limbs, and encouraging all to bear up as they would on a
battle-field.

This terrible visitation continued to scourge the place
from the 14th to the 18th unceasingly, and if it had not
then abated the whole station would have been destroyed ;
for in its mitigated form, the deaths on the 30th of June
were one hundred and twenty of the people besides
soldiers ! Every twenty-four hours the general and his
staff, twice visited every ward and every man in the
hospitals, besides taking measures for reassuring the popu-
lation— a fearful duty, because of the horrible agonies of
the sufferers. The labour was also great. The different
hospitals were far asunder, the nearest more than a mile
from his house, and in that dreadful heat and on that
dreadful duty, they must have passed over twenty to
twenty-five miles each day besides the exertions of person-
ally aiding the patients. The dying men with look and
voice expressed satisfaction at having their general near
them in their pains, and he, seeing that moral influences
would be at least as efficacious as medicines, though he
was debilitated by previous sickness, nerved body and soul
for the task without any shrinking of either, even when
the plague smote his own home — heavily smote it.

The child of his nephew, John Napier, first died and
was buried, its mother being then on the eve of giving
birth to another ; and the next evening the young father,
whose affliction had not lessened his efforts to help others,
was laid in the same grave ! His years were few, and he
had no opportunity of gaining that distinction in arms
which with a chafed spirit he constantly sought, for he was
a lion's cub ! He found instead a death of agony, and
obscure for such an ardent soldier; yet it was on the
straight path of honourable duty, which he followed with-
out faltering when danger was more rife and intrepidity
more needful than on the field of battle.

It was computed that seven thousand persons, more
than a third of the population of the town and canton-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

293

ments, died in the few days the horrible pestilence lasted ; CHAP. XII.
and the deaths in the country around being added not
less than sixty thousand persons perished. The Angel of
Death had passed over the land with sounding pinions and
all were dismayed.

" This mysterious disease," said Sir C. Napier, writing
at the time, "principally attacks the finest and the
strongest men. I separated the regiments as quickly as my
deficiency of carriage enabled me, but nothing would stop
the vehement progress of the sickness for the first three
days. Afterwards, that is to say from the night of the
17th, its virulence seemed mitigated, and on the 18th it
became infinitely milder. This day, the 19th not more
than fifteen soldiers have died, and the medical men
expect that to-morrow it will pass away. It is a strange
and mysterious sickness and defies reflection to account
for it. In some it appeared with violent convulsions,
dreadful to behold ; in others all was calmness, they came
into hospital placid and silent. Not one of these quiet
ones lived many hours, but the cries of the others were
prolonged and very painful to hear.

" I believe many medical men hold that water is bad in
cholera ; this seems a great error ; some of the most violent
cases appeared to give way to repeated draughts of cold
water. At first it was thrown up, but after two or three
rejections remained on the stomach, and the patient reco-
vered. All were continually calling for water, and
especially for soda-water, which happily was manufactured
at Kurrachee, and thousands and thousands of bottles
have been drunk. I greatly encouraged the surgeons to
give water, because, seeing death was inevitable, I thought
it cruel to add the pains of intense thirst ; and I happened
by a strange accident to have seen in the newspaper, the
morning of the day cholera broke out, an advertisement
by a medical man, asserting the' beneficial effects of cold
water in cholera ; his description tallied exactly with what
I observed in the hospitals, and I am persuaded it is
correct to give water. I endure great anxiety from this
sickness, and from fear of the station being destroyed by

294

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. XII. famine, and the sun is hot beyond anything we have yet
1846 experienced in Scinde ; however, generally speaking, until
this blow fell we had been remarkably healthy

Notwithstanding the great diminution of the population
by death and by flight, food became very scarce, because
distant people, dreading infection, would not come in with
supplies, and every horror menaced the station. Shocking
also was the reflection that the disease had been exacer-
bated— and would have been more so but for the accidental
presence of the soda-water manufactory — because sanction
for bringing the Mullyeer river to Kurrachee had been
neglected. The Kurrachee water, holding many delete-
rious substances in solution, predisposed the viscera to
accept the disease, and aggravated its development. Sir
C. Napier, as already shown, had been for two years pre-
pared to supply good water, but never could he get even
an answer to his solicitations on the subject — " and for the
king's offence the people died ! "

This official procrastination clogged or retarded almost
every measure of importance. The formation of the
baggage corps had been delayed for two years, and the
names of the officers of the irregular corps which had been
formed were long withheld from the Gazette, so they
could only draw their pay on account, to their discontent
and public inconvenience. Above seventy thousand pounds
also had been disbursed under the supreme government's
orders for various objects, yet the regular official sanctions
were retarded, and thus the public accounts were thrown
into confusion, the accountants into difliculties.

It was so likewise with respect to Ah* Moorad's treaty,
which he was impatient to have concluded ; and it was
very essential that it should be arranged, because the
rumour of restoring the ameers, sounding like his death-
knell, urged him to look for alliances and support inde-
pendent of the British. ' Yet no effort could extract any
decision or any intimation on the subject, the treaty was
neither confirmed nor abrogated, a profound silence was
maintained on the subject.

Sir C. Napier attributed this state of things to a

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

295

malicious feeling in official persons, civil and military, who CHAP. XII.

having thwarted Lord Ellenborough for reasons before 1846

mentioned, now transferred their hostility to him as one

of that nobleman's successful generals. Sir Henry Har-

dinge, new to Indian affairs, and having a great war and

negotiation on his hands, naturally referred such matters

to the subordinate authorities, secretaries and boards, with

whom to embarrass the governor of Scinde was a maxim

of state. " Oh let Scinde wait " was the official password,

and hence all measures of a beneficial tendency depending

on such persons, were held in abeyance or entirely abated,

and the action of the Scinde administrative policy had no

adequate scope.

" It is thus," he observed, " that I am lamed in my course,
for if I make fight, both I and Sir Henry Hardinge will be
overwhelmed with an enormous correspondence from every
department to prove that they are quite right; and after
two or three years of this work it will be settled that I am
a very zealous but entirely wrong-judging person, and ill
informed of what is required in government. The game
is not worth the candle, when that candle is my life, which
must sink under such additional vexatious work. Where-
fore, when justice to individuals or to bodies is involved I
am stiff, but where the evil only affects the government I
let things go their own gait ; the public suffers indeed, but
I cannot help that when every remedial effort only makes
matters worse. I will not sacrifice the primary considera-
tion of forwarding the civilization and prosperity of Scinde,
to waste my time and my bodily strength in useless con-
tests with factious official people ; I am content, if they so
please, to do nothing, but I will not do mischief ! "

Though cribbed and constrained by such arts, all that
depended on his own authority made rapid progress, for it
was well said of him at the time of the cholera, " That Rem*rlg °n {
neither age, nor exhausting toil, nor gathering dangers, Outram's work,
nor broken health, nor the greatness of the public calamity, ^a^bggq
nor the stings of private sorrow could make his heart published by
falter, or shake his spirit in the performance of his duty." Rldsway-
The advancement of agriculture, of commerce, of popu-

296

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. Xll. lation and of revenue was astonishing. The most expe-
1846< rieneed men had judged it hopeless for many years to
make the country pay even its own civil expenses, and in
1843-4 the revenue had been only nine lacs; yet such was
the power of his formula of government,, that in 1844-5
it was twenty-seven lacs — in 1845-6 the financial year
ending in April, it was forty lacs, of which thirty-one, or
three hundred and ten thousand pounds sterling were
surplus paid into the general treasury, after defraying the
whole cost of civil administration including more than two
thousand policemen horse and foot, all excellent soldiers !
Yet the ameers' taxes had been reduced one-half, and no
new ones imposed, while the cost of the civil government
by vigilance and economy was kept stationary.

This steady augmentation of surplus revenue was sure
to increase under the powerful administrative machinery
developed, which was attaining every day more regularity
and precision and was attended by an increasing commerce
and agriculture. Each half-year also cancelled some
current expenses, which had been required for the first
establishment of government, but which were not to be
permanent, such as the construction of barracks and for-
tifications. A thorough clearing out of the canals was
another enforced outlay of a temporary nature, because
that duty had hitherto of necessity been trusted to the
kardars to whom it belonged under the ameers ; and who
had taken advantage of the times to redouble their usual
frauds ; but now the organization of a canal department
under Major Scott being completed, a general survey
made, and the water-levels all over Scinde ascertained with
great cost and labour, a scientific system was laid down,
and the whole of the canal and water system was taken
out of the kardars* hands.

On the new system a far greater extent of country would
have been irrigated, and at a diminished cost, augmenting
the revenue both ways; but the principal improvement
would have been the establishing of sluice-gates, so com-
bined that the waters of the Indus were entirely con-
trolled, whether in flood or in recession, whereas previously

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

297

they had rioted capriciously both for production and CHAP. XII.
destruction. Thus in June and July the country was 1846
always an expanse of water in which grain shot up mar-
vellously ; but often the water would recede anomalously,
leaving the plants to the raging sun, which they could,
from the moisture left, sustain for a time, and if a second
inundation came quickly the harvest was sure to be rich
and heavy ; but if the refreshing flood did not return, as
often happened, or was not high enough to fill the canals,
the crops perished, and in conjunction with the lower
levels which were always swampy, produced promiscuous
crops of grain, weeds and fever ! These evil changes and
results would have been corrected by the sluice-gates,
and yet at first, the ignorant people thought this control-
ling of the waters was designed to withhold it and starve
them ! The Bombay faction greedily recorded those
foolish apprehensions as proofs of general disaffection; but
soon the cloud passed away, and the conquered would
have rejoiced in this new benefit from the conquest.

The conqueror did rejoice at having established a
system which in a few years would have been thoroughly
understood, and which by controlling the action of sun
and moisture on an alluvial soil, was sure to render
Scinde one vast farm for cotton, indigo, sugar, wheat
and all minor grains. He had now also the satisfaction
to find that the merchant cafilas, which had previously
gone from Khelat by Beila to the Gedrosian port of Plan 1.
Soonomeeanee, the rival of Kurrachee, had, from the
secimty of Scinde under his government, changed their
route, descending by Sehwan to Kurrachee ; which thus
by the mere force of justice, with an inferior harbour,
had usurped the whole trade. Soonomeeanee was then
deprived of its mercantile value, and Sir C. Napier dropped
the negotiations for its purchase. He had however already
raised the revenue of Bombay very largely by stopping
the smuggling of opium from Scinde; and had good
reason to say the conquest was a most profitable one ^hbam<^
for the Company and for England. For the Company so J^^j^jf"
enormously profitable, that in the suppression of opium App.xvi.

298

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XII. smuggling only, it must be reckoned by millions, and
would be almost incredible if the proofs were not so clear
and irrefragable. The facts are indeed still perverted in
parliament, or withheld from the public, but from this
source alone the Company have by the conquest of Scinde
derived millions of pounds sterling !

Notwithstanding all these facts, false statements of the
expense, and equally false returns of the number of troops
employed, were palmed on the parliament with the object
of discrediting Sir C. Napier's labours — but while loud
cries were raised against the number of troops quartered
in Scinde there was really a strong aversion on the part
of the Bombay faction and its unworthy abettors in
England to have them reduced, because that would have
publicly demolished all their libels as to the feelings of
the people towards their conqueror. Those feelings were
not as was said, hatred and discontent ; they were of
reverence of attachment and of admiration, which grew
stronger and were more unequivocally shown as the re-
sult of his protecting and encouraging legislation became
more developed ; and those results, however great, would
have been much greater but for the two interrupting wars
which had occurred — that against the hillmen in the
beginning of 1845 and that of the Punjaub in the begin-
ning of 1846 — which engrossed all the mental and bodily
energies of the general and his officers, day and night,
leaving no margin for thought or intervention as to civil
improvements. Many months' action of the energy which
had marked every day by some measure of peaceful utility,
were thus forcibly abstracted from the three years which
the civil administration of Scinde had now lasted; and
it has been before shown how vexed and tormented those
years were by natural visitations, by the foulness of
factions, and the negligence and enmity of power.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

299

CHAPTER XIII.

Wearied of exile, or believing the Talpoor dynasties CHAP. xill.
would be finally restored, the Lion sent vakeels in the j^T
summer of 1846 to treat for his return to Scinde, but
being referred to the governor- general, broke off the ne-
gotiation and remained in the Punjaub. This notion of
restoring the ameers had been, as already shown, industri-
ously promulgated by the Bombay faction. In England
also Lord Ashley had moved parliament in their behalf ;
and without any accurate knowledge of affairs to warrant
interference, he so stirred himself, as to merit being classed
with the persons described by Napoleon as " Brave blun-
derers who with all possible good intentions, do all possible
mischief." The ameers therefore, thinking him a sure
support, had through their Bombay confederates an-
nounced, that a paper given by Lord Ashley to their
vakeels in London, contained an assurance to themselves,
that they were to live as private gentlemen close to the
frontiers of Scinde. That paper indeed said, they would
not be allowed to do so, but it suited the faction to leave
out the negative, and hence the story ran, that they were
to be conveniently planted for raising commotions in their
lost dominions.

This prospect produced consternation all over Scinde,
and the sirdars of the Talpoor family were most alarmed.
The ameers, they said, could not live quietly, they must
conspire. Belooch honour would compel the Talpooree
nobles to join them, and thus ruin would fall on all, for
their power would be naught against Sir C. Napier, and
their treason would give him the right to destroy them.

300

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XIII. They earnestly deprecated the return of the ameers and
wished for no change. The Scindee population was less
concerned. Believing equally in the power of the British
general,, and feeling only hatred for their former tyrants,
they were able and willing to defend their newly-acquired
independence; but the Hindoos were so frighted that
some of the richest merchants instantly transferred their
money to other countries, and prepared to follow it with
their families. Thus commerce was seriously checked,
and doubt and dread pervaded the whole community, as
the concocters of the falsehood designed: nor was the
distrust entirely removed by a proclamation which was
immediately issued by the general to contradict the report.

Over these shameless artifices Sir C. Napier grieved, as
they were injurious to the public and hurtful to private
persons ; but as they affected himself he treated them with
contempt. " I wish," he said, ' ' plenary success to them.
I wish they may restore the ameers, and withdraw all our
troops — in one year anarchy would be at its height. The
poor indeed, of all countries bear much before they resist ;
but the poor of Scinde have now justice, work and high
wages ; and the rich have all they had before and more, for
now they can keep their riches. The merchants have
security, all classes have the benefit of a vast reduction of
taxation, and twenty thousand soldiers with their followers
spend money. Let the ameers be restored and the poor
will get plenty of work, but no wages, justice will dis-
appear, the rich will be plundered to form a new treasury,
and will hold their jagheers at the caprice of despots,
instead of fixed law ; the merchants will again be
squeezed, the old pernicious taxation will be renewed, and
the cutting of throats will be resumed as a virtue."

Whether there was any intention of restoring the ameers,
is not publicly known, but a change of government at
home happened at this time, and Lord Bipon, on quitting
the Board of Control, wrote to assure Sir C. Napier that
he approved of all he had done, acknowledged the difficul-
ties overcome, and thanked him for his exertions in the
public service ! This unendurable provocation from the

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

301

man who had encouraged and supported his enemies, and CHAP. X
condemned what he now acknowledged to be meritorious, 1846<
proved the abject submission with which that man had
obeyed the Court of Directors. He was thus answered.

" I have the honour to thank you for your letter of the
7th of July, which however places me in a position dis-
tressing to any man of proper feelings. I mean that of
obligation for expressions of private kindness, while as
president of the Board of Control you have refused me
justice. Your lordship refers to the difficulties which I
have had to encounter in Scinde. The greatest, and the
only painful one, has arisen from your lordship's conduct
relative to Major Outram. While I have strictly obeyed,
though with mental uneasiness, the orders to be silent,
issued by the governor- general to myself and to Major
Outram, that officer has been not only allowed, but by
your lordship's silence, encouraged to assail me in the
public prints and in a book ! I now find also, from Lord
Hardinge, that your lordship had long ago resolved that I
should not receive support from government.

" My lord, you must excuse me for saying, that if my
conduct in Scinde deserved the approbation which it
received from her Majesty, from Parliament, from the
Court of Directors, and from yourself, it also deserved a
better return than the injustice I have received from your
lordship."

Having given this merited rebuke to Lord Kipon Sir C.
Napier, hearing that Scinde was to be placed under civil
authorities from Bombay, and knowing how much error
was afloat in England as to his government, thought it
proper to instruct Lord Bipon's successor, Sir John Hob-
house, as to the true state of affairs and the probable
results of such an arrangement. In that view, he sent him
the following memoir which, though composed in a few
hours amidst pressing public business, displays the true
aspect of the government and evinces the writer's power of
generalization.

State of the People. — The people of Scinde are wild,
uneducated, warlike, and a noble nation, if the word

302

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

chap. xill. nation can be applied to men who have no national
1846. feelings, no union whatever. They are divided into tribes,
some stationary, some nomadic. All are addicted to rob-
bery and murder if we can call their acts by those names ;
but that would not be strictly just, because no law existed
under the ameers against such crimes, in which those
princes largely participated. A few general rules did
exist, but they were so open to every species of corrupt
influence that it is an abuse of terms to call them laws.
They only applied, if applied at all, to the first of the three
races inhabiting Scinde, namely Beloochees, Scindees, and
Hindoos. The Beloochees are Mahomedans and, until the
conquest, were the masters; — the other two were their
slaves. The Scindees were serfs, over whom every petty
Belooch chief held the power of life and death, and used
that power freely. In reality there was no law, and each
tribe protected itself in the following curious way.

Tribe A being in want robbed tribe B, which remained
passive for a longer or shorter period according to circum-
stances. When the proper time came, B, having perhaps
a quarrel with tribe C, proposes pardon to A if it will help
B to rob C ; which aid and a small compensation for the
original robbery made up the quarrel between A and B.
This rotatory system of plunder was general, and thus
pressing necessity was relieved by what may be called
forced loans ; and between these attacks on each other, the
plunder of travellers, and the levying of " black mail " on
caravans, intervened. The black mail and a limited but
existing commerce, enabled the tribes to live in a country
where neither lodging, nor clothing nor firing are needed ;
and where the greatest chief lives under a mat stretched
on poles cut from the jungle. It is true that the richer
Hindoos had houses in towns ; but built of mud, and
purposely made wretched in appearance, or the ameers
would have squeezed from their owners large sums of
money. This system to us is robbery ; for them a conven-
tional arrangement, understood, and producing no very
bitter feelings amongst the tribes. At the same time it
prevented in a great measure (except amongst chiefs)

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

303

intermarriages; for evident reasons each tribe kept itself CHAP. XIII.
pure and distinct. 1846>

With regard to murder, it is still a sort of rude natural
law, understood and rigidly maintained. If a man of tribe
A seduces a woman of tribe B, her friends kill both,
a blood-feud arises, and the two tribes become deadly
enemies unless they have joined to slay both culprits.
But if a man of A seduces a woman of B, and her relations
kill her, while the man escapes, there will be a blood-feud,
because a man of A has caused the death of a woman of B,
and the first man of A that can be caught is slain ; but
then the feud would cease.

I have said the first man of A caught, is slain, but the
man so sacrificed is unconnected with the criminal, and
his family make no remonstrances ; they admit the justice
of the act yet secretly vow a private feud against the man
of B who actually slew their relation, and they will watch
for years and finally slay him or some of his family in
revenge — thus the public balance of murder is again uneven
and both tribes take arms. These private feuds are not
blamed, it would be dishonouring to neglect them. I have
traced this running account of blood through several
generations, on several occasions, and one recently between
the " Bull-foot Noomrees " and the " Choola Noomrees " —
the first our subjects, the last our neighbours. They knew
I would not let them fight, and so made me umpire.
Originally of one family they split about a hundred years
ago, and their feud comes down to this day. They
embraced in my presence with a peculiar ceremony, the
Choola making the first advance to the Bull-foot chief as
the head of all the Noomree tribes. Their expression,
when I recommended reconciliation, was, " That my sword
was stronger than their swords, and what I ordered must
be obeyed." When reconciliation takes place it is not
unusual for the murderer to give a sister or daughter in
marriage to the next of kin of the slain ; and I have known
the daughter of the murdered man given to the murderer.
Educated to expect this, it is not such a hardship on the
girl as it would be with us.

304

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. XIII. From the time a blood-feud begins, an exact account is
kept, and until an equal number are slain on each side no
peace can be — sometimes not even then. So accurately is
this account kept, that wounds which do not prove fatal
are set down. All this we call murder, with them it is
only fatal duelling, and not so bad as our duelling, for we
have law protection if we choose to seek it. But in the
ameers' time, these men had no law, and no other protec-
tion; wherefore robber and murderer does not justly apply
to them.

As to petty thieving it is scarcely known — a little in the
large towns ; and in our cantonments which are infested
with the lowest blackguards from Bombay.

These divisions amongst the tribes prevented their
having any national feeling or any attachment whatever
to their late rulers the ex-ameers. I saw this when I first
arrived, and when the conquest happened I turned it to
account by giving each chief all he possessed before the
battle of Meeanee, and with it a secure title which he had
not before ; for under the ameers no man who was not
very strong was sure of his jagheer. The nobles were
thus attached to an order of things which confers advan-
tages they never before possessed ; and I acquire knowledge
of their feelings as to government from the collectors —
especially Captain Rathborne the collector of Hyderabad,
who lives on intimate terms with the most powerful, and
is an officer of great ability.

System of Government. — I shall now state my mode of
governing such rude tribes. Having secured the confi-
dence of the chiefs as to their possessions, my next object
was gradually to subvert their power over their Scindee
and Hindoo slaves — not called so, but so in fact. The
abolition of slavery by order of the supreme government
gave the first blow to this, as far as their purchased African
slaves were concerned. The second step was to hear all
complaints made by the poor of ill-treatment perpetrated
by Englishmen or Beloochees. This produced a feeling
that justice and protection to all would be found under
the British rule. The third step was to deprive the chiefs

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE. 305

of the power of inflicting death, torture, or any other CHAP. XIII.
punishment; and force them to refer to our magistrates
for justice against offenders. This in some measure
lowered the chiefs in the estimation of their retainers;
hut it raised the latter in their own estimation. The
fourth step was to abolish the abominable old Indian
system of regulating labour by a tariff. I threw open the
market for labour, and wages rose, to 3^. and 4d. a day,
having been before forced, unpaid labour, or nearly so.
This met with opposition from Englishmen, and, strange
to say, I have hardly been able entirely to enforce the rule
yet ! I have heard that a tariff on labour prevails very
much in India at this moment. I do not know this from
personal experience, and can hardly believe in the existence
of such foul injustice and tyranny towards the labouring
class. However by this measure I have so improved the
condition and feelings of the poor, that I doubt, if govern-
ment were so unwise as to restore the ameers, that the
latter could hold their position for six months : all would
be confusion and bloodshed.

I deprived all persons of the right of bearing arms in
public except the chiefs ; for them it would have been an
indignity; and I doubt if they would have borne it so
patiently as they have other rules more fatal to their
supremacy as feudal chiefs. Had I suppressed their arms
discontent would have united them in a common cause
and healed their feuds, whereas by leaving them their
swords and shields I added to their consequence and
flattered their vanity. Their followers would care little
for the deprivation unless worked up to anger by their
chiefs ; but if so worked, they would have been fierce and
ready to use their arms instead of relinquishing them.
All was received with good feeling. Meanwhile the Scin-
dees and Hindoos, who were never allowed to wear arms,
acquired importance, and were pleased to find themselves
on a level with their former tyrants — the latter being
pulled down while they were raised — and were no longer
awed by the Belooch scimitar which had before been
drawn and fatally applied upon the slightest provocation.

306

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. XIII. It is now man to man, and the Scindee is as good as the
j^T Beloochee, allowing for the habitual fear of the slave.

Emancipation cannot at once remove that, and I see it
still to prevail, especially when the reports are spread by
some of the infamous Indian newspapers that the ameers
are to be restored.

A letter arrived last Christmas from the ameers, stating,
that Lord Ashley had written to say, they were to live on
the frontier as private gentlemen ! I am unable to say
what truth there was in this, but the Hindoo merchants
believed it, and in consequence sent their money to
Muscat and Bombay and prepared to abandon Scinde.
The first notice we had of it was from a great chief, the
nephew of the ameers, who stood by them to the last
against us. He possesses a principality which I restored
to him to honour his faith towards his family; for he
fought at Meeanee at Hyderabad and in the desert ; but
when Shere Mohamed (the Lion) fled from Scinde this
man laid his sword at my feet. He is very clever and has
heartily entered into the English habits, improving his
land, and adopting civilization. He said "I am ruined,
and so are numbers of others if this news be true ; for we
must join the ameers in a conspiracy to overthrow the
English government, and shall be overthrown. For God's
sake tell your government to let us alone, we are happy and
getting rich ; but all of Talpoor blood must join our chiefs
if you let them come near us, and as to their living quiet
as private gentlemen that is nonsense."

And if the ameers do come assuredly blood will be
spilled ; not by the people, but the great chiefs who will be
influenced by family honour, and as this chief said, ruined.
His words were emphatic. ' ' The first time I was received
by the general as a brave and faithful soldier, and I have
received from him all and more than all I had before ; but
if I fight him again I shall be a traitor and can have no
claim on his mercy." Speaking thus to Captain Rath-
borne, this prince became very animated, and taking a jug
of water that stood near filled a glass, saying, u You Eng-
lish are a very odd people, you have conquered Scinde,

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

307

you have done us good, all is full like this glass, but CHAP. XIII.
instead of drinking you throw all away thus" — and he 1846<
poured the water on the floor, alluding to the return of
the ameers.

The prohibition to appear armed has tended more than
most things to keep the people orderly and prevent mur-
ders and feuds arising from the sudden wrath peculiar to
men of hot climates.

Collection of Revenue. — I divided Scinde into three great
collectorates, placing at the head of each a collector with
deputies under him, English officers. They are all magis-
trates, but with restricted powers as to punishment. To
them I gave the whole establishment employed by the
ameers for collecting money and inflicting vengeance ; as
to punishing moral crimes those princes never interfered ;
the only crime in their eyes was disobedience of their
orders, and those orders had but two objects — amassing
money and administering to their debaucheries. The last
was only painful to certain individuals. The first opened
a door to great and general calamities— injustice, torture,
and ruin to the country at large. Their machines for extor-
tion were the kardars, the head men in each village who
collected the taxes ; the umbardars who took charge of the
grain when collected for the ameers. Both kardars and
umbardars had their familiars to execute their orders;
and what those orders were depended generally on what
the kardar himself was, but not always, as the following
facts show. If grain was high the ameers ordered the
kardars to sell it at a certain price beyond the highest in
the market, and to send the amount received at once to
the treasury. The kardar assembled the richest people of
his district, compelling each to take a portion of the grain
and pay instantly the ameers' price, perhaps more for their
own profit. If any refused he was hanged by the thumbs
to a beam and a hot ramrod was placed between his thighs.
The money being thus collected — God help the kardar if
it was not — each zemindar, or farmer, took his forced
purchase away and divided it in like manner, and with
like persuasion, amongst his ryots or labourers, who, being

x 2

308

sir chaules napier's

CHAP. XIII. poorer, had a larger allowance of hot ramrods and other
1846> tortures. The kardar in such cases could not help himself
if he would; but it generally gave him opportunity to
extort money for his own profit.

All these kardars and umbardars I made over to the
new magistrates to work with, and thus enlisted a large
body of influential men in favour of the conquest. They
of course robbed us at first as the English officers were
ignorant of what ought to be paid ; but now the collectors
know their work well, and from their systematic military
habits and experience of men they quickly got the whole
machinery into high order, working hard, and the revenue
rapidly improved and will yet improve. The collectors and
their deputies keep diaries, which are sent to me weekly
and I thus learn what goes on in each district. They are
read to me by the secretary to the government, Captain
Brown, an officer from whom I have received such able
assistance that I ought in justice to call him my colleague
rather than secretary.

Police. — To secure the peace of the country and avoid
disseminating the troops, which would render them too
familiar with the people and possibly diminish the whole-
some fear of our power, I established a police of two thou-
sand four hundred men, well armed, drilled, and divided
into three classes — one for the towns, two for the country.
The first all infantry, the two last infantry and cavalry,
called the rural police. They assist the collectors, but
form a distinct body under their own officers. The police
never agree with the kardars, and while the police inform
us of the cheating of the kardars, umbardars and zemin-
dars, these people complain of the usual faults of police-
men— namely overbearing insolence. In this manner they
keep each other in check, and both take the part of the
poor, not out of humanity but spite : the motive signifies
little, the government profits by the results, for the poor
now look on both as protectors. Thus if a policeman ill-
treats a ryot the latter applies to the kardar for protection ;
and if a kardar robs the ryot, the latter goes to the police-
man. All this gives much trouble at times to the collec-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

309

tors and myself, for some sub-collectors have been weak CHAP. xm.

enough to enter into the disputes of their followers ; but J^T

that is ephemeral, and we have a sufficient number of men

of sense and temper. The whole works well and the police

not only seize thieves but are good troops : they had on

their first establishment sundry battles with robber bands

whom they generally defeated, and now no such bands exist.

Control of the Administration of Justice. — An officer has
been made judge-advocate-general, who from experience
and study has acquired much knowledge of his work and
of military law ; he was sent by Lord Ellenborough, and
his calm dispassionate good sense and amiable disposition
and his great industry and uprightness singularly qualify
Captain Keith Young for the post he so worthily fills.
To this officer I have given two deputies who officiate at
Hyderabad and Shikarpoore. To this judge-advocate-
general all the magistrates send reports of trials which
they are competent to enter upon. Crimes of a deeper
hue, such as murder, robbery with violence, are first
examined into on the spot by the magistrates, and the
preliminary depositions on oath are sent to the judge-
advocate; he submits them to the governor, who orders
thereon, if he thinks fit, a trial by a military commission
consisting of a field officer and two captains ; or in case of
a paucity of officers a subaltern of not less than seven
years' service : a deputy judge-advocate conducts the pro-
ceedings, but has no voice in the finding or sentence.
The minutes are sent by the president to the judge-advo-
cate-general, who makes a short report upon the sen-
tence and submits the whole to the governor. If the
court, the judge-advocate-general and the governor all
concur, the latter confirms the sentence and orders execu-
tion : if the court and judge-advocate-general differ the
governor's opinion decides. By this mode justice is ren-
dered as quickly as I can insure it, though not so quick
as I could wish, and the prisoner has in fact the advantage
of three courts.

I read all the trials on which I have to decide, with the
greatest attention, frequently twice or thrice over, especially

310

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XIII. when the punishment is capital — never ordering an execu-
1846> tion until I have given at least two and often several days
to the full consideration of the sentence. In smaller
matters the deputy- collectors at once try the cases and
submit the proceedings to the collector, who either confirms
the award or objects, but in either case forwards the pro-
ceedings to the judge-advocate-general, who has a casting
voice in some cases; in others appeals to the governor.
In addition to the above, there are for civil cases, what are
termed Punchayets. I have made a slight change in these ;
they were formerly assembled without remuneration and
I give them a small daily pay to cover their loss of time.
They are something like our juries, or rather courts of
arbitration, and hitherto their functions have been re-
stricted by me to civil cases ; for I keep all criminal cases
in the hands of Europeans ; but I wish much to increase
the powers of these tribunals, which I found under another
name existing in Greece. They exist I believe in all
eastern countries and the English jury is but one form of
them. In Greece they call it the court of Veechiarde, or
Ancients, in India Punchayet, and their powers vary at
different periods and in different countries according to
circumstances. In India and in Scinde they are limited ;
in the Punjaub lately the Punchayet assumed supreme
power ! I am sure this subject demands much considera-
tion, as a cautious mode of gradually introducing the people
to take part in the government of their own country : but
it is possible the directors do not think that so advisable
and wise as it appears to me.

Such is the simple process by which justice is admi-
nistered in Scinde, and the frequent disagreement in
opinion between magistrates, military commissions, judge-
advocate-general and governor, proves in my opinion the
independence of the judges, and that the system works
well and is merciful rather than harsh ; especially as the
judge-advocate-general and myself endeavour, as far as we
can with justice, to modify the sentences so as to go with
the feelings of the people and avoid giving disgust. But
this is a large field, so I will conclude by saying that I

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

311

have long applied for leave to transport culprits to Aden, CHAP. XIII.
but have not yet had any reply. If this were permitted [g^T
much of the capital punishments would be avoided, and
the government would gain cheap labour for the fortifica-
tions there ; the culprits would come back at the end of
their sentence and the great evil, so justly reprobated by
the archbishop of Dublin, of forming a condemned popu-
lation would be avoided.

Revenue. — The revenue of the ameers averaged from
thirty-five to forty lacs. The revenue under my govern-
ment has gradually increased from nine to thirty-one lacs;
but there seems no reason to doubt that it will reach thirty •-
five lacs next April, ending the financial year of 1846-7.
The general opinion of the collectors is that it will in in the ameers'
1848 amount to forty lacs and gradually increase, because jj^^j; Ali
commerce is increasing, and cultivation has this last year sessions and S
been greatly extended. However this letter is to state facts {^fi
not conjectures. I am given to understand that the con- cote and
quest of Scinde has added very much to the Bombay revenue n^w transferred
by preventing smuggling through the Portuguese colony t0 Bhawulpore
at Demaun. I have also to call to your notice, that in
the ameers' revenue one of the most productive of their
taxes was the transit-duty or rahdari. This has been
abolished by us, and yet there is every probability that
our revenue will exceed theirs. I have also abolished
many other taxes — hence the amount of all these abolished
taxes should be added to my revenue, and it will appear
that less taxation has raised greater revenue.

Commerce. — Our imports of European goods have in-
creased since 1843, from four and a half to nine lacs in
1845 ; and to ten lacs in the first six months of 1846 !
The merchants of Kurrachee cry out for steamers to convey
their goods up to the sources of the Indus and the Sutlej !
I have received memorials from them to this effect, and
have begged of the governor- general to make over four of
the war-steamers on the Indus to the Scinde government
for mercantile purposes. Thus the steamers will repay
their keep, be equally available for war, and give facility
for general commerce by their rapid and safe transmission

SIR CHARLES NAPIER*S

CHAP. XIIT. of goods. For now the calculation is, that of every seven
^6. vessels coming down the Indus at certain periods of the
year, six are lost altogether or their goods destroyed,
owing to the badness of the country boats and the igno-
rance of the boatmen. This amounts to a prohibition of
commerce. No steamer has ever been lost on the Indus,
and if four are given up to the Scinde government they
will be continually and fully laden, and I understand from
merchants here that trading companies to the interior
would be instantly formed.

Merchants are not altogether to be trusted in this
country on such points, as the desire of lucre deceives
them. But the demand for steamers has without doubt
arisen, and I think it ought to be complied with, and
the more readily as we have just discovered an inland
passage for steamers from Kurrachee to the mouths of
the Indus. I have had it surveyed, and a steamer has
passed through. It runs parallel to and very near the
shore, which shelters it from the furious monsoon sea,
one impassable for five months in the year. The only
doubt is whether this passage will be affected by the inun-
dations. This will be decided when the waters have subsided,
and a steamer is then to make the passage. The officers
of the flotilla are confident of success, and if so, Kurrachee
becomes the real fixed mouth of the Indus, not varying
like the other mouths with every inundation, so as to be

It did not fail, useless for commerce. If this passage fails us, the
merchants will still equally require steamers to convey
their goods from Tattah to the sources of the Five Waters.

Agriculture. — Cultivation and revenue are on the
increase, because taxation has been lowered ; and during
the short time we have ruled, considerable immigrations
have taken place. I am now endeavouring to ameliorate
still more the condition of the ryots. You must know, Sir,
that the system of farming the revenue has generally pre-
vailed in Scinde, the ameers farmed every branch of their
revenue. I have abolished this detestable practice ; but
still the zemindar, the farmer, exists ; he hires large tracts
of land from government or from jagheerdars, and while

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

313

he cheats his landlord he starves the ryot — as far as men chap. XIII.

can be starved who live in a country fall of game and

wild fruits — who can rear fowls without cost, and who

have abundance of firing for the trouble of collecting fuel :

men who go naked, who require no houses and who make

no difficulty of stealing a sheep when pressed. A man

here first steals a camel, which he rides a hundred miles

to steal a sheep, returns next night with his mutton and

turns the camel loose into the jungle from whence he took

him. No one is the wiser, unless he who loses the sheep

misses his animal in time — that is to say, while the camel's

foot-prints are fresh ; but then he hires a puggee or

tracker who pugs the camel's steps and the thief is caught.

These pug-gees are unerring. They follow a track for eight

or ten days and nights, unless a storm of wind overlays

the foot-prints, human or quadrupeds, with sand; or a

fall of rain washes them away. No ingenuity seems able

to elude a good puggee.

The zemindar oppresses the ryot, driving him to idleness
and robbery. And I am granting small farms to ryots to
take them out of the zemindars' hands, giving them only
so much land as they can cultivate by their own labour
without sub-letting. They pay their rent to the collectors
direct without the intervention of kardar or zemindar.
I hope thus not only to raise the character of the poorer
ryot, but greatly to increase our reputation in surrounding
countries, and so add to the population of Scinde, its
happiness and its revenue. I have also adopted a measure
which I know succeeds in England, viz. making small
loans to the industrious poor when they are distressed by
unforeseen accidents. These loans are made with caution
by the district collectors and sub -collectors : the repay-
ment is by instalments and rigidly enforced, yet under
certain rules which cannot be detailed in a letter.

I consider that taxation may be still more diminished
and yet the revenue be increased. In time I will prove
this, and I expect next April will show more clearly what
my system will finally produce. Last year realized thirty-
one lacs — and I shall be disappointed if this year does not

314

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^S

CHAP. XIII. produce thirty-five lacs. Our crops this year are good,
j[jjJT but in great danger from locusts, which have destroyed
the grain in the adjacent countries. Scinde has not had
time to settle since the conquest. People fancy that trade
and agriculture spring up at once like Aladdin's palace.
But it will, I reckon, require ten years to recover from
the effects of the ameers' tyranny and such a great revo-
lution as Scinde has undergone; and it appears to me no
ordinary matter, that already she is perfectly tranquil and
rapidly improving. At the time of the battle of Hyder-
abad I thought that if we kept Scinde it would take ten
years to put it in the state it is now in. Lieutenant-
Colonel Outram publicly asserted, that I would have a
guerilla war for ten years ! So much for his knowledge
of the people of Scinde !

This is our present financial position : —

Total revenue from 24th March, 1843, the
date of the battle of Hyderabad, to 30th
April, 1846 £659,393

Total expense of civil government for three

years including police force . . . £336,526

Balance in favour of general government,

April 30th, 1846 £322,869

I shall make a full statement on this head in another
paper, because the papers laid before Parliament and
ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 30th of
April 1846, I do not think correct. Meanwhile I have to
say the large force in Scinde has not been for Scinde but
for the Punjaub. I have for two years constantly said,
that 5,000 men are sufficient, and more than sufficient, for
the defence and for the maintenance of tranquillity in
Scinde. This has been contradicted by an ignorant and fac-
tious party at Bombay ; but I can prove this force is more
than sufficient. Have I not quitted Scinde with nearly
my whole force, even when the Seikhs were up and might
have been looked to for help against us — as they always
were by the ameers ? And has there ever been the least
doubt of the tranquillity of Scinde ? Never ! And there

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

315

never will be while I am here,, because that tranquillity CHAP. XIII.
has been based, not on the force of arms after the battles, 184G#
but the justice and kindness of government towards all
ranks. Not an Englishman has been murdered since the
ameers quitted the country — not an Englishman has been
even insulted ! These are facts of no small weight, and
not usual in these eastern countries, nor in any country
recently conquered.

The extraordinary military expenses are of two kinds ;
the one relating to supplies, the other to the building of
barracks. The first will diminish as the force diminishes,
and three-fourths of it must be charged to the Punjaub
account ; the other fourth to the occupation of Scinde —
not one penny to the conquest of Scinde, except the
expense of barracks at Hyderabad, which has been already
much more than covered by the surplus revenue stated
above. The conquest of Scinde has not cost a single
shilling to the East-India Company, on the contrary it has
saved money ; for I defy any politician, or soldier to say
that, had the ameers still ruled in Scinde we could have
occupied Kurrachee and Sukkur with a smaller force than
was kept here during the events of the last two years at
Gwalior and on the Sutlej. I will say more — and I can
prove it — that had the ameers remained, bloody scenes
would have been enacted here when Gwalior was in arms,
and when the Seikhs crossed the Sutlej.

Had the governor-general been so rash as to reduce the
garrison of Scinde to 5,000 men in 1842-3, the ameers
remaining in power and our small force divided between
Kurrachee and Sukkur, he would have lost the army.
The delusion of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, who could not
perceive the hostility of the ameers till he was attacked in
the residency, would, had he been left in the position I
succeeded to, have lost the whole army in 1844 or in
1845 ; for all would have been apparently tranquil in the
first year until Gwalior was ready; and in the second
till the Seikh army crossed the Sutlej, which would have
been accompanied by a simultaneous and equally unex-
pected attack by the ameers on Kurrachee and Sukkur.

316

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. XIII. No succour could have been sent to our weak divided and
every way unprovided force. Lord Keane's army was
scarcely able to bold the ameers in cbeck even before the
disasters in Affgbanistan. The result would have been a
cost of blood and treasure, far exceeding what the conquest
required : I therefore assume that conquest must be ac-
counted, except in the opinion of an obstinate faction, a
great saving of blood and treasure, without reference to
the honour of our arms, which has certainly not been
stained in Scinde since the end of 1842.

Mine may be called an impartial opinion as regards
the policy of the conquest; for I cannot recollect ever
having presumed to offer a single suggestion to Lord
Ellenborough on the subject ; so far from it, I did, until I
was appointed governor, expect that the ameers would be
subsidized. I admired Lord Ellenb or oughts policy, but I
must have equally executed my orders had I disapproved.
/ believe I am a singular instance of a successful general
having been run down by his own government, for having
obeyed the superior authority set over him by that government
— and receiving no support in his command from home when
all he did was approved of by successive governors-general.
Yet this is what Lord Ripon and the Court of Directors
have done by me. However I am prepared to prove that the
conquest of Scinde has been less expensive in blood and
money than an occupation would have been, according to
what is generally understood as being originally intended
after the destruction of our army at Cabool. If to occupy
Scinde with a diminished force was not the original inten-
tion, it is evident that the only result of the conquest is
the addition of its revenue to the public treasury, without
additional outlay. This will be seen when passion,
prejudice, and a very insidious, very virulent, but not
very honourable war, made upon me, by individuals shall
subside — a moment that I wait for with patience because
I feel confident in the result.

Climate. — That the climate of Scinde is very hot is
unquestionable, but that it is more unhealthy than any
other part of India I know to be untrue. Many soldiers

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

317

have died, so they have in every new conquest made by CHAP. XIII.
the Company, and for these simple reasons. Want of 1846>
good barracks — ivant of comfort — want of local experience.
All three were felt by the army in Scinde — a country so
entirely ruined, so miserable and deprived of everything
by tyrannical government, that we are really more like a
colony planted in a desert than an army occupying an
inhabited country. We have lost but few officers, even
including those who died of cholera and other diseases
unconnected with the locality, because they have been
better lodged and have had more comforts. Now we are
gradually getting good barracks erected, and Scinde will
not be unhealthy beyond what all parts of India must ever
be to European constitutions. Twice since the conquest
has an epidemic fallen on the troops, and the European
private soldiers have also suffered, because they drink
ardent spirits, bad ardent spirits, and because their consti-
tution is not congenial to a hot climate. We have also
twice had cholera. All this frightens weak timid people
and they unjustly condemn the climate.

Natural Riches of the Country. — Scinde is capable of
producing an immense revenue ; the soil is rich beyond
description. I am endeavouring to control the waters of
the Indus ; this will I hope ere long be effected, and then
the produce will be very great. The present want is
that of sufficient population to cultivate the great quantity
of waste land. The mines are supposed to be rich, and
the fields of salt inexhaustible.

Surrounding States. — The newspapers talk of our being
constantly embroiled with neighbouring tribes. This
shows great ignorance. Not a single tribe has the least
desire to quarrel with us — on the contrary they are
gradually coming to settle in Scinde ! All who love
peace and desire to cultivate and enjoy the fruits of their
labour wish to settle here, and numbers do so.

Such is the general state of Scinde since I have
governed it, and I do not think I have misstated anything.
I could not enter into details without having more time
than I can command, and to have done so would have

318

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. xiil. made this memoir a book ; still I feel how very slight
1846# and general is the view I have given. But under this
system the revenue has increased and is increasing; the
people are contented and happy, and there have been no
conspiracies or insurrections, though the hill campaign
and Seikh campaign both offered tempting opportunities.
Here also I will give an opinion, I think a correct one —
not formed by an old Indian (which frequently means
a man who has been living twenty years in India eating,
drinking, and in profound ignorance dogmatizing ; as if he
possessed a thorough acquaintance with the people), but
by one who has for five years studied the character of the
Scindian people and successfully governed them for four
years. It is then my opinion that if a civil government is
formed in Scinde, the revenue will be swamped by large
salaries to civil servants, immense establishments and little
work : for as civil servants of experience and real know-
ledge will not quit their good positions in India to come
here, the province will be overrun with young and
ignorant men who have been initiated into all that is
luxurious and idle without experience or perhaps ability to
have acquired the good. They may be very good fellows ;
they smoke, hunt hogs, race, drink beer and issue their
orders in bad Hindostanee, to a subservient set of native
clerks, who consequently soon get the real power into
their hands, and turn it to account by all sorts of
venality and oppression. The result of this will be, or
rather may be, bloodshed and expense. The people
here have no respect for civil servants. Soldiers them-
selves, they look to being governed by soldiers, a feeling
that would make them ready to draw the sword if
affronted by civilians.

In proportion as the civil establishment is increased,
expense will increase, and the military will decrease, and
the control will become weaker ; so that if a civil govern-
ment produced insurrection it would not be well able to
put it down. I am aware of the inconvenience which
arises to the army by the extensive employment of
military men in civil branches of government, and I have

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

319

introduced four or five uncovenanted civil servants into the CHAP. XIII.
Scinde government, with good effect; they, with one "j^T
exception, have conducted themselves with diligence and
modesty. But three covenanted servants, sent by Lord
Ellenborough in the first moment of conquest, were quite
useless. I had no prejudice against them, but the con-
trary ; for one was the relative of an old comrade of mine,
who fell in Spain, and for any one belonging to him I
would have done anything in my power ; but their ideas
were so grand as to establishments, and they were them-
selves reported to me as being so idle, that I could only send
Lord Ellenborough the statement made by the collector
Captain Pope, under whom I had placed them, and with
it their own explanation. He ordered them back to India.
They were, I have no doubt, clever and gentleman-like
young men, but a dozen of them would have paralyzed my
government, and thrown it into the hands of clerks and
natives. I indeed should have no objection to these clerks
who are very clever men generally, and so are natives ;
but then let them have the pay and responsibility and get
rid of the gentlemen with their high salaries, their clerks,
their pigs, and their beer-barrels. Let the men who do
the work have the offices ! If men have any other
pleasure than their business they are good for nothing in
that business.

I will now conclude by saying that though the officers
with me, and myself might have done more and better,
no one will deny that we have had many and great diffi-
culties to struggle with — war, and pestilence in its utmost
virulence, the destruction of a whole harvest by locusts,
and the greatest part of another by a sudden and unpre-
cedented fall of the inundation before the grain was mature
have been amongst the evils afflicting Scinde since 1843.
In the midst of an extensive military command I have had
to construct the entire machinery of a civil government,
assisted by young officers who had at first starting little or
no experience, but whose zeal and abilities have enabled
them to serve me well; and by diligence they have over-
come the great obstacle of total want of local experience,

320

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XIII. which was at first almost insuperable in the collection of
-[g^g revenue. How we have succeeded we must leave the
world to decide. But we have done our best ; and if, as
I see stated in the public papers, it is intended to change
the system of rule here to one more analogous to that of
India, I am ready, if called upon, to give a full account of
my mode of conducting the government since it was
confided to me by Lord Ellenborough in 1843, and to
deliver it over to my successor, who I hope may feel the
same interest in it that I do. But if the home government
approve of what I have done and wish me to remain in
my present position, I am prepared to continue my exer-
tions as long as my health will permit me to do with
justice to the public service.

Since writing the above I have received orders from the
governor-general to send away a large portion of the force
in Scinde. This is to take place next January, and
greatly pleases me, as it will be another proof of the
tranquillity of this country and relieve the province from
the absurd charge made against it of being ruinous to the
finances of India.

It was understood that this able memoir arrested the
transfer of Scinde at the time, but it in no manner abated
the falsehoods promulgated, or softened the hostility of the
Court of Directors. Nor did it procure justice or protec-
tion from the cabinet — Lord Howick's despicable enmity
prevailed there too strongly. Meanwhile Sir C. Napier
in pursuance of his convictions renewed his proposition
for reducing the number of troops, offering to send away
eleven regiments and all the European artillery ! The
governor-general actuated no doubt, by an inward sense
that the Punjaub conquest was unsettled, would only call
off four regiments, and the Scindian governor thus re-
mained under the accusation of retaining troops when he
was anxious to get rid of them ; and the Scindian people
were called disaffected, when the most touching proofs of
their profound attachment were being given, and when
foreigners were eagerly demanding to be allowed to become

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

321

their fellow-subjects ! For in the autumn of this year, an CHAP. XTII.

independent chief formerly driven from Scinde by the lg46

tyranny of the ameers, offered, and his offer was accepted,

to abandon his mountain refuge and settle with eighteen

hundred families for cultivation if lands were assigned to

them. At the same time the collector of customs, having

business to transact at Beila, was on his return surrounded

by a multitude of miserable slaves entreating him to take

them to Scinde, " where all men were free." Their masters

came up, and, being afraid to coerce them lest the " great

English sahib should be angry," besought the collector to

put them back officially. He refused, saying, he hoped

they would break their bonds, but he could not interfere

either way. Then the masters forced them back, two

excepted, who were armed with axes and keeping close to

the collector's horse forced a way across the frontier.

There was still much distrust abroad as to the probable
restoration of the ameers. Ali Moorad, foreseeing ruin
to himself if that should happen, became so uneasy at the
non-confirmation of his treaty, that it was to be feared he
would seek other alliances if fresh troubles arose in the
Punj aub ; and meanwhile the reasons assigned by the govern-
ment for having so many troops in Scinde contrary to the
general's wish was, that fear of him alone kept the people
submissive ! This assumption he proudly and peremptorily
rejected. " They were at first submissive from such fear,
and he had taken advantage of it to establish his adminis-
tration vigorously, but that influence had long passed
away and been replaced by self-love — they were quiet
because they were getting rich and enjoying the fruits of
their industry. Their quietude was not the result of force,
but of justice and its attendant happiness : they were
quiet because they knew their own interests."

But Sir C. Napier had now acquired the certainty that
official men in England were, equally with the Bombay
council, the instigators and protectors of the libellers
who so constantly assailed him, and whose virulence was
hourly augmenting. He had honestly strived to serve,
and had most efficiently served governments which were

322

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XIII, bent on his ruin while they profited from his devotion to
_^jr their interests ; he had been successful in war and peace,
had won battles, subdued kingdoms, tranquillized and
governed nations, legislating happily, administrating justly ;
and he had made English power an object of love and
reverence where before it had been abhorred and at times
despised. He had been repaid with foul enmity, malignant
and scurrilous abuse, and his virtues had been denied. He
had been denounced as a man stained with cruelty and
rapacity, and the slanderers who thus assailed him were
rewarded by those who owed kingdoms, aye and safety to
his genius, his courage, energy and incorruptible character.
He alone of those officers who had been distinguished in
Indian warfare had been neglected in the distribution of
honours. Even the thanks of Parliament had been with-
held for a year — an unexampled slight to a victorious
commander — and they were not finally voted without the
accompaniment of personal insult from a knot of calum-
niators, the chief of whom was now a cabinet minister.
Attempts had been made to stifle his despatches that his
exploits might be lessened to the public ; and sinister
measures were taken, vainly indeed, but taken, to render
him unpopular with his troops. His name had been stu-
diously withheld at public banquets when Indian victories
were toasted, as if he were an outlaw from glory ; though to
nearly unexampled success in the field he had added unusual
sagacity and unusual economy in civil government — the
last perhaps an inexpiable offence, for he was so vigilant
that corruption could not thrive in his neighbourhood.

These things made him reflect seriously on the inutility
of wasting his life to serve men who had marked him for
every injustice and insult ; and with this sense of ill-usage
he resolved to retire into private life. Yet remembering
what he owed to the people he had subdued and under-
taken to civilize, he determined not to resign until he
had completed what was necessary to consolidate his work,
and for that another year of power was required.
His principal objects were,

1°. A reduction of the troops to the number formerly

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

323

fixed by Lord Auckland for the garrisons of Sukkur and CHAP. XIII.
Roree, namely, five thousand ; at that time certainly in- i846.
sufficient against the ameers, but now more than enough
to hold all Scinde ; and even this number was adopted in
deference to the views of the supreme government, and
with reference to the appointment of a civilian, or some
obscure military man, to the government, more than to
the necessity of the case.

2°. The complete development of the ameliorated sys-
tem of taxation, whereby all vexatious town- duties were
abolished, and all export duties collected at fixed posts on
the frontier. This was a matter involving the future
interests of commerce and the immediate comfort of the
towns, and a vigilant superintendence of the early working
of this system was all-important.

3°. To obtain Mittenkote from the supreme government
as an appurtenance of Scinde ; and to have Deyrah in the
Cutchee hills occupied either as an outpost, or as a mili-
tary colony ; an arrangement which would give the Cutchee
hills as a frontier from the Indus to Dadur near the
mouth of the Bolan pass, and debar their being again filled
with robber tribes, who he knew by experience could not
be again put down without much bloodshed.

In the hope of attaining these objects he remained in
Scinde. But his recent trying journey to Lahore and
back while suffering under a painful wearing bodily ail-
ment, his great mortification of spirit, his extraordinary
exertions during the cholera, and his grief for domestic
losses, nearly deprived him of life. It was not until the
end of autumn that his strength returned. Fortunately
his administration now worked easily and happily, and
with exception of a not very fatal visitation of cholera at
Sukkur, the country was remarkably free from disease.
Crime was very much diminished, and the comparatively
fewer murders of women, and of homicides in feuds, proved
that the social habits were being improved. The public
works were also well advanced. The great mole at Kurra-
chee had got into such deep water that steamers took in
cargoes alongside it ; and these cargoes were for Sukkur,

y 2

324

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. XIII. an important step in the river commerce, enhanced by the
184$. discovery of the chain of salt creeks mentioned in the
memoir addressed to Sir J. Hobhouse. They run parallel
with the coast to the nearest great mouth of the Indus,
offering a natural canal, intricate indeed, but always full
and unaffected by the inundations, or the monsoons.

As this gave direct water communication with the
Indus and made Kurrachee the permanent port of that
great artery of commerce, the general immediately appro-
priated the only two river steamers at his disposal for the
transport of merchandize by this communication to the
Indus ; thus opening a new commercial road to Central
Asia, the effect of which must, sooner or later, render
Scinde a great and prosperous country. Some slight dif-
ficulties attending the first effort, were thus described.

" The Kurrachee merchants are a little timid, or rather
I believe cunning, and mean to frighten me into low fares ;
but they will not succeed. I have made my calculations
as low as we can afford, and if they don't like my charges,
they may buy steamers for themselves — there is no force
for pigs that won't eat grains. Or they may continue to
send their goods by camels, which cannot reach Shikar-
poore under five weeks, while my steamers get there in
sixteen days. Each camel must be guarded, and may be
robbed notwithstanding. A steamer is safe, and one man
guards the whole cargo, whereas each camel requires two
men — one to lead another to guard — making twenty or
thirty men for every cafila, some of which take three
months for the journey. Yes ! the merchants will come
to my terms : their shyness is subtilty, but Cocker's
arithmetic beats barbarian arts.

" The merchants of Shikarpoore take larger views.
They see that the freight charge must cover the cost of
fuel, and they are all ready. I have refused passages to
my officers, at which they are discontented, but, ' know
thyself/ said the oracle ; and next to that it is good to
know your countrymen. I will give passages to officers in
the war steamers, but not in these merchant steamers ; they
would lord it too much over the merchant and the super-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

325

cargo. When my experiment can go alone, it shall cease CHAP. XIII.

to be a government venture, and I will turn it over to the 1846>

merchants ; who will not then be able, if willing, to return

to the cafilas, for business will have become too brisk, the

demand will cover the cost, and yield a profit to draw

private steamers into the trade — meanwhile the child

must be nursed."

This happy state of affairs was supported by a vast
increase of production. 1846 was the only year since the
conquest in which agriculture had not been distressed by
wars, locusts, pestilence, and anomalous inundations, hence
the price of grain fell one half; and for the first time
since the accession of the Talpoor dynasty Scinde became
a wheat-exporting country instead of an importing one.
Scindian wheat was actually exported in 1846 and 1847,
through Bombay to England, with good profit ; for being
much harder, drier, and heavier than Canadian wheat it
fetched twenty shillings a ton more in the market. Sir
C. Napier offered eleven thousand tons, received as re-
venue, for the use of famishing Ireland, at one-third of
the market price of wheat in England, and Lord Ellen-
borough pointed out to the ministers a cheap mode of
conveying it — the bargain would have been most advan-
tageous, alleviating the misery of the Irish and improving
the Scindian revenue ; but a measure reasonably beneficial
to Ireland, and useful to Scinde, was a cup of double bit-
terness and instantly rejected.

This excess of production exceedingly lowered the
revenue, which was chiefly paid in kind, yet left it
sufficient to defray all civil expenses ; and it would have
paid all the military expenses likewise, if the proposition
to reduce the troops had been acceded to. Revenue was
however with Sir C. Napier always secondary to the wel-
fare of the people ; he rejoiced in the abundance and
would not increase the imposts ; for to raise more money
by taxation than the absolute expenses of administration
and protection required he thought a crime in govern-
ment ; and vigilantly to economize these expenses a sacred
duty ; not however in a pitiful spirit, for he judged it no

325

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. XIII. economy to starve useful institutions. A great vexation
184& to the Bombay libellers however was this abundance,, and
they displayed it with an effrontery of falsehood scarcely
credible ; for while the Scindian population was thus, as it
were gorged with food, they asserted that it was scourged
with famine, the result of Sir C. Napier's ignorance !
And this astounding falsehood was republished in England
and believed !

Unheeding their fury he continued his administrative
labours. His canal system was in fall progress ; and the
chief engineer, Captain Peat, an officer too soon lost to
his country, conducted all the works of his department
with such singular ability, that the general felt he could,
so assisted, open the road to prosperity in a marvellous
manner if supported by the supreme government. With
this feeling he formed great schemes, and made arrange-
ments to send an exploring steamer to Attock, hoping
thus to establish trading communications along the great
river and all its confluents. But official procrastination
baffled all plans, all hopes ; he could not even obtain an
answer to any proposition ; and while fretting under this
injurious restraint he had to break up and disperse the
model army he had organized for the Punjaub war. It
was a good occasion, and he took it, to make an exposition
of the real condition and value of Scinde in the following
general order issued January 1847.

" The army of Scinde is ordered to be broken up, and
the number of troops reduced so as, in future, to form the
ordinary garrison of a frontier province. This, as regards
the interior tranquillity of Scinde might have been done
two years ago. But the character of the Lahore govern-
ment and of its troops made it necessary for the govern-
ment of India to keep an army in Scinde.

The danger apprehended from the Punjaub subsided after
the victories gained on the Sutlej, and the concentration
of a large force on the Indus ceased to be necessary.

To the army of Scinde is due the tranquillity of this
noble province. To the discipline and orderly conduct of
all, and the support which the officers of this army have

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

327

given to me by their just and conciliating conduct CHAP. XIII.
towards the people, England is indebted for the tranquil
possession of a country which the valour of the troops
had conquered.

To the abilities of those officers who have from the first
conducted the civil branches of this government, and to
their unremitting exertions in the administration of
justice, is, more especially to be attributed the successful
administration of the province, that attachment to the
British rule, and that confidence which has been so
strongly evinced by the inhabitants of* Scinde on two
signal occasions, the campaign in the Bhoogtee hills, and
the march of the Scinde force to Bhawulpoor.

But to the glory of freeing an enslaved country by a
necessary conquest, and the consequent tranquillity of an
apparently satisfied people, this army has added an in-
crease of revenue to the Company.

The last financial year showed, that the united ordinary
and extraordinary expenses of the civil government of
Scinde (including the expense of a police of two thousand
four hundred horse and foot) amounted to only fifteen
lacs one thousand seven hundred and fifty-four rupees.
That the revenue, for that year, was forty-one lacs
forty-two thousand nine hundred and twelve rupees,
and consequently, that twenty-five lacs were paid last
year towards defraying the military expense incurred, not
by the conquest of Scinde in 1843, but by the previous
occupation of Scinde, and by the disturbed state of the
Punjaub.

Previous to the conquest, the army of Scinde was an
unmitigated expense to the. East-India Company.

Since the conquest, that expense has been reduced by
the aggregate sum of forty-two lacs thirty-seven thousand
four hundred and thirty-five rupees, which has been
collected in excess of the expenses of civil government
and police force, calculating both from the battle of
Hyderabad to the present day.

Thus, whatever the previous occupation may have pro-
duced, the conquest of Scinde has not cost the East-India

328

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. xiii. Company a single rupee : for had the ameers continued
1846> to rule the land not a soldier could have been with-
drawn from the force which occupied Scinde in 1842 —
on the contrary, strong reinforcements must have been
added to it, divided, as it would have been, between
Kurrachee and Sukkur, with the aggregated forces of the
courts of Hyderabad and Khyrpoor assembled, in a central
position, between the weak wings of the army of occupa-
tion— wings separated by four hundred miles of difficult
country, and incapable of assisting each other, or of
receiving any reinforcements during five months of every
year ! Such a position must have been untenable, or
tenable only in consequence of egregious folly on the
part of an enemy who commanded one hundred thousand
men in a central position.

An army divided as I have stated, would probably have
been cut to pieces, for apparently there could not have
been any retreat !

The prompt military operations ordered by Lord Ellen-
borough in 1843, not only saved the army of Scinde from
the fate which befel that of Cabool, but secured the north-
west frontier of the Indian empire, speaking of Scinde
in a military point of view — while in a commercial one, as
commanding the navigation of the Indus, it is the key
to the Punjaub.

Not a man has been added to the army of occupation in
consequence of the conquest. Scinde was conquered by the
troops which previously occupied Sukkur.

This is a fact which cannot be too often repeated. But
this is not all. The advanced frontier has a right to the
troops that occupied the former retired frontier, extending
from Bhooj to Balmeer. The latter no longer require
garrisons, and consequently the conquest of Scinde has
not entailed the necessity for having additional troops, or
throwing greater duties on the Bombay army — whereas,
but for the conquest, not a soldier could now be with-
drawn, or the Indus would be closed to commerce even
though the Punjaub were opened !

No troops, beyond the police, are now required to pre-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

329

XVIII.

serve the interior tranquillity of Scinde. The increasing CHAP. XIII.
revenues are thrown into the Indian treasury, and the isi6.
military charges belong to India generally, not to Scinde
more than to any other province of the empire.

An immense increase of revenue has taken place in
Bombay in consequence of the conquest of Scinde, which
prevents the smuggling trade in opium, formerly carried See Appendix
on. What may be the amount of this increase I have no
means of knowing ; but it is said to be very great. Com-
merce is already actively commencing between Kurrachee
and Sukkur, ready to branch forth into the Punjaub when
the results following the victories on the Sutlej shall open
up the Five Rivers to the enterprising spirit of British
merchants. Sukkur, ordered by Lord Ellenborough to
be called Victoria on the Indus, has become the depot
for goods passing into Central Asia.

Such, soldiers of the Scinde army, have been the ser-
vices of those regiments which conquered, and of those
which have occupied Scinde since the conquest. During
this period of four years, there has not been a single
political crime, conspiracy, or act of hostility of any kind,
public or private, committed by the people of Scinde
against the government, or against the troops, or against
any individual. Nor am I aware that any body of officers,
any officer/ or any private soldier, has given cause of com-
plaint to the inhabitants. There has been perfect har-
mony between the conquerors and the conquered, if the
term, conquered, can be applied to a people who have
been freed from a degrading and ruinous tyranny, which
sixty years ago was established by traitors over the country
of their murdered sovereign !

This adds more glory to our arms and to the British
name than even the victories which you won on the
fields of Meeanee and of Hyderabad. Courage may win a
battle, but it is something more than courageous when a
victorious army turns a conquered people into friends and
peaceable subjects !

Such, soldiers ! have been the results of your labours,
and your dangers ; and those regiments which return to

330

SIR CHARLES NAPIEr's

CHAP. XIII. their respective presidencies, return with the becoming
1846> pride of men who have well performed their duty, and
gained the approbation of their sovereign and their govern-
ments— the greatest reward that well-disciplined soldiers
can receive !

For myself, I remain at my proper post as governor of
Scinde, and the commander of that division of the Bom-
bay army stationed on the new line of frontier. But it
becomes your general, who best knows what you have
done and what you have suffered, to make known on the
breaking up of the army the things it has achieved for
India — his admiration of its merits and his gratitude for
its assistance. The military spirit which animated the
force that marched last year to Bhawulpoor, was probably
never surpassed : no army was ever more worthy of India,
nor more possessed the confidence of its commander."

This forcible exposition increased the obscene violence
of his enemies, because it displayed the truth they were
so anxious to obscure ; and their mortification was aug-
mented at the time by two public testimonies to his merit
from the duke of Wellington and Lord Ellenborough.
For the first moved the sovereign to confer on him the
rank of lieutenant-general in India — an advancement
hitherto confined to commanders-in-chief. The second
offered the following concise but comprehensive eu-
logium.

" It is unnecessary for me to declare in words my entire
approbation of Sir C. Napier's conduct. I showed what
I thought of it by my acts while I was governor-general,
and I think the services he has performed since I left
India have been even greater than those I endeavoured,
but was unable, adequately to reward. His campaign in
the hills was a military operation even superior to that
which was for ever illustrated by the victories of Meeanee
and Hyderabad ; and he has proved himself to be the
ablest, at least the most successful of all administrators,
if the success of an administration may be tested by the
contentment and confidence it gives the people. His

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

331

services during the late campaign on the Sutlej, when, chap. XIII,
having had no previous instructions to keep his forces j^T
prepared, he moved in a few weeks with fifteen thousand
men and a hundred guns against Mooltan, leaving Scinde
tranquil in his rear, was of itself sufficient to show to all
minds capable of comprehending great measures of war
and policy, not only the perfection of his arrangements
and the popular character of his just and excellent govern-
ment, but the immense value in a military point of view
of the position which his former victories had given to
Scinde. These matters are however so very little under-
stood in this country, even by the few who attend to them
at all, that I fear it may be long before his merits are
justly appreciated; and people here may discover only when
it is too late, that Sir C. Napier has possessed that rare
combination of military and civil talent, both excellent in
their kind, which is the peculiar attribute of a great mind."

Scinde was now internally very prosperous, but it was
still subject to frontier disturbances, and towards the close
of 1846, the miserable Bhoogtees, defeated by the Mur-
rees, rejected by the Keytrians, repulsed by the Mazarees,
and warred against by their former comrades the Jack-
ranees under Deyrah Khan, had finally cultivated the
valley of Deyrah for subsistence, desiring rest : but their
harvest failed and they once more made a foray on Scinde.
The British cavalry posts immediately took the field.
Twenty-five troopers under Lieutenant Moore, accompanied
by some J ackranees, first fell in with them, and the latter
slew several in a jungle, amongst them a noted chief.
The Bhoogtees then came out of the bush, and Moore,
finding their numbers considerable, retired, urged thereto
by the J ackranees, who declared themselves unequal to a
conflict, yet offered if so commanded, to kill their horses
and die sword in hand. There was no need for such
devotion, and all fell back on Meerpoore, a small place,
where a supporting force was assembled under Colonel
Stack. To that point also came Lieutenant Greaves, who
had likewise fallen in with the Bhoogtees, and sent notice
of their foray to Shikarpoorc. Stack had a respectable

332

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. XIII. cavalry force, and some riflemen, sent to him from Shi-
1846> karpoore on Greaves' s report. That officer had however
forgotten to send a like notice to Shahpoor, the garrison
of which could, with timely warning, have moved on Ooch
and so cnt off the robbers' retreat ; this rendered prompt
action essential, bnt Colonel Stack remained fonr hours at
Meerpoore, and finally, made a night march in the desert
with his cavalry only, and without carrying water or food
for man or beast.

At dawn he found the enemy drawn up on a sandy
waste, covering the retreat of the herds they had captured.
There were only eight hundred footmen and not all pro-
vided with matchlocks, but rattling their swords against
their shields with loud shouts they offered battle. Stack
had two hundred and fifty troopers, furnished with car-
bines and pistols of great range; yet he declined action
and returned to Meerpoore, his men and horse fainting
from the double march and want of water. This was
excused on the plea that the enemy had a strong rising
ground with a nullah in front. An after-examination
showed that there was no nullah, and the rise of ground
very slight ; it was then said the mirage common in that
desert had quite deceived the English commander. Islam
Khan subsequently declared that he had resigned all hope
of life at the moment the cavalry retired. He now regained
his rocks in safety and held a funeral feast, where ven-
geance against the Jackranees was solemnly sworn for the
death of the champion killed in the jungle. The failure
on this occasion was certainly in the execution. The
efficiency of the general arrangements was proved by the
robbers being found by so many parties ; and soon after-
wards Lieutenant Younghusband of the police showed
what the result of a fight woiild have been. For hearing
of a minor foray, he with only thirty-four mounted
police pursued a superior force, overtook it after a march
of thirty-five miles in the desert, and in a sharp encounter,
where Aliff Khan the swordsman distinguished himself,
killed ten and carried off seven prisoners, with a chief
named Dora.

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

333

Stack's error was disquieting, because the slightest CHAP. X
success elated those barbarians inordinately, and the 1846.
Bolan tribes might join the Bhoogtees; the Scinde
Moguls and the camel corps were therefore sent to the
frontier ; but meanwhile the Bhoogtees, always in trouble,
had fought with the Murrees again, and losing the battle
were quieter for a time. At Bombay the whole affair
was, as a matter of course, proclaimed to be one of Sir
C. Napier's crimes ; for at this period he could not move,
or utter a word in public without furnishing a topic for
torrents of scurrility ; and always there were abundance
of correspondents to furnish the newspapers with a
thousand easy and infallible correctives for the civil and
military errors and disorganization which those persons
perceived and deplored. Supremely contemptible all this
would have been, if experience had not demonstrated that
some members of the council of Bombay were the secret
instigators and concocters of these calumnies, and that the
Court of Directors was ready to reward the calumniators.
With this stimulus to slander, India was deafened with
statements of his crimes and follies; and one especial
topic was his inhumanity to the ameers' wives. — " He had
torn away their personal ornaments to swell his prize-
money, and still remorselessly persecuted those helpless
females, having recently treated the aged mother of the
excellent Shadad with peculiar barbarity, intercepting her
correspondence with her virtuous son and opening her
letters to add mental anguish to bodily sufferings. — -She
was actually pining from hunger under his government
while her jewelled ornaments were being offered for sale
in Bombay to swell his brutal profits ! " with much more
of a like nature.

This starving lady, had however, in conjunction with
her sisterhood, and notably the widow of Kurreem Ali,
taken advantage of the conqueror's extreme delicacy
towards them, after the battle of Meeanee, to abstract
nearly two millions sterling from the ameer's public
treasury ! And they were at this time, while complaining
of destitution, for the starving story originated with them,

334

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

CHAP. XIII. expending ten thousand pounds upon a tomb for one of
1846. the princes ! She and Kurreem's widow, in concert with
the latter* s confidant, Mirza Kosroo, a Persian slave and a
clever violent man, were engaged in secret machinations
with the young ameers residing in Ali Moorad's court,
and it was in pursuance of some of their schemes that leave
had been asked and obtained to send letters to Shadad.
Secret information led to the arrest of the messenger
App. XVI. on the frontier, when, as foretold, a large sum in coin
and ingots of gold was found artfully concealed in his
baggage. Whether this treasure was designed directly to
aid Shadad's escape, or to pay Buist and his employers for
their advocacy did not appear, because the general, while
barring this improper intercourse with a state prisoner,
returned the gold, and the letters, unopened, to the lady.
' In this manner passed the year 1846, but in 1847 Sir
C. Napier, while treating with disdain the calumnies of
his enemies, felt that he must give a permanent character
to his interior policy before he quitted Scinde, foreseeing
that once placed under the civil government of Bombay
the object would be to overturn and destroy all that he
had effected, were it only to prove that he had effected
nothing. Minor mischief he could not prevent ; but he
resolved that the people at large should not be thrown
back into barbarism, and therefore hastened the action of
his regenerating policy as to the tenure of land. By that
policy he aimed to make the great men landlords, their
retainers tenants, and their serfs independent labourers,
instead of remaining as heretofore military barons, vas-
sals and slaves. He had long meditated on the prin-
ciple, had gradually prepared the people for the change,
and was now determined silently and quietly to complete
it — trusting, and, as it proved, judiciously trusting that the
extreme ignorance of the Court of Directors on all that
really affected the interests of the nations under their
rapacious rule would enable him to effect his object with-
out official interference. Once done, by no evil intermed-
dling of power could it be undone. " And I shall then,"
he said, " stand upon a rock and defy them."

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

335

It has been shown before that all the land of Scinde CHAP. XIII.
was by law and custom vested in the government, which lg46
was entitled to resume any jagheer or crown grant at
pleasure ; but at the great Durbar, held in 1844, jagheers
had been given on life tenancy, subject to a rent, a portion
of the land being retained, in the nature of a fine, to be
let to poor ryots on government account. This system had
been gradually expanded, to accustom the people and the
jagheer dars to changes preparatory to the great one now to
be effected.

Jagheers were of all sizes, from three hundred thousand
acres down to small estates ; but not above a fourth part
of any had been or could be cultivated by the holders, and
the remainders were wastes, only valuable as they gave
importance by their royalties, and an excuse for a greater
warlike following, to be subsisted by oppression and
plunder; but the suppression of military tenures having
taken away that advantage the extent of jagheer no longer
conferred such dangerous greatness. The system of life
tenancy had worked well, and was spreading ; for always
the jagheer dars were free to choose under which tenure
they would hold ; and the principle was now to be extended
in the hope of giving the population, rich and poor, new
views of social organization, by making the great men
territorial nobles and gentlemen instead of turbulent
rapacious waiters on despotism.

With that view they were offered an absolute hereditary
right of property in all the land they had, or could culti-
vate ; but the remainder was to be resumed by government
as a fine, or purchase of the fee-simple ; and the resumed
lands, nearly three-fourths of the whole, were to be let to
ryots and immigrant settlers, at very low rents and with
the advantages of being free from both rent and taxes for
two years. The cultivators and the immigrants of both
races would thus be attached irrevocably to the new order
of things; and the noble Beloochees would be satisfied
with a secure title and enjoyment of all that was really
valuable in their jagheers. Their importance in the state
would be increased by this enjoyment of independence, but

336

SIR CHARLES NAPIER^

. xiii. their clannish power abolished, and their hitherto oppressed
serfs would enjoy freedom and gain good subsistence while
they contributed largely to the revenue by bringing the
waste lands into cultivation. The sirdars came slowly into
the scheme at first, because they could not easily divest
themselves of their suspicions, that no government could
be of good faith, and hence that Sir C. Napier's departure
would destroy their security of title ; but it has since
spread, as such a wise, great and benevolent measure
should spread.

The complete mastery the general had obtained over all
the people of Scinde was thus evinced ; for the new prin-
ciple was established without constraint, without commo-
tion, without remonstrance or discontent; but from his
first assumption of power, his measures were always
advanced to consummation, with the cautious sagacity of
sound legislation. " My motives for this step," he said,
a are that a host of poor ryots, hitherto slaves, not only to
the ameers but to the jagheerdars, will be enfranchised
and enabled to live in comfort if industrious ; and I know
that the nobles can never be good or contented subjects
unless we give them public employment and honour them.
When civilization advances they will, under this system,
find themselves rich, and they will embark in mercantile
pursuits and agricultural improvements, because they will
find their property safe and need not as heretofore make
themselves formidable as military chiefs to retain it. But
had I left them in possession of their enormous jagheers,
and their military tenures, and their royalties, they
would have always been dangerous subjects. We have
now put them down as military chieftains, and we can
keep them down because of their semi-barbarism; but
hereafter we should find it very difficult to deal with their
more civilized sons, if they continued to hold such immense
tracts of land, which advancing civilization will change
from wastes to fruitful possessions. Even under my
system they will become very powerful; but I have
established a counter-check by opening a way to raise
a race of independent farmers attached to the govern-

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

337

ment. This is all I can now do for Scinde and its fine CHAP. XIII.
people." ^

That he conld do no more good was daily becoming
more evident, and his resolution to free himself from the
stupid spiteful enmity of ungrateful masters was fixed;
yet, ere he took that step, he thought it politic to show
himself to the people after the number of troops had
been reduced, and while the false impression that the
ameers would be restored was prevalent. Wherefore as
the body of Nusseer Khan, the chief of the captive Hyder-
abad ameers, who died about this time, had been brought
to Scinde for interment, he resolved to carry the corpse
with him up the river. The Bombay faction had looked
for disturbance on this occasion, thinking there would
be a great public ceremony, but the prudence of the
general baffled that expectation. " I would," he said,
" give the deceased ameer a pompous funeral, but reason
forbids it, and I balk my own desires and reject the
prayers of my son-in-law, McMurdo, who invoked me,
exclaiming, c But, general, a dead enemy!' I did not
want the hint, and I like him the better for having given
it ; but to accede would raise a notion, that the supreme
government had ordered the ceremony as a prelude to the
restoration of the ameers and if bloodshed followed blame
would justly attach to me. Much therefore as I might
wish to honour a fallen enemy, who however had no
honour according to our ideas, I refuse myself the credit
of such a display, because I have no right from personal
vanity, and after all it is but that, to risk the shedding
of blood. Lord Ashley has, unintentionally, by urging
this restoration retarded the tranquillity of Scinde and
caused great loss to private Hindoo families ; but as to
restoring the ameers, as far as I am concerned, he could
do nothing more contributive to my reputation in these
countries. The poor know I devote myself to their in-
terests, and they know the cruel treatment they would
receive from the Talpoor race if they again became
masters. Experience has taught them a lesson, and I
defy anything but English bayonets to replace the ameers !

338

SIR CHARLES NAPIER's

CHAP. xiii. Lord Ashley and myself will appear before a tribunal
1847. where truth alone can be heard, and he will then learn —
I will not say to his cost for I am told he is a good man —
but he will learn that I have acted with honour and
humanity to the ameers and to the people of Scinde ; that
I have seen my way with more knowledge of the country
than he has ; that I have never done an act of injustice,
but have raised the character of the English for truth and
honour where the political agents had sunk it ; and that
he has been from first to last in error about Scinde.

" Well ! time will tell on these matters and I abide
mine, though I do not think any justice will be done to
me while I am alive, and when I am dying I will not say
with that great man Sir J ohn Moore ' I hope my country
will do me justice' for I am so hardened by undeserved
abuse and misrepresentation, that I care not whether
justice is done to me or not. Yet it is discouraging, how-
ever firm the heart may be, to see persons like Lord Ashley,
ignorantly assenting to the running down the character of
a man who has lost two of his family in this trying climate,
and who is risking the lives of the rest, and his own life,
from a determination not to abandon his post while he
can be of use. I am however hardened — not in feeling,
but by principle and reason — against abuse. I have done
nothing but what was right and honourable. I have in no
instance violated religion or honour to obtain success; on
the contrary, I have attained it by a rigid adherence to
both, and I hold those who so foully abuse me in just
contempt."

With these sentiments he continued to work conscien-
tiously, and by the light of his own genius amidst the dark
cloud of falsehood raised to shroud his actions from the
knowledge of his countrymen ; but in July, 1847, a severe
illness, which nearly sent his wife to the grave, hastened
by a few months his resignation of power, and in October
he embarked for England with all the honour that his
troops could offer to show their veneration, and every
good wish that a people grateful for happiness and security
bestowed, could express. Nor was this a transient feeling

ADMINISTRATION OF SCINDE.

339

with the Beloochee and Scindee races ; for this after- CHAP. xill.
proof of its depth and sincerity has been given; one as j^T"
irrefragable as that furnished by the grateful peasants of
Cephalonia, when they cultivated his farm in his absence.
In 1850, when returning from the supreme military
command of India through Scinde — when it was known
that he was at variance with the governor-general and was
abandoning India for ever — the grateful Belooch chiefs
asked leave at Kurrachee to present him with a sword of
great value, not, as they said, because he was their con-
queror, but that he had, after conquest, secured to them
their rights, their dignities and possessions, and made that
conquest a benefit to them and their race.

This is a noble contrast to the feelings which have actu-
ated Lord Dalhousie and the Bombay government; for
with that littleness which forgets the public welfare in the
indulgence of personal malice, they have, since Sir C.
Napier's departure from Scinde destroyed as far as their
power went every great work and institution projected by
him for the benefit of that country.

The camel baggage corps if not entirely put down, has
been so withered by intentional neglect as to be useless.

The completion of the barracks at Hyderabad, perhaps
the most excellently contrived for the soldiers 9 health and
comfort of any in the British dominions, has been peremp-
torily stopped when one wing was finished, the other
advanced ; and all the materials gathered are left to rot
alongside the walls which are perishing from exposure !

The continuation of the great mole at Kurrachee has
been abandoned under positive orders, issued in disregard
of the loud cries of the shipping and mercantile community
for its completion. Those cries have indeed been so loud
and imperative, that the present able and vigorous com-
missioner for Scinde, Mr. Frere, confident in the just
feelings of Lord Falkland to support him, has, it is said,
resolved to resume the work. The petty jealous folly
which stopped it remains however the same, it is Mr. Frere
not Lord Dalhousie who has displayed sense.

The construction of the aqueduct for conveying the
z 2

340

SIR CHARLES NAPIEIi's

CHAP. xill. Mulleear water to the town and vessels lias never been
1847 permitted.

The great canal system for scientifically irrigating Scinde
has been abolished, and the control of the waters, so ab-
solutely essential to the agriculture and revenue of the
country, has been thrown again into the hands of the
ignorant and fraudulent kardars.

To these retrograde acts must be added the breaking up
of the annual mart for horses and other commodities at
Sukkur, and the refusal to sanction the building of a safe
magazine at Bukkur. Commerce with Central Asia was
forwarded and the army supplied with fine animals at a
cheap rate by the first establishment, and the want of the
second exposes Bukkur, Sukkur and Boree hourly to a
terrible explosion. These and many other minor injurious
interferences present a lamentable picture of destructive
folly and ignoble jealousy.

While Sir C. Napier was yet in the land, the last deci-
sive blow was given to that robber system which he had
sworn to extirpate — a blow terrible in its details of blood,
but a crowning measure of mercy for the tranquillity of
Scinde.

Notwithstanding their skirmish with Lieutenant Young-
husband, and their subsequent disastrous fight with the
Murrees, Islam Khan's Bhoogtees, always pressed by
hunger, made another foray on the Scindian frontier.
Moving down the Teyaga ravine, they first assaulted one
of the Kyharee forts, were repulsed, and their further
march tracked by a young officer named Mere wether, who
from Shahpoor followed them with a detachment of the
Moguls and some auxiliary Kyharees. He found them,
about seven hundred in number, thirty-five only being
mounted, arrayed in a deep line near the foot of the hills,
but preparing to cross the desert. They first sought by
a flank movement to gain a jungle on their left, but Mere-
wether galloping across their front cut them off ; yet their
position was still strong, amidst rocks and bushes, if they
had staid quiet. They however, thinking the gallop of the
Moguls was to avoid an action rushed forward firing

ADMINISTRATION OP SCINDE.

341

matchlocks, clashing sword against shield, shouting and CHAP. XIII.
howling in a frightful manner, whereupon the horsemen im?.
wheeled and charged through them. The shock was rude,
but the undaunted Bhoogtees closed again and keeping
shoulder to shoulder still made for the hills, followed by
the Moguls who plied their carbines with a terrible exe-
cution. Having crossed a rivulet the robbers turned and
stood to receive another charge and carbine-fire, and then
without breaking renewed their efforts to retreat, yet
were once more cut off from the hills and finally brought
to bay. Merewether offered quarter, but they bore his
fire until only one hundred and twenty remained, who
sullenly threw down their arms. Two of their mounted
men escaped, all the rest were killed or taken, and eight
chiefs died sword in hand.

Islam and Ahmed Khan, the two principal men, were
not present in this fight, and so avoided the general ruin,
but their stout-hearted tribe was destroyed; for though
only one hundred and twenty Moguls were engaged the
earth was cumbered with six hundred Bhoogtee carcases !
There was here no cruelty to cause this dismal butchery
— all the ferocity was on the side of the sufferers. Long
had Sir C. Napier striven to abate that ferocity and induce
them to settle alongside the Jackranees in Scinde ; he had
personally endeavoured to soften the temper of the cap-
tive chief Dora, had given him land and sent him with
renewed offers of protection and possessions for his tribe ;
and in the fight Merewether had adjured them to accept
of quarter. Hence, while admiration for their constant
intrepid temper is mingled with pity for their destruction,
justice proclaims that their blood was on their own heads !

So ended Sir C. Napier's administration of Scinde !

He had found that land domineered over by a race of
fierce warriors, who hated the English from political and
religious motives, and who were preparing for war, with
a well-grounded distrust of British public faith and honour,
and a contempt for British military prowess — a contempt
which the disaster at Cabool and several recent minor
defeats in Khelat seemed to warrant.

342

SIR CHARLES NAPIER'S

CHAP. XIII, He had found it under the oppressive sway of an oligarchy
1847< of despots, cruel, and horribly vicious in debauchery ;

setting such examples of loathsome depravity, as must
finally have corrupted society to its core and made
regeneration impossible.

He had found the rural subject population crushed
with imposts, shuddering under a ferocious domination,
wasting in number from unnatural mortality and forced
emigration — the towns shrinking in size and devoid of
handicraftsmen. The half-tilled fields were sullenly cul-
tivated by miserable serfs, whose labours only brought
additional misery to themselves ; and more than a fourth
of the fertile land was turned into lairs for wild beasts by
tyrants, who thus defaced and rendered pernicious what
God had created for the subsistence and comfort of man.

He had found society without the protection of law, or
that of natural human feelings ; for slavery was widely
spread, murder, especially of women, rife, blood-feuds
universal, and systematic robbery so established by the
force of circumstances as to leave no other mode of
existence free, and rendering that crime the mark and sign
of heroism. Might was right, and the whole social frame-
work was dissolving in a horrible confusion where the
bloody hand only could thrive.

He had found the Beloochees with sword and shield,
defying and capable of overthrowing armies. — He left them
with spade and mattock submissive to a constable's staff.
He found them turbulent and bloody, masters in a realm
where confusion and injustice prevailed — he left them
mild and obedient subjects in a country where justice
was substituted for their military domination.

He had found Scinde groaning under tyranny, he left
it a contented though subdued province of India, respected
by surrounding nations and tribes, which he had taught
to confide in English honour, and to tremble at English
military prowess as the emanation of a deity. He found
it poor and in slavery, he left it without a slave, relieved
from wholesale robbery and wholesale murder, with an
increasing population, an extended and extending agri-

ADMINISTRATION OF SC1NDE.

343

culture, and abundance of food produced by the willing CHAP. xill.
industry of independent labourers. He left it also with 1847>
an enlarged commerce, a reviving internal traffic, expand-
ing towns, restored handicraftsmen, mitigated taxation,
a great revenue, an economical administration, and a
reformed social system — with an enlarged and improving
public spirit, and a great road opened for future prosperity.
He had in fine, found a divided population, misery and
servitude on the one hand, and on the other a barbarous
domination — crime and cruelty, tears and distress, every-
where prevailing. He left a united regenerated people
rejoicing in a rising civilization the work of his beneficent
genius.

344

SUPPLEMENT.

In the foregoing chapters, the administration of Scinde
has been sketched rather than described ; a full exposition
mnst be sought for in Sir C. Napier's correspondence ; and
should that proof of his qualities for command be ever laid
before the world, it will show how entirely he loved
justice, and how conformable to the spirit of Christianity
was his whole government. It will then be seen that he
deserved well of his country, and of the directors who
treated him so basely : but neither worth nor success
could abate their ungrateful hostility, which continued to
pursue him in England.

It had been the constant usage when conquests were
made in the East, for the Court of Directors to move the
Crown to order a distribution of " booty " prize-money
being so officially termed ; but this was by the Court of
Directors refused to the victorious army of Meeanee,
Appendix IX. which was thus forced to appeal directly to the sovereign.

This appeal was successful, but for some reason not ex-
plained, though not difficult to divine, the Court of
Directors was made trustee for a fair distribution, and
immediately proceeded to make a foul one ; namely, that
Sir C. Napier, " not beiny a commander-in-chief, should,
according to the prevalent usage in India, share only as a
major-general, and have but a sixteenth instead of an

SUPPLEMENT.

345

eighth" This was notified to the Lords of the Treasury
as the Court of Directors' decision !

There was however more to be done. A decision it
was, and as mean and base a one as ever disgraced a
public body, but it was not a final decision. The royal
warrant provided an appeal to the Lords of the Treasury ;
and though the Court of Directors withheld all official
notice of its decision from Sir C. Napier, who was then in
Scinde, thus indirectly seeking to debar him of his right of
appeal by lapse of time, his friends in England, apprized of
what was going on through other channels, were permitted
by the Lords of the Treasury to put in a plea for the absent
general. Then was poured into the public ear, all possible
anonymous scurrility, and resistance to oppression was
represented as a sordid seeking for dishonest gain at the
expense of the soldiers who had fought the battles !
Moreover at the very time the decision, shameless as it
was shown to be, was made by the directors, one of their
body, Sir J. Weir Hogg, prompted a member of the
House of Commons, Mr. Baillie — the prompting being
readily accepted in all its foulness — to assert, in opposition
to a suggestion that the general had not been duly
honoured, that " he had received seventy thousand pounds
as prize-money ! " — a sum exceeding the amount of the
eighth which Sir J. W. Hogg was then endeavouring to
reduce one-half, and also knew well, that far from being
received, neither the greater nor the lesser sum could
be paid for several years ! Neither prompter nor speaker
on this occasion could understand, that to a generous
mind money was not an equivalent for honours withheld
when glorious actions had been performed : that was a
mystery they could not penetrate.

The directors' decision was, on appeal, reversed by the
Lords of the Treasury, and Sir C. Napier's advocate, Mr.
John George Phillimore, dissecting it with a firm and
skilful hand, exposed all its malignant weakness. He
showed, that the denial of rank as commander-in-chief was
advanced in direct contradiction of the governor- general's

346

SUPPLEMENT.

minute conferring that appointment, and in opposition to the
whole stream of his official correspondence — that the direc-
tors had studiously suppressed all facts bearing on the real
question, and had as studiously brought forward irrelevant
matter to obscure the truth — that all former decisions, all
usage, all analogy precedent and rule laid down, whether
by former courts or by royal authority, contradicted the
Directors' assertions, and marked their decision, indelibly,
as a pitiful display of personal hostility, offensive alike to
custom, to law, and to honour ! Yet here, justice again
imperatively calls for the admission, that amongst the
directors were men who did not join and were incapable
of joining in this proceeding, though powerless to prevent
the corporate act.

As a corporation the Court of Directors acted in a base
manner. From the moment Sir C. Napier appeared as
a victorious general under the auspices of Lord Ellen -
borough, he was marked by that court, and through its
influence by the crown ministers, for slights and ill usage,
because his exploits gave lustre to a policy which it had
been factiously decided to decry. In that spirit the park
guns had been silenced, and the thanks of parliament for
his battles withheld for a year, though the noise of both
was readily furnished for intermediate actions scarcely to
be called victories.

Every scurrilous writer, from the pompous libellers
of the Edinburgh and Quarterly Reviews, to the penny-
paid slanderers of the daily journals, were set to assail his
character and depreciate his actions ; and while he was
denied all legal and customary official protection, insub-
ordinate officers were inordinately rewarded for assailing
him in publications violating at once discipline, decency,
and the orders of the court itself — orders issued with
Machiavelian policy, to give an appearance of condemning
what it was secretly encouraging and openly rewarding.
Miserable expedients also were resorted to for abating his
reputation. Lord Ripon forgot to publish his despatches
— ministerial orators omitted his name at public banquets

SUPPLEMENT.

347

when lauding the generals who had gained Indian victo-
ries : and those contemptible arts were continued when he
returned to England. He only of the officers who came
back from the East with any pretensions to celebrity was
uninvited to city feasts, was ungreeted by the offers of
city honours. When tributes of respect, springing from
real public feeling, were paid to him, the London journals,
a few excepted, left them unnoticed; and that this was
the result of an extraordinary sinister influence was proved
by its constancy, aud by the following fact. The town-
council of Portsmouth, in presence of an enthusiastic
assemblage of inhabitants, presented an address to Sir
C. Napier on his landing ; and he was escorted to the
town-hall by all the regular officers of the garrison, and
those of the royal marines. No account of this complimen-
tary proceeding appeared ; and when the mayor of Ports-
mouth sent an authentic report to one of the leading
journals for publication it was refused, though he offered
to pay for it as an advertisement !

The contrivers of those artifices in their eagerness to
obscure a great man's fame, forgot that history and pos-
terity would remain, even though the English public had
been so indifferent as to accept such pitiful impositions
on its judgment. But it did not do so. Unexpected and
imminent danger to India caused the real national feeling
to burst forth with a violence overwhelming all despi-
cable arts ; and those ministers who had lent them-
selves to the Court of Directors' passions and enmity, were
compelled by the nation to present to their sovereign
the slandered, neglected, victorious general, as the man
whom England called for in the hour of danger —
and then the directors, licking the dust with fevered
tongues, besought him to accept honours and confer
safety !

Scornfully forgetful of past injuries, Sir C. Napier put
ministers and directors from his thoughts, and looking
only to the sovereign and the people, returned to India,
there to meet, as he foretold, the same ungrateful male-

348

SUPPLEMENT.

volence when danger should pass away. Forced by insult to
resign his high command a second time, he is again a butt
for injustice, and supercilious neglect ; but for posterity,
for history, he will always be the daring victor of Meeanee
and Hyderabad, the intrepid subduer of the hillmen, the
successful regenerator of Scinde, the firm military reformer
of India — the man on whom the universal English nation
called in the hour of danger to uphold a distant tottering
empire.

THE END.

APPENDIX.

The nature of the ameers' government to which the
Bombay faction gave the character of " patriarchal " is
here shown.

Extract from a Report of the Kurrachee Collector, to the
Judge- Advocate-General on the mode of examining
witnesses in criminal trials under the Ameers.

November, 1844.

The ameers had no regular rules for examination of
witnesses or for administering justice. The most common
practice was to ask the witness, without administering an
oath, what he knew, and in the event of his professing
ignorance, should the judge entertain suspicion of his
truth, he was forthwith put to the torture to make him
tell what the judge considered he ought to know. This
torture was either the hanging him up by the thumbs,
and applying a red-hot ramrod to different parts of his
body ; or by pricking him with a dagger ; or by applying
a naked blade to his throat, with an intimation that his
throat would be severed unless he at once told the truth.
These atrocious modes have been practised, to my know-
ledge, by different hakims or governors of Kurrachee
since I have been in Scinde, and on two occasions with
success !

Extract from a Report of the Hyderabad Collector and
Magistrate.

November, 1844.

Oaths were generally in the ameers' time administered
to parties in civil suits, but there were then no such things

350

APPENDIX II.

as regular criminal trials in Scinde. The usual way was,
if the case was one of murder to leave the respective
tribes to settle the matter by retaliation or otherwise. In
case of robbery or other ordinary crimes, the kardar
ascertained as he could by verbal information, by tracking,
and other modes, who the delinquent was, and when he
had seized him, put him in the stocks and thrashed and
tortured him until he confessed. Any man whom there
was good reason to think able to throw a light on the
case, but who refused or tried to evade giving evidence,
was treated in like manner, till his reluctance was over-
come. There was also the ordeal by fire and that by
water, wherein, if the accused was burned, or unable to
remain below water the regulated time without being
drowned, or if he refused the ordeal altogether, he was
without more ado found guilty.

In the above cases I suppose always the accused to be
a Hindoo or Scindee, or a Beloochee of some tribe whose
chief was powerless; for otherwise he would not have
concealed anything, but have kept the property in defiance
of complainant and kardar, and cut down the first man
sent to apprehend him.

II.

Compressed Extracts from a Report by C. W.Richardson,Esq.
Deputy Collector in Scinde.

July, 1845.

Sugar has been planted and grown in considerable
quantities throughout upper and lower Scinde on the
banks of the Indus for many years, and I am led to
believe the culture of it may be increased to any extent.
The culture was in the ameers' time much diminished,
from the exorbitant taxes on the ground ; but the soil on
both banks is admirably adapted for the sugar-cane. The
richness of the soil from the annual alluvial deposits
obviates the necessity of manure, which in every other
part of India is absolutely requisite and entails besides

APPENDIX II.

351

much labour and expense for carriage and collection. In
Scinde the principal labour is ploughing and clearing the
land of jungle-bush and weeds. In many parts of India
it has been found difficult and even impossible to raise
sugar-canes, from the great quantity of water required
independent of the labour of drawing it from deep wells ;
but near the Indus they can be supplied in abundance and
certainty. Notwithstanding the advantages of rich soil
and abundant water, the inhabitants during the ameers'
sway have taken no interest in the cultivation of sugar ;
and even now with ameliorated taxation they do not take
care or trouble ; hence the cane which ought to be of a
superior kind is generally stunted and small, and the juice
is of an inferior flavour.

A great deal of the cane is sold as an esculent in large
towns and the villages in the vicinity of the cane-farms ;
some portion is however compressed in a rude manner
for goor, but the people are ignorant of any good
process. By the introduction of superior canes from the
Mauritius and other places, and a better cultivation of the
indigenous cane with superior manufacture, the actual
produce of goor might be doubled; meanwhile sugars of
every description are imported, chiefly from Muscat.
In many parts of Bengal sugar-manufactories have been
established with success ; yet nowhere have the facilities
been so great as in Scinde, where soil, climate, abundance
of water, easy irrigation and transport are all combined ;
it needs but. the hand of government to make sugar-
cultivation flourish. The expense of a large sugar-manu-
factory would not be very great, and a handsome return
would soon be realized, and induce private speculators to
commence enterprises which would largely increase the
revenue. The sugar-mills should be established in the
vicinity of the cane, as the latter dries and ferments
rapidly after being cut ; and it would be well to encourage
the ryots to raise the cane, make the goor and bring it
under conditions for sale at the government sugar-manu-
factory. The cost of an iron mill sent from England
would be about three hundred pounds, and the govern-

352

APPENDIX III.

ment outlay of the establishment be about three hundred
and sixty pounds ; but if the government had the
ryots instructed how to produce the best raw material
and then purchased it, the cost of an iron mill would
be spared.

Joined with the institutions for making sugar might be
one for indigo, for which valuable product the soil, from
Sukkur to Kotree, is generally very favourable ; but
below the latter place the dews are so heavy as to be
injurious to the plant. Any quantity of indigo may be
grown in Scinde ; and the alluvial soil on each side of the
Indus, saturated by inundations, should produce indigo of
a quality rally equal to, if not better than that of Bengal ;
and I doubt not would do so ; for in fact Scinde is just
Bengal over again, without its rains, and the rains are the
great enemy of the Bengal planter. In the districts of
Kanote and Mahajanda, ninety or a hundred maunds of
indigo are yearly made, and the quality of the drug is
good, but a rough mode of manufacture greatly depre-
ciates its value.

III.

Extract from one of many Letters addressed by Sir C.
Napier to the supreme Government about the Mullaree
river } which were unanswered.

August, 1845.

As we have now passed over the season for rain and
have not had any at Kurrachee, the tanks are all dry and
the wells very low. The consequence of this is bad water,
and bowel-complaints are attacking the soldiers. I assure
you it would be very desirable for the health of this can-
tonment if we were to have the Mullaree river brought
into camp, the expense, which I forwarded in August
1844, would be only twelve thousand pounds : a small
sum compared to the great advantages of health and
convenience which would result from this work.

The water here is drawn from wells, and is strongly

APPENDIX IV.

353

impregnated with soda and other matters. Sometimes
you dig and come to fresh water at ten, twenty, or thirty
feet ; then go a foot deeper and it is perfectly salt. There
are wells in the cantonments within two hundred feet of^
each other, and in some cases a great deal nearer — one is
salt the other fresh. The earth is full of saltpetre and
soda they say. However the water is deleterious
whatever it be composed of, and you would do a great
favour to Kurrachee if you will order us to begin this
work at once.

(Signed) C. J. Napier.
To Sir Henry Hardinge, &c.

Note. — A medical board was afterwards directed by
government to report on the water at Kurrachee and
declared it to be "pure and good water." Nevertheless it
contained the foreign substances mentioned in the above
letter with the addition of alum : and invariably produced
bowel complaints when first used by new . comers. It
was by all unlearned men considered unwholesome. More-
over this board examined it at a time when rain had just
fallen, and as all the wells were then full the proportion
of deleterious matter was greatly reduced. — W. N.

IV.

Extracts from a Letter to Lord Ellenborough written when
preparing to commence the Campaign against the Hill-
men.

Sukkur, 19th December, 1844. -

I have this day arrived here, the anniversary of the
day on which I left it two years ago ! It reminds me of
all your lordship's kindness to me, and of the danger to
which this empire lias been exposed by your recall ; and
in the words of one of our greatest men, Sir John Moore,
I will say I hope all the mischief that may happen will
not happen. I left Kurrachee the 11th of November, and
have found the country a dead level with, if I may use
the expression, rows of mountains running through it in

2 A

354

APPENDIX IV.

a direction, more or less, north and south. These hills
do not gradually rise so as to form undulating sections ;
they are all strongly defined like walls and full of fossils.
Paragraph A. One day we marched through quantities of petrified wood ;

this we found at Mulleree camp — so marked on Walker's
map. When we passed Pokune the country changed to
hill and valley, and between those two watering-places
the highest part of the country appears to be. Thence it
becomes rocky and the alluvial soil disappears, but we again
come upon it on reaching Chorla. Up to that all is barren.

Between Pokune and Chorla the country is wild in
the extreme ; rocks rolled together apparently by some
grand convulsion of nature. I heard from one guide that
there is a quantity of alum here — he said he had got it
and sold it. I would have halted there a week were it
not that I am so ignorant of geology and mineralogy that
I should have lost time, and Scinde would have gained
nothing, nor science either. There are hot springs among
these hills, and we observed a low range of hillocks ten
to twenty feet high, running parallel to the great range of
the Hala, and formed of stones like cinders. One wise
man of our party pronounced them a " concrete of vege-
table matter," so I suppose they are. However they have
a curious appearance and are quite different from their
neighbours. I carried away some pieces which I keep
against the time I meet a learned man, the breed of which
I am afraid is rather scarce in Scinde, and I have begged
a little philosopher from Sir H. Hardinge, if he has one to
spare, for travelling in Scinde to tell us what treasures we
possess.

From Chorla I passed through Peer Aree where Colonel
Eoberts surprised Shah Mohamed. It was well done,
and I am sorry the colonel did not get the C. B. ; that
march and capture of the Lion's brother were of great
use in settling the country, and a march at that time
of year was no ordinary movement.

At Sehwan I examined the ruins of what is called
Alexander's Tower. I have seen a great deal of Grecian
ruins, and this is decidedly not Grecian. It probably is

APPENDIX IV.

355

the site of the colony left by Alexander, because the
rocky bank makes it probable the Indus has always run
here and occasionally Greek coins are found, but the
ruins are those of a fortress destroyed by Aurengzebe.
From thence to Sukkur the land has much cultivation
though not a hundredth part is cultivated. Still it is
rich and so may all between Kurrachee and Pokune be —
immense plains of rich soil untouched by man ! The
formation makes it difficult to find water, but to me
it is beyond a doubt that water may be found every-
where by sinking wells, and to that I will give my best
attention as soon as I can. My idea is to increase and
improve the wells where they have been already made by
poor people; then, as the advantages are there felt and
agriculture increases round them, and the people grow
richer from growing markets and decreasing robbery,
they will themselves sink new wells distant from those
existing. This seems to me the most rational mode of
proceeding — a slow one, but that is inevitable — one needs
patience in these things, yet the more anxious I am to be
of use, the more difficult I find it to be patient.

I found a set of robbers of the Bin tribe — not Beloochee,
but Scindee Bins — they had remained faithful to the
Kalloras and the ameers persecuted them. They were
driven by the ameers from the Delta to the moun-
tains some years ago, and have from that time lived by
plunder ; but being intruders the Belooch robbers were
hostile to them and were supported by the ameers, the
poor Bins lived a hard life. They petitioned me for land
and protection, and I gave them waste land in the vicinity
of Jurruck. This has been one good done by my tour.
Another is that I found, in despite of my exertions, slavery
existing to a great and cruel extent. This was made
known by the slaves coming to me when they found I
mixed with the poor people and had an interpreter, for
they crowded round my tent everywhere. I instantly
seized ten or twelve slave-masters, men of rank and
influence, and for three weeks I have marched them as
prisoners through the country. * * * I am

2 a 2

356

APPENDIX IV.

extremely displeased at this slavery still existing, and I
believe it to be only in Captain Preedy's collectorate, and
in the close neighbourhood of the mountains, where
obedience to the law only establishes itself step by step
and cannot be enforced at once as in the flat lands — it
is a great point for robbers to have their retreat secure in
their war against the law. However my harsh treatment
of the slaveholders has struck a terror that I hope
will really destroy slavery.

Wullee Chandia has behaved with perfect fidelity. He
captured Nowbut Khan, a robber chief who has defied
me for a year, plundering and murdering without remorse.
On his plundering a caravan of seventy-five camels and
killing the camel-men I offered 1,000 rupees for his capture,
and he is now in Fort Bukkur, and with him another
great robber, Sobah Guddee, who also defied me. Fitz-
gerald marched seventy-five miles with the camel corps
and surprised this chief in his mountain hold ; 400 of
his men were out, he and forty were at home. He fought.
His son and two nephews died gallantly in arms with their
backs to a tree. Lieutenant James, deputy- collector,
begged of them to surrender but they refused, saying,
they were Sobah Guddee's son and nephews and would
not lay down their swords and shields. I am sorry they
could not be saved. Their father had less courage ; his
character is that of a cruel unsparing robber, and the
whole country rejoices at his fate; Lieutenant James
says, people turned out in crowds to see him pass
and expressed their satisfaction. He shall be tried by
a military commission. I think the capture of these
men will stop robbery in bands for the future, and
I now hope I may say the right bank of the Indus
is orderly and tolerably secure. There are however
one or two gentlemen with whom I had conversation
as I passed their villages, who are very fit subjects
for capital punishment. One was very active. in pursuing
Nowbut when he plundered the caravan : he recovered
sixty-three of the camels and very generously gave
eighteen to the owners. As I passed they complained

APPENDIX IV.

357

and I sent a policeman to him. He is old, and if ever
villany was depicted in man's face it is so in this chief's
countenance.

I find in many cases here taxation taking one half the
produce, I will reduce it everywhere, and nnder all cir-
cumstances to one-third. It is objected that the revenue
will suffer. It will at first, but there will be a reaction ;
more people will then come and settle in the plains and
there will be more jungle cleared, and increased cultiva-
tion will more than cover the loss to the revenue for two
or three years. The government has plains of good land,
.some twenty miles long by eight and twelve in breadth,
untouched, and by giving great advantages to the ryots so
many will settle as to repay the temporary loss of revenue,
and the additional comfort will diminish the disposition to
robbery. But these wild men must get comfort on easy
terms at first, or they will not change their swords for
ploughshares. I have turned all this much in my mind as
I rode through the country thinking how I could best
serve it. The result is to reduce taxation and rent — they
are really one — to one-third of the produce of land at all
hazards. If I do harm I must be punished by my own
regret, and the Company must place here a better man.
I have the collectors against me, and I do wrong therefore,
if wrong it be, of my own will, no one else can be blamed,
except your lordship for putting me here ; but I am too
thoroughly convinced that my principle is right to have
fear. However I will go slowly and gradually to work.

I am resolved also upon another step — that of making
advances to the poor ryots of a little money, say, as far as
thirty rupees to purchase a pair of bullocks ; and to give
them land rent free for two years on condition of clearing
jungle. I am told they will run away with the money.
This may happen in one or two cases but I wholly dis-
believe it will be general. These Scindees I think an
exceedingly honest people. As to the hill chiefs it is
another thing; robbery is a profession made necessary
with them by bad government, which has left men of a
certain rank no other mode of existence. No officer is

358

APPENDIX IV.

robbed, every kind of property is safer in Scinde than in
Bombay. I am therefore sure that by these little ad-
vances to poor families I shall clear the jungle rapidly and
raise up that class for which England was once so cele-
brated— yeomen. I am also gradually breaking down the
system of jagheers. Whenever a jagheerdar dies, I either
resume the jagheer and divide it amongst zemindars and
ryots, or let it to the son of the jagheerdar for a regular
rent, depriving the jagheer of its royalties — they try hard
to preserve their privileges of life, death, and taxation.

The black mail is a terrible affair; I cannot see how to
deal with it for several years. Our police works admirably.
They fight stanchly, and their inclination to bully has
been taken out of them on one or two occasions rather
severely ; so they no longer give offence to the people as
they did at first.

The system of trying great culprits by military commis-
sions answers well as far as I can judge, and the magistrates
deal out substantial justice in minor cases. I read every
process and sign every sentence myself, and I find my
labour increases : the people like our system and the
number of trials is very great. I fear if they increase I
shall hardly be able to go through them for want of time.
I have now given your lordship a general idea of how we
go on. Perhaps I may add, that with allowance for
Eastern manners, the flocking of the people round my
tent everywhere to make salaam, and the shouting loud
prayers for me as I rode through their villages, were signs
that they are rather content than otherwise, with my
government. Another good sign is my riding with only
the Scinde irregular horse through these wild tribes.
Insult might have been offered, and maintained also, by
these mountain chiefs ; for I could not have entered their
mountain defiles with a slender escort of cavalry far from
any support. I felt however confident in the disposition
of the people or I should not have clone so.

I have just heard the Delhi Gazette states that Scinde
is positively to be given back to the ameers. Unless
government puts a stop to these reports they must do

APPENDIX IV.

359

harm ; they keep the Hindoo population in great alarm,
and they will not spend money in any speculation while
these doubts exist. Some of them tell me frankly, " We
have money, but if we show this, (which we would do if
we were certain of the English remaining) and you restore
the ameers we shall be lost men : they would not leave
us a shilling, and we might be tortured to make us confess
to more."

They are going to take Cutch from Scinde ; they are
wrong and I have said so in answer to a very weak paper
sent by the directors to Sir Henry, who sent it to me. I
hope they will do so as far as I am concerned, for Cutch
adds to my labour and I feel no interest about it; but
Colonel Roberts, who has been all his life a personal friend
of the Rao, has I think done much good. The Bombay
government is very sore, Cutch having been taken from
it. However all these external matters have little interest
for me ; I am wholly engrossed by Scinde, and always
fear I do not do half what ought to be done — indeed I
know I do not, yet I strive hard, for the interest I feel for
the country is past description, and daily increases. I
hope I shall never be offered the commander-in-chiefship
of Bombay, especially now, when they seem going on
badly I fear, though they have the advantage of " single-
handed James Outram " " with full powers " as the papers
inform us. I am ignorant of the nature of this social
warfare, but it seems to train on, and will open men's
eyes to the advantage of your lordship's vigour at Maha-
rajapoore ! I suspect they will find that they removed
your lordship when you had " scotched not killed the
snake;" but for that blow at Gwalior, the insurrection
in the southern Mahratta country would probably have
worked well with the northern, and that long line of
country been in arms. Nor are the Mahrattas a despi-
cable enemy — the spirit of Sevagee is still amongst
them.

I have given Sir G. Arthur the 6th N.I., and the 13th
light infantry, not numerous but stanch old soldiers,
worth double the number of young ones. I cannot give

360

APPENDIX V.

him more ; I know not what effect his disturbance may
have on Scinde, and I have lost the 78th. That beautiful
regiment arrived here in high health, and every other part
of Scinde was healthy ; but the first week in November
they began to grow sickly, and here they are bodily in
hospital, about 200 dead, men women and children. I
am sending them away as fast as I can to Hyderabad. As
to any movement against the hill tribes at this moment I
have no men ! This place is just a depot of fever — not a
man has escaped, it is as bad as last year.

•* •* * * ■*

Extracts from Letters to Lord Ellenborough and Sir
H. Hardinge touching the mutiny of the Sepoys and the
sickness of the troops.

Mutiny — I am afraid the mutiny is not over. I met
Hunter to-day for the first time, and he knows the sepoys
well — he has no confidence in the present calm.

I cannot delay telling you that General Simpson and
Hunter are both of opinion that all is not right among the
Bengal troops here. The soldiers of the 4th have of late been
putting very unpleasant questions to their officers about
pensions to their families in case of their (the sepoys')
death. The 64th expect to get those pensions ; the other
regiments want to know why they who have not mutinied
should not have the pensions also. In short there is
reason to believe that great discontent prevails. Some of
the 4th have said that if the 64th go back to India they
mean to follow them. * * *- *

It is with great pleasure I correct a mistake that both
I and my adjutant-general made as to the opinion of
General Hunter regarding the sepoys, He is satisfied
that all is now right. General Simpson is not ; nor is it
the general opinion of the officers as far as I can discover

APPENDIX V.

361

quietly, for it is not a thing to be talked about — one must
find out without asking.

Sickness. — I have this day sent the first division of the
78th to Hyderabad — not a man in the whole regiment
can stand under arms ! and not above 120 of the 64th
N.I. and about 80 of the 4th N.I. Some of the guards
have not been relieved for five weeks ; but fewer native
soldiers have died than of the 78th regiment. I have
also sent the European battery or rather the men to
Larkaana : the guns and horses were left behind ; there
were no men able to take them. This is a crippled force
to do anything with — only 200 men and they have been
ill ! I brought the Scinde horse through the hills with
me as a guard j they and the camel corps are the only men
I have able to use their arms, except 300 volunteers from
the 13th whom I have left at Larkaana. I was afraid to
bring them to this den of fever. Five or six of the 78th
died this day ; and I fear many more will go. In this
state, hostility on the frontier, and crippled by this terrible
fever you will I am sure approve of my acting as cir-
cumstances may demand, I may be obliged to keep the
volunteers. * * •• • / * ' #

As to the 78th, that a severe fever raged through the
cantonment is certain ; the natives suffered as much as the
Europeans. But my own opinion is, and I am backed up
in it by Dr. Robertson of the 13th, a high authority, that
the mortality in the 78th was as much owing to drink as
to fever ! no medical man can say that malaria fever or
remittent fever does not fix upon the brain and the liver
— they all say this — they all say that ardent spirits do
the same, and the received opinion of mankind is so, even
to vulgar songs, " Gin it burns my liver." Now let us
take the soldier. I do not mean the 78th in particular —
it is, say in beautiful order and no drunkenness — but the
Highlander takes his allowance to the full as well as any
other man. Observe then that the government allows
him two drams a day — that is to say, three glasses or
nearly one-third of a quart bottle. One he takes before
breakfast, and one after. And will any one tell me, who

362

APPENDIX V.

have lived my whole life amongst these men that they do
not, aye ! the soberest of them who drinks at all, add at
least one if not three more ? I laugh when I hear their
officers, men of little experience, and who do not pay the
attention I have done all my life to the habits of soldiers
- — I laugh when I hear these young men say their men
don't drink ! ! by which they mean get drunk. I have
said the truth. These sober and well-behaved men pitch
in at least half a bottle of spirits daily. But I want no
exaggeration. I will take the government allowance of
nearly one-third of a bottle of raw spirit, swallowed daily,
and I ask common sense if that is not enough to keep the
liver and brain in a constant state of inflammation, more or
less. And I ask of any medical man to say, if a remittent
fever supervenes, whether the chances of recovery are not
against the patient ?

For those who are more guided by authority than
reason, I heard Sir John Moore say, he thought the
third of a bottle of wine too much for a young man to
drink regularly every day in England. Yet here we give
a boy one-third of a bottle of raw spirits ! My second
authority was Doctor Bailey, the great Bailey, who said to
* * * « if y0U want to recover your stomach and
have health never touch wine or beer" — " Oh ! but I am
used to wine I cannot leave it off so suddenly" — " That
is egregious nonsense, an argument used only by men
who don't like to give up their wine." So much for
authorities ; but common sense must tell every one that
the government allowance is enough to ruin the health of
the young men who come to this hot climate. I again
appeal to medical men. The strength of a young soldier
carries him through the remittent fever and his ration
of raw spirits; he is weak indeed and at death's door,
but nature triumphs. He leaves the hospital, his body
disposed to dysentery ; the hospitals are full, the attend-
ance, from the sickness, scarce, surgeons worked to death.
When weak and low the convalescent gets his dram and
his spirits at once rally. Young and uneducated, he
attributes this to the dram doing him good; after a while

APPENDIX V. 363

the exhilaration goes off, and then languid and feeble he
tries another — he won't get drunk, he knows that is had ;
but he goes close to it, and in a few days the internal
irritation turns to dysentery, or that is upon him from
the first perhaps, and he takes the drains to cure it — in
either case he is gone. Now here is a good youth without
vice, merely using what government allows him, which
he naturally thinks good for him, and his comrades tell
him so j it kills him, and when he dies the result is laid
on climate. Xow climate is strong, yet medicine and
regimen can wrestle with and overthrow it ; but medicine
cannot overthrow climate and the third of a quart bottle of
raw spirits, taken daily preparatory to fever before going
into hospital, and as a restorative after coming out !
I have taken a sober soldier who drinks only his ration j
and how few there are who confine themselves to that !
I am told that some "tee-totallers" have died. I do
not doubt it; there may be hundreds of exceptions —
sobriety does not make a man immortal — but I will still
say that the mortality is divided between drink and
climate, and also want of sufficient care and attendance
which in these heavy attacks cannot be provided —
surgeons and attendants get sick and die like other people.

I have entered largely into this question because
I know its importance. Dr. Robertson of the 13th
(Queen's) told me that in his long Indian service,
wherever it happened to be impossible to get spirits the
hospitals were invariably empty ! He had not a sick man
in Jellalabad until they were relieved and spirits arrived.
When that regiment had leave to volunteer here he said,
" Now you will see, the moment the bounty is paid my
hospital will be filled with cases of fever and dysentery" — and
so it was. Yet in the face of these facts and of medical
opinions, and of common sense, we give rations of spirits
to soldiers ! — and men of sense will assert that it does
no harm ! It may be so, and the government seems to be
of the same opinion. However the natives who do not
drink spirits recover in far greater numbers than the
Europeans do.

364

APPENDIX VI.

[Extract of a Letter to Doctor Kirk.']
My own opinion is immoveable, that among the many
concurring causes of death in cases of malaria, of which
I have seen much in all countries, especially in the Medi-
terranean, drink is one of the most vigorous. I do not
mean drunkenness. I mean swallowing a certain portion
of spirits every day — especially with young soldiers whose
habits before entering the army were those of sobriety.
The young soldier winks his eyes as he swallows his first
dram, and is obliged to make, as they say, " two bites of
a cherry." He then comes to tossing it off with ease —
then he likes it, and then he buys another in addition to
the ration drams which are given him twice a day — to
train him I suppose ! Now, do not run away with the
idea that I am such an ass as to attribute malaria fever to
drink as a cause. I am persuaded that on certain occa-
sions, and in certain circum stances it is a preventive of
malaria fever ; but I am confident a man who never gets
drunk, but regularly imbibes a certain quantity of alcohol
daily, prepares his brain and liver for fever, and an attack
will run him hard — especially if this alcohol is poured into
an empty stomach. What can be worse than the silly
Indian habit of drinking a glass of wine before dinner to
enable the stomach to take more than it has strength to
manage !

VI.

Sir C. Napier's Observations on the 6th section of the new
Articles of War for the Indian Army, re -introducing
corporal punishment.

December 29, 1844.

With regard to the note to Sec. 6 "Criminal Offences,"
which I received subsequently to writing my previous
observations, I think the greatest care should be taken
not to tie up the courts-martial by defined rules when it
can be avoided.

1°. Because, where no criminal jurisdiction exists the

APPENDIX VI.

365

Country must be one lately come under the power of the
East-India Company.

2°. Such a country is probably in a state of barbarism,
like Scinde.

3°. The most decisive, and at times the most severe
measures are necessary to secure the peace and control
the chiefs of such a country.

4°. Such measures cannot be supported by the good
sense of a court-martial (if it be tied down by accurately-
defined crimes and punishments, and by rules formed for
objects which are quite different) by military judge-advo-
cates, who believe they understand law, and yet are
ignorant of law. They thus destroy the real vigour, the
efficiency and spirit of military courts without gaining the
advantage of real legal principles. They produce a non-
descript which is neither military nor legal. The result
is that the military spirit of courts-martial is daily
changing into the captious spirit of quibbling ; and the
use of such quibbles, the only part of law these gen-
tlemen know, may do great harm when a lawyer pleads
before a judge and jury. The latter hear the ingenuity
of the lawyers on both sides, and then have the deep
learning and experience of the judge to clear away the
quibbles and place the case before them in a plain unpre-
judiced manner. With his charge impressed upon their
minds they retire and decide on their verdict. Very
different is the case with a court-martial. A military
judge-advocate, who unhappily for the service fancies
himself versed in law, and two or three of the members,
who believe themselves equally enlightened, lay down
all sorts of rules which they have decided to be law, and
screw and twist every word and sentence in the charge,
which is thus placed on the rack of their ignorance ; and
the most determined culprit often escapes by this quib-
bling spirit. There is no adverse counsel, no learned
judge to clear the law and expound it. It has been laid
down by extreme ignorance, to people who are equally
ignorant and carries the force of law, without being law.

The courts are thus placed in a false position, for these

366

APPENDIX VT.

ignorant men are the judges as well as the jurors ; there
is no real judge to control or instruct them, no refuge
from their self- sufficiency , and the military spirit of
courts-martial is lost. I mean the consciousness amongst
them that they are courts of honour and conscience assem-
bled to arrive at the truth, without regard to the means,
if they be such as honesty warrants and common sense
dictates — the members, satisfied that the prisoner is guilty
or innocent acquitting or condemning accordingly.

The judge-advocate being a soldier of some experience
should regulate the forms of the court according to the
customs of war and the Articles of War, and not according
to writers on military law, who are no authority whatever.
The judge-advocate, not having a vote, has no other
responsibility and can give his whole time to correct the
court if it acts against the Articles of War, or the rules of
the service. He probably knows no more of them than
the senior members ; but as he is taken off other duty he
is supposed to be more ready, and to have the details more
at hand. But if he forgets that he is a soldier and fancies
himself a lawyer all becomes illegal quibbling, produced
by the legal castle the gentleman has built in the air, and
for which he finds inhabitants amongst the weak-headed
portion of the members.

Now if the new articles define too much the jurisdiction
of courts-martial, where no criminal jurisdiction exists ; it
is my opinion that great confusion quibbling and illegal
proceedings will take place. We have no learned judge
to charge, and our courts are not juries in any point of
view. But if the new Articles of War will merely say, that
where no criminal judicature exists, courts-martial are to
take cognizance of all criminal offences, we shall have
courts which will judge as honest enlightened men of
education always judge when untrammelled — that is to say
they, together with the approving authorities, will do sub-
stantial justice, which is all that a newly-acquired territory
can want till its habits demand, and its revenues can pay
for a regular code of laws with proper officers. Then the
military rule ceases. * * * * *

APPENDIX VI.

367

The way in which the judge-advocates at head-quarters
go on is in my humble opinion subversive of our code ;
and is making courts-martial absolutely dangerous to a
general officer. It is no longer a question whether a man
is guilty or innocent ; but whether he can get out of a
scrape by quibbles. At Newcastle-upon-Tyne I brought
a soldier to trial on the occasion of the regiment
attacking the new police. The case was a gross one.
The captain of the man's company sat by the prisoner with
a very clever attorney, who so bullied the court^that, if
I recollect aright, the man was acquitted. Here every
European soldier demands " a day for his defence " and
produces a very fine written defence ; some of these are
very clever, but -very mischievous from their^ pert^and
saucy tone to the prosecutor, and their legal quibbles —
these are well paid for of course. Now all this is exceed-
ingly bad I think.

By our judge-advocates-general not being in their
proper places they are ruining discipline. D'Aguilar's
book was good as a help ; it sticks to the Articles of War ;
but all the others, which bring their miserable modicum of
law into play, and God knows it is bad law, do a world of
harm. We soldiers are not lawyers, we never can be
lawyers ; but we may be, and are — and we are daily
getting worse — great quibblers, and in time we shall
not be able to convict a criminal. The other day there
was a doctor, a known drunkard, tried. Several officers
proved he was drunk, one being his senior medical officer,
whose evidence was, " The assistant-surgeon was drunk/'
— "Are not so and so the signs of blood to the head?"
— " Yes." — " Might I not have blood to the head?"—
" Yes ! but you were drunk." The court then asked the
medical witness. " Did you apply any test ! " — "No." An
acquittal followed, and the drunkard is turned into an
hospital in such a climate as this, and the unfortunate
patients see him reeling from bed to bed, and must take
what he prescribes ! ! It is horrible ! Yet not a man
of that court had a doubt of his guilt.

Another doctor here, whom I also tried, got off with

368

APPENDIX VII.

being put a few steps down the list, though he actually

fell down upon Colonel 's daughter who had the

fever, while attempting to feel her pulse ! She died, poor
girl, and no wonder. Those men got off by the spirit of
quibbling; the honour of the medical profession, and,
what I care more for, the safety of the soldiers was sacri-
ficed in one instance, not by this judge-advocate who is
not troubled with the law rage, but by the quibbling
members of the court.

VII.

Compressed Observations on the necessity of restoring Cor-
poral Punishment in the Indian Army.

I have long considered the flogging question as regards
native troops, and my opinion is fixed. I entirely concur
in the governor-generaPs remarks upon the orders of Lord
Combermere, General Barnes, and Lord William Bentinck.
The abolishing flogging was a great mistake and injurious
to the Indian army. Discharge from the service is not
the greatest punishment to a bad sepoy, though it is to a
good one. And it is severe to give that highest punish-
ment— made more terrible and disgraceful by hard labour
in irons along with felons — to a well-drilled sepoy of
previous good character, a man attached to our service,
who has, perhaps only in a single instance, broken the
rules of discipline ; a man who, born under the fiery sun
of India, is by nature subject to flashes of passion that
cannot be passed over but do not debase him as a man.
It is unjust and therefore injurious, and even disgraceful
to the military code, which thus says, ' ' I punish you in
the highest degree, and stamp you with infamy for having
a weakness, more or less common to all men/' These
transgressions, chiefly ebullitions of anger, are to my
knowledge often provoked by young officers who fre-
quently command regiments, and by others not in com-
mand. These gentlemen at times fancy, because they
" passed in the languages," that they are masters of Hin-

APPENDIX VII.

369

dostanee, when they cannot speak a sentence correctly;
and if they could, the chances are a Mahratta or Guzerat
sepoy would not understand them. In some disputes
both grow angry. If the officer commits himself by unjust
abuse, it passes over, unless he brings the man to trial
and thereby exposes himself. If the private is wrong he
is dismissed and worked in chains like a felon. There is
now no other punishment ; and in the field scarcely this ;
so that the power of punishing ceases when it ought to be
most vigorous, and order becomes almost a matter of
personal civility from the sepoy to his commander. Heally
one is astonished how the army preserves any discipline !
It proves that the sepoy loves the service, and how unjust
it is for an outbreak of temper to give a punishment so
terrible to him. Their own expression admirably depicts
this injustice. " If we deserve punishment flog our backs
but do not flog our bellies." Lord William Bentinck was
a man I loved personally, as my old and respected friend
and commander; but he did not see the severity, I will
almost say cruelty to the sepoy of a measure, which he
deemed to be the reverse.

Taking the sepoy's own prayer as the basis of our system,
I would reward him and flog him, according to his de-
serts— his good conduct should benefit his belly, his bad
conduct be laid on his back. An Indian army is always in
the field and you have no other punishment but shooting.
In the campaign against the ameers I availed myself of
provost-marshals to flog. Some of the newspapers called
upon the sepoys to mutiny. I stood the risk. Had I not
done so, and showed the Scindians they were protected on
the spot, instead of feeling safe and being safe they would
have been plundered, and would have assassinated every
man who passed our sentries, and instead of bringing
supplies would have cut off our food : thus to save the
backs of a few marauders hundreds of good soldiers would
have been murdered. And if the campaign had not failed
in consequence, such hatred would have been engendered
that at this moment we should have only the ground we
stand upon. Instead of my riding as I am doing with a

2 b

370

APPENDIX VII.

slender escort, I should be praying for reinforcements;
instead of chiefs arresting robbers at my command, all
would have been in arms against me. All this was avoided
by having at once ordered every pillager to be flogged.
And plenty these were — I dare say not less than sixty
were flogged the first two days. Some religious people
said "it was unholy" forgetting that our Saviour scourged
the money-changers in the Temple. Some attorneys'
clerks in red coats said " it was illegal but I flogged on,
and in less than a week the poor ryots instead of flying,
or coming into camp to entreat protection (which I could
only give by the lash) they met us at the entrances of the
villages and furnished us with provisions. That some
plunder goes on still I know ; so there does in England ;
but the principle of protecting the people from the insults
of armed men has been established; the people know it
and are attached to a government which thus protects
them. Without the use of the lash plunder would have
raged — officers would have made personal efforts to stop
atrocities, and what the great duke calls "the knocking-
down system" would have prevailed, and shooting and
hanging alone could have saved the army.

In the courts-martial here on native soldiers, insolence
to officers is a strong feature ; and the prisoners who in a
moment of anger have been heedless of imprisonment
and dismissal express deep regret when too late; but I
think they would master their tempers had immediate
corporal punishment awaited them. I observe that in
nearly every case the officers and non-commissioned
officers have fairly cautioned the offenders, but the suffer-
ing from dismissal being in some degree remote the angry
sepoy braves it. Formerly he loved a service which
punished him when he deserved it, yet still kept him —
he does not in the same degree love one which discards
him for one fault not in itself dishonourable. In the
former state the army was his home, but that feeling has
been weakened by the second.

I must take another view. The state has to be con-
sidered as well as the culprit. The good soldier does not

APPENDIX VII.

371

enter into the question at all, which is confined to culprits
and the state. The state enlists, arms, drills, pays, and
at an enormous cost places the culprit in presence of the
enemy. The army exists by its discipline — all safety, all
hope of victory depends on discipline. A wild violent
malicious or drunken sepoy breaks through that dis-
cipline. You cannot confine him with hard labour — that
is impossible. Dismiss him ! He will join the enemy and
teach him to shoot your good soldiers. But say there are
five hundred culprits, five hundred well-drilled soldiers to
join the foe! They will not do so. Worse and worse as far as
humanity, justice and policy are concerned ; for they will die
of starvation or be murdered by the enemy, and that, because
they are still faithful to a service which rejected them !

I am convinced corporal punishment must be restored,
whether the sepoys like the measure or not ; and at once, or
the governor-genera? s observation will prove prophetic —
"Belay tends to confirm the general order of 1835 by
usage, and weakens the power as well as the right of
returning to the former system of discipline." If a right
be not exercised, it grows so weak that to exercise it
becomes impossible ; or a tyranny which divests it of pro-
priety and makes justice revolting. I do not agree that
if once a sepoy works in chains with felons, dismissal
should be a necessary consequence. I doubt the necessity.
It is not so with us. Infamy is a matter of volition.
I would say to the sepoys, "The state has bought you
from yourself ; the bargain was voluntary ; it paid a great
price for you and you shall perform your contract — you
shall go again in irons if you do not. The road of repent-
ance and honour is again opened for you." In same cases
dismissal may be necessary, but it should be left to the
commander-in-chief, when recommended by courts-
martial.

With regard to caste it has attained an importance
beyond its due. I would not outrage any man's religious
prejudices ; if he chooses to redden a stone and worship
it, let him do so : but if, seeing I respect his prejudices,
he goes beyond that and says, "Now worship you likewise,"

2 b 2

372 APPENDIX VII.

I am surely a fool to do so ; for he next will say, " I have
drawn a circle round this stone., your house stands inside
my circle and the god has ordered me to pull down your
house, it is a respect due to my religion." And if I obey
another demand will follow. But if instead of submitting
to his absurd demand I at once punished his impertinence,
he would have felt that I was just and not foolish. This
appears to be our way with caste. We are meanly, unbe-
comingly and mischievously nourishing prejudices that Ave
ought not to pay court to, for we have abundant examples
of the natives being ready to break through them if
properly treated — that is to say neither insulting them nor
permitting them to insult us. The 35th lost caste by
their intimacy with the 13th when defending Jellalabad.
They are attacked I understand by their own people.
What is the result ? They glory in their friendship with
the 13th. These natives have good sense. Insult them
and they resist ; act upon just principles and they will go
hand in hand with you to the end of the chapter. I see
great danger from giving undue importance to caste, as
I understand is done in the Bengal army. They pay,
apparently, little attention to caste in the Bombay army.
If a high-caste man in private life touches a low-caste man
he is denied. If this happens in the ranks he is not
defiled. This shows that good sense effects the object
despite of prejudices, which ought not to be considered
insurmountable though not to be interfered with lightly.
The highest caste man, if he commits crimes can bear
being flogged and will do so if administered justly, and
that he sees we are resolved to punish him.

The great danger of our Indian system is this. We
keep Indian princes on their thrones and allow them to
tyrannize under our protection, while we teach the people
not to bear their oppressions ! The Kolapore irregular
horse have just turned traitors ; had this happened at the
moment flogging was restored it would have been attri-
buted to that cause ; and that necessary punishment would
have fallen into disrepute. This may seem a digression ;
but I wish to show that the whole Indian fabric is inti-

APPENDIX VII.

373

mately connected, and that we are in no danger from
introducing wise measures ; but we are so from old
measures, wise and necessary perhaps in their day, but
dangerous now from the growth of the empire, when our
stations are so distant, so isolated, and consequently
weaker against sudden outbreaks by native princes. If
flogging be objected to by the Bombay army, it might be
dangerous to restore it until the Kolapore insurrection is
quelled ; but from all I hear it will not be objected to
by officers, native or European, nor by the sepoys. I had
here an instance of how firmness acts on caste. A 64th
mutineer, a Brahmin, refused to drink the water at
Kurrachee which was carried to him by low-caste men :
he said he would rather die. My answer was he might
choose to die or live, but if he did not work I would flog
him, and he gave no more trouble ; his plain sense told him
that he must submit ; but had I yielded he would have
made other demands. If the independent native princes
are put down, their people justly ruled, and the sepoys
punished as justly as they are paid, our hold of India
will last for ages.

While I thus strongly advocate corporal punishment, I
must be clearly understood to wish its adoption only
under very stringent rules ; such as I find in the new
copy of the Articles of War which appear excellent ; but I
object to the same number of lashes being given to the
sepoy as to our soldiers ; he is a weaker man, more deli-
cate of fibre, and has a softer skin — I think half the
number would have equal effect. How the sepoy bears
solitary confinement I know not, it is not used in the
Bombay army ; but I think a month too much for
Englishmen even in the English climate. When com-
manding the northern district I inquired into this, and
found magistrates, and medical men, civil and military,
thought it too long. The sepoy is likely to bear it better
— he eats opium and sleeps.

The additional responsibility given to regimental com-
manding officers by the new Articles of War makes it more
necessary to have experienced officers in command. At

374

APPENDIX VII.

present lieutenants are frequently in command of regi-
ments, and if this evil be not remedied no rules can
prevent the deterioration of the Indian army; exclusive
of the danger in active service. The native officers and
sepoys have the greatest respect for experienced officers ;
but they cannot respect youngsters, without knowledge or
experience, in the same degree as they do men who have
been their instructors and protectors, men who first made
them soldiers and have led them against the enemy. The
young officers are anxious to learn, but like other trades
they must serve their apprenticeships under master work-
men. Now who is to teach them ? A brother subaltern ?
Preposterous ! As to lieutenant-colonels, they seem never
to be left a moment with their regiments. This is a great
injury to the service, and it is a matter intimately con-
nected with the judicious infliction of corporal punishment.
It becomes more than ever important to have field officers
at the head of regiments and they should not be changed
as the custom is. I do not mean that a lieutenant-
colonel is never to have any other command, but that his
removal should be a rare occurrence. The 64th regiment
at the execution of the mutineers was under a lieutenant !
a very young one ! That fact seems ominous for the
Indian empire ! I speak with fifty years' experience of
soldiers generally, and with two years' experience of an
Indian army constantly in the field; a period sufficient
for a general to learn something of the nature of his
troops, if he is capable of learning anything — if not, a life
spent among them would be unavailing.

There are people in India who think differently, who
believe bile and a knowledge of the native character is
acquired by the same process, and that men with the
largest livers must necessarily be the greatest generals
and diplomatists. Without admitting this doctrine en-
tirely, I maintain that a certain degree of age and
experience is necessary to command a regiment, or that
reverence with which European officers are still held by
the native soldiers will decline- A regiment is a school
and if it has no experienced master the army must decline,

APPENDIX VII,

375

especially when the character of the people as well as the
profession is to be taught — the Indian army's fidelity and
efficiency depends more on its regimental officers than any
army in the world. When a lieutenant commands, unless
he has naturally an extraordinary character, he becomes a
butt for his brother youngsters ; he makes mistakes from
inexperience which become subjects of mirth for the young
men, and of course for the sepoys. All this is injurious
to the respect for the " sahib " character which should be
maintained and cherished with the sepoys. I would have
more captains, or call the present captains divisional
captains, placing them at the head of grand divisions, or
two companies, each company having a brevet captain or
captain-lieutenant, so that experienced men should be at
the head. I would let the divisional captains on parade
be posted in front of the centre of his two companies like
a squadron leader in the cavalry. This would be better
than five companies with captains, and five commanded
by subalterns ; because every sepoy would then have an
experienced divisional captain to look up to ; I would not
allow captains to be on the staff, but form a staff as an
exclusive corps. In this manner having experienced and
respected officers in regiments, I would seek to make
corporal punishment little needed, much feared, and
effectual in this noble army ; for better soldiers or braver
men I never saw — superior in sobriety, equal in courage,
and only inferior in muscular strength to our countrymen.
This appears to me, as far as I am capable of judging, the
true character of the Indian army in the three presiden-
cies, and I have had men of each under my command. I
may be in error ; let abler men judge ; but to me it is as
clear as the sun in the heavens, that unless the East-India
Company keep officers of high rank at the head of their
regiments, and more captains with companies, it will ere
many years pass have cause for regret — native officers will
gain influence and finally take the command. If I am
answered "It is too expensive," I reply "It is more
expensive to lose India." Every part of this magnificent
army is in the highest degree interesting. It is one grand

376

APPENDIX Til.

arch, the keystone of which is pay, and accordingly it is
the best paid army in the world ; and the Company has
a right to hold the soldier to his bargain. Nor does the
sepoy shrink; he glories in the service and nothing bat
unfortunate mistakes on our part will make him swerve
from his fidelity.

Paragraph A. The Bombay government has said that I was " unne-
cessarily alarmed" because I complained that the remit-
tances from the sepoys in Scinde were not duly received
by their families in the presidencies. I differ with the
Bombay government. It was just one of those important
details, which might, if it was not instantly attended to
give a dangerous shake to the fidelity of the army, espe-
cially when mutiny had made its appearance in the Bengal
and Madras troops. It signifies nothing, whether the
error which caused the nonpayment arose in Scinde or
Bombay • with our difference of opinion on that point the
public can have no interest ; the danger was that the sepoy
should feel a want of reliance in the faith of government,
and be uncertain as to the fate of his family. I therefore
took good care that he should not feel this ; and that
the moment that a mistake arose he should see that the
supreme government — the Bombay government, and the
Scinde government — were all at work to correct the evil.
I made a great stir about the matter purposely, that the
sepoy should feel safe ; and I would do the same thing
again, so far from thinking I was unnecessarily alarmed.
It is utterly impossible to be too cautious in such a case —
the second I have had to complain of, since I came to
India, and in both I have had thorough support from Sir
George Arthur, the governor. The first took place before
his arrival ; but when he came he at once took the matter
in hand; and I believe (for I left Poonah), satisfied the
sepoys of the 24th N.I. whom I found in a state of extreme
indignation and very justly so. Thus in the short space
of three years I have tioice seen the sepoys very much
wronged in the most important of all points and this, not
by the supreme government, for the Company is generous in
the extreme to its troops, but from the neglect of individuals.

APPENDIX VIII.

377

All this proves that officers of experience must be with
regiments and companies, and I strongly recommend this
reform when the re-adoption of corporal punishment is
promulgated, as a matter of precaution ; but I repeat that
in the Bombay army the general opinion is that measure
will be popular with all ranks.

On reading the account of the battle of Maharajahpoore
I was struck, by finding that many of our sepoys' rela-
tions came from the enemy to see them the day before the
action. Those men fought us the next day and were
enemies because they were too short for our ranks, in
which I presume they would otherwise have been! I
could not help reverting to Napoleon's plan of voltigeur
battalions for men of under-size.

I do not know whether I shall be thought to have
written sense or nonsense ; but I have done my best to
understand the Indian army ; and if my zeal has drawn
from me a more extended opinion than I was called upon
to give I hope to be forgiven for the honest motive.

VIII.

Memoranda on the Baggage of an Army. Addressed to
Lord Ellenborough.

Hyderabad, 18th May, 1843.

In acknowledging your lordship's letter of the 12th
April, which letter reached me last night, I have to observe
that your lordship refers to suggestions, relating to a
camel corps, contained in some letter I have never received.
With regard to the other observations with which I have
been honoured, and also the report of Sir W. Nott which
I have attentively read, I must agree with that officer as
to the difficulty of making a report beyond the confined
limits of one's immediate experience. I will therefore
without further preamble lay before your lordship the
results of my own experience during the campagn I have
served in India ; for in the Peninsula we used a superior
animal to the camel, that is to say the mule.

378

APPENDIX VIII.

The Camel.

This animal seems to be the favourite beast of burden
in these provinces ; and one more unfitted for military
purposes can scarcely be imagined. His faults are.

1°. He is extremely delicate in his constitution.

2°. He is liable to diseases the treatment of which appears
to be but little understood ; for if the camel grows ill from
fatigue or any other cause, the cessation of that cause
seems to have no effect in producing a recovery. The
horse or the mule when exhausted by fatigue is quickly
recovered by rest. Not so the camel, he grows daily
weaker and weaker, he expresses his sufferings by the
most piteous groans and in a short time dies in spite of
every care.

3°. He requires an immense time to feed, and in
military movements it is frequently impossible to give
him this time, and always difficult in an enemy's country ;
for it is immediately after a march when everybody is
fatigued that the camel requires his nourishment and the
camel-driver feels least disposed to attend to his wants.

4°. The least wet completely impedes his march in
clayey ground ; his soft foot slips in moisture ; his long
unwieldy hind legs split widely asunder, and the weight
on his back prevents his recovering his position, both
his hip joints are dislocated in an instant, the great force
of his muscles prevents the possibility of setting the
dislocated joints and the animal is lost. The smallest
ditch after a shower of rain is sufficient to stop the
baggage of an army for many hours. The baggage arrives
late, and daylight is nearly gone before the animal can be
turned out to graze. If his grazing-ground be at a con-
siderable distance, and an enemy in the neighbourhood,
it is impossible to send him to it, and he goes four-and-
twenty, perhaps six-and- thirty hours without food, except
such as may be carried with the troops, which enormously
increases the number of animals and the difficulty of
making military movements.

5°. In mountainous and in rocky ground the camel
appears to me unfit to carry burdens ; I have remarked, on

APPENDIX VIII.

379

all occasions, when ascending a hill he is frequently
obliged to stop for want of breath, and unless rest is thus
given him he cannot pass mountains without being dis-
tressed in an extraordinary degree, I discovered this
when watching the progress of the camel battery over
steep sand-hills. They did not exhibit the same evidence
of suffering that a horse does. There was no panting, no
apparent want of breath, but the animals suddenly became
powerless and apparently unable to move. After a few
moments^ rest they recovered, and again put forth their
strength. Their soft feet are quite uncalculated for rocky
ground and prevent their exertion.

6°. The length of the animal, and the slowness of
his movements, when loaded, make the baggage cover
an enormous space of ground, and demand, when in
presence of an enemy, an immense force to guard it.
Such appear to me to be the natural defects of the
camel as a military beast of burden and they cannot be
remedied.

Ill-treatment of the Camel.

Under ill-usage the camel quickly succumbs, and he
always receives it in some one of the following ways,
generally speaking in all conjoined.

1°. The proper load for a camel is in these countries
from 200 to 300 pounds weight. It is impossible accu-
rately to estimate the load of a camel, but the average
may be taken at 250 lbs. Now this is invariably exceeded.
I have frequently detected 800 and even 900 lbs. weight
upon a camel. The sepoy has no mercy upon these
animals, nor have the Europeans much, and the latter
are even more violent in their treatment of the animal
afterwards : they constantly beat them ferociously and
tear out the cartilages of their noses. Naturally of a
gentle disposition he pines and dies under this mal-
treatment.

2°. He is never sufficiently nourished.

3°. He rarely gets sufficient rest.

4°. His drivers are generally of the lowest and most
brutal description of persons.

380

APPENDIX VIII.

5°. Owing to ignorance or carelessness, Lis load is ill
put on, and few things destroy the power of the camels
sooner than an ill-balanced load, for the length of his
leg becomes a powerful lever to distress him when the
load is on one side.

Such are the evils, natural and artificial under which
those unhappy animals labour, when pressed into the
military service. Let us now inquire into their few
perfections.

1°. He goes longer without water than the horse or
the mule.

2°. In Scinde, and other countries where the tamarisk
and other shrubs of which he is fond abound, he is
easily fed and it is not necessary to carry forage, as is
always necessary for the horse and frequently for the
mule.

3°. In the sandy desert for which the conformation
of his feet seems peculiarly fitted, he is perhaps more
valuable than the horse or the mule ; he does not suffer
much from extreme heat, and if fairly loaded, not hurried,
and well fed, he is capable of making long marches with-
out suffering. For example, when I marched to Eruaum-
ghur the camels of the camel battery performed their
work well. It was very severe, but I increased their
rations, they were carefully attended to by Captain
Whittie, and more camels were put to each gun than was
allowed by the constitution of the battery. Had I adhered
to the regulations with regard to food and number of
camels to each gun, the batteiy would never have reached
Emaumghur. If this battery had been drawn by horses we
must have carried forage for them, the number of animals
would have been immensely increased, we should not have
had water sufficient for them, and the enterprise would
have been rendered much more difficult, if not altogether
impracticable. Here then the camel was in his element
and did his work well.

Having now stated as far as I have been personally able
to judge, the advantages and disadvantages of the camel
as applicable to military carriage, the next point to be

APPENDIX VIII.

381

considered is, what ordinances are necessary to render his
good qualities as efficient as possible, and render his
natural deficiencies less inconvenient. I am convinced,
and long ago wrote a memoir on this subject, that the
baggage of an army can never be rendered properly move-
able even in Europe or America, still less in India, unless
it is formed into a corps perfectly organized. It was with
great satisfaction therefore that I found your lordship was
disposed to such a project. It applies to every country,
every army and every climate. It is a general principle
by which most difficulties regarding baggage may be
removed, and all of them reduced and made comparatively
trifling. I am not aware of anything which would better
exemplify the advantages which arise from the division of
labour.

The baggage of an army is perfectly susceptible of being
reduced to order ; but for that purpose a base of rigid
organization must be thoroughly established. How can
such an organization be produced among a thousand
camels, uncouth camel-drivers, sepoys, servants, all assem-
bled on a dark morning at three or four o' clock, jostling,
shouting, fighting for places, the baggage-master hoarse
with useless roaring to people who do not mind the least
what he says — and exposed perhaps to the attacks of
insolent camp-followers. How can any order or system
be introduced by him into such a mass of wild confusion,
and introduced too within the space of half an hour
allowed for the baggage to assemble and march ? The
thing is utterly impossible and the consequence is that
the movements of the army are impeded, the duties of the
baggage guard most fatiguing to the troops, and the
baggage itself liable to be cut off, or which is worse driven
in among the troops producing a great risk of general con-
fusion and defeat. The fact is that a general officer's
character when he commands an Indian army is greatly
endangered by the baggage, the great mass of which, and
the immense number of followers, if they are driven upon
the fighting men, is quite sufficient to produce total
defeat.

382

APPENDIX VIII.

The organization required is to form a corps of camels,
horses, mules, bullocks, and donkeys, the division of which
is an arrangement of detail for after-consideration. But
I shall here speak of camels only as being the chief
beast of burden with an Indian army ; and sufficient to
exemplify the principle. The " corps of camels," then,
should have its colonel, majors, captains, lieutenants,
ensigns (for it especially requires standards), non-com-
missioned officers and privates, the latter being also the
camel-drivers. All these should be armed, and I should
say that the proportion would be as much as two to every
camel, of whom, on the line of march, one should lead two
camels, and one form their guard. These minor matters,
however, are details for future arrangement, and must
vary according to the state of the country, its formation
and the description of roads.

The next point to be considered is the arrangement of
the baggage itself. An order should be issued prohibiting
the use of any other than a regulation form of box, of
bed, of table, of chair, and of every article carried by officers
or private soldiers in the field, or indeed at any time ; for
in peace, if an officer wishes to have an inordinate quantity
of baggage let him send it by whatever means would be
open to him were he a private gentleman, but it is not just
that the public service should be hampered by their trum-
pery. The size, the weight, the form, the number of every
article in the officer's or private soldier's possession would
be at once ascertained by the practised eye of the officers
and non-commissioned officers of the camel corps; they
would immediately detect the slightest irregularity, and
on the roadside burn the extraneous article, taking care
to inform the owner at the end of the day's march that a
portion of his baggage had been burned. The halter for the
camel, the string by which he is led, and his saddle should
all be minutely according to regulation, and the last should
be made so as to admit of a man being carried together with
the baggage ; for preparation should be made beforehand
that in case a temporary exertion should be demanded of
the camel on an emergency to carry sick or tired men,

APPENDIX VIII.

383

the increased weight may be placed without deranging the
equilibrium of the baggage.

The advantages of such an organization seem to be as
follows.

At the hour appointed the drilled officers and non-com-
missioned officers conduct their detachments of camels to the
head-quarters of the regiments to which they are respec-
tively attached; there the servants of the officers await
them and are ready to guide the privates who conduct
and guard the camels to their masters' tents, where the
officers deliver their baggage and that of their companies
to the drivers ; the whole being according to regulation
and made to fit in a particular form on the back of the
animal ; each article has its particular and well-known
place and the whole is packed in an instant however dark
the night may be. The soldier camel- drivers then return
to the head-quarters of the regiment, where their officers
await their coming and assemble them by some peculiar
signal of trumpet or drum. From thence they march to
the " rendezvous" where the superior officers arrange
them in that formation which a habit of doing their work
has taught them to be most suitable to the description of
country through which they are marching. The whole is
systematic and methodical, no time is lost; the camels
are not unnecessarily harassed, the loads are all of an
equal weight and that weight suited to the power of the
weakest camel and balanced with precision ; the march is
liable to no interruptions, or difficulties greatly beyond
that which would attend the march of the troops them-
selves ; and the steady pace of the camel would generally
enable the commander to ascertain with precision the
moment of arrival. A small body of cavalry would then be
sufficient guard, for if the baggage were attacked it could
throw itself into squares, the animals kneeling down
with their heads towards the centre ; (a position in which
I ordered them to be placed at Meeanee) and form a living
redoubt of great strength ; for from behind the baggage
a fire would be kept up by the baggage-men, and no
cavalry could reach them with their swords.

384

APPENDIX VIII.

The certainty of the hour at which they would reach
the encamping-ground would prevent the soldiers being
detained in the sun and waiting for their tents; each
company or section of camels would at once proceed to
the several departments and regiments, and in an instant
they would be unloaded by the camp-followers and at
once marched to their grazing-grounds, instead of being
detained (as they now are) for many hours after arriving
at the encamping-ground. Thus they would have the
whole day to feed, they would be attended to by their
respective officers and drivers, instead of what happens
under the present system, and which I have myself
detected fifty times at least, viz. That the idle driver of
a government camel, afraid of being flogged for losing the
animal, goes into the jungle, ties him fast by the nose to
a small bush (which the poor brute devours in five
minutes) and goes to sleep, leaving the animal to fast till
the guard of cavalry which is scattered all over the jungle
drives them home at night. The commissary, supposing
very naturally that the beast has been feeding all these
hours and having other duties himself, is unable to attend
to the camels and prevent such villanies. Here the " divi-
sion of labour" would act with its wonted force to the
advantage of the camel.

When order, method, responsibility, are fairly introduced
into a body of men, a moral feeling also arises, and instead
of the base, thieving, cowardly crew which now form the
mob called the baggage of an army, the camel corps,
systematic and orderly, would feel proud of their work and
courageously defend it too in case of need; and the general
of an army could with safety detach his baggage to a consi-
derable distance without danger. He would be sure that
it would accompany him in the most rapid movements,
for its commander and his officers, perfectly acquainted
with the relative strength of their animals, would on all
occasions of emergency make a temporary distribution of
the loads, relieving the feeble camel without distressing
the strong one; the sick camel would be also at-
tended to.

APPENDIX VIII.

385

I believe that the loss of camels in the force which I
have commanded in the present campaign is considered
to be exceedingly small. I do not think in the whole five
months that we conld have lost 150 camels altogether;
and when it is considered that they were chiefly composed
of miserable animals, nearly worn out in Affghanistan,
this number I am told may be considered as nothing.
I attribute it in a great measure to my endeavour to
approximate as much as possible to the system I have
proposed, namely, attaching the baggage-master the pro-
vost-marshal and the commissary as much as possible
to the baggage on the line of march, and ordering them
to flog without mercy the camel-drivers and camp-fol-
lowers who were disobedient. I also ordered the baggage-
master to burn all baggage which was over the weight,
yet in spite of this I more than six times found camels
loaded with eight hundred-weight and even upwards ! As
matters now stand, fire is the only thing to deal with
baggage in an Indian army, and the only way to preserve
the camel from overloading — no activity and zeal can
supply the want of regulation, and no regulation can be
applied except by means of a camel corps.

There is another advantage in a camel corps which I
have not yet mentioned. You are always secure of the
efficiency of your carriage, whereas on the campaign in
which I am now engaged this is by no means the case.
The influence of the ameers nearly crippled my operations
about ten days before the battle of Meeanee. The con-
tractor's house and family fell into the hands of Nusseer
Khan at Shikarpoore, and he had made his contract with
us when Shikarpoore was occupied by a British force.
The result was, that on the day when he was to have
furnished 1,000 camels only 170 were forthcoming, and
during the two nights previous to the battle of the 24th of
March about 200 of the hired camel-drivers disappeared :
such accidents as these are severe trials upon the moral
courage of a commander. With regard to bullocks and
other beasts of burden the same principles will apply,

2 c

386

APPENDIX IX.

namely : systematic arrangement to insure justice to the
animals and orderly movement.

I will send a copy of this memoir to Captain Thomas in
order that he may make any remarks which his ability and
experience may prompt, though I am inclined to think
he will agree with me in what I propose, for the subject
has long been a matter of much reflection.

It does not appear to me that the system I propose is
in any way influenced by locality, because it is entirely
based upon the principle of doing justice to the animal,
which saves their lives, and consequently diminishes the
difficulty of supply and the expense produced by an
increased demand, which of course raises the value of the
animal.

The whole subject seems to me to be one of great sim-
plicity, but whether or not I have succeeded in stating my
ideas clearly I cannot say.

(Signed) C. J. Napier.

IX.

Extracts from a Letter to Lord Ripon.

Bhoogtee Hills, 7th February, 1845.

Prize-money, — I enclose to your lordship a direct
application from myself, (to the lords of the Treasury)
though I confess I feel a dislike to do so after having been
deliberately, and I will say, most atrociously accused in the
House of Commons by Lord Howick, of having sacrificed
the lives of thousands of my fellow-creatures, and amongst
the rest many of my brother officers and intimate friends,
from the infamous desire of getting prize-money, which
neither I nor any man in my army could have expected.
Who could have expected such a victory as Meeanee in
its results ? Who expected the unconditional surrender
of Hyderabad? However it is idle to occupy you with
refutations of Lord Howick's accusation.

My interest is so united with that of the troops that we
go together, and her Majesty will decide what is proper.

APPENDIX X.

387

I must do what you think just for the sake of others,
though it has the awkward addition of being personal and
will of course be said so by the public. Having nothing
but what I have saved from my salary, since I came to
India, I am not so hypocritical, or so foolish, as to deny
that I should be very glad to have prize-money; but I
assure you, Lord Ripon, that I have thought very little
about it, being quite satisfied that whatever share I had in
the conquest of Scinde has been amply rewarded by the
grand cross and the approbation of government.

Your lordship says, you conclude the batta issued must
be considered part of the prize-money. I am no judge of
these matters, but I know that the men who fought will
not be at all satisfied to have the batta issued to regiments
which were not in Scinde (78th, 86th and many native
regiments) deducted from their prize-money. The whole
force reckoned that the batta was given to cover their loss
of health from the unexpected and unparalleled epidemic,
in which hardly a man of 16,000 escaped suffering in
health. If the batta be deducted it would I imagine be
only so much of it as was paid to the troops of Meeanee
and Hyderabad. Whether we have a right to prize-money
I put aside as a distinct question, to be decided by her
Majesty. But if we are to have it, the division should
I think be made as it would have been on the field of battle.
Extend the principle of deducting batta given to troops who
neither made the capture, nor preserved it, nor were in
Scinde at all until long after the treasure was in Bombay,
and I do not see where a line is to be drawn. The
batta of the whole Indian army might with equal justice
be deducted ! In a few words. The Company takes the
prize-money to cover its military expenditure.

Hill Campaign. — My last letter informed your lord-
ship that I was preparing to attack the enemy. You
will ere this reaches you have heard that we made a

2 c 2

388

APPENDIX X.

most successful one, and as the details will reach you
officially I will not enter on them here. I am now
following up my attack with very great difficulty. The
robbers will I fear retire within the Mooltan frontier
which I dare not enter. Any military man will tell you
that a warfare amongst arid sandy deserts and barren
mountains, and against the inhabitants of those mountains,
is one of the most difficult that can be made and
requires the greatest caution. To enter the defiles of
these mountains is not possible without making the
means of retreat secure. To get intelligence of the enemy
is all but impossible, and to catch him quite so, if the
Mooltan people admit him.

Believe me, my Lord Bipon, that the Punjaub must be
conquered. I am hostile to the extension of territory
beyond the Sutlej on principle, but I am satisfied that
we must go into the Punjaub. Lord Howick will say I
want to go there for prize-money ; but I do not ; I can
hardly bear the fatigues of war. I do not want to go to
the Punjaub, yet I apply the words of Cato — the Punjaub
is the Indian " Carthago/3 only it must be conquered not
destroyed ! Its present state will, amongst other and
greater evils, force you to keep 10,000 men in Scinde
more than the occupation of Scinde requires. I positively
deny that I love war and want to see wars ; I am most
unjustly accused ; but I do know that unless the Court
of Directors are very careful they will some day find, that
in endeavouring to make a show of peace they will be
doing what unskilful surgeons often do — heal the skin and
leave a sinus full of matter beneath. Look at the state of
the Mahratta country at this moment. How is it possible
to suppose that we can be safe, while native princes are
left on their thrones within our territories. Outside ! Yes !
That is a distinct case. I hope to put many regiments at
Sir Henry's disposal after I finish this war, which I hope
to do within a fortnight ; but who dare prophesy in such
a war as this ?

APPENDIX XI.

389

XI.

Names of the Volunteers from the YSth Regiment who
Scaled the Rocks of Trukkee 8th March, 1845.
Sergeant John Power — Reached the top^Was slightly
wounded.

Corporal Thomas Waters — Did not quite reach the top
— Two medals.

Private John Kenny — Did not quite reach the top —
Three medals.

Private John Acton — Reached the top — Slew three
enemies — Killed — Two medals.

Private Robert Adair — Reached the top — Slew two
enemies — Killed — Two medals.

Private Hugh Dunlap — Reached the top — Slew two
enemies — Killed .

Private Patrick Fallon — Reached the top — Killed —
Two medals.

Private Samuel Lowrie — Reached the top — Slew the
enemy's commander and another — Killed — Two medals.

Private William Lovelace — Reached the top — Killed.

Private Anthony Burke — Reached the top — Slew three
enemies — Two medals.

Private Bartholomew Rohan — Reached the top — Slew
an enemy — Severely wounded — Two medals.

Private John Maloney* — Reached the top — Slew two
enemies — Saved Burke and Rohan — Severely wounded —
Two medals.

Private George Campbell — Reached the top — Slew two
enemies.

Private Philip Fay — Did not quite reach the top—
Two medals.

Private Mark Davis — Did not quite reach the top —
Two medals.

* John Maloney was wounded with his own bayonet after he had
driven it through a Beloochee, for the latter unfixed it, drew it out
of his own body, stabbed Maloney and fell dead !

390

APPENDIX XIII.

Private Charles Hawthorne — Did not quite reach the
top — Two medals.

Sepoy Ramzan Ahier — Did not quite reach the top.

XII.

Extract of a Letter from Sir Roderick Murchison, upon
the Geological Specimens collected in the Cutchee Hills
by Captain Vicary during Sir C. Napier's Campaign.

I return the report of Captain Vicary on the geolo-
gical features of the Beloochistan hills, the reading of
which produced much interest and a good discussion at
the Geological Society. It was curious to ohserve that
among the camel-load of fossil shells sent here by Sir
C. Napier several specimens are perfectly identical with
fossils of the uppermost beds of the chalk in the Pyrenees ;
thus the age of the chief ranges of Beloochistan, and also
I believe of Affghanistan, has been for the first time
determined.

XIII.

Letters to the Governor of Bombay touching Forged and
Stolen Letters published by Dr. Buist.

Kurrachee, 13th August, 1845.

To the Governor of Bombay.
Honourable Sir, — The Bombay Times of the 23rd
July has published a letter to the governor-general of
India in council, and to this has affixed my name. Sir,
I never sent such a letter to the governor-general ; nor
any letter on the same subject to his excellency. I
therefore enclose to your honour in council an affidavit
to that effect, and request that the editor of the Bombay
Times may be prosecuted for the forgery of a state paper,
and for affixing my name to the same ; or that such other
steps may be taken as your honour in council may deem
to be the proper course to punish the delinquent, and to
insure the integrity of the public offices against the

APPENDIX XIII. 391

corrupt influence of the Bombay Times. If the editor
gives up the name of his informant, and that he is in
Schide, I will either try him by a general court-martial
here, or send him a prisoner to Bombay, as the law
officers judge most proper.

(Signed) C. J. Napier.

The Governor of Bombay
in Council.

Extract of a Letter to the Governor -General.

16th November, 1845.

I do not understand what the verbose letter of the
Bombay government means. A state paper is stolen. It
is found in the Bombay Times. Surely the proprietors of"
that paper can be called upon to say where they got it ?
It is like any other description of property, inviolable !
My reason for never sending you the letter in question
was a good one. Captain Powell commanding the Indian
flotilla told me he thought it would give offence to the
navy, for they did not like orders issued to them through
a military orderly-book. I therefore thought it better not
to risk making the seamen discontented, as the great
object is to work well together ; but to my surprise I saw
my letter in the Bombay Times, as having been sent to you !
Whereas it is a draft and is in my own possession now !

It is very clear that now the Bombay Times can get, and
will get, any paper he wants if it leaves my writing-box,
or perhaps the editor can reach it there — I may leave
my key out of my pocket accidentally.

By Mr. Lemessurier's doctrine any secret state paper
may be published with impunity, provided that it really
was authentic and had been written. The mode by which
it was obtained and who obtained it appears to be a
matter of no importance. I am pretty certain that I
know the man who stole the paper, and so does Powell ;
but we have no proofs and the Bombay government will
not make the Bombay Times tell. Its own editor boasts
of its connection with government — -see Mr. Buist's letter —
but I believe he told no secret.

392

APPENDIX XIV.

XIV.

Letter to the Governor -General relative to Lieutenant-
Colonel Outran? s published slanders.

3rd August, 1845.

Right Honourable Sir, — Captain Outram, a brevet
lieutenant-colonel in the service of the Honourable Com-
pany, has published a libel reflecting on my character as
governor of Scinde ; and has added the monstrous accusa-
tion that I caused the destruction of her Majesty's 78th
regiment.

I shall not trouble your excellency in council by the
detail and easy refutation of the mis-statements delibe-
rately published by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram ; but I am
ready to do so. I simply send a copy of that part of his
production which has reached me.

I have not either by word or deed, privately or publicly
given to this officer any cause for hostility.

His libel professes to be an answer to a work published
by my brother Major- General Napier. Now, I in Asia
am assuredly not answerable for what another man
publishes in Europe ! I may consider such a publication
to be good or bad, eloquent and true; or vulgar and false;
but I cannot be responsible for it.

Even if Lieutenant-Colonel Outram were to form the
tribunal before which general officers are to be dragged
like criminals to receive judgment, I could not in the
present circumstances be amenable to his, or any juris-
diction ; for not only was General Napier's book written
at such a distance as to be beyond the reach of consulta-
tion, but it has only been read by me within forty-
eight hours ; and the work altogether contains a mass
of matter on which I was previously but imperfectly
informed.

My whole conduct as regards Lieutenant-Colonel Outram
is explained in the two Blue-books on Scinde. It was
direct — open-^official — and public ! In short I can only
attribute this officer's hostility to me, and the untruths

APPENDIX XIV.

393

which he states, to that malicious blind vindictiveness
which we frequently see arise from disappointed self-suffi-
ciency acting on feeble intellects. I had preserved an
army, and the Blue-books contain the proof, that had
I attended to the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram,
that army would have been annihilated.

Lieutenant-Colonel Outram is responsible for what he
puts his name to. I am responsible for what I put my
name to, and General N apier is responsible for what he
puts his name to ; but none of us are responsible for what
another man writes.

I therefore formally demand through your excellency in
council the protection of her Majesty's government, and
that of the Honourable Court of Directors, against the
libels of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram.

I have served with faith, zeal, and hitherto with unusual
success, and always in strict obedience to the orders of the
supreme government of India. 1 have devoted myself to
the honour and glory of her Majesty's and the Company's
troops ; and more especially to that part forming a part of
the Bombay army with which I am intimately connected,
both as my companions in arms and by private friendship ;
yet a captain in that army, a man whose ignorance was
nearly causing its destruction, has with unprovoked malice
put forth these * * * * * and scurrilities. If I had given
this officer any cause of complaint, redress through the
proper channel was open to him ; as it is to every officer
and soldier in the Queen's and Company's service.

I have up to the present moment received the marked
approbation of her Majesty, the Parliament, the British
Government, the Court of Directors and the supreme
government in India. But it is impossible for any man to
command a military force if a captain in the army, of which
that force forms a portion, is thus openly and foully to
traduce and hold up such general officer to the scorn and
contempt of the troops under his orders.

I do not complain, Honourable Sir, of the effect of
Lieutenant-Colonel Outram' s publication on the troops
generally, because they know me too well for such * * * * *

394

APPENDIX XV.

to do much harm, or produce any other result than
that of contempt for the writer. Yet in particular cases,
it may do mischief ; for what are the poor Highlanders to
think, when in their barracks at Poona they read the
gross * * * * * adduced as having been uttered by me to
the disparagement of their noble regiment? And when
Lieutenant-Colonel Outram tells them in print, that their
general is more ignorant than any subaltern of five years'
standing under his command, and that he recklessly
destroyed their comrades.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed) C. J. Napier.

XV.

Extract from a Letter addressed by Sir C. Napier to the
Governor- General.

7th November, 1845.

We have received our medals, sent to us amongst the
commissariat stores as a bale of goods, without ribands or
any means of hanging them on our breasts! As Lord Ripon
has taken nearly three years to prepare them they might
have been finished ! Those I received from Bengal came
in a more gentleman-like way from the commander-in-
chief, and through the adjutant-general — the orthodox
channel. Lieutenant-Colonel Penefather sent me mine, and
some officers here received theirs through private hands
long before ! Indeed it was from them I first heard of the
arrival of the medals. Those gentlemen were annoyed
and brought their medals to me. However all this is
Bombay style, and don't much signify, or rather does not
signify at all.

Compressed Extracts from a Letter addressed by Sir
C. Napier to the Governor-General, touching the secret
schemes of the Ameers and their women.

9th September, 1845.

I have traced a correspondence between Shere Mohamed
(the Lion) and Shadad at Surat, and the channel is the

APPENDIX XV.

395

zenana of the ameers, which is entirely governed by a
man named Mirza Koosroo, a very violent man. When
going through the zenana in the fortress to give up the
treasure there to the prize agents, Mirza made all sorts of
difficulties — no blame to him — to give time for the abs-
traction of treasure by the departing ladies. He stopped
every moment and began disputing with the agents, and
when an attending havildar said " Come, come," and took
Koosroo by the arm but without violence, the latter seized
Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson by the throat and tried
to choke him. He was made a prisoner, and the Bombay
Times said / flogged him cruelly. I did .not flog him at
all ! I sent for him, and telling him such conduct would
not do set him free again. This admonition was the only
punishment he received ; but a sepoy seeing McPherson
so handled was going to put his bayonet into Mirza and
McPherson saved him. He was left by the ameers
in charge of their intrigues, together with Noor's widow
Kurreem. She gave seven lacs to Nusseer for the war,
and took, it is said, and was said at the time, six lacs
from the fortress. I however refused to let her baggage
be overhauled.

From information, I have now arrested a slave named
Mayboob. In this man's secret box and a bag were found
about 3,000 rupees in gold mohurs, with other articles —
one a rich hilt of lapis lazuli belonging to the ameers.
We also traced his intercourse with Shadad, and found
in his box a letter from Shere Mohamed. Mayoob says
the gold belonged to Mirza Koosroo, and he says it
belongs to the ladies, who, we can prove, have before
through the same channel sent to Shadad 8,000 rupees, or
some such sum. I have given all the money to the ladies.
We found a quantity of the richest Cashmere shawls and
silks, which there is little doubt were abstracted from the
treasury of the ameers " the Toshkhana." These I also
gave back, as the washermen, on whom they were detected
said they were presents from the ameers, and that was
possible though not probable as the amount is so large.
One of these men had given his three daughters to

396

APPENDIX XV.

Nusseer Khan, and the other, a handsome man, is sup-
posed to have been Shadad' s. * * * * *
I thought it right to return the articles as not becoming
in government to doubt the generosity of their highnesses
for such favours, or to go into an examination of such
matters.

The correspondence of Shere Mohamed with the ex-
ameer Shadad is another affair. By all I hear the latter lives
quite familiarly with the officers and is under no restraint
whatever. I have written to Sir Gr. Arthur about this,
because we should have mischief if this villain is allowed
to lay his train. I wish he was removed to Bengal, where
he would be properly watched and out of reach ; and as
Mirza Koosroo was a Persian slave I think it would be
wise to send him to the ameers. The ladies flatly refuse
to leave Scinde and will continue to intrigue, and if I take
the least step to prevent it no terms will be bad enough
to describe me ! Some other information, crossing upon
that which led to what I have discovered, makes me fear
Ali Moorad is not going on right. I do not think he is
doing any actual mischief, but I suspect he is carrying on
some correspondence with people to the west. He is
watched and I shall give him advice, if I find cause, and
plain speaking steadies him for a short time. But he
has got some bad counsellors, who are not friends to the
Feringhees on religious grounds.

I hope it will be practicable to put Shadad in some
fortress in Bengal ; it is not good to keep him in a presi-
dency where all but the governor himself, think and tell
him he is a martyr, and not a felon.

There does not appear the remotest symptom of any
jagheerdars, much less of the people, having been mixed up
with these things ; indeed from first to last it has been
clear they never liked the ameers nor cared whether they
were dethroned or hanged. The Scindees and Hindoos
hated them, and the Beloochees were indifferent. Every
Beloochee looked to the immediate chief of his tribe,
and those chiefs thinking our object was to despoil them
fought : finding this erroneous they are quite satisfied !

APPENDIX XVI.

397

This as far as we strangers can judge seems to be the real
state of the case, and it is the opinion of all the Europeans
in Scinde. If we are wrong the Beloochees must be the
most expert conspirators to deceive both us and the
Hindoos ! The hill campaign was a strong test. The
Punjaub war, if it takes place, will be another and a
stronger one.

XVI.

Letters to the Widow of the Ameer Noor Mohamed.

17th October, 1846.

Lady, — You asked me to let you send four men to the
ex-ameer Shadad, and you said they were to bear letters
and a few clothes which you specified. I had reason to
believe you were also sending a large sum of money to the
ameer. This very much surprised me on three accounts.
First because you did not mention to me that you were
sending money — secondly because you must be well aware
that large sums of money are not allowed to be sent to
state prisoners except through government — thirdly I
was surprised, because, not long ago you and the other
ladies stated to me that you were starving. Now lady, I
had your men stopped, and the police found a large sum of
money in bars of gold and coins of gold and silver in their
possession, which you were sending and which I have
ordered to be safely returned to you, and also your letters
unopened. As your instructions about the money, if such
instructions they contain, may require to be altered, your
fresh letters, or those returned, shall be forwarded for
you to the ameer, but no treasure shall be sent to him
except through, and with the knowledge of, government.

C. Napier, Governor.

28th October, 1846.

Madam, — I understand and approve of your feelings for
your son. I did not object to your sending him money,
but to your sending money clandestinely, for it was con-
cealed in a bag of rice ; and to your telling me you were

398

APPENDIX XVII.

starving, when in addition to the handsome allowance paid
to you by the Honourable the East-India Company, you
had means of sending large sums constantly to the ameer
Shadad ; for you know and I know it is not the first time.
This money shall be sent to your son if the governor-
general pleases, and if you wish I will ask his leave, but I
cannot allow money to be sent in large quantities without
the permission of the governor- general. The ameer is not
kept in poverty, and allow me to say you know this per-
fectly well ; and you also know, and all Hyderabad knows,
how the English general was to have been treated by your
son had the former been so unfortunate as to fall into
your son's hands ! You know well Madam that I have
always treated and shall always treat you and the other
ladies with proper respect and honour, both because you
are women and because your husbands and 'sons are
prisoners. Your sons are fed and protected by govern-
ment, and I regret to be obliged to differ with a lady
when she asserts what I know to be inaccurate. I cannot
allow the government I serve to be accused unjustly ; I
do not know why your days are passed in distress, no one
molests you, you have a handsome allowance from govern-
ment, and you are not prisoners. You are free to go to
your son if you choose. I am afraid that the people about
you cheat you and tell you falsehoods — and therefore I
will have this letter delivered into your own hands. I
have the honour to be with great respect,

Madam,

Your most obedient humble servant,

C. Napier.

XVII.

Major-General Hunter touching the progress of the Horse-
mart at Sukkur, established under his superintendence
by Sir C. Napier.

I think I sent about 300 or 350 horses to Bengal — there
was no doubt but 1,000 horses could have been got yearly,

APPENDIX XVII.

399

after the horse-venders were aware that a sale could be
effected at Sukkur : the demand in common years for the
army never could exceed that number, indeed 600 would
I fancy be enough. For horse-artillery and European
dragoons I paid 450 rupees each horse, and they were
most excellent. For light field-batteries I never gave
above 300 for each horse, and they were the best adapted
for that work of any I ever saw ; far superior to the under-
sized stud-horses, which were much too light for gun-
draught, and never could be put to use under the same
sum that the full-sized horses cost.

The supply would yearly have increased both in number
and quality, I am sure. The first year I got only suffi-
cient to complete Foster's Bombay battery; the second
I completely horsed Smith's battery and the Bundlecund
Legion, and the 7th Bengal cavalry ; and eighty horses
I sent up with the return troops to Hindostan. I am so very
fond of horses, and being well acquainted with the manners
and customs of the northern horse-dealers, I doubt not
that I could have formed a capital horse-market at Sukkur,
and had Lord Ellenborough remained governor-general
there would have been a great trade into Sukkur. He
caused many letters to be written to me on the subject,
but after he went nothing was done from Calcutta ; and
the assistance you gave me was in the third year quite
upset by an order from Colonel Benson, by the authority
of Lord Hardinge, desiring me to purchase no more horses
for the Bengal army. You of course then directed only a
sufficient number for the Bombay troops quartered in
Scinde. To my certain knowledge many of the horses
that went from Sukkur, by merchants, to Bombay, were
purchased at five and six hundred rupees each and sent
back to Sukkur for remounts, but that was before your
time. No reason was ever assigned to me for giving up
Sukkur as a mart, and I am quite at a loss to know what
cause there could have been for so doing. Certainly we
had sufficient proof that the light field-battery, nine-
pounders of the Bundlecund Legion, were respectably horsed
entirely by Sukkur-purchased horses. I think I made over

400

APPENDIX XVIII.

seventy to Alphorts when he arrived, to replace an equal
number I was obliged to cast which he brought from
Hindostan : these went off without training in any way to
harness, - and performed a campaign of fifty-two days
through the Bhoogtee hills, and not one of them died or
was lamed. (" Mowatt's troop it was that made the long
march to the hills with me to Ooch." — Note by Sir Charles
Napier.) On our return to Sukkur, Captain Mowatt (now
colonel) also wrote to me that all the horses he got for his
troop were excellent. You may recollect my writing often
to you of the sad complaints the horse-dealers made at
none of their horses being purchased the last year, when
they in hopes of a sale brought some 1,200 noble nags.
It was a great mistake stopping that market ; no money
was carried out of the country by those northern mer-
chants, as what I paid them for horses they gave back
for English or Indian cloth and other articles.

XVIII.

The following observations by Captain Rathborne chief
collector of Scinde confirmed by the comment of Mr.
Edwardes the civil magistrate at Simla, show one source
of enormous profit to the Company by the conquest of
Scinde ; and the results thus set forth as clearly prove
the incapable baseness which still strives to injure Sir
C. Napier, by misrepresenting that conquest as a barren
and expensive one.

Observations by Captain Rathborne.

Hyderabad, 30th July, 1850.

What Lord Ellenborough says is true about the forty-
two lacs increase on opium-passes. But he omits to take
into account the Company's profits on the opium grown
by itself in Bengal. It must be obvious, that the same
circumstance (viz. the closing up every route) that has
enabled it to levy 275 rupees more per chest on opium in
transit from foreign territories, must have procured it a
proportionate enhancement of price on the opium grown

APPENDIX XVIII.

401

within its own. The price of Patna opium for export to
China must necessarily be very much affected by the price
of the Malwa, which eventually meets it in the same
market — it would be absurd to suppose speculators would
buy opium at monopoly price from the Company in Bengal,
if they could get the Malwa opium at the mere cost of
production and growers' profit through Scinde. The
effect of Scinde being an open route was not felt in its
full extent at the time, because for the last few years
preceding the conquest the state of Scinde had been
adverse to its being used very largely as a route for so
valuable a drug as opium is. Nor were the ameers — cut
off as they were by their institutions from all communi-
cation with the civilized world — aware of the advantage
their country possessed in this respect. But with peace
would have come security, and with increased intercourse
with us, knowledge ; and eventually, there can be no doubt,
we should have had to compel them by force to close
the route, or in other words recur to the old story
of war, or our opium revenue in India would have been
annihilated.

Continuation of Observations by the same.

Hyderabad, 15th August, 1850.

With reference to opium I enclose a report of Sir John
Hobhouse's speech on Mr. Bright's motion, which shows
the increase in the number of chests sold by the Com-
pany of its own opium in the six years subsequent to the
conquest of Scinde, and the actual amount sold. All this
is wholly independent of the opium on which passes have
been granted, and in respect of which Lord Ellenborough
considers Scinde ought to be credited to the extent of
forty-two lacs (£420,000) a year.

When, as in the case of opium, government raises a
revenue in two ways — one by charging an export-duty
of 1,000 rupees (£100) a chest on the opium of every one
else; the other by selling its own opium at public
auction with the privilege of exporting duty free — it must
be quite clear that in each case the amount of tax will be

2 D

402

APPENDIX XVIII.

just the same, though in one it assumes the shape of pass-
duty, and in the other that of monopoly profit to govern-
ment. For were it otherwise, either the Calcutta or the
Malwa tradewould cease. No one would pay 400 rupees duty
on Malwa opium in addition to the government charges
if, duty and charges included, he could get it cheaper in
Calcutta. And on the other hand, no one would pay a
higher rate to the monopolists in Calcutta than — duty and
charges included — he could get opium from Malwa,
because the opium in each case, it must he borne in
mind, is eventually to meet in the same market, that of
China.

This being so, the same cause that has enabled the
government to levy a higher duty by 275 rupees a chest
on Malwa opium, has in reality given that increase per
chest on its own, if there have been no other causes
leading to depress the price of opium while this was
raising it. This will be visible in a clear rise of the price
of opium per chest to that amount at the Calcutta rates ;
but if there have been other depressing causes at work,
and the actual sum paid per chest has fallen, the fall has
not been in the monopoly profits but in the growers'
charges ; and the fall has still been less by that amount
than it otherwise would have been.

Allowing these data to be correct — and be they tested
as they may they will prove so — there is in addition to
the forty- two lacs (£420,000) increase on passes, allowed
per annum by Lord Ellenborough to be credited to Scinde,
the sum of 41,347,150 rupees, being 275 rupees increase
per chest on the 150,426 chests of the Company's own
opium sold within that period. This in English money
will be in round numbers, four millions one hundred and
thirty -four thousand pounds sterling !

The proper person to comprehend the value of Scinde,
taken in this light, would be a Spanish minister of finance,
who has an instance before his eyes in Gibraltar, of the
loss of revenue to a country from an outlet for smuggling
being in adverse possession. In regard to a drug like opium,
the only possible thing that could prevent the revenue

APPENDIX XIX.

403

being utterly ruined by such a circumstance, would be the
ignorance of the barbarian holder of power over our
finances in this particular — an ignorance that in these
days of enlightenment both with Blacks and Whites never
could last long.

I mark another passage wherein Sir J. Hobhouse takes
credit for the amount expended on canals in Scinde !
I must say it does seem a good joke, this perpetually twit-
ting us about the cost of the province, and then taking
credit for the principal item as a proof of the liberality
generally of the Company's government.

Comment on the above Statement by Mr. Edwardes, Civil
Magistrate at Simla.

September 5th, 1851.

I return you with best thanks Captain Rathborne's
statement. I have studied it carefully and fully coincide
in the correctness of his reasoning.

I have also submitted it for the judgment of our com-
missioner of customs, one of the soundest financiers in the
country, and he fully agrees with Captain Rathborne, that
the increase he mentions may fairly be attributed to our
holding possession of Scinde and closing that formerly
important outlet for contraband trade.

XIX.

Notes by Major Beatson, on his Separate Operations, and
March to blockade the Northern Entrance of Trukkee,
1845, written at the time.

On the 20th of February 1845 I joined the camp of his
excellency Sir Charles Napier, governor of Scinde, about
two miles below Goojroo : I had with me a portion of the
Bundlecund Legion, consisting of two nine-pounders, a
squadron of cavalry and the first battalion of the infantry
of the legion.

2 d 2

404

APPENDIX XIX.

On the 21st Sir Charles directed me to take up a position
at Goojroo which the enemy had left on the approach of
his excellency's force : giving me two horse -artillery six-
pounders, instead of my nines, which were considered too
heavy for hill-work.

My position commanded both the pass from the west-
ward, and the valley opening to the north of Goojroo.

On the morning of my arrival I accompanied Captain
Malet and Ali Moorad to the place where the road to
Deyrah goes off to the left ; but we saw nothing of the
enemy.

On the morning of the 23rd I went up the hills
to the north-west of Goojroo, accompanied by Cap-
tains Winter, Barry, and Hayes, with an escort of fifty
sepoys.

In a very difficult watercourse, near the top of the
first range of hills, I found the remains of fires which
must have been recently left, and also of one or two
fires on the face of the hills ; but did not see a man.

On the 24th we went to the top of the hills to the south-
west of Goojroo ; after my return to camp, in the fore-
noon, some of the Belooch horsemen made an attempt to
carry off the camels at graze, but on being pursued, they
made off by some of the numerous paths well known
to them, but which we knew nothing of, and left the
camels as yet I have not lost a single animal.

On the 25th I went up the valley to the north of
Goojroo, over a very rugged pass, and descended into the
sandy bed of a river, the only apparent entrance for
which is through a chasm about thirty feet wide, formed
by perpendicular rocks on each side, of about two hun-
dred feet in height; so regular is this chasm, that it
looked as if a column of infantry had opened from its
centre by subdivisions, closing fifteen paces outwards.

One shot was fired from an inaccessible hill in the
neighbourhood; but we saw no person.

Goojroo was an important post : the enemy had no
choice but to force that or go into Trukkee, and he chose
the latter alternative, which enabled the general to finish

APPENDIX XIX.

405

the war. It was clearly the enemy's desire to avoid
fighting from the first, or he never would have allowed Sir
Charles's force to go without opposition through passes
where he might by rolling down rocks have destroyed the
force without losing a man.

I had at Goojroo a striking instance of the confidence
which such a man as Sir Charles Napier inspires in all
soldiers who serve under him : — the exigencies of the ser-
vice, caused by the crippled state of our camels, rendered it
necessary that my men should be put on half-rations of
unground wheat, and with only enough of even that for a
few days when we took up our position at Goojroo ; but
there was never a murmur from any man of the legion, and
when we were sometimes reduced to our last day's half-
rations the feeling of every soldier was " the general will not
forget us !" And true enough, he did not forget us ; for as
sure as the sun was about to disappear behind the Belooch
hills in the evening, a string of camels with supplies was
seen ascending the pass, thus justifying the confidence of
the soldiers that their general had not forgotten them — and
recollect, these soldiers generally were the high-caste men
of Hindostan — Rajpoots, Brahmins, and Mahomedans —
the two former of whom would die rather than eat any-
thing but grain. But the whole secret is, they had con-
fidence in their general, and where soldiers have that
they will do anything.

On the 2nd March I received orders from Sir Charles
Napier to proceed with a field detachment from Goojroo
to blockade the rear of Trukkee, while his excellency's
force took up a position in front of that place. My
instructions were to march if possible north-west from
Goojroo to Lutt ; but I found the country impracticable See Piar 2.
for guns. I therefore descended the pass into the Deyrah
plain, and skirted the hills till I came to " Deolet Gorai "
and then went due north through a very difficult pass
into the Murrow plain, where I found Ali Moorad with
his force encamped, and where I was joined by the volun-
teers of her Majesty's 13th under Lieutenant John Barry,
and the camel corps under Lieutenant Bruce : — the former

406

APPENDIX XIX.

brought me a despatch from Sir Charles Napier directing
me to act independent of Ali Moorad in blockading the
north of Trukkee. On my arrival I informed the ameer
that I should march immediately my rear-guard came
through the pass ; on hearing which he immediately struck
his tents, and moved off in the direction of Trukkee, which
he did not appear to intend to do till he found that I was
determined to move on whether he did or not. The delay
in getting the rear of my force through the pass gave Ali
Moorad a few hours' start, and enabled him to keep some
miles in front of me all day — the difficulties of the
country frequently obliging me to dismount the Euro-
peans from the camels to drag the guns up passes, which
the horses were found quite unequal to.

An instance of the tact and cunning of the Beloochees
occurred on this march : I was riding at the head of the
column, about dusk in the evening, when three horsemen
with red turbans were passed up from the rear of the
column under an escort of the Bundlecund cavalry, they
having represented themselves as AH Moorad' s horsemen,
come from Sir Charles Napier with orders for me to halt,
as Beejar Khan had given himself up and the war was at
an end. I asked them if they had brought me a letter
from Sir Charles : this did not disconcert them in the
least, and they at once replied that they had been sent on
ahead, to give me the intelligence, and that others were
following with the letter. Their story was so plausibly
told, that I must confess I thought there was truth
in it ; but at the same time I was too old a soldier to
halt without written instructions to do so, after I had
received Sir Charles's positive orders to blockade the rear
of Trukkee as soon as possible : I therefore told the
three horsemen to go on to Ali Moorad, and I would con-
tinue my march till the letter came from Sir Charles.
On joining Ali Moorad next day I mentioned the circum-
stance to him, when he immediately declared they must
have been a party of the enemy who had tried to deceive
me, as none of his men had come up with any message to
him from the rear.

APPENDIX XIX.

407

I must here mention that the only distinguishing mark
between Ah MooracTs men and those of the enemy was
that the former wore red turbans, and the latter white, or
green: — the Beloochees were too knowing not to take
advantage of this ; so the three who professed to bring me
the orders to halt, had donned red turbans for the occa-
sion, thus the disguise was complete as to dress ; and I
must confess the ruse was well planned and skilfully
carried out. Talleyrand could not have kept his counte-
nance better, or told his story more plausibly than the
Beloochees did. The instructions I got from Sir Charles
Napier were, on getting to the north of Trukkee, to
blockade the pass but not to attack the enemy without
orders, and to report to his excellency every day. I did
write and send off my reports every day; but I am
inclined to believe that Ali Moorad played me false and
did not forward my reports to Sir Charles, and I was
obliged to trust to Ali Moorad to do so, as my men were
totally unacquainted with the country. After I had been
several days in rear of Trukkee I sent a European officer
with an escort, and a letter to Sir Charles, and I have
reason to believe that was the first he received since I left
Goojroo. I was subsequently confirmed in the belief that
Ali Moorad had not forwarded my letters.

After we had been some days in rear of Trukkee, I
got impatient at seeing or hearing nothing of the enemy,
and also at receiving no intelligence of what was going on
with Sir Charles's force in front of Trukkee — I therefore
determined to go some distance into Trukkee to recon-
noitre. I told Ali Moorad of my intention, and moved off
to the right into Trukkee at daybreak, leaving the ameer
with his force at the mouth of the pass : to my astonish-
ment on my return I found that Ali Moorad had moved
off with his whole force to the left, out of sight, and left
the principal pass into Trukkee, quite open : this was not
only a strange kind of co-operation, but it also crippled
my subsequent movements by obliging me to leave a
part of my force to guard that pass which Ali Moorad' s
force had occupied. When I went into Trukkee the 8th

408

APPENDIX XIX.

March to look out for some men I had seen on the hills
to the right (supposed to he part of the enemy, which
they turned out to be, and I believe Beejar Khan was
with them) on a triangular table-land, it appeared from
where we were, to us who were unacquainted with that
difficult country, to be inaccessible ; and so it was every-
where, excepting by foot-paths, by which only one man
could ascend at a time — so that a few men at the
top to roll down stones could have kept our army in
check.

In an endeavour to turn this position to the right, in
hopes of finding a way to get up on the other side, one of
my flanking parties consisting of a few of those daring
soldiers, the volunteers of her Majesty's 1 3th, ascended the
apex of the triangle by a goat-path overhanging a tremen-
dous precipice. The Beloochees had a breastwork on the
table-land about twenty paces retired from the top of
this path, behind which were concealed about seventy
men, who overwhelmed the small party of Europeans
as soon as they got to the top ; first giving them a volley
with their matchlocks, and then attacking them sword in
hand, killing several and driving the others down the rock :
the volunteers did all that men could do, and fought most
gallantly ; but seventy against ten ! the former having all
the advantage of position, while the latter were blown by
the steep ascent and unexpected attack, were too great
odds. One European drove his bayonet through the
breast of a Belooch, but white so entangled, about a dozen
swords flashed about his head, and he was of course cut to
pieces : — the parties of volunteers under Lieutenant Barry
and Lieutenant Darby, seeing their comrades engaged,
immediately rushed to their assistance, but a deep chasm
prevented their getting even to the bottom of the ascent ;
all they could do was to open a fire from the opposite
side ; but the distance was too great, the balls all falling
short — their marks were afterwards seen on the rocks
below the enemy's position.

The bravest of the brave could not have done more than
these few men of her Majesty's volunteers — but they were

APPENDIX XIX.

409

overwhelmed in a position where their comrades could
give them no assistance — and even after I collected all
my detached parties we could find no practicable way of
getting at the enemy's position on the triangular table-
land. We afterwards found there was a path on the
opposite side, but our men being unacquainted with the
country we did not discover the path till too late.

Early next morning I got a note from Captain Curling
informing me that Beejar Khan had surrendered. I there-
fore suspended operations. I also got a letter from Colonel
Frushard, mentioning that the enemy had agreed to sur-
render and that the war was at an end.

On rejoining Sir Charles Napier at Shahpoor, his excel-
lency did me the honour to appoint me to the command
of Shikarpoore and of the line of frontier outposts, as far
as the Larkaana river to the south, and Shahpoor to the
northward.

I was subsequently also appointed by Sir Charles
Napier to be president of the military commission for the
trial of all serious criminal cases at Shikarpoore, and on
the frontier. The Calcutta Revieiv, for September 1850,
says, Major Jacob was left in command of the frontier.
This is a mistake — Major Jacob did not succeed to the
command of the frontier till 1846 after the Bundlecund
Legion left it.

Note. — The position on which the Beloochees killed
the men of the volunteers was such as the other
men, who had been through the campaigns of Afi?-
ghanistan, declared they had never seen anything at
all to compare to in that country — "My eye what a
place ! " was their exclamation. It was an almost per-
pendicular rock to be ascended by a footpath, on which
only one man could go up at a time — and supposing
the enemy to let them get up unmolested to the top,
there was not room for more than ten men to form in
front of a breastwork capable of containing a hundred
men, with the rear open and reinforcement constantly
coming up from the base of the triangular table-land —
besides which from the width of the ravine no musketry

410

APPENDIX XIX.

fire was of any use in covering the advance of an attack-
ing party, which would thus have had to ascend by single
men as before described in the face of a strongly-posted
enemy. This the Beloochees were no doubt well aware
of, and seeing that the few men of the volunteers were
separated from the rest of their party by one of those
chasms so common in that country, they allowed them to
ascend the precipice unopposed till they had got them on
the top in front of their breastwork, where they expected
them to be an easy prey, which they were not — for
the Europeans fought like devils, and slew more than
their own number of the Beloochees before they were
overpowered.

The gentlemen of the pipeclay school will probably ask
why was this flanking party so far separated from the
main column, and where were the connecting files ! My
answer is, You were never in Trukkee or you would
not ask : — it is there quite impossible to keep either dis-
tances or communication. I have seen an officer, whom
I knew to be a gallant fellow under the enemy's fire,
lose his head on the ledge of a rock overhanging a pre-
cipice, so that several soldiers were obliged to help him
across. I have seen others caught by the feet between
two rocks, and several men required to extricate them,
with the loss of their shoes : — if this will not explain to
the martinet why distances and communication were not
kept, I have nothing left for it but to recommend him to
"try Trukkee."

In 1846 came the first Punjaub war; and there never
would have been a second had Sir Charles Napier's plan
of operations been carried out : — that it would have been
carried out successfully, it is only necessary to mention
that Sir Charles himself would have taken command of
the force to march to Deyrah Ghazee Khan and thence to
Mooltan. Such a move would have as effectually settled
the Punjaub in 1846 as Scinde was settled by the battles
of Meeanee and Hyderabad.

APPENDIX XX.

411

XX.

The following letters properly belong to the History of
the Conquest of Scinde, but having been obtained since the
publication of that work, are inserted here.

The question as to whether Koostum's cession was, or
was not voluntary, has been decided by the annexed letter
from that ameer, written to his son at the time, but only
produced in 1850 in consequence of an official inquiry
instituted as to Ali Moor ad's conduct : it disposes com-
pletely and peremptorily of all the falsehoods published on
the subject by the ameers and by their English coadjutors
and bewailers.

Meer Roostum Khan to his Son Meer Mahomed Hussain.

Dated 17th Zekaght, 1258,— 20th Dec, A.D. 1842.

[After compliments.] According to the written direc-
tions of the general (Sir C. Napier) I came with Meer
Ali Morad to Dejee Kagote. The meer above mentioned
said to me, " Give me the Puggree and your lands, and
I will arrange matters with the British." By the persuasion
of this Ali Morad Khan, I ceded my lands to him, but
your lands, or your brother's, or those of the sons of Meer
Mobarick Khan, I have not ceded to him : nor have I ceded
the districts north of Roree. An agreement to the effect
that he will not interfere with those lands, I got in the
handwriting of Peer Ally Gohur and sealed by Meer Ali
Morad, a copy of which I send with this letter for you
to read.

Remain in contentment on your lands, for your districts,
those of your brothers, or of the heirs of Meer Mobarick
Khan (according to the agreement I formerly wrote for
you) will remain as was written then, and Meer Ali
Morad cannot interfere in this matter.

Dey Kingree and Badshapore I have given to Peer Ally
Gohur in perpetuity ; it is for you also to agree to it. My

412

APPENDIX XX.

expenses and those of my household are to be defrayed by
Meer Ali Morad.

(True translation.)
(Signed) Jn. Younghusband,

Lieutenant of Scinde Police.

Sukkur, 4th May, 1850.

The letter of which the above is a translation was given
to me by Meer Mahomed Hussain.'* It bears the seal of
Meer Roostum.

(Signed) Jn. Younghusband.

Letter from Sir C. Napier to Sir Jasper Nicholls, Com-
mander-in-Chief, in reply to the tatter's Censures on the
Conduct of the Operations in Scinde.

25th June, 1843.

I have just had the honour to receive your excellency's
note of the 9th of March, in which you observe, " But I
see you made that an arduous struggle, which might have
been an easy success had you detained the 4i\st regiment
and some part of Colonel Wallace's detachment"

This is a serious charge against me. Whether you will
think it justly grounded, or not, when you hear my
defence, I cannot say ; but you will I am sure excuse my
desire to stand higher in your opinion as an officer than
I appear to do.

To begin with the 41st. Versed as your excellency is
in Indian warfare, I need not tell you that a European
regiment cannot march, especially in hot weather, without
"carriage." The 41st had none. They were on the
Indus in boats. I had not and could not obtain sufficient
" carriage" for the force I had with me; much less could
I assist the 41st. The want of carriage obliged me to
leave the 8th native infantry at Roree. The 41st must
have joined me, if they could have joined me at all,
without carriage for sick ; for ammunition ; for water ;
for tents ; for provisions. How could they have joined
me ? Impossible !

* The son of Meer Roostum.

APPENDIX XX.

413

But this was not all, though sufficient. Up to the 15th
the ameers of Hyderabad had loudly declared their perfect
submission to the will of the British government — they
disclaimed all union with the ameers of Kyrepore. The
latter had not an army that my force was not fully equal
to cope with; and the governor-general and the govern-
ment of Bombay had reiterated their positive orders to
me to have the 41st ready to embark at Kurrachee on
the 20th of February. I knew the cause of their anxiety,
and that it was very important the 41st should embark
the 20th. Was it for me in January, when all the ameers
had declared their acceptance of the new treaty, to write
to Sukkur in the face of superior authority and order the
41st to halt? Not to join my force, for that was impos-
sible, but to halt ! I suspect the governor-general and the
government of Bombay would not have been much satis-
fied with my conduct had I done so. The 41st therefore
arrived at Sukkur on the 4th of February and found
orders instantly to proceed on its voyage, and it passed
Hyderabad the 10th February, five days before the
ameers declared war, and when Major Outram, an
accredited agent of mine, was by their own invitation
living in their capital, and assuring me of their earnest
desire for peace — he being the person supposed to know
more of Scinde than other Englishmen, and more of the
ameers individually and personally.

On the day of the action the 41st were at Kurrachee.
I being inland and my letters constantly intercepted could
not know where the 41st was, except that it was some-
where on the Indus, that is someivhere or other on a
range of three hundred miles I I did not hear of its arrival
at Sukkur till it was past my reach had I supposed
it was required, which I did not, how could I suppose so ?
By reference to my journal I find that on the 13th
February, being then at Syndabad, I received no less than
two expresses from Major Outram to say and impress
upon me that there were uno armed men at Hyderabad III "
At that moment however the town was full, and 25,862
men were in position at Meeanee, six miles off ! short

414

APPENDIX XX.

miles, for the battle was seen from the walls. I think
after the above statement your excellency will acquit me
of having had the power to reinforce my army with the
41st regiment ; but this and more shall become public if
any inquiry be necessary.

Now for the second part of your excellency's charge,
viz. that I might have had an easy success, had some part
of Colonel Wallace's detachment been with me.

In the first place the whole brigade under Colonel
Wallace, as far as I recollect, and my memory is
tolerably strong, could not turn out fifteen hundred rank-
and-file : it must therefore have been a large portion to
have made the battle of Meeanee an easy success. How-
ever, say I had five hundred ; assuredly that number
would not have changed the character of the engagement.
It would have brought a larger force of the enemy into
action very possibly, and consequently both their loss and
ours would have been greater in that proportion; but
the action would not have been an " easy success/' No !
nor an easier success. But what excuse had I to weaken
Wallace, who was apparently, at the time we divided, in
more danger than I was ? He was about to seize an
extensive district, and if any resistance were to be made
assuredly there it might have been expected.

Supposing me to have made the military error of
sending a feeble force to execute what was expected to be
a perilous operation, and that I had brought a thousand
men down with me to the south, what would have been
the result? Water was everywhere scarce, and often-
times I had scarcely sufficient for the small force with
me. Had I had the Bengal column also3 or a large
portion of it, I must have marched in two columns, with
the interval of a day between them to let the wells fill
after being emptied by the first column. The result
would have been, that I should have been unable to have
given battle till the 19th of February, before which 10,000
Chandians under Wullee Chandia — 7,000 under Meer
Mohamed Hussain and 10,000 under Shere Mohamed
would have joined the troops at Meeanee ! When the

APPENDIX XX.

415

victory was decided all these were within six or eight
hours of the field of battle — an additional 1,000 on my
side, an additional 27,000 on that of the enemy would
not have rendered my success more " easy."

Your excellency will say that these things were not
known to me at Roree when I first marched south. All
were not, but enough were ; 1°. I knew there was a great
want of water. 2°. I knew I could carry spare provisions
with me if the country refused supplies, but I should not
have had carriage for this if the Bengal column was with
me. The additional baggage would have been nearly as
large as our own baggage, and all the wells would have
been drunk dry. The Bengals had carriage for their
baggage, but not for additional water and spare provisions
independent of wells and of their bazaar.

Suppose I could have conveniently brought down the
Bengal troops, and left the north unguarded. Still men
are not prophets. The ameers of Hyderabad were at
peace with us — I was marching against those of Kyrepore.
The latter had not 10,000 men, I wanted no increase of
numbers to encounter them; nor did any man believe
they intended to fight : nor the ameers of Hyderabad
neither. Even on the 12th of February, Major Outram,
then in Hyderabad, wrote me two letters assuring me the
ameers of Kyrepore and Hyderabad had not a single
soldier. So little did he then even apprehend hostilities.

The Belooch army suddenly assembled, as if by magic !
I saw nothing but disgrace and destruction in an attempt
to retreat, and I at once resolved to attack, confident in
the courage of the soldiers. My confidence was not mis-
placed ; neither will it now I hope, when I trust this letter
will satisfy you that I brought every man into action that
was at my disposal.

(Signed) C. J. Napier.
Lieutenant- General Sir Jasper Nicholls,
Commander-in-Chief.

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Full text of "The history of General Sir Charles Napier's administration of Scinde, and campaign in the Cutchee Hills"

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